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Chapter I . 
INTRODUCTION 
Ch r i s t i a n i t y and Hinduism are two of the world's 
greatest l i v i n g r e l i g i o n s , and i t i s of the utmost import-
ance that they should be compared i n every possible d e t a i l 
so that through such comparisons Christians and Hindus may 
understand better each other's, and t h e i r own, heritage. 
This would by no means be i n s u f f i c i e n t reason f o r under-
taking studies of the sort we are intending to pursue i n 
the f o l l o w i n g pages. But what makes such e f f o r t s especial-
l y desirable, even imperative, i s the fac t not only that 
Christians and Hindus have i n the past made inadequate 
e f f o r t s to understand the best i n each other's t r a d i t i o n , 
but that they have i n f a c t allowed, considerable misunder-
standing to exist i n t h i s area of t h e i r knowledge. I t i s 
not at a l l d i f f i c u l t to f i n d sound reasons f o r t h i s un-
fortunate state of a f f a i r s . Misleading but catchy phrases 
(which have a power of t h e i r own) about "the Hast" and 
"the West" and the various kinds of p o l i t i c a l and social 
s t r a i n s and c o n f l i c t s have given r i s e to strong prejudice 
— t h a t age-old enemy of man's knowledge and i n s i g h t ! 
2. 
Owing to the circumstances of the past few 
centuries, the Christian "colonial" West and (l a r g e l y ) 
Hindu India have u n t i l recently regarded each other with 
d i s t r u s t , fear and hatred. Naturally neither of them can, 
on the whole, be credited with the best of motives i n 
approaching each other's e t h i c a l , r e l i g i o u s or s p i r i t u a l 
heritage. Almost t o t a l ignorance, punctuated by rare 
i n d i v i d u a l e f f o r t s to understand each other's way of l i f e , 
has by and large prevailed among Christians as well as 
Hindus. This may sound paradoxical i n a way. For one 
would expect that the centuries of contact between the 
Christian and Hindu worlds that was brought about by the 
colonisation of India should have made mutual understanding 
near perfect. But t h i s i s f a r from true. This contact 
was not the coming together of equals anxious to under-
stand each other, but rather the unfortunate clash of two 
cultures, or at best the uneasy co-existence of two 
re l i g i o u s systems—one that of the v i c t o r , the other that 
of the vanquished. The logic of the sit u a t i o n i t s e l f 
could not have permitted more than the essential minimum 
of understanding that did keep l i f e i n India going. 
This i s not to deny the immense value of the work 
of those few Western scholars who had a genuine admiration 
f o r the fundamental s p i r i t u a l i t y and l o f t y character of the 
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Hindu view of l i f e . Max Muller, Sir William Jones, 
Schopenhauer, Deussen, and Rudolph Otto are j u s t some of 
the names i n t h i s category. Some of these scholars did 
indeed spend l i f e t i m e s studying, i n t e r p r e t i n g and trans-
l a t i n g the Sanskrit scriptures of the Hindus, and are often 
j u s t l y credited with making many Indians themselves aware 
of t h e i r r i c h c u l t u r a l and s p i r i t u a l heritage. 
But i t must be admitted that these men were excep-
tio n s . The general a t t i t u d e of Christians to Hinduism has 
been either one of hasty dismissal as incomprehensible or 
else one of benevolent indifference. I t i s true that the 
r u l i n g Christian community i n India was to an extent ob-
lig e d to learn about some of the customs of the Hindus, even 
i f f o r no other reason than to promote the smooth running 
of the administration. But such learning was generally kept 
confined to that of s u p e r f i c i a l but widely prevalent customs 
so as to avoid giving unnecessary offence to the uneducated 
but deeply r e l i g i o u s masses. In other words, the minimum 
of tolerance of Hindu practices from purely pragmatic 
considerations was a l l that was considered necessary. Not 
many were p a r t i c u l a r l y anxious to penetrate beneath the 
th i c k crust of superstitious practices and b e l i e f s that 
had enveloped the essential e t h i c a l and s p i r i t u a l substance 
of Hinduism during and a f t e r the Western colonisation of 
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India. Western C h r i s t i a n i t y caught India during i t s 
darkest days of decadence and was appalled by some of the 
shocking practices prevalent then. Only the exceptional 
person among the r u l i n g Christians t r i e d p a t i e n t l y to dis-
cover the inner and essential s p i r i t of Hindusim; the rest 
i d e n t i f i e d i t with what they saw and dismissed i t as a 
crude, p r i m i t i v e and queer f a i t h . 
This, however, i s only one side of the story. 
Hindus, f o r t h e i r part, have generally been no less unsym-
pathetic to the merits of C h r i s t i a n i t y . Deprived of 
p o l i t i c a l power, they clung tenaciously to t h e i r f a i t h , and, 
burying t h e i r heads i n the sand, refused to face the winds 
of change and reform coming from outside sources. This 
resulted i n the prevention or at least delay of the much 
needed purge i n the body p o l i t i c of Hinduism. The fact of 
p o l i t i c a l domination by the Christian West aroused i n Hindu 
minds a deep suspicion of C h r i s t i a n i t y as an instrument of 
e x p l o i t a t i o n . The spectacle of the immense resources at 
the disposal of Christian missionaries engaged i n winning 
more followers f o r the Christian way of l i f e , though 
admired i n other ways, aggravated the f e e l i n g of suspicion. 
The idea took root that the mild-mannered and soft-spoken 
missionary was doing i n a subtle way the same gob that the 
colonisers were doing i n t h e i r more o f f i c i o u s way: depriv-
ing the natives of everything they had, including t h e i r 
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f a i t h . To cut a long ai?gument short, the conditions i n 
which the Hindu and Christian worlds came i n t o contact i n 
the recent past have been f a r from conducive to mutual 
understanding and genuine appreciation of each other's 
point of view. 
V/ith the change i n circumstances during the la s t 
three decades, and with much of the cause f o r mutual sus-
picion, d i s t r u s t and apathy gone, i t seems to be time to 
s t a r t a dialogue between these two of the world's greatest 
l i v i n g r e l i g i o n s . Once t h i s i s conceded, there can be 
hardly any question why i t must be ethics and morality, 
rather than any other aspect of these r e l i g i o n s , that 
should receive a t t e n t i o n f i r s t . I t i s not only because 
e t h i c a l and moral issues are treated as extremely important 
i n these systems, but also because i t i s i n the f i e l d of 
morals that the atmosphere of mutual recrimination rather 
than appreciation seems to be most marked. I t i s the 
f a i l u r e to read periodic moral aberrations as nothing more 
than aberrations that i s pri m a r i l y responsible f o r the 
di s t o r t e d perspectives of Hindus and Christians regarding 
the proper worth of each other's f a i t h . I f some Christians, 
f o r example, maliciously r e f e r to the abhorrent r i t e of 
"Sattee" practised i n some parts of Hindu society i n i t s 
days of decadence and to the practice of untouchability, 
some Hindus i n t h e i r turn never f a i l to remind the Christians 
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of the witch-hunt rampant i n the Christian world during 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the Crusades 
which involved so much blood-shed and cruelty. Both 
parties i n t h i s mutual recrimination, hov;ever, are g u i l t y 
of t r y i n g to estimate the worth of a r e l i g i o n by exaggerat-
ing the importance of the few moments of insanity that have 
occurred i n the course of t h e i r long h i s t o r i e s . 
Since a balanced and objective perspective has been 
lacking, reactions to the fact u a l content of each other's 
r e l i g i o n or morals have seldom been free from prejudice. 
These reactions have either been those of t o t a l derision or 
of unmixed admiration, depending on whether the prejudice 
has been f o r or against. To substantiate what we have jus t 
said, l e t us take two examples of the estimation by Christ-
ian w r i t e r s of Hindu ethics or aspects of Hindu ethics. The 
examples both r e l a t e t o the e t h i c a l implications of the 
absolute monism enunciated i n some of the Upanisads and 
f o r c e f u l l y championed i n l a t e r days by thinkers l i k e Sham-
kara. While Deussen finds i n t h i s philosophy a complete ex-
planation of the ethics of love, Mackenzie finds no room f o r 
ethics at a l l i n t h i s system. The words of Deussen are: 
'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as t h y s e l f i s 
the requirement of the Bible. But on what grounds 
i s t h i s demand to be based, since f e e l i n g i s i n 
myself alone and not i n another? 'Because,' the 
Veda here adds i n explanation, 'thy neighbour i s 
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i n t r u t h thy very s e l f , and what separates you 
from him i s mere i l l u s i o n . . . . ' ! 
But commenting on t h i s very system, Mackenzie comes to t h i s 
conclusion: "Let the case be stated bl u n t l y . Those ideas 
which bulk so largely i n the Vedanta, and v^hich f i n d ex-
pression i n other systems of philosophy, when l o g i c a l l y 
2 
applied, leave no room f o r ethics." Hov/ i s one to recon-
c i l e these two equally extreme views on the same system? 
Numerous such i l l u s t r a t i o n s of extreme reactions to Plindu-
ism and Hindu e t h i c a l ideas could be quoted. But v/e shall 
l e t these two examples su f f i c e to vindicate our point. 
Understandably, there are few works by Hindus on 
C h r i s t i a n i t y or Christian ethics. But the pattern of argu-
ment or reaction does not seem to be much d i f f e r e n t from 
that of Christian w r i t e r s on Hindu ethics. There have been 
those Hindus who have had a genuine admiration f o r some of 
Christian moral and r e l i g i o u s ideas. I'oremost among these 
comes the name of Raja Ram Mohan Roy, who was d e f i n i t e l y 
influenced by C h r i s t i a n i t y and who founded the Brahrao Sama-
Ja with an e x p l i c i t statement of his indebtedness to Christ-
ian scriptures. His deeply pro-Christian sentiments f i n d 
expression i n passages l i k e t h i s one, f o r example: 
••-Paul Deussen, The_Philo_sophy of the Upanis^ds, authorised 
English translatTon by the Rev. ATS. Geden XT. and T. Clark, 
Edinburgh, 1906), p. 49. 
2John Mackenzie, Hindu Ethics (Humphrey Mil f o r d , Oxford 
University Press,"1^27, PP. 205f. 
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The consequence of long and uninterrupted researches 
i n t o r e l i g i o u s t r u t h has been that I have found the 
doctrines of Christ more conducive to moral p r i n -
ciples and more adapted to the use of r a t i o n a l beings 
than any others which have come to my knowledge.1 
Gandhi more than once acknowledged his admiration of the 
person of Christ and of Christ's ethics of non-violence and 
forgiveness as enunciated i n his Sermon on the Mount. But 
these men, again, are exceptions. The large majority of 
Hindus have either been completely i n d i f f e r e n t , or have 
dismissed C h r i s t i a n i t y too l i g h t l y . 
The most h e l p f u l thing that can be done under the 
circumstances seems to be to present comparative accounts 
of the main e t h i c a l ideas of the two systems. Hindus and 
Christians, who more often than not have a f a i r l y good no-
t i o n of the e t h i c a l ideas i n t h e i r own t r a d i t i o n , w i l l thus 
f i n d i t easier to understand the other's point of view by 
placing i t against t h e i r own. No systematic or detailed 
comparative study of Hindu and Christian ethics seems to 
have been attempted. Many writers on Hinduism, C h r i s t i a n i t y 
and Comparative Religion have made casual remarks drawing 
p a r a l l e l s between some feature or other of one of these eth-
i c a l systems and some corresponding features of the other. 
But such comparisons usually do not prove enlightening, f o r 
•"•Quoted by William Paton i n Jesus Christ and the World's 
Religions (The Cargate Press, Londo"n7~1928), p7~49^ 
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they abstract these features from t h e i r t o t a l context, and 
thereby quite often d i s t o r t the significance of these fea-
tures themselves. A proper appreciation of the basic facts 
of the two e t h i c a l systems can only be had from a more de-
t a i l e d and systematic comparison of the two. 
One reason f o r undertaking t h i s comparative study 
of the ethics rather than of any other aspect of Hinduism 
and C h r i s t i a n i t y i s , as we' suggested e a r l i e r , that i t i s 
i n the f i e l d of ethics that the misunderstanding has been 
most acute. But t h i s i s certa i n l y not the only reason. I t 
seems that i f there i s any f i e l d i n which these two r e l i -
gions do have a common ground, i t i s undoubtedly that of 
ethics. In matters of metaphysical and theological b e l i e f s , 
i n forms of worship and prayer, the two are vastly d i f f e r -
ent, but when i t comes to the e t h i c a l implications of these 
metaphysical b e l i e f s the gap becomes considerably narrower. 
Though the systems s t a r t from d i f f e r e n t premises, the pic-
tures of the good l i f e that emerge ai^e by and large simi-
l a r . The most important reason, however, i s the intimate 
r e l a t i o n between ethics and r e l i g i o n i t s e l f . But since 
there are differences of opinion among philosophers as to 
the precise relationship between ethics and r e l i g i o n , i t 
may be desirable to make some remarks on t h i s issue i n 
order to make our own stand clear. 
10. 
Ethics, and Religion 
The problem of the relationship between ethics and 
r e l i g i o n , or between morals and r e l i g i o n , has occupied f o r 
some time an important place i n the discourses of philoso-
phers. Though the problem i s on the whole quite complica-
ted and has many aspects, the main question i s : Does mor-
a l i t y have an essential dependence on one or the other form 
of r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f — n o t merely as a contingent fa c t of 
h i s t o r y but lop;ically? On t h i s question, as on many others, 
philosophers, as usual, are divided. The controversy has 
gone on f o r quite some time, and shows no signs of being 
s e t t l e d one way or the other. Most analytic philosophers, 
as w e l l as many others, have argued that morality and r e l i -
gion are independent l o g i c a l l y , and that i t i s impossible 
i n p r i n c i p l e to base a morality on r e l i g i o n . But of late 
some Oxford-oriented l i n g u i s t i c philosophers (D.A. Rees, 
G.E.M. Anscombe and R.N. Smart, to mention only a few) have 
seriously challenged t h i s claim. I t i s , however, not our 
task here to take sides i n t h i s controversy. 
Whatever the l o g i c a l position regarding the r e l a -
tionship of ethics and r e l i g i o n i n general, the intimate 
re l a t i o n s h i p between these two, as contingent facts of his-
t o r y , has never been, and can never be, denied. I t may be 
possible to lay down a system of ethics without any re f e r -
ence to r e l i g i o n or r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f , but the converse 
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would hardly be tenable. A r e l i g i o n worth the name must 
incorporate some system of morality f o r the guidance of i t s 
followers. This i s an inescapable f a c t . Professor Lewis 
states the correct position i n t h i s respect i n these words: 
Although e t h i c a l t r u t h s require no di r e c t support 
from r e l i g i o n , except i n so f a r as we have some 
s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l i g i o u s duties l i k e acts of worship 
i n mind, there can be no adequate presentation of 
re l i g i o u s p r i n c i p l e s that does not make a very 
fundamental use of e t h i c a l o b j e c t i v i t y . 1 
This then appears to be the minimum of common 
ground among the various sides i n t h i s controversy. There 
may be a morality without r e l i g i o n , but there cannot be, 
and there has not been, a r e l i g i o n without morality. This 
becomes a l l too clear when we examine the contents of the 
great l i v i n g r e l i g i o n s l i k e Hinduism and C h r i s t i a n i t y which 
surely have made a "very fundamental use of et h i c a l ob- • 
j e c t i v i t y . " Professor Hare, i n his a r t i c l e "Religion and 
Morals," quotes a passage from St. James to show how i n -
timately morality has been linked with h i s t o r i c a l Christ-
i a n i t y : 
•^ H. D. Lewis, Mprals and the New Theology (Victor Gollancz 
Ltd., London, lSW77~V^2^' "~~ 
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I f any man thinketh himself to be r e l i g i o u s , 
while he b r i d l e t h not his tongue but deceiveth 
his heart, t h i s man's r e l i g i o n i s vain. Pure 
r e l i g i o n and undefiled before our God and Father 
i s t h i s , to v i s i t the fatherless and widows i n 
t h e i r a f f l i c t i o n , and to keep himself unspotted 
from the world.1 
This passage unequivocally implies that one cannot be said 
to accept C h r i s t i a n i t y unless, as Professor Hare says, 
"one accepts and at least t r i e s to act on i t s moral pre-
cepts." The Upani^ads anticipate St. James when they 
proclaim: "No one who has not ceased from immoral conduct, 
who i s restless, who i s not self-determined, whose mind i s 
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not t r a n q u i l , can r e a l i s e t h i s Self." 
Morality, then, i s an indispensable part of these 
r e l i g i o n s , and i s presupposed by and incorporated i n t o the 
l a t t e r . Thus irrespective of the purely l o g i c a l position 
regarding the relationship of ethics to r e l i g i o n , i n his-
t o r i c a l Hinduism and C h r i s t i a n i t y , as i n other important 
h i s t o r i c a l r e l i g i o n s , the two are i n e x t r i c a b l y intertwined. 
S t a r t i n g o f f from t h i s premise, i t i s easy to see why i t i s 
not only meaningful but extremely important to study the 
ethics of the two r e l i g i o n s i n order to get an insight i n t o 
the true significance of the r e l i g i o n s themselves. 
•'•R.M. Hare, Faith and Logic, ed. Basil M i t c h e l l (George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd.7~T95S7, p. 180. 
% a t h a Upanisad, 1,2,24. 
15. 
But we have not yet asked ourselves the most im-
portant question as to what i s meant by "Christian ethics," 
"Hindu ethics," or by "ethics" i t s e l f . We proceed to do 
that f o r t h w i t h . In other words, l e t us define our basic 
terras—"Christian," "Hindu" and "ethics." We s t a r t with 
the l a s t f i r s t . 
The Meaninp;s of "Ethics," "Christian" and "Hindu" 
Anyone who has read a textbook on Ethics would be 
f a m i l i a r with the observation, invariably made i n such books, 
that the terms "ethics" and "morality" are derived from 
words meaning "custom" or "behaviour." How they came to 
mean what they do i s rather i n t e r e s t i n g . The word "ethics" 
i s derived from the Greek root "ethos" which o r i g i n a l l y 
meant "dwelling" or " s t a l l . ""^  The Latin t r a n s l a t i o n given 
to t h i s words was "mos," from which the word "morality" i s 
derived. Paul Lehman records that t h i s term was " f i r s t 
applied not to human beings but to animals." He elaborates: 
I t was obvious to men that animals needed to be put 
somewhere f o r shelter and protection. Thus the germi-
nal idea i n the word "ro ^$0^ i s the s t a b i l i t y and 
•^Paul Lehman. Ethics i n a Christian Context (SOM Press Ltd., 
London, 1963), p. 25." 
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security provided by a ' s t a l l ' or 'dwelling' f o r 
animals. The verb root ei'^&t^ means 'to be ac-
customed t o ' or 'to be wont t o . ' Hence the r e l a -
tionship between s t a b i l i t y and custom was a kind 
of elemental datum of experience. I t was r e a l l y 
the primary o f f i c e of custom to do i n the human 
area what the s t a l l did f o r animals: to provide 
security and s t a b i l i t y . 1 
Thus "custom" or "behaviour" was the o r i g i n a l 
meaning of "ethics," as w e l l as that of "morality.". But 
i n the subsequent development of philosophy a d i s t i n c t i o n 
came to be made between "ethics" and "morality." Moral-
i t y , thus, generally refers to a set of beliefs about 
what one ought to do, how one should beliave, whereas eth-
ic s or "moral philosophy" to the r a t i o n a l or philosophical 
foundations of such p r i n c i p l e s . As William Prankena puts 
i t , "Ethics i s a branch of philosophy; i t i s moral p h i l o -
sophy or philosophical thinking about morality, moral 
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problems and moral judgments." 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note, by way of anticipation, 
that Dharma, the comprehensive Hindu term f o r morality and 
ethics, as well as f o r much else, comes from the root Dhr, 
which means "to hold together." Thus the function of 
Dharma i s to hold human society together, to give i t sta-
b i l i t y , exactly what was conceived to be the function of 
•^Ibid., p. 24. 
William K. Frankena, Ethics (Prentice H a l l , Inc., New 
Jersey, 1963), p. 3. 
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"ethics." Right conduct then i s essential i f human soci-
ety i s to survive. Such conduct, however, may spring 
either from obedience to authority or convention or from 
r e f l e c t i o n on the pr i n c i p l e s and truths underlying such 
convention; and Pharma comprises a l l these sources. 
I t may be useful to bear t h i s s l i g h t shade of dis-
t i n c t i o n between "morality" and "ethics" i n mind, f o r what 
we intend to do i n the following pages i s neither to pre-
scribe a new set of moral principles nor, pr i m a r i l y , to 
c r i t i c i s e the moral b e l i e f s and practices of either Christ-
ians or Hindus, but only to study the philosophical or the-
o l o g i c a l foundations of t h e i r moral b e l i e f s and practices. 
In other words, we s h a l l be interested i n comparing the 
"philosophical t h i n k i n g " of Christians and Hindus about 
morality, moral pi-oblems and the issues underlying moral 
judgments. By t h i s we not only mean the specific views 
expressed by Hindus and Christians on such issues as were 
recognised to be e t h i c a l issues, but also those that logic-
a l l y follow from other kinds of opinions expressed by them 
which bear on e t h i c a l issues. This has to be so because 
many of the problems which we, modern students of ethics, 
regard as problems were not treated as such i n t r a d i t i o n a l 
Hindu or Christian ethics. 
I t may now be desirable to consider i n 
a few words the s l i g h t extension of scope that 
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"ethics" i n e v i t a b l y acquires i n a theological or reli g i o u s 
context. Professor Nowell-Smith r i g h t l y considers most of 
t r a d i t i o n a l ethics and almost a l l r e l i g i o u s ethics as 
"t e l e o l o g i c a l . " He says: 
...The notion of doing one's duty f o r duty's sake 
hardly appears before Kant. Ea r l i e r philosophers 
thought i t quite sensible t o ask 'Why should I 
do my duty? ; the obligation to do one's duty 
needs j u s t i f y i n g and can only be j u s t i f i e d by 
showing that doing his duty i s , i n the short or 
long run, advantageous to the agent; indeed the 
classic t r e a t i s e s on the subject might be said 
to be mainly concerned with t h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n . ^ 
This point of view can hardly be challenged. Especially 
i n the context of r e l i g i o u s ethics, the t e l e o l o g i c a l 
character of a l l e t h i c a l enquiry i s very obvious. Eor 
example, the relevant question f o r Christian ethics, as 
he suggests i n the words of St. Luke, i s "What s h a l l I do 
to i n h e r i t eternal l i f e ? " "Eternal l i f e , " then, i s the 
goal, and ethics or moral behaviour i s only an aid or i n -
strument f o r achieving t h i s goal Duty, thus, has always a 
supra-ethical reference which makes the former meaningful. 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t not to accept t h i s position gener-
a l l y . But i t may not be out of place to state here that 
there i s a sense i n which much of Hindu ethics may be re-
•^ P.H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1957), 
p. 13. 
^ I b i d . , p. 15. 
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garded as r e l a t i v e l y "deontological" rather than t e l e o l o g i -
cal. Of the four de\rable ends—Artha (wealth), Kama 
(pleasure), Dharma (righteousness or holiness) and Moks_a 
( l i b e r a t i o n ) - — t h e u l t i m a t e l y or r e a l l y desirable are con-
sidered t o be the l a s t two—Dharma and Moksa. But i t i s 
realised that Moksa, the highest i d e a l , may not necessarily 
be everyone's i d e a l . Indeed i t i s thought that most people 
w i l l not have reached the stage of evolution or s p i r i t u a l 
enlightenment when the earnest desire to be liberated be-
comes the abiding passion. But Moksa or no Mokga, Dharma 
has t o be performed. No one has a.real option i n respect 
of the l a t t e r . Hence f o r many, Dharma, and a l l that i t 
stands f o r , i s i t s own j u s t i f i c a t i o n , whereas f o r the few 
who seek l i b e r a t i o n or Moksa, the former i s a means to t h i s . —' 
higher goal. Therefore, insofar as Dharma (duty i n the most 
conprehensive sense) can be an end i n i t s e l f , the Hindu view 
of ethics may i n a sense be regarded as deontological. But 
t h i s , however, does not a l t e r the main position that r e l i -
gious ethics i s , on the whole, t e l e o l o g i c a l . For even i n 
the Hindu view, the fact remains that the ultimate ideal 
i s Moksa. The recognition that as a matter of fact most 
people w i l l not seek i t does not change the position that 
i d e a l l y t h i s i s what everyone ought to seek. And i f so, 
then Dharma i t s e l f must derive part of i t s content or at 
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least orientation from t h i s higher goal of Moksa. 
Now i t i s t h i s reference to and presupposition of 
a higher r e l i g i o u s goal which extends the scope of the term 
"ethics" i n the context of r e l i g i o n . I f the Ultimate Good 
i s a non-ethical or r e l i g i o u s goal, then whatever promotes 
approximation to t h i s goal may, in a sense, be regarded as 
e t h i c a l . I f the highest goal i s Mok^a or "eternal l i f e , " 
then a l l a c t i v i t y that i s recommended by competent author-
i t y as leading to t h i s goal may form part of the e t h i c a l 
i d e a l of the seeker. Thus acts of worship and prayer, f o r 
example, may be discussed under "ethics" i n a r e l i g i o u s con-
t e x t , but w i l l not form part of "philosophical" ethics. In 
t h i s extended sense of the term, i t would be seen, i t may be 
d i f f i c u l t not to include under ethics, f o r example, the sys-
tematic exposition of the various exercises f o r s e l f - c o n t r o l 
t h a t the Yoga system recommends as leading to s e l f - p u r i f i c a -
t i o n (Citta-Suddhi) and thereby to Moksa. This example i s 
merely to emphasise the s l i g h t l y wider sense that "ethics" 
may be given i n the r e l i g i o u s or theological context. 
To make our point clearer, l e t us approach t h i s 
issue from another angle. Though we have accepted Professor 
Nowell-Smith's main contention that "doing one's duty f o r 
duty's sake" hardly appears before Kant, i t i s doubtful i f 
he i s e n t i r e l y r i g h t i n saying that "the notion of duty does 
not play the central role i n t r a d i t i o n a l that i t plays i n 
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modern ethics.""^ A more accurate statement would perhaps 
be that duty does play a central role, though i t i s not duty 
f o r duty's sake. This i s at least true of the major r e l i -
gions. The emphasis on duty i n Hindu, Christian and Buddhist 
ethics i s unmistakable, though i t i s j u s t i f i e d , by and large, 
on the ground that i t i s God's corfimand. What i s i n fact di s -
t i n c t i v e about the concept of duty i n rel i g i o u s ethics as 
against that i n philosophic ethics i s the irievitable addition 
of a separate category of duty—duty to God. Philosophic 
ethics recognises duty under only two heads-—duty to society 
and duty to oneself. But t h i s i s just not enough f o r a 
system of r e l i g i o u s ethics. Duty to God i s always either 
s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned or covertly i n p l i e d , though i n some 
cases t h i s may be i d e n t i c a l with duty under the f i r s t two 
heads, that i s , duty to s e l f and duty to others. This again 
leads t o the extension of the scope of ethics which we men-
tioned e a r l i e r on. I f God i s the f i n a l point of reference, 
then not only should ethics include worship and prayer, but 
i t should also take account of specific attitudes to and 
int e r p r e t a t i o n s of Godhead i n a way that i s generally out of 
question i n philosophical ethics. Similarly, i f ethics, or 
moral behaviour i s only a means to the attainment of a high-
er s p i r i t u a l end, then one or the other view of t h i s higher 
end i s l i k e l y to make a l l the difference to the orientation 
^ I b i d . , p. 15. 
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of the ethics, even though the higher end i t s e l f may not 
be a s t r i c t l y " e t h i c a l " goal. These and other implied 
factors make the use of "ethics" i n a wide sense i n the 
rel i g i o u s context almost imperative, f o r the " s p i r i t u a l " 
overplus of meaning that e t h i c a l terms acquire i n a r e l i -
gious context cannot be accounted f o r i f we use "ethics" 
i n i t s more l i m i t e d sense. 
I t was considered important to draw attention to 
t h i s wide sense of "ethics" because more often than not i t 
would be found necessary to use t h i s term i n i t s wider con-
notation i n the course of our discussion of Christian and 
Hindu ethics. The necessity f o r introducing t h i s d i s t i n c -
t i o n w i l l be gradually driven home as we proceed with our 
enquiry. But j u s t to give an example here, when we speak 
l a t e r of the ethics of Raraanuja or of Shamkara, say, i n 
connection with our analysis of Hindu ethics, the use of 
the term can only be j u s t i f i e d i n t h i s wider sense. This 
i s so because i n the Hindu t r a d i t i o n Dharma and i t s i m p l i -
cations are generally accepted by a l l , whatever t h e i r meta-
physical views may be. Thus t r a d i t i o n a l Dharma or the prin-
ciples underlying the morals of men w i l l remain the same 
whether he i s a follower of the non-dualism (Advaita) of 
Shamkara or of the q u a l i f i e d non-dualism (Vis i s t a Advaita) 
of Raraanuja. But since the conceptions of the ultimate 
r e a l i t y and of the f i n a l goal (Moksa) are very d i f f e r e n t 
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i n these two thinkers, the orientation and emphases of the 
e t h i c a l thinking or, to be more precise, of t h e i r meta-
physical thinking bearing on ethics, are bound to be d i f f e r -
ent. Thus i n the narrow sense of "ethics," there i s none 
to be found s p e c i f i c a l l y i n t h e i r systems apart from t h e i r 
acceptance of Dharma and i t s implications. But i n the 
wider sense there c e r t a i n l y i s , f o r t h e i r conceptions of 
Godhead and human destiny are so d i f f e r e n t . 
With t h i s explanation of the meaning and scope of 
ethics, we now pass on to the meanings of the terms "Christ-
ian" and "Hindu." Defining Christian ethics, Paul Lehman 
says: 
Christian ethics, 'as a theological d i s c i p l i n e , i s 
the r e f l e c t i o n upon the question, and i t s answer: 
What am I , as a believer i n Jesus Christ and as 
a member of his church, to do?l 
I t i s obvious, then, that "Christian" according to him means 
"a believer i n Jesus Christ and his church." This i s a 
d e f i n i t i o n which, f o r p r a c t i c a l purposes, sums up the mean-
ing of the term, though i t may not be considered an e n t i r e l y 
adequate d e f i n i t i o n . For "believing i n Jesus Christ" i n 
j u s t any form w i l l c e r t a i n l y not do. Islam believes that 
Jesus was a prophet of God, but not that he was God. Or, 
"^ Lehman, op. c i t . , p. 25. 
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say, a Hindu may extend his conception of incarnation and 
believe that Jesus Christ was one of the various incarna-
tions of God. But neither the Muslim nor the Hindu who 
believes as stated w i l l q u a l i f y f o r being a Christian. 
I t i s important to believe not only that Christ was God 
but also that he was the one and only incarnation of God 
and much else besides. 
The Nicene Creed, which has been described by Dr. 
J.N.D. Kelly as "one of the few threads by which the t a t -
tered fragments of the divided robe of Christendom are 
hold together, "•'^  lays down what i s involved i n being a 
Christian. Let us quote some phrases from the Creed to 
state the main points i n the d e f i n i t i o n of a Christian: 
I believe i n one God the Father Almighty, 
Maker of heaven and earth, And of a l l things 
v i s i b l e and i n v i s i b l e : 
-^ "cL i n one Lord Jesus Ghx--ist, the only begotten 
son of God... .Begotten, not made. Being o"f one sub-
stance with the Eather..,who f o r us men and f o r our 
salvation came down from heaven. And was incarnate 
by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, And was made 
man. And was crucifled....He suffered and was buried. 
And the t h i r d day He rose again....And ascended i n t o 
heaven....And he s h a l l come again with glory to judge 
both the quick and the dead: whose Kingdom shaTl have 
no end. 
1 J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, quoted by John 
Burnaby i n his preface to The Eelief of Christendom: A 
Commentary on the Nicene Creed (National Society and 
S.P.C.K., London, 1960). 
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And I believe i n the Holy Ghost....Who proceed-
eth from the Father and the Son...And I believe one 
Gatholick and Apostolic Church. I acknowledge one 
Baptism f o r the remission of sins. And I look f o r 
•tlie Resurrection of the dead. And the Li f e of the 
w,orld to comeT.. . 1 ~ 
The ideas underlined above may safely be taken to consti-
tute some of the main points i n the d e f i n i t i o n of "Christ-
ian. " 
Much as we might l i k e to do so, i t i s not possible 
to explain here i n greater d e t a i l what we have outlined as 
the important elements of a Christian's b e l i e f . V/e may 
note i n passing that the emphasis on one is. unmistakable 
at t h i s stage of the development of Christian thought, 
though t h i s u n i t y could not be maintained much longer. The 
differences of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and emphasis that r e s u l t from 
the Christians' attempts to analyse what believing i n Christ 
and his church involves have given r i s e to the variety of 
churches and the d i v e r s i t y of e t h i c a l thinking. But, un-
fortunate as i t may be, we s h a l l f i n d that on the whole we 
s h a l l have to leave out the differences and concentrate on 
the common ground, except i n our second chapter, where the 
specific aim i s to throw the spotlight on the variety of 
emphases and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s i n Christian as w e l l as Hindu 
ethics. 
•^ The Wicene Creed, reproduced by John Burnaby, op. c i t . , 
under the heading "The Nicene Creed" (emphases mine). 
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When we come to analyse what "Hindu" means, the 
r e a l i s a t i o n i s forced on us that we are dealing with a very 
complex and d i f f i c u l t problem. Hinduism covers such a wide 
ground and means so many d i f f e r e n t things to d i f f e r e n t men 
that i t i s extremely d i f f i c u l t to come forward with a short 
and precise d e f i n i t i o n of the term. Dr. Radhakrishnan's 
remarks i n the opening sentences of his Hindu View of Li f e 
are i n d i c a t i v e of the kind of d i f f i c u l t y that one has to 
face i n defining Hinduism. "To many," he says, " i t seems 
to be a name without any content. I s i t a museum of b e l i e f s , 
a medley of r i t e s , or a mere map, a geographical expres-
sion?"''' The answer might be that i n fact i t i s a l l of these. 
But i t i s also much more. I t i s perhaps generally known by 
now that "Hindu" o r i g i n a l l y meant a geographical area, that 
which lay around and was contiguous with the r i v e r Sindhu 
i n the northwest of India. This i n di;ie course came to de-
note the whole of India. Therefore, the term "Hindu" sig-
n i f i e d a l l the various b e l i e f s and practices that prevailed 
i n t h i s vast and variegated stretch of land. No wonder the 
term s i g n i f i e s so many things. 
But l e t us not despair. This variety of be l i e f s 
and practices i s not the whole t r u t h about Hinduism. There 
"'"Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, The Hindu View of Life (Unwin Books, 
London, 1963), p. 1. " ~ ~™™ ™" 
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i s much uni t y underlying t h i s d i v e r s i t y . There are some 
fundamental b e l i e f s which must be accepted by every Hindu. 
I t i s true that beyond the acceptance of these fundamentals 
the Hindu i s i n a l l other respects free; but there can be 
no compromise regarding these fundamentals themselves. And, 
v/hat i s more important, a Hindu i s a Hindu by v i r t u ^ e of 
his b e l i e f i n these. Without more ado, therefore, i t w i l l 
be desirable to state some of these underlying b e l i e f s with 
a view to f i x i n g the connotation of the term "Hindu." These 
are: 
(1) Belief i n the authority of the Vedas and other 
sacred writings of the ancient sages, 
(2) Belief i n the immortality of the soul and i n 
future l i f e , 
(3) B elief i n the existence of a Supreme God,"^  
(4) Acceptance of the theory of Karma and r e b i r t h , 
(5) The worship of ancestors, 
(5) The social organisation represented by the 
four main castes, 
(7) Acceptance of the theory of the four main 
stages of l i f e , and 
(8) Acceptance of the theory of the four Purus-
arthas or Ends. 
I t i s true that the MImamsa and Samkhya systems do not 
believe i n a God, but the*former venerates the Vedas almost 
as d i v i n i t y i t s e l f , and the atheism of the l a t t e r i s count-
ered by the theism of the a l l i e d Yoga system. Moreover, 
there i s hardly any p r a c t i s i n g Hindu today who does not be-
lieve i n God i n some form. I t i s therefore appropriate to 
incorporate b e l i e f i n one God as a tenet of Hinduism. 
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I t may be possible to add more to t h i s l i s t ; but the be-
l i e f s mentioned here are generally regarded as the most 
fundamental. We are now, therefore, i n a position to an-
swer the question, "Who i s a Hindu?" A Hindu i s anyone 
who, irrespective of anything else he believes, accepts 
the above tenets and i s not expected to do anything which 
i s l i k e l y to undermine these b e l i e f s and t h e i r d i r e c t im-
p l i c a t i o n s . 
With the d e f i n i t i o n s of "ethics," "Christian" and 
"Hindu," i t i s not d i f f i c u l t now to f i n d out what "Hindu 
Ethics" or "Christian Ethics" can mean. Hindu Ethics i s 
the system of philosophic thought on moral problems which 
guides the community of Hindus k n i t together by the funda-
mental b e l i e f s underlined above. Simi l a r l y , Christian 
Ethics i s the record of the philosophical thinking of 
Christians on moral problems. 
The Plan of the Work 
I t may be h e l p f u l to say a few words about the 
plan we intend to follow i n oui* comparative account of 
Christian and Hindu ethics. V/hat we s h a l l do i s to select 
some fundamental questions that are generally discussed i n 
philosophical ethics and then f i n d out what answers to these 
can be given by C h r i s t i a n i t y and Hinduism, and f i n a l l y to 
compare and contrast these answers. Everyone may not agree 
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with our selection of the most fundamental problems of 
ethics, but i t can be hoped that the problems selected w i l l 
at least be considered important. 
We s h a l l s t a r t w i t h the "Nature of Christian and Hin-
du Ethics" to underline our observation that neither of the 
two are uniform or homogeneous systems representing a single 
l i n e of e t h i c a l thinking. In the next chapter we w i l l dis-
cuss "The Nature and Destiny of Man." What view a r e l i g i o u s 
system of ethics takes of human destiny i s , we have seen, 
extremely important, f o r i t i s t h i s view that largely shapes 
i t s views on other issues. The remaining chapters i n the 
main body w i l l be f a m i l i a r topics discussed i n r e l i g i o u s and 
philosophical ethics. "The Moral Law, I t s Authority and 
Sources (Chapter l Y ) , "The Content of the Mp.ral Law: Virtues 
and Duties" (Chapter V), "Moral E f f o r t and Human Freedom" 
(Chapter V I ) , and "Moral Failure and Responsibility" (Chap-
t e r V I I ) w i l l be discussed respectively. Of these various 
topics, only "Virtues and Duties" would appear to be one 
which i s seldom discussed i n philosophical ethics; but i t 
w i l l be included i n view of i t s importance i n r e l i g i o u s and 
theological discourses. Freedom and Responsibility are 
generally discussed together i n treatises on ethics, but i n 
view of the many serious problems involved, and also owing 
to the f a c t that r e s p o n s i b i l i t y presupposes much more besides 
freedom, i t w i l l be convenient to discuss these two issues 
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and t h e i r implications separately. The la s t chapter, of 
course, w i l l supi up our arguments i n the previous chapters, 
besides throwing l i g h t on issues not discussed e a r l i e r . 
Sources 
Since the primary purpose of t h i s work i s neither 
B i b l i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n nor the in t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Hindu 
scriptures, we sh a l l generally leave the in t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
the main scriptures to acknowledged authorities i n the f i e l d , 
except i n cases where the available interpretations appear 
to be i n s u f f i c i e n t or unsatisfactory or where a certain 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the relevant passages i n the scriptures 
has never been adopted though i t i s l o g i c a l l y possible. In 
other words, we s h a l l be r e l y i n g mainly on secondary sources, 
that i s , on works by other scholars of Hindu and Christian 
thought which re l a t e t o the subjects under our examination. 
References, however, to the Vedas, the Upanisads, the 
Mahabharata and the Gita amongst Hindu scriptures and to 
the Bible and the Nicene Creed and commentaries on them, 
amongst Christian scriptures, w i l l frequently be made. As 
w i l l be realised gradually, wherever there are differences 
of opinion among Hindu thinkers and scriptures with regard 
to specific issues, the position outlined i n the GIta w i l l 
be adopted i n preference t o any others, unless there are 
29. 
s u f f i c i e n t reasons to t r e a t some other source as more 
au t h o r i t a t i v e . This w i l l appear to be i n keeping with the 
unique and most i n f l u e n t i a l position that the GIta enjoys 
among Hindu scriptures. Similarly, on the Christian side, 
the d i r e c t and unambiguous implications of B i b l i c a l pass-
ages w i l l i n general be preferred to church opinion. More-
over, since t h i s work i s an essay i n comparative philosophy 
rather than theology (wherein, unfortunately, the wr i t e r of 
these pages has no special t r a i n i n g ) , wherever independent 
and a u t h o r i t a t i v e philosophical opinion w i l l be available 
either i n Hindu or Christian ethics, i t w i l l generally be 
adopted i n preference t o t r a d i t i o n a l theological opinion. 
The Presupposition 
To avoid getting involved i n the considerable task 
of explaining elementary terms i n either Hindu or Christ-
ian ethics, which would only complicate and delay coming 
to grips with the main issues, a general f a m i l i a r i t y with 
the basic Christian and Hindu world-views w i l l be presup-
posed. The immensity of the scope of the subject leaves 
no option i n t h i s respect. The more important and complex 




Since the e f f o r t w i l l be to t r e a t Hindu as well 
as Christian ethics as systems rather than as mere collec-
t i o n s of creeds, i t w i l l n a t u r a l l y not be possible to pay 
much a t t e n t i o n to denominational differences on most issues. 
I t seems that f o r any f r u i t f u l or useful, as against merely 
pedantic, comparison of the two systems as systems, t h i s i s 
in e v i t a b l e . The attempt generally w i l l be to take account 
of more representative and, as f a r as possible, universally 
acceptable., views. Hence f a i l u r e to mention h a i r - s p l i t t i n g 
d e t a i l s , though sometimes due to ignorance, may generally 
be due to deliberate omission. 
Chapter I I . 
NATURE 01? CHEISTIAN AlW HINDU ETHICS 
As a necessary prelude t o our comparative studies 
i n the fundamentals of Christian and Hindu ethics, i t w i l l 
be worthwhile to stress one very s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t — t h e 
c a t h o l i c i t y of these two systems of re l i g i o u s ethics. Of 
Hindu ethics t h i s observation w i l l perhaps be rea d i l y ac-
cepted even by orthodox Hindus. But when asserted of 
Christian ethics, i t may i n i t i a l l y appear to be of question-
able v a l i d i t y . The reason f o r t h i s w i l l be clear i f we 
contrast a t y p i c a l statement of the Hindu a t t i t u d e with the 
general impression about the Christian position. A reason-
ably representative description of Hinduism i s perhaps the 
following one by J. N, Sarkar, who states that Hinduism i s 
"that all-embracing but undefinable system of t o l e r a t i o n 
or synthesis which shelters w i t h i n i t s capacious bosom 
every form of b e l i e f and practice that w i l l agree with i t s 
few general conventions. We may not agree with the use 
of "undefinable," f o r we have already offered a d e f i n i t i o n 
"'•J.N^  Sarkar, India through the Ages, p. 17, quoted by 
Sir ir'.S, Sivaswamy Aiyer i n Evolution of Hindu Moral Ideals 
(Calcutta University Press, 1935)? "2T 
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of Hinduism, But that i s beside the point. I f we remem-
ber the emphasis on one i n the exposition of the Christian 
p o s i t i o n i n the Nicene Creed, i t would appear that the 
e t h i c a l implications of t h i s unity of b e l i e f can never ad-
mit of any d i v e r s i t y . "Every form of b e l i e f and practice" 
c e r t a i n l y cannot be predicated of C h r i s t i a n i t y . 
But whatever the appearances, the t r u t h i s that 
Hindu ethics i s not a l l chaos and Christian ethics not en-
t i r e l y a picture of s i m p l i c i t y . The various forms of be-
l i e f and practice w i t h i n Hinduism have much more i n common 
than i t s "few general conventions"; and "church history i s 
l i t t e r e d with various interpretations of that holiness" 
which emerges from the l i f e and teaching of the "One Lord 
Jesus Christ.""'" Sir Charles E l i o t appears to understand 
better the true s p i r i t behind the outward d i v e r s i t y of Hin-
du f a i t h and morals as well as the so-called u n i t y claimed 
on behalf of C h r i s t i a n i t y . Speaking of the var i e t y i n the 
b e l i e f s and practices of Hindus, he writes, "...nothing i s 
more surprising than the va r i e t y of i t s phases except the 
underlying u n i t y . " He continues: 
-••J.E. Fison, The Faith of the Bible (Pelican Books, 1957), 
pp. 115f. 
2 
Sir Charles E l i o t , liinduism and Buddhism (Routledge and 
Kegan Paul Ltd., 195^), I , x c v i i . 
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This power of varying i n sympathetic response to 
the needs of many minds and growing i n harmony 
with the outlook of successive ages, i s a contrast 
to the pretended quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab 
omnibus of the Western Churches, f o r i n view of 
t h e i r differences and mutual h o s t i l i t y i t can only 
be called a pretence.1 
This i s not intended to be either a sat i r e on the 
differences within the Christian church or a denial of the 
un i f y i n g power of the person of Jesus Christ, but simply a 
vindic a t i o n of the t r u t h t h a t , f o r very understandable 
reasons. Christian f a i t h and morals, l i k e t h e i r counter-
parts i n Hinduism, display an amazing variety and "catho-
l i e comprehensiveness." The true character of Christian 
ethics would perhaps be suggested better i f we were to say 
of C h r i s t i a n i t y what St. Paul said of himself, that i s , 
that i t was "made a l l things t o a l l men, that | ^ i t might 
by a l l means save some." 
To substantiate what we have been arguing so f a r i t 
w i l l be necessary to trace the background, composition and 
development f i r s t of Christian and then of Hindu ethics. 
We s h a l l analyse some of the various elements i n and i n -
fluences on the e t h i c a l thinking of Christians and Hindus 
-^Ibid. 
2 
Pison, op. c i t . , p. 115. 
^ I Corinthians 9:22 (Authorised King James Version). 
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through the ages with a view to f i n d i n g out what resemb-
lance (or otherwise) there i s between the general char-
acters of the two ethics. Because of l i m i t a t i o n s of space 
t h i s analysis obviously cannot be exhaustive and we sh a l l 
have to be content with stressing what we consider to be 
the most s i g n i f i c a n t features. 
Sources and Development of Christian Ethics 
In the words of Bishop Henson, 
Christian morality as we know i t today i s the 
r e s u l t of a long process of development, i n the 
course of which many contributions of varying 
o r i g i n , potency and e t h i c a l q u a l i t y have been 
assimilated.1 
This position i s fundamentally sound; but i t ought to be 
added that the "assimilation" has i n some cases been f a r 
from complete. I t has to be remembered that even such 
potent and powerful forces as Christian or Hindu ethics 
cannot be r e a l l y suited to assimilate everything. In 
response t o the demands of changing times, however, they 
have often had to make room f o r ideas and ideals which did 
not always agree with the basic postulates of the systems. 
•^ H.H. Henson, Christian Morality (Gifford Lectures, 1935-36, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1936), p. 65. 
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And to allow some b e l i e f or practice to co-exist i s hardly 
what i s meant by "assimilation." But we sh a l l have oc-
casion to come to t h i s point l a t e r . For the time being 
l e t us proceed with our analysis of the various factors 
i n the development of Christian ethics. 
To quote a passage from Henson again, 
The range and character of o r i g i n a l Christian 
morality were mainly determined by three factors—^ 
the t r a d i t i o n of Judaism, the teaching of Jesus, 
and the influence of Graeco-Roraan society. From 
the f i r s t , C h r i s t i a n i t y received the conception 
of a moral law expressing the w i l l of a Righteous 
God, and, i n i t s essential contents, declared i n 
the Decalogue. Prom the second, C h r i s t i a n i t y de-
riv e d freedom from national l i m i t a t i o n s , a new and 
larger understanding of moral obligation, and, 
above a l l , a supreme embodiment of personal moral-
i t y i n i t s Pounder. Prom the t h i r d , C h r i s t i a n i t y , 
by an inevitable reaction from i t s social environ-
ment, learned to emphasise the necessity of ascetic 
d i s c i p l i n e , to assert the f i n a l authority of the 
priva t e conscience, and to magnify the function 
and claim of the Christian fellowship.! 
Quoting t h i s rather long passage from Henson need not ob-
l i g e us to follow a l l the d e t a i l s i n his analysis nor to 
agree with everything he has to say. But i t may be desir-
able t o adopt i n our own analysis the general pattern sug-
gested by him. 
•^Ibid., p. 137. 
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(a) The Judaic inheritanc e 
Of a l l the sources which have shaped the nature of 
Christian ethics, the profoundest and most important i n -
fluence has come from the parent system of Judaism. Jesus, 
the founder of C h r i s t i a n i t y , was himself a Jew and strove 
a l l h is l i f e to practise essential Jewish morality at i t s 
best, a l b e i t i n the l i g h t of his own insight i n t o the sys-
tem. " I am not come to destroy, but to f u l f i l l " " ' ' i s a 
clear statement of the indebtedness of Jesus to the Jewish 
f a i t h and i t s morals. He regarded himself merely as a re-
former and restorer of the true perspective. I t i s obvi-
ous, therefore, that o r i g i n a l Christian ethics must above 
a l l be considered a continuation of the f i n e r side of Jew-
ish ethics, a superstructure raised on the foundation sup-
p l i e d by the l a t t e r . , Now, of what exactly did t h i s founda-
t i o n consist? 
In the very f i r s t place, i t must be recorded that 
Judaism had already come to accept a monotheistic f a i t h 
and unquestioning b e l i e f i n one supreme God who was not 
only kind and merciful but also " t e r r i b l e . " 
For the Lord your God i s God of gods and Lord 
of lords, a great God, a mighty, and a t e r r i b l e ^ 
which regardeth not persons, nor taketh reward. 
••-Matthew 5:17. 
2 Deuteronomy 10:17, 
37. 
Such was the Jewish conception of God. And na t u r a l l y i t 
evoked and inspired an e t h i c a l a t t i t u d e essentially 
oriented toward love of God—love i n gratitude f o r a l l 
"these great and t e r r i b l e things""*" that God had done f o r 
the people of I s r a e l . Por "Only the Lord had a delight 
i n thy fathers to love them, and he chose t h e i r seed af t e r 
2 
them, even you above a l l people, as i t i s t h i s day." And 
i f t h i s great and t e r r i b l e God had bestowed t h i s d i s t i n c -
t i o n of choice on the people of I s r a e l , how could they turn 
ungrateful and not do what God required of them? Hence 
Moses i s unequivocal i n declaring what these people were 
to do: 
And now, I s r a e l , what doth the Lord thy God 
require of thee, but to fear the Lord thy God, to 
walk i n a l l his ways, and to love him, and to 
serve the Lord thy God with a l l thy heart and with 
a l l thy soul. 
To keep the commandments of the Lord, and his statutes, which I command thee t h i s day f o r thy good?3 
Prom the foregoing account of the then Jev/ish 
morality i t would appear that i t was an essentially simple 
and unsophisticated system. There was a single a l l -






time t e r r i b l e . This God had somehow come to take a fancy 
to the people of I s r a e l and had done tremendous things f o r 
t h e i r salvation. Nothing could be more natural than to 
expect the peo|)le of I s r a e l to obey the laws and command-
ments of t h i s God as revealed to them through t h e i r prophet 
and spokesman, Moses. God had promised salvation f o r the 
Jeivs, and the least that the Jews could do f o r t h e i r God 
would be to be g r a t e f u l to Him f o r a l l t h i s . God had 
wrought miracles f o r these people and promised to do much 
more only i f these people were to tread i n God's ways, to 
obey his commandments and to respect his law. This was, 
therefore, essentially an ethic of p-;ratitude f o r deliver-
ance, "'• even though t h i s was reinforced by an appeal to the 
t e r r i b l e nature of God, who had to be feared as well. 
We must not forget, however, that t h i s was the post-
e x i l i c . Mosaic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Jewish morality and was 
d i f f e r e n t from the s p i r i t of the elaborate s a c r i f i c i a l sys-
tem with i t s centre at Jerusalem and i t s essence i n r i t -
ualism. This new insistence on allegiance to Divine law 
rather than to the national monarch was i n s p i r i n g indeed, 
but nonetheless i t was a change i n perspective which was li-
able to give r i s e to c o n f l i c t as, perhaps, i n time i t did. 
• ^ I am indebted to Dr. W.A, 'Whitehouse (formerly of Durham 
University, Theology Department) f o r kindly discussing 
t h i s topic with me. 
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There was, on the one hand, the clearest possible recog-
n i t i o n that 
The Creator was also the Author of the Moral Lav;, 
and, so the prophets had taught, had His witness 
i n the human conscience. The true knowledge of 
God drew with i t a r i g h t understanding of His W i l l , 
obedience to which was the essence of morality.1 
But on the other hand, t h i s appeal to conscience created 
p e r p l e x i t i e s f o r the feeble-minded, as i t always does f o r 
the vast majority of human beings. This abstract concep-
t i o n of a moral law expressing the w i l l of a righteous God 
and inscribed i n the consciences of men might have been 
a l l r i g h t f o r the sage; but the ordinary man wanted some-
thin g more tahgible and concrete as a guide to his morals. 
The answer to these people was that t h i s Law, apart from 
being w r i t t e n i n the consciences of men, had also " i n i t s 
essential contents been declared i n the Decalogue." This 
opened the door to the authoritarianism and l i t e r a l i s m i n 
Jewish ethics. I f Divine Law was l a i d down i n the scrip-
tures, then obviously someone who claimed to know t h i s law 
through his study of the scriptures was going to become an 
indispensable element i n the moral guidance and i n s t r u c t i o n 
of the Jewish people. In time, therefore. 
•'"Henson, op. c i t . , p. 66. 
^ I b i d . , p. 137. 
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Effective guidance had passed from the central 
s a c r i f i c i a l system at Jerusalem to the recently 
established organisation of the Scribes, that i s , 
to those who were the students of the Law, and who 
expounded i t i n the synagogues every Sabbath.1 
This was both a step forward and a step back—forward be-
cause of i t s orientation towards the understanding of mor-
a l i t y i n place of mere r i t u a l s and s a c r i f i c e , and backward 
because of i t s having i n the long run the same demoralis-
ing, authoritarian and dogmatic implications f o r essential 
morality as the s a c r i f i c i a l system with i t s priests and 
high p r i e s t s had had. 
As a r e s u l t of the inevitable c o n f l i c t between the 
ancient canonical writings and the f a i t h and s e n s i b i l i t y 
of the comparatively modern Jew, there had evolved a 
casuistry which i n a way sought to make a compromise be-
tween the two, and was n a t u r a l l y more elas t i c and p r a c t i -
c a l ; being largely unwritten, i t was known as the "Un-
w r i t t e n Torah." And t h i s casuistry aspired to be a com-
plete guide i n practice, a kind of manual of behaviour. 
I t must be added that t h i s urge to provide a detailed and 
voluminous casuistry might i n part have come from the ex-
ample of Moses himself. For Moses does not rest content 
with his general exposition of the ethic of obedience to 
God i n gratitude f o r deliverance, but goes on to elaborate 
•'-Ibid,, p. 69. 
^ I b i d . , p, 70. 
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i n great d e t a i l what t h i s ethic implies according to him. 
As a r e s u l t , the book of Deuteronomy does not contain only 
passages l i k e "...thou shalt love the Lord thy God with a l l 
thine heart, and with a l l thy soul, and with a l l thy 
might, ""^  but also the ones that lay down what i s to be eat-
en and what i s not. "Thou shalt not eat any abominable 
thing. These are the beasts which ye sh a l l eat: the ox, 
2 
the sheep, and the goat...." This i s followed by a l i s t 
of animals which may be eaten and explains why one rather 
than the other i s to be considered edible. The people of 
I s r a e l are "an holy people unto the L o r d , a n d therefore 
must not eat anything that d e f i l e s and makes one unholy. 
I t should be easy to realise that i f holiness involves not 
only one's response to God but also one's choice of foods 
and the l i k e , the door i s being opened f o r the voice of 
conscience to be replaced by an appeal to authority. There 
must be someone to decide what i s permitted and what i s 
forbidden f o r the Jew; hence the need f o r the casuistry 
and hence the indispensability of the Scribes. 
Now whatever the causes of i t s growth and whatever 






became, i n the course of time, "over subtle, voluminous, 
morally enfeebling. "-*- I t concealed the essence of moral-
i t y and thus contributed to the development of the a t t i t u d e 
of self-righteousness i n the Pharisees. This v;as natural 
enough; f o r i f holiness consisted i n doing what was pre-
scribed, f o r a l l moments of l i f e , i f i t meant following the 
scriptures and the Scribes and performing the various r i t e s 
enjoined f o r various occasions, then the Pharisee could 
j u s t i f i a b l y boast of his performance. He knew what must be 
done—or so he thought—and strove every moment of his l i f e 
to keep the l e t t e r , i f not the s p i r i t , of the Lav/. He 
scrupulously obeyed a l l the injunctions himself and was 
n a t u r a l l y prone to censure anyone who seemed to v i o l a t e 
these. The ethics of the Pharisee had shi f t e d the emphasis 
from the s p i r i t of the law to i t s l e t t e r . 
Even t h i s sketchy account of the Jewish scene leaves 
no doubt as to the nature of the Jewish ethic. There was 
undoubtedly a clear recognition that there was a Moral Law 
whose author was none other than God himself and that 
morality consisted i n obeying t h i s Law. But when i t came 
to the question of what t h i s Law implied and who was to 
judge the implications of the Law, there were two d i f f e r e n t 
-••Henson, op, c i t . , p. 71. 
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answers to be found i n the t r a d i t i o n of the Jews. On the 
one hand, there was the t r a d i t i o n of prophets l i k e Amos and 
Isaiah f o r whom morality consisted i n showing gratitude to 
God f o r deliverance, w i t h i t s appeal t o conscience and i t s 
emphasis on the r i g h t a t t i t u d e rather than on the d i l i g e n t 
and scrupulous performance of r i t e s and ceremonies. This 
was perhaps the essence of Jewish morality. On the other 
hand, there was the appeal to authority and the emphasis on 
r i t u a l and ceremonial duty leading to a concealment and 
d i s t o r t i o n of essential morality. These, then, were the 
two d i s t i n c t ways i n which duty continued to be understood 
and interpreted i n Jewish society; i t either s i g n i f i e d the 
a t t i t u d e of love and gratitude, with only a nominal concern 
f o r r i t u a l , or else i t consisted almost e n t i r e l y i n r i t u a l 
and routine performances as prescribed by the canonical 
wr i t i n g s . Though one of these conceptions of duty did 
sometimes succeed i n pushing the other i n t o oblivion or i n -
significance, i t w i l l be reasonable to think that neither 
of them ever completely disappeared. Jewish morality, there-
fore, may be regarded as a compound of both these elements, 
and, perhaps, much more. But that there was a Jewish mor-
a l i t y i n the proper sense of the term i s proved beyond 
doubt. The b e l i e f i n a Righteous God, the awareness of a 
Moral Law or moral order imposed by t h i s God which had to 
be respected, and the conviction that there was a l i f e of 
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holiness which ought to be livedo—these and other elements 
had given the Jewish f a i t h a t r u l y moral orientation. And 
i t was against t h i s background and i n t o t h i s society that 
Jesus was born. 
(b) The l i f e and teaching of Jesus 
As we have seen, Jesus was a reformer and not a 
destroyer of Jewish morals and f a i t h . But what was i t that 
needed t h i s reform? The answer i s that at the time of 
Jesus' appearance, Jewish morality was perhaps i n i t s worst 
phase of decadence. Morality had no more remained a matter 
of the spontaneous choice and application of one's con-
science but had degenerated i n t o a l i f e l e s s code of do's 
and don't's which covered p r a c t i c a l l y a l l moments of an 
individual's l i f e . The essential morality of love and 
gratitude f o r deliverance had suffered a set-back and the 
perspective had been d i s t o r t e d . I t was Jesus' task to re-
store the perspective. Besides, Jewish morality suffered 
from i t s narrov; nationalism and parochialism. Even the 
best of the Jewish prophets had not succeeded i n freeing 
themselves from t h e i r obsession with I s r a e l , and t h e i r 
concern f o r deliverance was confined i n i t s appeal to the 
people of I s r a e l . Jesus converted t h i s f a i t h i n t o a uni-
versal r e l i g i o n i n which there was to be no d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the Jews and the Gentiles. Dr. Claude Montefiore, 
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a Jewish scholar, sums up s u c c i n c t l y the d i f f e r e n c e i n the 
a t t i t u d e s of the then Jews and Jesus i n the f o l l o w i n g words 
I t h i n k Rabbinic teaching was d e f e c t i v e about 
the love of the f o r e i g n e r and the i d o l a t e r , and 
t h a t Jesus might very w e l l have said, 'you a l l 
consider your neighbour t o be only your f e l l o w -
Jew, but I t e l l you t h a t the neighbour yhom you 
are t o love includes a l l men, the Roman and the 
Greek and the Syrian no le s s than the Jew.' That 
would by no means have been needless teaching....^ 
I t would be obvious from t h i s t h a t the task of Je-
sus was p r i m a r i l y t h a t of purging the Jewish f a i t h of i t s 
unnecessary r i t u a l i s m , l i t e r a l i s m and nationalism. E.W. 
H i r s t r i g h t l y remarks, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the " o r i g i n a l i t y " 
of C h r i s t i a n i t y was not so much i n i t s content as i n i t s 
"note o f a u t h o r i t y , i t s emphases, and i t s r e l i g i o u s s et-
2 
t i n g . " He i s of the opinion t h a t the content of the 
C h r i s t i a n e t h i c i s " f a r from being e n t i r e l y o r i g i n a l . " 
The C h r i s t i a n e t h i c , according t o him, had been a n t i c i p a t e d 
i n broad o u t l i n e s by some of the older r e l i g i o n s , the c l o s -
est approximation having occurred i n p r e - C h r i s t i a n Jewish 
l i t e r a t u r e — p a r t i c u l a r l y i n The Testaments of the Twelve 
P a t r i a r c h s , "a book w r i t t e n , presumably, i n the l a s t quar-
t e r of the second century B.C."^ *" He goes on t o quote 
•^Quoted by Henson, op. c i t . , p. 100. 
E^.W. H i r s t , Jesus and the M o r a l i s t s (Epworth Press, London, 
1955), p. 13. 
^ I b i d . , p. 11. 
4 I b i d . , p. IQ. 
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several a u t h o r i t i e s who have t r i e d t o r e l a t e the New 
Testament e t h i c t o i t s r o o t s i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r book. I t 
i s s t a t e d , on the a u t h o r i t y of H. Maldwyn Hughes, f o r ex-
ample, t h a t " i n t h i s book...we f i n d f o r the f i r s t time i n 
l i t e r a t u r e the union of the two commands t o love God and 
t o love our neighbour. This only emphasises our e a r l i e r 
observations t h a t the e t h i c of Jesus i s p r i m a r i l y based on 
t h a t of Judaism, and t h a t the Jewish e t h i c i n i t s f i n e r 
and more e s s e n t i a l aspect had much t o be proud of. But un-
f o r t u n a t e l y , at the time of Jesus' m i n i s t r y , Judaism had 
n e a r l y l o s t touch w i t h i t s l o f t y e t h i c and was i n need of 
someone who could r e s t o r e t h i s suppressed legacy back t o 
i t s r i g h t f u l place. Thus Jesus had on h i s hands more the 
problem of r i g h t a p p l i c a t i o n of precepts than of inno v a t i o n . 
From the Jewish t r a d i t i o n he took the "conception of the 
moral Law as expressing the w i l l of a Righteous God" and 
also the i d e a l s of love and holine s s , which, though found 
i n the s c r i p t u r e s , were r a r e l y allowed t o take t h e i r cen-
t r a l places i n the moral l i f e of the Jews. Jesus himself 
provided the " l a r g e r understanding of moral o b l i g a t i o n , " 
and, above a l l , a l i v i n g example of the moral i d e a l . 
Where p r e c i s e l y , then, d i d Jesus d i f f e r from the 
guardians of the contemporary Jewish f a i t h and morals? 
• ^ I b i d . , p. 12. 
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We can answer t h i s question very s a t i s f a c t o r i l y i n the 
words o f Henson: 
Jesus broke w i t h Pharisaism on the c a r d i n a l 
p o i n t of i t s mechanical conception of duty.... 
With increased i n s i s t e n c e and more august author-
i t y , He echoed the p r o t e s t s of I s a i a h and Amos 
against an esta b l i s h e d r e l i g i o n which had parted 
company w i t h fundamental m o r a l i t y , and, i n i t s 
emphasis on r i t u a l and ceremonial o b l i g a t i o n s , -j. 
had destroyed the t r u e perspective of human duty. 
This " p r o t e s t of I s a i a h and Amos," i t may be s t a t e d , was 
e s s e n t i a l l y nothing else but an ex h o r t a t i o n t o go back t o 
the e s s e n t i a l s p i r i t of the e t h i c preached by Moses i n 
the Deuteronomy. Jewish m o r a l i t y d u r i n g the time of Jesus 
had almost parte d company w i t h fundamental m o r a l i t y i n the 
sense t h a t i t was g r a d u a l l y f o r g o t t e n t h a t t h i s e t h i c was 
an.ethic of g r a t i t u d e f o r deliverance t h a t e n t a i l e d whole-
hearted love and surrender t o the w i l l of God and not 
merely the performance of r i t u a l and ceremonial duty. 
Complete obedience t o the w i l l of God, love f o r God and 
a genuine concern f o r d i s c o v e r i n g what God re q u i r e d of 
men, coupled w i t h the f e a r of God's w r a t h — t h i s was the 
essence of m o r a l i t y and the mark of holine s s . And a l l 
t h i s was t o be there because the redemption of men lay 
not i n performing s a c r i f i c e s and worshipping a t an 
appointed hour at the s h r i n e , but i n the mercy and 
"^Henson, op. c i t . , p. 102. 
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d i s c r e t i o n of a God who was t o be pleased not by meaning-
less r i t u a l but by the performance of good deeds. I s a i -
ah's advice i s a b s o l u t e l y p l a i n : 
B r i n g no more vai n o b l a t i o n s ; incense i s an 
abomination unto me.... 
To what purpose i s the m u l t i t u d e of your 
s a c r i f i c e s unto me? s a i t h the Lord: I am f u l l 
of the burnt o f f e r i n g s of rams, and the f a t of 
f e d beasts; and I d e l i g h t not i n the blood of 
b u l l o c k s , or of lambs, or of he goats. 
VJhat the Lord expects, according t o I s a i a h , i s t h i s : 
Wash you, make you clean; put away the e v i l 
of your doings from before mine eyes; cease t o 
do e v i l ; 
Learn t o do w e l l ; seek judgment, r e l i e v e the 
oppressed, judge the f a t h e r l e s s , plead f o r the 
widow.2 
This i s the essence of m o r a l i t y and t h i s i s what i s t o 
be done i n g r a t i t u d e f o r God's promise of deliverance. 
This was perhaps the t r u e s p i r i t of the e t h i c of Jesus 
He d i d not l a y down s p e c i f i c d e t a i l s of conduct f o r h i s 
f o l l o w e r s . The essence- of h i s e t h i c d i d not consist so 
much i n the f o l l o w i n g of commandments as i n the a t t i t u d e 
of t o t a l surrender of one's w i l l t o t h a t of God i n love 
and h u m i l i t y . "Not what I w i l l , but what thou w i l t " 
sets the tone of man's r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h God. 
^ I s a i a h 1:15; 11. 
^ I s a i a h 1:16,1?. 
^Mark 14:36. 
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Like I s a i a h , Jesus s h i f t s the emphasis from r i t e s 
t o "righteousness." 
For I say unto you. That except your r i g h t -
eousness s h a l l exceed the righteousness of the 
scri b e s and Pharisees, ye s h a l l i n no case enter 
i n t o the kingdom of heaven.1 
The kingdom of heaven i s the o b j e c t i v e and none but God 
can grant t h i s . I f one seeks redemption from h i s sins, 
l e t him be ri g h t e o u s , l e t him love God and h i s neighbour. 
Love God and love your neighbour-r--"on these two command-
ments hang a l l the law and the prophets." God loves men 
and i s prepared t o f o r g i v e t h e i r sins and save them only 
i f men would set t h e i r hearts on God, pray t o Him and be 
t h a n k f u l t o Him. This i s the s p i r i t of Jesus' e t h i c which 
transforms the concept of o b l i g a t i o n . Duty does not con-
s i s t i n meekly f o l l o w i n g t r a d i t i o n , but i n g e t t i n g oneself 
i n t o the r i g h t r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h God. He mocks the 
Pharisees f o r t h e i r perverted sense of values: "Howbeit 
i n v a i n do they worship me, teaching f o r d o c t r i n e the 
commandments of men."-^  Yes, the t r u e d o c t r i n e does not 
cons i s t i n the commandments of men but i n love and g r a t i t u d e 





others, redemption w i l l be our reward. The l o g i c of t h i s 
assurance i s p l a i n : 
I f ye then, being e v i l , know how t o give 
good g i f t s unto your c h i l d r e n ; how much more 
s h a l l your heavenly Father -give the Holy S p i r i t 
t o them t h a t ask Him?l 
To conclude, then, these are the main d e t a i l s i n 
which Jesus transformed the Jewish e t h i c of the time: he 
changed i t from a narrow n a t i o n a l t o a u n i v e r s a l e t h i c of 
love and forgiveness; he restored the proper sense and 
perspe c t i v e of o b l i g a t i o n , and f r e e d m o r a l i t y from mere 
a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m and s u p e r f i c i a l conventionalism; he t r i e d 
t o r e s t o r e the value of i n d i v i d u a l human conscience i n 
matters of morals: f o r the e t h i c of love and g r a t i t u d e 
t h a t he was preaching had t o be the response of the human 
hea r t , of the whole p e r s o n a l i t y of man, and not merely 
one's r e a c t i o n t o conventional r u l e s . This e t h i c of love 
and g r a t i t u d e had a very f a r - r e a c h i n g consequence i n de-
t e r m i n i n g the character of the C h r i s t i a n e t h i c and i n g i v -
i n g i t the c a t h o l i c i t y t h a t we i n t e n d t o i n v e s t i g a t e . 
Perhaps the other very important f a c t o r i n t h i s respect 
was the complexity of Jesus' own i n s i g h t and the many 
strands of h i s teaching and p r a c t i c e . - But we s h a l l come 
t o t h i s l a t e r . Meanwhile, l e t us examine the t h i r d f ac-
-••Luke 11:15. 
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development of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s , namely, the Greek and 
"Roman i n f l u e n c e s . 
( c ) The Greek and Roman inl'luences 
Our accounts of the e t h i c of the Jews and of t h a t 
preached by Jesus should have made i t amply c l e a r t h a t 
d e s p i t e the misplaced emphases and o r i e n t a t i o n of the foi?-
raer t h e r e i s nothing i n i t which may be e s s e n t i a l l y opposed 
t o the s p i r i t of the l a t t e r . I n fact,'Jesus had b u i l t on 
Jewish foundations. But when we come t o consider the 
Greek i n f l u e n c e on o r i g i n a l C h r i s t i a n m o r a l i t y , the p i c t u r e 
changes almost e n t i r e l y . I t i s no more merely a d i f f e r e n c e 
of emphasis; we now examine the impact of an e t h i c which 
i s d i f f e r e n t i n k i n d . Not only the goal of moral e f f o r t 
was d i f f e r e n t l y conceived by the Greeks; even the d e f i n i -
t i o n of moral l i f e was d i f f e r e n t , and so was the means of 
ac h i e v i n g a v i r t u o u s l i f e . To s t a r t w i t h , u n l i k e Jewish 
and C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s , Greek e t h i c s was not p r i m a r i l y God-
o r i e n t e d nor d i d v i r t u e connote a surrender t o God's w i l l . 
The moral law d i d not d e r i v e i t s a u t h o r i t y from the w i l l 
of God but from human reason. C h r i s t i a n theology regards 
the w i l l of man as e s s e n t i a l l y corrupt and e v i l ; hence 
the r e cannot be an appeal t o human reason, but only t o the 
redeeming love of God. That i s good f o r man which God 
commands. Thus the "prophets and Jesus never appeal t o 
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human reason or t o human conscience," but only t o the 
" w i l l of the Father.""*" This i s not so i n Greek e t h i c s . 
Here, though man i s regarded as a compound of reason and 
passion, the c o n v i c t i o n i s always there t h a t the d i s t i n c -
t i v e and s p e c i f i c a l l y human f a c u l t y i s reason. Hence 
v i r t u e c onsists i n r e l e g a t i n g the passions and leading a 
l i f e or reason proper. The source and f i n a l a r b i t e r of 
the moral l i f e , t h e r e f o r e , does not l i e i n anything ex-
t e r n a l , but i n the reason of man himself. A p r o p e r l y ac-
quired knowledge of the workings of reason w i l l automatic-
a l l y b r i n g w i t h i t a knowledge of r i g h t and wrong, of v i r -
tue and v i c e , and i f the lead of reason i s t o be fol l o w e d , 
the end w i l l be a v i r t u o u s and happy l i f e . Thus the goal 
of a moral l i f e i s happiness, eudaemonia. The model of a 
happy l i f e i s t o be found w i t h i n the human reason i t s e l f , 
and the achievement of t h i s p e r f e c t , happy or v i r t u o u s l i f e 
l i e s w i t h i n the powers of man himself, unaided by any 
supernatural agency. I n other words, what an asp i r a n t f o r 
the v i r t u o u s l i f e had t o do was t o l e t h i s reason take 
command of h i s e n t i r e l i f e , t o l e t h i s t r u e r a t i o n a l s e l f 
e s t a b l i s h i t s ascendancy over h i s passions. 
I t i s c l e a r , then, t h a t according t o the dominant 
l i n e of Greek t h i n k i n g , the i d e a l enjoined was t o become 
"""IA/.J. Verdenius, "Plato and C h r i s t i a n i t y , " Ratio, June, 
Q^ ^^, p. 24. — ' 
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master of one's s e l f , t o acquire proper self-hood v;ith 
the a i d of knowledge and pei^sonal d i l i g e n c e . I t was an 
e t h i c of self-autonomy, i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t i c i n conception 
and w h o l l y anthropocentric. C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s , on the oth-
er hand, ivas t h e o c e n t r i c i n as much as i t regarded the 
achievement of a v i r t u o u s l i f e p r i m a r i l y as a g i f t of God, 
d e f i n i t e l y beyond the powers of man w i t h o u t the grace of 
the Almighty. Man could s t r i v e , of course, but without 
the redeeming grace of God he could never reach the goal 
of h o l i n e s s . I t was no longer a question of mere s e l f -
d i s c i p l i n e or of knowledge. The only means of r e a l i s i n g 
v i r t u e or righteousness was a complete and l o v i n g submis-
sion t o the w i l l of God, whose mercy would lead a man t o 
h i s goal. 
Thus we f i n d an i nherent opposition between the 
Greek e t h i c of " n a t u r a l v i r t u e s " and the C h r i s t i a n e t h i c 
of " f a i t h . " One c o n t r a d i c t s the other, and the two approa-
ches t o e t h i c a l l i f e are s u r e l y c o n f l i c t i n g . Yet the new 
e t h i c of f a i t h could not simply brush aside the established 
e t h i c of n a t u r a l v i r t u e s , which had a tremendous appeal t o 
enlightened minds. The Greek masters, e s p e c i a l l y Plato 
and A r i s t o t l e , had s t a r t e d e x e r t i n g such a compelling 
f o r c e on t h i n k i n g minds of the day t h a t i t was impossible 
f o r even t h i s h i g h l y promising C h r i s t i a n e t h i c t o displace 
the e t h i c of self-achievement enunciated by the Greeks. 
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From t h i s there r e s u l t e d w i t h i n C h r i s t i a n h i s t o r y a con-
t i n u a l e f f o r t t o r e c o n c i l e and synthesise the two approa-
ches. I n the words of Jacob Taubes, 
The subsequent h i s t o r y of Western moral ex-
perience and thought may be described i n terras 
of the tension between the symbols of ' n a t u r a l ' 
v i r t u e and 'supernatural' f a i t h . I t i s the 
s t o r y of a continuous e f f o r t to synthesise 
these fundamentally c o n t r a d i c t o r y standards by 
c l a s s i f y i n g the Greek philosophic canon of v i r t u e s 
as the ' n a t u r a l ' norm f o r human behaviour, w h i l e 
t a k i n g the C h r i s t i a n standard of f a i t h , hope and 
love as a guide f o r the 'supernatural' order of 
man. 1 
The problem f o r C h r i s t i a n i t y since has been t h a t i t has 
been presented w i t h two opposing methodologies, n e i t h e r 
of which could be dispensed w i t h . Hence the lead i n g 
a u t h o r i t i e s on morals i n the West have been at pains t o 
devise a way i n which the Greek e t h i c of self-achievement 
could, w i t h o u t inconsistency, be accommodated i n s i d e the 
C h r i s t i a n e t h i c of f a i t h . The anxi e t y on the p a r t of 
theologians and m o r a l i s t s t o b r i n g C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s i n t o 
a meaningful r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h p h i l o s o p h i c a l e t h i c s i s 
no t h i n g but the outcome of t h i s e a r l i e r search f o r a 
compromise between C h r i s t i a n and Greek e t h i c s , f o r i t i s 
an undisputed f a c t t h a t Western p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h i n k i n g — 
whether i n e t h i c s or i n m e t a p h y s i c s — i s nothing more than 
"'"Jacob Taubes, "V i r t u e and F a i t h , " Philosophy East and West, A p r i l - J u l y , 1957, p. 27. _ - » i i - . > L ™ „ 
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a c o n t i n u a t i o n of the Greek t r a d i t i o n . We may say th a t 
i t i s t h i s desire f o r synthesis t h a t has r e s u l t e d i n what 
Paul Lehman c a l l s "the Thrust of C h r i s t i a n E t h i c s toward 
P h i l o s o p h i c a l E t h i c s , " the "most i n f l u e n t i a l " of these 
t h r u s t s being the " R e v i s i o n i s t t h r u s t of Augustine," "the 
Synthetic t h r u s t of Thomas Aquinas" and "the D i a - p a r a l l e l 
t h r u s t of Schleiermacher. "•*" The crux of the problem has 
been the i r r e c o n c i l a b i l i t y of self-achievement w i t h the 
b e l i e f i n the grace of God. Therefore, there have been 
attempts t o i n t e r p r e t the concept of grace i n such a way 
t h a t grace could be regarded as only a supernatural 
v a r i a n t on the self-achievement s t o r y . I n t h i s way i t 
has been po s s i b l e t o t r e a t grace as merely r e i n f o r c i n g 
man's own e f f o r t a t achieving m a t u r i t y or p e r f e c t i o n . 
Thus n a t u r a l v i r t u e s have been the norm of human behav-
i o u r , and f a i t h , hope and love have been regarded as g i v -
i n g shape t o the g r a t i t u d e by which a man prepares himself 
t o receive the r e i n f o r c i n g power of God's grace. This i s 
then the s t o r y of the co-existence of the e t h i c of s e l f -
achievement and the e t h i c of se l f - s u r r e n d e r , the e t h i c of 
" n a t u r a l " v i r t u e s and the e t h i c of "supernatural" f a i t h . 
The exact nature of t h i s co-existence i s summed up i n a 
passage i n Jacob Taubes' a r t i c l e , r e f e r r e d t o above: 
"•"Paul Lehman, Ethics i n a OhristIan _C_^ontext (SCM Press 
L t d . , London, 1963T, pp. 253ff. 
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The emphasis on e i t h e r of these elements has con-
t i n u e d t o s h i f t from time t o time. I n the c l a s s i c 
p e r i o d of C h r i s t i a n moral philosophy i n the Middle 
Ages the edges of both the canons were d u l l e d ; i n 
the d o c t r i n e s of Pelagius, Erasmus, Montaigne and 
Hegel the r e l i g i o u s statement was f l a t t e n e d out 
and formulated i n terms of a n a t u r a l philosophic 
canon. But i n the teachings of Augustine, Luther, 
Pascal, and Kierkegaard the consciousness of n 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n between the two realms f l a r e s up. 
I t would appear from t h i s t h a t i t has, on the whole, been 
an uneasy t r u c e between the two canons w i t h i n the wider 
framework of European and C h r i s t i a n morals. And, i t may 
be added, t h a t i t has been t h i s "tension between an e t h i c s 
of v i r t u e s and a l i f e of f a i t h t h a t i s the very d e n i a l of 
an e t h i c s of v i r t u e s " which has given " r i s e t o the p e c u l i a r 
dynamics which marks Western morail philosophy and moral 
theology throughout i t s h i s t o r y . " 
We now come t o another important i n f l u e n c e on e a r l y 
C h r i s t i a n m o r a l i t y which may be termed Graeco-Roman. This 
was the Stoic philosophy founded by Zeno and propagated 
by t h r e e famous men d u r i n g the days of the Roman Empire— 
Seneca, the statesman, E p i c t e t u s , the slave and Marcus 
A u r e l i u s , the Emperor. Though the Stoic School was founded 
by Zeno i n Greece, " i t was, however, when Stoicism passed 
from Greece t o Rome t h a t i t became s p e c i a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g 
from the p o i n t of view of C h r i s t i a n i t y . " That some of 
"'"Taubes, op. c i t . , p. 27. 
2 l b i d . , p. 52. 
5 H i r s t , op, c i t . , p. 70. 
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the e a r l y teachers of C h r i s t i a n i t y , notably the Apostle 
Paul, were i n close contact w i t h the then leading Stoics 
i s a h i s t o r i c a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d f a c t . I t i s possible t h a t 
as a r e s u l t of these contacts the Stoics also v;ere i n f l u -
enced by C h r i s t i a n teaching, and t h a t "the i n f l u e n c e was 
r e c i p r o c a l , b u t i t cannot be denied on any count t h a t 
e a r l y C h r i s t i a n m o r a l i t y came under Stoic i n f l u e n c e i n a 
s i g n i f i c a n t way. The most important Stoic influences'on 
C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s , perhaps, were the e t h i c of as c e t i c s e l f -
d e n i a l and the excessive stres s placed on the l i f e of 
reason. The Stoic i n s i s t e n c e on the l i f e of reason as 
against t h a t of passion was so pronounced t h a t the Stoic 
" t r i e d t o r i d himself as f a r as possible of emotion, and 
t o c u l t i v a t e 'apatheia' or apathy." This element of 
asceticism could without much d i f f i c u l t y penetrate i n t o 
the s t r u c t u r e of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s f o r the simple reason 
t h a t t h e r e were strong undercurrents of asceticism i n the 
teaching of Jesus himself. I n the words of J.E. Fison, 
The holiness of monasticism was profoundly a s c e t i c , 
and though i t s monastic expression was l a t e i n 
developing i n the C h r i s t i a n church, i t s ascetic 
emphasis was t r u e t o an i n d i s p u t a b l e element i n 
the l i f e and "t'eacHTng of Jesus Ch r i s t ^ He~rJesus) 
•••Ibid., p. 75. 
^ I b i d . , p. 75. 
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was himself unmarried.... He made the strongest 
p o s s i b l e demands on h i s f o l l o w e r s f o r poverty, 
c h a s t i t y , and obedience. He said i t was almost 
impossible f o r a r i c h man t o enter the kingdom 
of heaven.1 
He even went so f a r as t o demand the "hatred of k i t h and 
p 
k i n as a c o n d i t i o n of l o y a l t y t o God," This leaves no 
room f o r doubt about the presence of an element of 
asceticism i n Jesus' l i f e and teaching. What the Stoic' 
i n f l u e n c e d i d was merely t o sharpen t h i s element i n the 
teachings of the e a r l y C h r i s t i a n s . One example from St. 
John w i l l show how at a very e a r l y stage Stoic asceticism 
had entrenched i t s e l f i n C h r i s t i a n m o r a l i t y . No one can 
f a i l t o n o t i c e the a s c e t i c note i n these verses: 
Love not the world, n e i t h e r the t h i n g s t h a t 
a r o ' i n the world. I f any man love the world, 
the love of the Father i s not i n him. 
For a l l t h a t i s i n the world, the l u s t of 
the f l e s h , and the l u s t of the eyes, and the 
p r i d e of l i f e , i s not of the Father, but i s 
of the world. 
And the world passeth away, and the l u s t 
t h e r e o f : but he t h a t doeth the w i l l of God 
abideth f o r ever.5 
A c a r e f u l perusal of the h i s t o r y of e a r l y C h r i s t -
i a n m o r a l i t y makes i t d i f f i c u l t f o r one t o agree w i t h Hen-
son's r e f u t a t i o n of Dean Inge's remark t h a t " e a r l y C h r i s t i a n 
"^Pison, op. c i t . , p. 118 (emphasis mine). 
^ I b i d . , p. 119. 
5 I John 2:15-17. 
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e t h i c s . . .v^ere mainly S t o i c a l " and t h a t "the S t o i c a l e t h i c s 
were taken over by C h r i s t i a n i t y . ""^  This cleavage which the 
e a r l y C h r i s t i a n w r i t e r s created between the world and the 
Church remained d i s c e r n i b l e i n C h r i s t i a n m o r a l i t y f o r hun-
dreds of years w i t h a l l i t s world-denying i m p l i c a t i o n s , 
most conspicuously i n the monastic d i s c i p l i n e . Stoic as-
c e t i c i s m on the whole, hov/ever, r e f l e c t e d i t s e l f i n the 
sexual m o r a l i t y of the C h r i s t i a n s more than i n any other 
sphere. Perhaps i t was under t h i s ascetic i n f l u e n c e t h a t 
C h r i s t i a n i t y tended t o regard " V i r g i n i t y " as the " s p e c i f -
2 
i c a l l y C h r i s t i a n v i r t u e , and the essence of a l l v i r t u e s . " 
But i t would be a mistake t o t h i n k t h a t Chi-istian m o r a l i t y 
was a s c e t i c only i n i t s treatment of sex. The general note 
of C h r i s t i a n m o r a l i t y i t s e l f remained r a t h e r a s c e t i c r i g h t 
up t o the Middle Ages, and even now, i n s p i t e of the 
encroachments of m a t e r i a l i s t i c and hedonistic philosophies, 
an a s c e t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s should not 
n e c e s s a r i l y be regarded as h e r e t i c a l or scandalous. Whether 
01* not Henson i s c o r r e c t i n saying t h a t "the French revo-
l u t i o n was directed' against the ascetic character of 
C h r i s t i a n m o r a l i t y as w e l l as against the dogmatic demands 
of C h r i s t i a n f a i t h , ""^  he i s c e r t a i n l y not f a r from the 
"•"Henson, op. c i t . , p. 159. 
2 
Harnach, H i s t o r y of Dogma, I I I , 128, quoted by Henson, 
op. c i t . , p. 1'^  
•^Henson, op. c i t . , p. 198. 
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t r u t h so f a r as the asc e t i c character of C h r i s t i a n 
m o r a l i t y i s concerned. 
We may conclude, then, t h a t v^hatever i t s degree, 
asceticism i s not f o r e i g n t o the s p i r i t of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s , 
and t h a t t h i s has t o some extent been due t o the in f l u e n c e 
of the Graeco-Roman philoso;phy of Stoicism. With t h i s we 
must close our an a l y s i s of the Graeco-Roman i n f l u e n c e on 
C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s , f o r though Greece and Rome might surely 
have c o n t r i b u t e d other elements as w e l l , i t would be 
reasonable t o t h i n k t h a t the most s i g n i f i c a n t of these have 
been the ones we have already discussed. With the above 
account of the main streams t h a t helped t o give shape t o 
C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s i n i t s formative years, we s h a l l now 
b r i e f l y discuss some of the c h i e f r e - o r i e n t a t i o n s of and 
emphases on the various elements of t h i s e t h i c s i n some 
of the l a t e r t h i n k e r s and i n t e r p r e t e r s . 
(d) Some l a t e r accents i n the h i s t o r y of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s 
Of a l l the r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s and emphases put on 
one or the other aspect of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s i n i t s l a t e r 
days, perhaps the most s i g n i f i c a n t was the i n t e l l e c t u a l -
i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of St. Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas, w i t h 
h i s deep r o o t s i n Greek, e s p e c i a l l y A r i s t o t e l i a n , thought, 
regards b e a t i t u d e as the highest end of l i f e , and considers 
the natui-e of t h i s b e a t i t u d e as e s s e n t i a l l y speculative. 
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"The act c o n s t i t u t i n g b e a t i t u d e must t h e r e f o r e be of a 
specu l a t i v e nature, and t h i s amounts t o saying t h a t t h i s 
act must consist i n conbemplation. ""^  The attainment of 
beatit u d e i s n e c e s s a r i l y an i n t e l l e c t u a l operation and i s 
i d e n t i c a l w i t h what Lehman might c a l l the "ascetic or 
contemplative crown of the C h r i s t i a n l i f e at the end." 
I n h i s words, 
The discussion of the t h e o l o g i c a l v i r t u e s at the begin-
n i n g of the Secunda secundiae, and of the as c e t i c 
or contemplative crown of the C h r i s t i a n l i f e a t the 
end, w i t h the treatment of the c a r d i n a l v i r t u e s i n 
between, provides s u b s t a n t i a l c o n f i r m a t i o n of the 
f a c t t h a t both the s p i r i t and the l e t t e r of Thomas' 
argument are marked by the ascetic and m y s t i c a l 
approaches t o the C h r i s t i a n l i f e which dominated 
the Middle Ages.2 
I t i s needless t o emphasise t h a t t h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t i c 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s by Aquinas has exer-
cised a considerable i n f l u e n c e , e s p e c i a l l y i n Catholic 
moral theology, and has become the f a v o u r i t e of those who 
v/ish t o adopt some form of s t r i c t l y r a t i o n a l i s t i c e t h i c 
v/ithout having t o d i s c a r d t h e i r C h r i s t i a n f a i t h . We may 
f e e l tempted t o quote a sentence from Lehman about the 
q u a l i t y and s i g n i f i c a n c e of Aquinas' achievement. He says: 
-dtienne Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 
t r a n s . Edward BulloughTTw. Heffer and Sons Xtd., Gam-bridge, 1929), p. 341. 
Lehman, op. c i t . , pp. 39f. 
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I t was Aquinas who made room f o r a l l men w i t h i n 
the household of f a i t h . And lie d i d i t by an 
ing e n i o u s l y c o n t r i v e d synthesis of reason and 
f a i t h , nature and grace, A r i s t o t l e and the B i b l e , 
r a t i o n a l and t h e o l o g i c a l v i r t u e , moral philosophy 
and C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s . ^ 
Perhaps not as a b i d i n g or as important an i n f l u -
ence as t h a t of Aquinas, but nonetheless a very s i g n i f i -
cant one has been t h a t exerted by the work of Sb. Thomas 
a Kempis of the l a t e Middle Ages. I n h i s celebrated work, 
I m i t a t i o n of C h r i s t , the emphasis s h i f t s t o an a l t o g e t h e r 
new element: "the c e n t r a l place i n C h r i s t i a n p i e t y and 
behaviour i s occupied by the Passion of C h r i s t . " This 
"Passion Mysticism"-^ may not have been a completely new 
element w i t h i n C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s but the emphasis was 
c e r t a i n l y new, and might p o s s i b l y have given r i s e t o 
tendencies w i t h i n C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s which q u i t e o f t e n l e d 
t o what W i l l i a m James c a l l s the "theopathic c o n d i t i o n ' ^ of 
the mind. Lehman's a n a l y s i s of the source as w e l l as the 
consequence of t h i s new emphasis seems t o be a very f a i r 
statement of the p o s i t i o n . " I t must be admitted," he says, 
t h a t t h i s concentration upon the l a s s i o n of C h r i s t 
c o n t r i b u t e d t o the understanding of the s a c r i f i c i a l 
c haracter of the love of God. But i t must also be 
•^ I b i d . , p. 257. 
^ I b i d . , p. 39. 
^ I b i d . , p. 39. 
^ W i l l i a m James, V a r i e t i e s of Reli^j;ious Experience (Long-
mans Green and Co., 1929), P. 3^1-3. 
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noted t h a t t h i s 'Passion Mysticism' was nourished 
by the Bride f i g u r e of the Song of Songs as w e l l 
as by the C r u c i f i x i o n . The e f f e c t of t h i s was t o 
sensualize and even t o sentimentalize the love 
f o r C h r i s t , a consequence confirmed not only by 
medieval mysticism but by e v a n g e l i c a l hymnody, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the Passion hymns.^ 
This u n d e r l i n e s a f a c t seldom r e a l i s e d , namely, t h a t 
sensualism or sentimentalism i n the love of God i s not, 
or a t l e a s t has not been, q u i t e a l i e n t o the s p i r i t of 
C h r i s t i a n p i e t y and behaviour. 
A mention of Kant i n course of t h i s enumeration of 
the sources of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s may s u r p r i s e some people, 
but i t i s g e n e r a l l y admitted these days t h a t though the 
c r i t i c a l philosophy of Kant was founded o s t e n s i b l y on 
independent sources, h i s deep r o o t s i n C h r i s t i a n thought 
were a formidable i n f l u e n c e i n shaping h i s thought. On 
the other hand, he has himself i n f l u e n c e d considerably 
C h r i s t i a n e t h i c a l t h i n k i n g since h i s day. This i s brought 
out c l e a r l y i n the f o l l o w i n g passage from Lehman: 
The A r i s t o t e l i a n search f o r the Good has c h i e f l y 
i n f l u e n c e d C h r i s t i a n t h i n k i n g about e t h i c s through 
the f ormative mind of Thomas Aquinas. But i f 
c l a s s i c a l eudamonisra may be said t o be nearer t o 
the e t h i c a l thought of Roman Catholicism, a p a r a l l e l 
claim may be made as regards the c r i t i c a l philosophy 
and the e t h i c a l thought of the Reformation.2 
"'"Lehman, op. c i t . , p. 59. 
'^^Ibid., p. 172. 
The d e o n t o l o g i c a l e t h i c s of Kant might have had i t s roots 
i n the C h r i s t i a n c a l l t o a.o the W i l l of God, and the 
Ca t e g o r i c a l Imperative might have been the r a t i o n a l i s t i c 
counterpart of the C h r i s t i a n Divine Imperative, but i t 
cannot be denied t h a t the renewed s t r e s s by Kant on ab-
s o l u t e obedience t o the Imperative has added a new r e l e -
vance t o the arguments of the theologians and C h r i s t i a n 
m o r a l i s t s regarding absolute submission t o the W i l l of God— 
the Divine Imperative. 
The temptation t o extend t h i s a n alysis t o modern 
exponents of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s , l i k e Emil Brunner, Keinhold 
Niebuhr, K a r l Barth and D i e t r i c h BonhSffer, may be great, 
e s p e c i a l l y i n view of the f a c t t h a t the subHeties of t h e i r 
arguments and the v a r i e t y of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s may lend 
f u r t h e r support t o our t h e s i s t h a t C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s i s 
comprehensive and e l a s t i c . But i t seems q u i t e reasonable 
t o b e l i e v e t h a t a l l these t h i n k e r s — t h o u g h d i f f e r i n g i n 
matters of d e t a i l — h a v e g e n e r a l l y adopted one or the other 
, of the various p o s i t i o n s we have already discussed. More-
over, i t seems reasonable t o suppose t h a t the case f o r the 
e l a s t i c i t y of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s has been adequately ex-
pounded i n the foregoing. Furthermore, the s u b t l e t y of 
the r e c i p r o c a l i n f l u e n c e s of democratic and s c i e n t i f i c 
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ideas w i t h those of C h r i s t i a n i t y t h a t one encounters i n 
d e a l i n g w i t h modern e t h i c a l thought c o n t r i b u t e s increased 
complexity t o a consideration t h a t i s already amply com-
plex. Both kinds of claims are made, and the controversy 
i s not r e a l l y s e t t l e d as t o whether s c i e n t i f i c advances 
transformed the C h r i s t i a n outlook or the C h r i s t i a n t r a d i -
t i o n helped the growth of science. But i t may perhaps be 
d e s i r a b l e t o remember the note sounded i n t h i s " b i t i n g 
epigram" of T.H. Huxley: 
When there i s a new t h i n g i n science, they 
f i r s t say ' I t ' s impossible!' Then they say, 
' I t ' s against the B i b l e . ' Then they say, 'We 
knew i t a l l the time. '-^  
Though our a n a l y s i s i s by no means exhaustive, 
nonetheless t h i s a n a l y s i s perhaps does demonstrate one 
t h i n g : any o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n of the content of C h r i s t i a n 
m o r a l i t y betrays an ignorance of the diverse f a c t o r s t h a t 
c o n s t i t u t e i t . The f a c t i s t h a t whatever i t s o r i g i n a l 
creed-—and even t h a t was not s i m p l e — C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s t o -
day i s a h i g h l y complex phenomenon which contains diverse 
elements and i s subject t o various i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , cap-
able of c a t e r i n g t o the t a s t e s of various i n d i v i d u a l s 
and groups w i t h i n a h i g h l y extensive and comprehensive 
framework. With t h i s account of the c o n s t i t u e n t s 
"^Quoted by S.C. Carpenter i n C h r i s t i a n i t y (Penguin Books, 1953), p. 134. 
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of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s , we must now t u r n t o Hindu e t h i c s 
and examine what the p i c t u r e i s l i k e there. 
Sources and Development of Hindu Ethics 
Hindu e t h i c s d i s p l a y s a much greater v a r i e t y and 
i s c o n s t i t u t e d of many more elements than we have been 
able t o t r a c e i n C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s . This i s q u i t e under-
standable, f o r Hinduism has always accepted, almost as a 
p a r t of i t s creed, t h a t human beings are d i f f e r e n t l y con^ 
s t i t u t e d and t h a t among them there are innumerable d i f f e r -
ences of temperament, t r a i n i n g and l e v e l of a s p i r a t i o n . 
This being so, the e t h i c a l goal w i l l obviously be approached 
i n various ways, and the e t h i c a l i d e a l w i l l always be sub-
j e c t t o various i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . I t i s t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n 
of d i f f e r e n c e s i n temperament and t r a i n i n g t h a t has been 
responsible f o r the growth of some of the well-known Hindu 
s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s such as the Varna-Asrama Dharma or the 
i n s t i t u t i o n of class and stages i n l i f e . But apart from 
t h i s , an eq u a l l y i f not more important f a c t o r i n shaping 
Hindu e t h i c s i n t o i t s h i g h l y complex and comprehensive 
character has been the extreme, sometimes even unquestion-
i n g , reverence of the Hindus f o r the Vedic and Upanisadic 
l i t e r a t u r e . The vast range of t h i s l i t e r a t u r e contains 
various strands of thought, some of which may be considered 
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i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h others. But i n h i s extreme regard f o r 
a u t h o r i t y , the Hindu has tended t o regard every idea muted 
i n t h i s l i t e r a t u r e as e q u a l l y sacred and, t h e r e f o r e , equally 
worthy of al l e g i a n c e and a t t e n t i o n . When some of these 
ideas and i d e a l s have been found t o be mutually c o n f l i c t i n g , 
the n a t u r a l r e a c t i o n of the Hindu m o r a l i s t s and men of 
l e a r n i n g has been t o regard each of them as a l t e r n a t i v e 
r a t h e r than t o d i s c a r d any of them i n favour of the other. 
Synthesis and compromise r a t h e r than c r i t i c i s m and elimin a -
t i o n have been the g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e s of Hindu teachers and 
commentators. Compromise has q u i t e o f t e n been possible 
only a t the cost of consistency, and the net r e s u l t f o r the 
character of Hindu e t h i c s has been e l a s t i c i t y leather than 
exclusiveness, and i n f i n i t e complexity r a t h e r than w e l l -
d e f i n e d s i m p l i c i t y . Almost every form of b e l i e f and prac-
t i c e w i t h i n Hinduism can be traced t o ideas and concepts 
e i t h e r i m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y l a i d down V i / i t h i n t h i s 
immense l i t e r a t u r e , so t h a t Hindu e t h i c s , u n l i k e C h r i s t i a n 
e t h i c s , has received l i t t l e by way of f o r e i g n i n f l u e n c e . 
Hindu e t h i c s i s almost e n t i r e l y an indigenous grov/th. Our 
a n a l y s i s of the c o n s t i t u e n t elements of Hindu e t h i c s , t h e r e -
f o r e , w i l l have t o f o l l o w a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t p a t t e r n from 
t h a t of our ana l y s i s of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s . We s h a l l not 
enumerate the various i n f l u e n c e s from d i f f e r e n t sources 
but r a t h e r take account of the s i g n i f i c a n t e t h i c a l concepts 
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found i n each of the important groups of Hindu l i t e r a t u r e . 
The main groups of r e l i g i o u s l i t e r a t u r e i n the 
Hindu t r a d i t i o n are (a) the Vedas and the Brahmanas, (b) 
the Upanisads and ( c ) the Epics and Puranas. Our account 
of the e t h i c a l concepts w i l l , accordingly, have these three 
main heads. But the Bhagavadgita, though only a p a r t of 
the t h i r d group, occupies i n Hindu l i t e r a t u r e a s i n g u l a r l y 
important place and has exercised a considerable construc-
t i v e i n f l u e n c e on the Hindu mind. I t would be proper, 
t h e r e f o r e , t o discuss the e t h i c a l ideas of the Gita under 
a separate head. This w i l l complete our account of e a r l y 
Hindu e t h i c s . To t h i s w i l l be added a section d e a l i n g w i t h 
the main emphases i n the l a t e r development of the e t h i c a l 
t h i n k i n g of the Hindus i n which we w i l l comment on the 
thought of such t h i n k e r s as Shamkara and Eamanuga. 
(a) The e t h i c a l concepts i n the Vedas 
Like so much else, i n the i n t e l l e c t u a l and r e l i g i o u s 
h e r i t a g e of the Hindus, t h e i r t h i n k i n g about e t h i c s must 
be t r a c e d back t o i t s beginnings i n the Vedas, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
the Rga Veda. Qf the f o u r Vedas, the two more deserving of 
a t t e n t i o n f o r our purposes are, of course, the Rga and the 
Atharva, but i n view of the f a c t t h a t the l a t t e r mostly 
presupposes and enlarges on the former, our account w i l l 
by and l a r g e concern i t s e l f w i t h the e t h i c a l ideas of the 
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former. I t should be remembered t h a t the e a r l i e s t of the 
Vedas were probably w r i t t e n three t o f o u r thousand years 
ago or even e a r l i e r , and so i t would be absurd t o regard 
them as t r e a t i s e s on e t h i c s . I t i s not at a l l s u r p r i s i n g , 
t h e r e f o r e , t h a t "any system of e t h i c s t h a t might be d i s -
covered i n the Rga Veda i s of a very rud.imentary sort.""*" 
What i s a c t u a l l y s u r p r i s i n g i s the presence i n the Vedas 
of some concepts which suggest an extremely w e l l developed 
moral consciousness. Commenting on the conception of Rta 
i n the .Rga Veda, John Mackenzie observes. 
Yet i t i s very s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t a t t h i s early-
stage we should f i n d such a u n i f y i n g conception 
as t h a t of Law or Order, pervading a l l t h i n g s , 
expressing i t s e l f i n the order of nature and i n 
the manifestations of man's r e l i g i o u s l i f e , and 
tend i n g t o be associated v;ith one Supreme God. 2 
E. \h Hopkins, concluding h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n of "The Vedic 
Idea of Sin and Law," has t h i s t o say about the e t h i c a l 
content of the Rga Veda: 
M o r a l i t y i s an expression of d i v i n e law; 
s i n i s oppo s i t i o n t o t h a t law. The sinner i s 
one who i s out of harmony w i t h the higher 
s p i r i t u a l environment which encompasses and 
c o n t r o l s the world.3 
j~~ 
John Mackenzie, Hindu Et h i c s (Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1922}, p. 7* 
^ I b i d . , p. 7. 
-^ E. W. Hopkins, Et h i c s of I n d i a (Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1924), p. 44. ' 
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I t should be c l e a r from the above remarks t h a t though the 
Vedas contain on the whole q u i t e a number of accounts of 
what appears t o us t o be obscure and o c c u l t r i t u a l and 
s a c r i f i c e , there i s undoubtedly an e t h i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n of 
r e l i g i o u s thought and p r a c t i c e . 
This r e c o g n i t i o n of a moral element, though i m p l i e d 
i n even the very concept of b r i g h t , benefic/ent gods— 
"Devas—shining, f a i r as opposed t o Raksas, meaning insur-
ers who go about by n i g h t " " * • — i s noticeable above a l l i n 
the conception of Rta, the Moral Law or Order, pervading 
the e n t i r e universe. Rta means f i t or o r d e r l y as the 
E n g l i s h word "good" o r i g i n a l l y meant or as the German 
" g u o t i " means. An rta,, i t s opposite, means falsehood or 
bad. Rta, t h e r e f o r e , stands f o r harmony or a moral order 
2 
i n the world. I t i s t r u e t h a t Rta i s used i n a very com-
prehensive sense; i t represents not only the moral order 
but also the n a t u r a l order as w e l l as the "ordered course 
of the s a c r i f i c e . " But i t must be made clear t h a t , though 
manifested i n these various orders, Rta i s a u n i t y . The 
moral i m p l i c a t i o n and o r i e n t a t i o n of the concept of Rta 
becomes c l e a r e r when we take note of one p a r t i c u l a r ob-
s e r v a t i o n made by Henry Lefever. He i s of the opinion 
l l b i d . , p. 2. 
^ I b i d . , p. 2. 
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t h a t Rta, though o b j e c t i v e , i s s t i l l i d e a l i n a sense. 
While making t h i s p o i n t he says: 
I t i s i n the sphere of human conduct, however, 
t h a t the diffei-ence between i d e a l and a c t u a l i t y 
i s most s t r o n g l y marked. However regul a r the 
operation of Eta i n the n a t u r a l world may be, 
i t i s expressly s t a t e d i n IX, 75, 6 (R.V.) t h a t 
the wicked ' t r a v e l not the pathway of ipta. ' Man, 
as B e t t y Heimann remarks, i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from 
nature i n t h a t he i s placed before the a l t e r -
n a t i v e s , t o act i n accordance w i t h y t a or not. 
Now the moral s i g n i f i c a n c e of Rta i s important because 
t h i s i s the concept which has given r i s e t o two other 
Hindu concepts which have a p r i m a r i l y e t h i c a l bearing. 
These are the concept of Dharraa and the Law of Karma. 
I t i s u n i v e r s a l l y recognised these days t h a t 
Dharma i s a very complex concept and i s , t h e r e f o r e , 
v a r i o u s l y t r a n s l a t e d and i n t e r p r e t e d . But t h i s should 
not lead us i n t o b e l i e v i n g t h a t i t i s vague or i l l -
d e f ined. As G. H. Mees suggests, Dharma, l i k e many of 
t h ^ conceptions of ancient c u l t u r e s ( I n d i a , Greece, Rome, 
et c . ) and l i k e the modern word "law," i s indeterminate 
r a t h e r than vague. And h i s reason f o r s t r e s s i n g t h i s 
d i s t i n c t i o n i s t h a t i n h i s opinion "indeterminateness does 
not preclude inner c l a r i t y , whereas vagueness i s the 
p 
opposite of c l a r i t y . " Thus the ancient Hindus allowed 
Henry Lefever, The Vedic Idea of Sin (London Mission 
Press, Travancore, India," "1"95577 P* 7. 
G. H. Mees, Dharma and Society (Luzac and Co., London, 1935), p. 5. ~~ ~ 
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Dharma t o stand f o r v a r i o u s t h i n g s not because of t h e i r 
f a i l u r e t o define i t but because of t h e i r e f f o r t t o name 
t h a t all-embracing p r i n c i p l e which would cover a l l aspects 
of a man's l i f e ; t h e r e f o r e , i t q u i t e n a t u r a l l y took 
d i f f e r e n t meanings i n d i f f e r e n t contexts. Though i t 
would be possible t o d i s t i n g u i s h between these various 
aspects of Dharma, l e t us not lose s i g h t of the f a c t t h a t 
i n the u l t i m a t e a n a l y s i s there could be only one Dharma— 
the fundamental Law or Order, var y i n g i n manifes t a t i o n and 
a p p l i c a t i o n but one i n essence. Dr. Bhagvan Das' d e f i n i -
t i o n of Dharma, quoted and h i g h l y commended by G. H. Mees, 
may convey the f u l l extent of the e l a s t i c i t y i n the mean-
i n g of the term. According t o him, Dharma i s 
. . . t h a t which holds a t h i n g together, makes i t 
what i t i s , prevents i t from breaking up and 
changing i t i n t o something else; i t s character-
i s t i c f u n c t i o n , i t s p e c u l i a r property, i t s 
fundamental a t t r i b u t e , i t s e s s e n t i a l nature, 
i s i t s dharma, the law of i t s being.... B r i e f l y , 
dharma i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c property, s c i e n t i f i -
c a l l y ! duty, m o r a l l y and l e g a l l y ; r e l i g i o n w i t h 
a l l i t s proper i m p l i c a t i o n s , psycho-physically 
and s p i r i t u a l l y ; and righteousness and law 
ge n e r a l l y , but duty above a l l . 
Since there w i l l be several occasions f o r more d e t a i l e d 
examinations of t h i s concept, we s h a l l close t h i s d i s -
cussion of i t f o r the time being w i t h the observation t h a t 
"'"Dr. Bhagvan Das, The Science of Social Organisation, as 
quoted by Mees, op. c i t . , p7*~H7 
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Dharma p r i m a r i l y s i g n i f i e d the Moral Law, and i s e s s e n t i a l l y 
the same as the Jewish "Tora^^." 
The other concept w i t h an eminently e t h i c a l s i g n i f -
icance which, along w i t h Dharma, was derived from the Rga 
Vedic Kta was the Lav/ of Karma. We may say t h a t the Lav; 
of Karma s i g n i f i e s t h a t there i s a uniform moral law gov-
er n i n g the actions of men and the rewards and punishments 
ap p r o p r i a t e t o such a c t i o n s . I n very simple terms, t h i s 
law i s an e x p l i c i t c r e d a l r e c o g n i t i o n of the t r u t h i m p l i e d 
i n the commonly known proverb, "As you sow, so you reap." 
I t would perhaps not be misleading t o suggest t h a t t h i s law 
might be described as the counterpart i n the moral f i e l d 
of the Lavj of Conservation of Energy, f o r i t i m p l i e s t h a t 
every a c t i o n — g o o d or b a d — t h a t v/e perform i n e v i t a b l y 
generates c e r t a i n s u b t l e potencies which determine our 
character and circumstances during our f u t u r e e x i s t e n c e ( s ) . 
I n other words, i t i s impossible f o r us t o escape the 
consequences of our a c t i o n s . The germs of t h i s p r i n c i p l e 
are already n o t i c e a b l e i n the Rga Veda and the Atharva 
Veda v/herein i t i s recognised t h a t the " s i n can not be 
escaped.""^ This law provides a c l e a r i n c e n t i v e t o r i g h t -
eous conduct, f o r i f i t i s impossible t o escape the con-
sequences of actions and i f only r i g h t conduct can lead t o 
•^Hopkins, op. c i t . , pp. 46f. 
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b e n e f i c i a l r e s u l t s , there would n a t u r a l l y be an urge t o 
do what i s considered good. 
I t should be remarked t h a t the Law of Karma i s 
only a s p e c i a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the e t e r n a l moral order, 
Dharraa, and t h a t the two concepts are a l l i e d and comple-
mentary. I n the words of Mees, 
Dharma i s Karman, but much more than t h a t , f o r i t 
i s not only the tendency due t o past and present 
work, but also the d i v i n e tendency hidden i n the 
inmost being of man, t o u n f o l d i n the f u t u r e . 
Dharma i s the law of h i s unfoldment, the d i v i n e i n -
ner p o t e n t i a l i t y . I f Karman i m p l i e s law and bond-
age, Dharma holds the element of Divine Grace and 
the p r i n c i p l e of freedom. Karman i s a law of cause -]_ 
and e f f e c t , Dharma i s l a r g e l y e t h i c a l and r e l i g i o u s . 
This mutual i n t e r r e l a t e d n e s s of Dharma and Karma i s of t e n 
l o s t s i g h t o f , even by able commentators, thus leading t o 
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y understanding of both these concepts. But 
we need not dwel l on t h i s p o i n t now. 
What i s worth s p e c i a l n o t i c e a t t h i s stage i s t h a t 
both these concepts, but p r i m a r i l y Dharma, have reference 
t o a d i v i n e agency. This d i v i n e power v/hose laws Dharma 
Karma represent i s o f t e n e x t o l l e d i h the Vedic hymns 
as the highest and the f i r s t among gods. Though each one 
of the various gods, being p a r t of the d i v i n e o r g a n i s a t i o n 
of t h i n g s , i s more or less responsible f o r the maintenance 
of Rta, i t i s above a l l Varuna who i s more of t e n than any 
•^Mees, op. c i t . , p. 20. 
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other god associated w i t h Rta as i t s guardian. The heno-
theism of the Vedas becomes e s p e c i a l l y manifest i n the 
context of Rta. Though many gods are mentioned and invoked, 
there seems at the same time t o be c l e a r r e c o g n i t i o n of the 
u l t i m a t e o v e r l o r d s h i p of one over the r e s t . Though Indra 
i s o f t e n declared i n the Rga Veda t o be the c h i e f God, 
Varuna i s the d e i t y s p e c i a l l y r e l a t e d w i t h prayers f o r 
moral guidance. Varuna i s even r e f e r r e d t o i n the char-
a c t e r i s t i c C h r i s t i a n way as Holy Father ( P i t a Ya.jatras)."^ 
Thus we n o t i c e not only t h a t the e t h i c s of the Vedas i s 
God-oriented, but also t h a t there i s a c l e a r movement 
toward monism, which f i n a l l y establishes i t s e l f i n the 
philosophy of the Upanisads. I n the words of Hopkins, 
...the b r i g h t gods, l i k e the p a r t s of a k a l e i d o -
scope, rearranged themselves and became u n i t e d 
i n t o one whole. At the very end of the Rga Veda 
the p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n of Right Order as a divine 
personal power, preceded by such p a r a l l e l s t a t e -
ments as t h a t the r e g u l a r succession of days i s 
i n accordance w i t h the s t a t u t e s "of Varuria" and 
"of Rta" (Order), leads t o Great Order being 
invoS:ed as a God along w i t h other deities.-^ 
According t o t h i s passage, Rta—-the foundation of Dharma 
•^Hopkins, op. c i t . , p. 42. 
p 
On the s t r e n g t h of several statements i n the gga Veda 
i t i s p o s s i b l e t o argue t h a t Vedic thought was monistic 
from the s t a r t ; but t h i s makes no d i f f e r e n c e t o the 
e s s e n t i a l e t h i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . 
•^Hopkins, op, c i t . , pp. 40f, 
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and Karma—is not only being r e f e r r e d t o the highest of 
the Gods, but i s being i t s e l f transformed i n t o the highest 
D i v i n i t y . This should leave no room f o r doubt as t o the 
e t h i c a l character of the Vedic f a i t h . 
We must confess, however, t h a t owing t o the devel-
opment of c e r t a i n "magical" and o c c u l t p r a c t i c e s i n the 
l a t e r Vedas, some w r i t e r s on Hinduism have come t o believe 
t h a t t h e e s s e n t i a l l y e t h i c a l character of the Rga-Vedic 
f a i t h i s not only impaired but l o s t completely i n l a t e r 
Vedic thought. To give only one example of such t h i n k i n g , 
l e t us examine Mackenzie's opinion. Soon a f t e r expressing 
h i s a d m i r a t i o n f o r the concept of Rta and i t s e t h i c a l 
s i g n i f i c a n c e i n a passage quoted e a r l i e r , he relapses i n t o 
a mood of lamentation: 
But u n f o r t u n a t e l y , long before the Vedic p e r i o d 
ended other conceptions had arisen and displaced 
i t , and i n the h i s t o r y of Indian e t h i c a l thought 
i t has not been upon the idea of an o v e r r u l i n g 
God, righterous i n Himself, seeking righteousness 
of His people, and h e l p i n g them i n the attainment 
of i t , t h a t the moral l i f e has been grounded.^ 
That Mackenzie's dismay i s unwarranted w i l l perhaps be 
c l e a r e r as we proceed w i t h our a n a l y s i s . Per the present 
we s h a l l content ourselves w i t h the observ&ition t h a t Dharma 
has always been the basis of moral l i f e i n I n d i a , i n s p i t e 
•'"Mackenzie, op. c i t . , p. 7. 
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of a l l appearances t o the contrary. Mees, f o r example, i s 
of the opinion t h a t " i n the d i f f e r e n t periods of Indian 
h i s t o r y Dharraa, and not Moksha, came on the whole foremost 
as i d e a l and was considered as supreme.""'' Ko student of 
Indian r e l i g i o u s thought can deny t h a t i n I n d i a there have 
been other conceptions of d e i t y than the one of which 
Mackenzie speaks, but i t w i l l a t the same time be imposs-
i b l e f o r anyone t o f o r g e t the tremendous r o l e of Dharma 
i n the l i f e of the tlindu. And i f we remember the connec-
t i o n of Dharma v i i t h Rta, i t w i l l be seen t h a t there i s no 
cause f o r Mackenzie's lamentation. Hopkins may be nearer 
the t r u t h when he says, 
...A lower order of magic submerged the l o f t i e r 
thought of the Rga Veda ( i n the post-Rga-Vedic 
p e r i o d ) , yet i t could not do away w i t h the e t h i c a l 
consciousness already awakened, nor d i d i t en-
t i r e l y suppress the idea t h a t m o r a l i t y was an 
expression of s p i r i t u a l worth d i v i n e l y implanted 
i n man.2 
I t w i l l not be unreasonable t o conclude from a l l 
t h i s t h a t the e t h i c s of the Vedas was on the whole not 
very u n l i k e the e t h i c s of the Jews before the advent of 
Jesus. Like t h a t of the Jews, the e t h i c s of the Vedic 
Plindus was p r i m a r i l y God-oriented, and there was a d i s t i n c t 
•^ Mees, op. c i t . , p. 26. 
2 
Hopkins, op. c i t . , p. 62. 
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r e c o g n i t i o n of a d i v i n e Moral Order or a Moral Law, con-
f o r m i t y w i t h which was the essence of moral l i f e . But 
when i t came t o the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Law i n the con-
t e x t of a c t u a l p r a c t i c e , two d i f f e r e n t emphases a t t r a c t e d 
people's a t t e n t i o n . There were those who thought t h a t 
m o r a l i t y consisted of discharging one's d u t i e s — c e r e m o n i a l , 
r i t u a l , and s a c r i f i c i a l - — t o the gods and the "fathei's. " 
The emphasis here on ceremonial and s a c r i f i c e r e s u l t e d from 
the tendency t o i n t e r p r e t the s c r i p t u r e s l i t e r a l l y . But 
i t has t o be confessed t h a t t h i s l i t e r a l i s m , w i t h i t s stress 
on occ u l t i s m and s a c r i f i c e , i s by no means the only ap-
proach t o the e t h i c o - r e l i g i o u s goal. Perhaps the more 
important and e s s e n t i a l element i n the Vedic e t h i c i s t h a t 
of love and worship o f f e r e d t o the gods i n complete sub-
mission. For the r e c o g n i t i o n i s there t h a t the gods are 
l o v i n g and benevolent and guard those who worship and 
love them. The statement t h a t "the Gods f u r t h e r him t h a t 
loves them and l i k e s u i t o r s r e j o i c e i n him who loves the 
Brahma, ""^  sets the tone of the personal r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t 
the Vedic Hindu desires t o have w i t h h i s gods. I n f a c t , 
the e t h i c of love and obedience t h a t was l a t e r adopted 
by the t h e i s t i c schools has i t s r o o t s i n the Rga Veda i t -
s e l f . As Hopkins says, "The Bhakti or l o v i n g devotion, 
••-Rga Veda, I , 83, 2. 
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which some scholars imagine t o be only a l a t e development 
of Hindu r e l i g i o n , i s already evident i n the Rga Veda, even 
i n i t s dangerous t r e n d tov/ard e r o t i c i s m . . . . ""^  
To summarise then, the Vedic Hindus had a c l e a r r e -
c o g n i t i o n of a Moral Order or Moral Law. This Law was 
considered t o have been l a i d down by God, t h a t One E x i s t e n t , 
That T r u t h which, i n i t s wider connotation, had been 
breathed i n t o the very c o n s t i t u t i o n of the universe. Men 
were regarded as being under o b l i g a t i o n t o obey t h i s law. 
This was t o be done i n one of two ways. Since t h i s Order 
was r e f l e c t e d even i n the r i g h t performance of s a c r i f i c e s , 
one who performed these s a c r i f i c e s and the ceremonial d u t i e s 
l a i d down i n the s c r i p t u r e s would achieve h i s goal of e t e r -
n a l happiness i n heaven. The other way of a t t a i n i n g t h i s 
goal was t o love and worship the g o d s — t o please the gods: 
f o r they were the guardians of the Law. Magic and s a c r i -
f i c e , according t o t h i s view, were merely "the means em-
2 
ployed t o express the worshipper's submission and f a i t h . " 
With obeisance, s a c r i f i c e and o b l a t i o n , 0 
Varuna, we deprecate t h y wrath.... Loose from us 
the s i ns we have committed (remove thy f e t t e r s ) 
and (by abiding) i n t h y law may we be s i n l e s s 
before A d i t i . 5 
"'"Hopkins, op. c i t . , p. 8. 
o 
I b i d . , p. 3^ -. 
^Rga Veda, I , 2^, 14-15. 
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Freedom from s i n s , thus, i s the goal; the two ways i n 
which t h i s can be achieved are by compelling the gods 
through magic and s a c r i f i c e or by p l e a s i n g and winning 
the favour of the gods, the keepers of the Law, through 
love and devotion. 
Before c l o s i n g our account of the e t h i c s of the 
Vedas, we ought t o take note of one other Vedic concept 
which perhaps introduced i n t o l a t e r Hindu e t h i c s an a l t o -
gether new and s i g n i f i c a n t element. This i s the concept 
of Tapas which occurs i n the Rga Veda i t s e l f . I t i s said, 
f o r example, t h a t " i t v;as through Tapas t h a t the L r i r a a l 
Being began t o create.""*" Tapas means "heat" and, as Mac-
kenzie suggests, l a t e r "came t o be a p p l i e d s p e c i a l l y t o 
the heat or f e r v o u r of devotion." Mackenzie also notes, 
however, t h a t i n at l e a s t one of the Suktas i n the t e n t h 
book ( o f the Rga Veda) one begins t o n o t i c e a s s o c i a t i o n 
of t h i s word w i t h the f a m i l i a r a scetic a u s t e r i t y . I n the 
Atharva Veda and the Brahmanas i t i s the l a t t e r a s s o c i a t i o n 
• 
of Tapas, t h a t i s , a s c e t i c a u s t e r i t y or s e l f - m o r t i f i c a t i o n , 
which i s more o f t e n i n evidence. A b e l i e f was generated 
t h a t by a u s t e r i t y and penance one could compel the gods, 
nay, even become a god. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s concept 
•"•Rga Veda, X, 129. 
2 
Mackenzie, op. c i t . , p. 1-^1-. 
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l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t i t formed the basis f o r the ascetic 
s t r a i n i n Hindu e t h i c s , and perhaps formed the core of 
Hatha Yoga, the path of asc e t i c a u s t e r i t y f o r the a t t a i n -
ment of Moksa. 
(b) The e t h i c s of the Upanigads 
The above account of the e t h i c a l concepts i n the 
Vedas i s by no means exhaustive. Vi/hat we have done i s t o 
have taken note of some of the more s i g n i f i c a n t concepts, 
but the s i g n i f i c a n t ones are su r e l y not the only ones. As 
a matter of f a c t , almost a l l the l a t e r movements and tenden-
cies i n Hindu r e l i g i o n and e t h i c s are believed t o have been 
contained, e i t h e r i m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y , i n the Vedas. 
I t i s important t o remember t h i s , f o r l a t e r Hindu e t h i c s — 
whether i t be t h a t of the Upanisads or of the Gita or of 
any other source—presupposes the Vedas and i s b u i l t on 
Vedic foundations. No section of orthodox Hindu r e l i g i o u s 
and e t h i c a l l i t e r a t u r e has ever consciously or d e l i b e r a t e l y 
t r i e d t o depart from or c o n t r a d i c t the Vedas. This does 
not mean t h a t Hinduism has had no new ideas since the 
Vedas. I t only means t h a t whatever new ideas have been 
the r e have been shown, w i t h v a r y i n g degrees of consistency, 
t o be i n conformity w i t h Vedic teaching. 
I t i s against t h i s background t h a t we s h a l l discuss 
the e t h i c a l ideas i n the Upanigads. The highest goal i s 
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no longer e t e r n a l happiness i n heaven, as i t had been f o r 
the common man i n the Vedic times, but l i b e r a t i o n from the 
trammels of t r a n s i t o r y existence and re-attainment of the 
inn e r essence of the sou l . R i t u a l s are no longer considered 
s u f f i c i e n t f o r the attainment of the goal. Their place 
i s taken by mystic contemplation coupled w i t h r i g h t con-
duct. But i n s p i t e of a l l t h i s change i n perspective and 
the consequent change o f emphases i n matters of morals, i t 
would s t i l l be wrong t o suppose t h a t the Upanisads are 
p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h e t h i c s . As Hopkins says, 
. . . i n t h i s philosophy (the r e l a t i o n of human soul 
t o A l l - s o u l ) e t h i c s i s taken f o r granted; the r e a l 
questions are concerning metaphysics, so t h a t we 
may be t h a n k f u l f o r such h i n t s as are given i n 
regard t o the sages' opinions on m o r a l i t y . 1 
But we must be c a r e f u l not t o f a l l prey t o the misconcep-
t i o n t h a t the sages of the Upanisads d i d not recognise the 
importance of m o r a l i t y . I n f a c t , while i t i s t r u e t h a t 
the Upanisads regard Moksa, or l i b e r a t i o n , as the highest 
goal, they i n s i s t t h a t t h i s cannot be achieved without 
l e a d i n g a v i r t u o u s l i f e . I t i s c a t e g o r i c a l l y asserted 
t h a t "He who has not ceased from immoral conduct can not 
obt a i n God through the i n t e l l i g e n c e . " Innumerable other 
•'"Hopkins, op. c i t . , p. 64. 
% a t h a Upanigad, I , 2, 24. 
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passages can be quoted t o show t h a t the philosophy of the 
Upanisads, though p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h metaphysical 
questions, i s e s s e n t i a l l y h i g h l y e t h i c a l i n character. 
I t i s i n the Upanisads, i n f a c t , t h a t the t r a n s i -
t i o n from Rta t o Dharma becomes complete, and i t i s here 
again t h a t the mutual i n t e r r e l a t e d n e s s of the various con-
cepts w i t h e t h i c a l import, l i k e those of Dharma and Adharma, 
Karma, Samsara and Mokga, begins t o be n o t i c e a b l e . A l l 
these concepts now begin t o f a l l i n t o a coherent p a t t e r n 
and impart s i g n i f i c a n c e t o one another. A passage from 
O'.A.B, -J/:an Buitenen very c l e a r l y b r i n g s out t h i s i n t e r -
connection among these concepts: 
...Dharraa i s a l l t h a t a c t i v i t y t h a t a man, i f he 
i s t o l i v e f i t t i n g l y , i s r e q u i r e d t o c o n t r i b u t e 
t o the f i x e d order of t h i n g s , t o the norm of the 
universe which i s good and should not be a l t e r e d . 
Adharma i s the exact opposite: acts c o n t r a r y t o 
the e s t a b l i s h e d order i n the widest sense of the 
word. The acts performed by man e x i s t , once per-
formed, f o r e v e r , c a r r y i n g t h e i r l a t e n t p o t e n t i a l 
(Karma) t o a new scene where they w i l l m a t e r i a l -
i z e i n new circumstances f o r man t o l i v e i n (Sam-
sar^). ^  
I n other words, Samsara means an endless cycle of b i r t h s 
and deaths f o r man i n accordance w i t h the Law of Karma 
which i s unsparing i n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n , u n t i l , by a supreme 
moral and s p i r i t u a l e f f o r t , he r i s e s above the Law and 
"'•J.A.B. Van Buitenen, "Dharraa and Mok§a, " Philosophy East 
ahd West, A p r i l - J u l y , 1957, p. 56. 
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a t t a i n s l i b e r a t i o n . I t i s not d i f f i c u l t t o see t h a t a l l 
these other concepts—Moksa, Samsara, Karma—are r e l a t e d 
"fco fharma. Dharma being the norm and the established order 
of t h i n g s , the v i o l a t i o n of i t s ^ i r i t , i . e . , Adharma, 
n a t u r a l l y ?^ nd i n e v i t a b l y binds man t o SamsSra through 
the i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y of the Law of Karma, and i t i s from 
Samsara t h a t l i b e r a t i o n i s sought. I t i s important t o 
remember t h a t i f i t i s the l a c k of Dharma which causes 
continued bondage, then release or Moksa can only be 
a t t a i n e d through the performance of Dharma. 
At t h i s stage, perhaps, i t w i l l be d e s i r a b l e t o 
analyse the meaning of Mokga and i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s , f o r i n 
the Upanisads Moksa becomes the supreme e t h i c o - r e l i g i o u s 
g o a l . This should be obvious from the above discussion 
of the i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n of a l l the e t h i c o - r e l i p ^ i o u s concepts 
i n the Upanisads. Moksa, we may say, has two aspects. 
Negatively, i t means release from the cycle of b i r t h s and 
deaths (Samsara). On i t s p o s i t i v e side, however, i t im-
p l i e s the recovery of the t r u e nature of the s o u l , the 
knowledge of v;hich i s obscured by Maya, or Cosmic Ignor-
ance. The Soul, being s p i r i t by d e f i n i t i o n , a t t a i n s l i b e r -
a t i o n by r e a l i s i n g t h a t i t i s d i f f e r e n t from body, l i f e , and 
mind, a l l of which are n o n - s p i r i t u a l . The m a t e r i a l body 
t h a t every soul assumes must be t r e a t e d as an a c c r e t i o n , 
and the essence of the human soul must be supposed t o l i e 
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much deeper than we normally imagine. As long as the 
r e a l i s a t i o n of t h i s essence through a supreme moral e f f o r t 
and genuine transcendental wisdom does not take place, we 
s h a l l go on i d e n t i f y i n g ourselves w i t h our bodies, and 
w i l l remain subject t o the d i c t a t e s of the b o d i l y passions 
and d e s i r e s , as though these were t h e r e a l c o n s t i t u e n t s of 
our t r u e s e l f . This, i t may be i n c i d e n t a l l y remarked, i s 
reminiscent of the sharp d i v i s i o n between reason and 
passions o c c u r r i n g g e n e r a l l y i n the whole of ancient Greek 
philosophy but e s p e c i a l l y i n the philosophy of the Stoics. 
To continue our account of Moksa, however, t h i s l o s s 
of p e r s p e c t i v e regarding the t r u e nature of the human soul 
leads t o a perversion of i n s i g h t and i d e a l s . Once we have 
i d e n t i f i e d ourselves w i t h our bodies, we n a t u r a l l y look 
a t t h i n g s from a narrow angle and tend t o act i n s e l f i s h 
and i n d u l g e n t ways, w i t h undue attachment t o t h i n g s t r a n s -
i t o r y and perhaps, i n the l a s t a n a l y s i s , unreal. This 
attachment and cr a v i n g i n t u r n makes us subject t o the 
Lav/ of Karma and binds us t o the chains of Samsara. Our 
release, then, l i e s i n a f r e s h r e a l i s a t i o n of the e s s e n t i a l 
character of the so u l . Once we succeed i n doing t h i s , we 
cease t o be slaves t o our bodies and t h e i r passions, and 
consequently we cut the very r o o t s of Karma and Samsara. 
We become one w i t h our essence again; we regain the l o s t 
g l o r y o f the s e l f . And t h i s i s a goal which can be r e a l i s e d 
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p r i m a r i l y by the acquirement of transcendental knowledge 
(Viveka JrSna), d i s c r i m i n a t i n g between the s p i r i t u a l and 
the n o n - s p i r i t u a l , and a gradual withdrawal from the snares 
of the body and the senses, though, as we saw e a r l i e r , t h i s 
must n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e f o l l o v / i n g the path of liharma. I n 
t h i s acquirement of Moksa, which i s sometimes i n t e r p r e t e d 
as " o b t a i n i n g God, ""^  the mercy or grace of God i s occasion-
a l l y invoked. For example, we are t o l d : 
He i s not t o be obbained by i n s t r u c t i o n , nor 
by i n t e l l i g e n c e , nor by much l e a r n i n g . He i s t o 
be obtained only by the one whom He chooses; t o 
such a one He reveals His own person.2 
A f t e r the r e a l i s a t i o n of the goal, i . e . , Moksa, a c t i o n does 
not cease a l t o g e t h e r ; i t only ceases t o have potency t o 
b i n d the soul again, f o r the l i b e r a t e d one does not act 
from hankering. I t i s needless t o emphasise t h a t the 
l i b e r a t e d man who has r e a l i s e d the i n n e r essence of t h i n g s 
i s h a r d l y l i k e l y t o act i n an immoral or a n t i - s o c i a l way. 
"The man who has wisdom," says the Mahabharata, "does not 
s i n ; he ceases t o do e v i l and through h i s wisdom annuls 
the e v i l of h i s former l i f e . " Thus Moksa does not mean 
i n a c t i v i t y or i m m o r a l i t y ; i t i s the culmination of a 
"'•Katha Upanigad, I , 2, 23. 
2 
Mundaka Upanipad, I I I , 2, 3. 
^Mahabharata, X I I , 270, 20. 
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continuous moral e f f o r t through a s e r i e s of l i v e s and 
deaths. 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t some w r i t e r s have 
seen a k i n d of o p p o s i t i o n between Dharma and Mokga. I f 
Dharma means the order of the universe, the power t h a t 
s u s t a ins the world, and i f Moksa means release from the 
world a l t o g e t h e r , then c l e a r l y the l a t t e r i s a negation of 
e v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s governed by Dharma. As Van Buitenen 
says, 
Moksa, 'release, ' i s release from the e n t i r e realms-
which i s governed by Dharma, t h a t i s , i n the 
picturesque phrase, the Egg of Brahma (Brahmanda). 
I t stands, t h e r e f o r e , i n opp o s i t i o n t o Dharma, but 
the o p p o s i t i o n i s of another k i n d than t h a t of 
Adharma t o Dharma....Adharma i s sheer lawlessness 
Mokga, t h e r e f o r e , does not c o n t r a d i c t Dharma; i t only 
transcends the l a t t e r ' s realm. I t i s , i n s h o r t , a higher 
s p i r i t u a l i d e a l conceived t o comprehend and y e t t o go 
beyond Dharma. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between Moksa and Dharma 
can perhaps be b e t t e r expressed i n t h i s way: 
Saying i t i n C h r i s t i a n terms, v/e might perhaps c a l l 
Moksa the Kingdom of Heaven, and Dharma, i n i t s 
highest aspect n a t u r a l l y ( r u l i n g Artha and Kama), 
the Kingdom of Heaven on earth, f o r which few are 
chosen, since most see Dharma only i n i t s lower 
aspects.2 
1 J.B. Van Buitenen, op. c i t . , p. 36. 
2 Mees, op. c i t . , p. 26. 
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This d e s c r i p t i o n by Mees could not be excelled. 
I n summary, i t i s not d i f f i c u l t t o see t h a t the con-
t r i b u t i o n of the Upanisads t o the e t h i c s of the Hindus i s 
on the whole s i m i l a r t o the Greek c o n t r i b u t i o n t o C h r i s t -
ia n e t h i c s . Like i t s counterpart, i t i s p r i m a r i l y anthro-
pocentxdc and i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t i c . I t does sometimes t a l k 
of grace but g e n e r a l l y t e l l s of self-achievement, and the 
emphasis on knowledge i s unmistakable. Though the Hindu 
understanding of the knowledge t h a t leads t o l i b e r a t i o n 
may tend more toward the i n t u i t i v e than the i n t e l l e c t u a l , 
i t i s apprehension t h a t i s emphasised. With t h i s obser-
v a t i o n , however, we must pass on t o the content of the 
next important group of w r i t i n g s , the Epics and the 
Puranas. 
( c ) The e t h i c s of the Epics and Lurapas 
I n the course of our discussion of the e t h i c a l 
concepts i n the Vedas we observed t h a t Bhakti or devotion 
t o the d e i t y , even i n i t s e r o t i c blend, i s already t o be 
found i n the Rga Veda i t s e l f . I n the E'pic period, Bhakti 
becomes a d i s t i n c t and povjerful c u l t . I n a way, t h e r e f o r e , 
the e t h i c of the epics presents nothing new, but the em-
phasis i s again new and has f a r - r e a c h i n g consequences. 
This emphasis i s a n a t u r a l and l o g i c a l development i n s o f a r 
as i t promised t o provide an a l t e r n a t i v e t o the h i g h l y 
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p h i l o s o p h i c a l and a b s t r a c t monism of the Upanisads. The 
s t r i c t monism and irapersonalism of the Upanisads could 
h a r d l y be expected t o s a t i s f y the r e l i g i o u s a s p i r a t i o n s of 
the common man, however appealing i t might be t o the philo-
sopher. Hence there must have been the need f o r an eth i c 
of f a i t h and love centered round the p e r s o n a l i t y of a sup-
reme and benevolent God w i t h whom the devotee could come 
i n t o a personal r e l a t i o n s h i p . The seeds of t h i s e t h i c , as 
we have seen, are contained i n the Vedas, a f a c t t h a t en-
ables us t o understand t h a t t h i s development was n e i t h e r 
abrupt nor discontinuous w i t h the past. The emergence of 
t h i s e t h i c i n an organised form was perhaps aided by the 
success of Buddhism, as some people have suggested. I n 
the words of Hopkins, once again,"'The god who had been a 
man' was of a l l others best f i t t e d t o enter the l i s t s i n 
a s t r u g g l e f o r supremacy w i t h the i d e a l i s e d Buddha, now 
worshipped over a l l I n d i a as a d i v i n e being. "'^  
Thus arose the d e v o t i o n a l c u l t s based on the b e l i e f 
i n i n c a r n a t i o n . Popular heroes l i k e Rama and Krishna were 
rep^arded as the i n c a r n a t i o n s of God, who was be l i e v e d t o 
have taken human forms i n order t o r i d the universe of i t s 
Adharma, or unrighteous element. The t h e o l o g i c a l presup-
p o s i t i o n s of t h i s c u l t , w i t h some notable d i f f e r e n c e s , 
•'"Hopkins, op. c i t . , pp. 171f. 
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s t r o n g l y resemble those of C h r i s t i a n i t y . There i s the 
same s t r e s s on complete l o v i n g submission t o the w i l l of 
a God whose mercy i s the only means t o deliverance. "Gome 
t o me as your refuge; I w i l l release you from a l l sins,""*" 
declares S r i Krishna. This seems t o s t r i k e the same note 
as the Pauline " j u s t i f i c a t i o n by f a i t h . " This i s , i n 
other words, an e t h i c of f a i t h , hope and love. I n keeping 
w i t h the s p i r i t of t h i s e t h i c , the Upanisadic meaning of 
Moksa undergoes a change. Moksa i n the Bhakti schools no 
longer means merger of the i n d i v i d u a l soul w i t h the U l t i -
mate Absolute, Brahma; i t now means l i f e e v e r l a s t i n g i n 
communion w i t h God. The close s i m i l a r i t y between the 
t h e o l o g i c a l tenets of t h i s c u l t and those of C h r i s t i a n i t y 
w i l l be d r i v e n even deeper i f we consider one passage from 
Rudolph Otto i n v/hich he s t a t e s the s i m i l a r i t y of views 
between C h r i s t i a n i t y and some forms of B h a k t i - r e l i R l o n : 
What i s the good conferred i n s a l v a t i o n by 
C h r i s t i a n i t y ? Communion w i t h the l i v i n g personal 
God. What i s the means of salvation? Grace, 
g r a t i a and g r a t i a sola, which lays hold of the 
l o s t , rescuing and redeeming him. Now these are 
the very slogans and d i s t i n c t i v e terms of those o 
forms of B h a k t i - r e l i g i o n of which we are t o speak. 
•^Gita, 18, 66. 
2 
Rudolph Otto, I n d i a ' s R e l i g i o n ol_Grace. quoted by John 
Mackenzie i n T w o R e l i g i o n s ~ T l ^ ^ London, 1950), p. 106": — a , 
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This e t h i c of s e l f - s u r r e n d e r , i t should be noted, 
i s i n c o n f l i c t w i t h the Upanisadic e t h i c of self-achieve-^ 
ment. But, as we saw e a r l i e r , some Upanisads do speak of 
grace and thereby provide a d d i t i o n a l support f o r the theo-
c e n t r i c e t h i c of the Bhakti schools. The compromise 
e f f e c t e d was t o leave the e t h i c of self-achievement f o r 
the few enlightened philosophers, and t o make the e t h i c of 
f a i t h and s e l f - s u r r e n d e r the guide f o r the common man. 
Whatever the c o n f l i c t s between the approaches of the Bhakti 
schools and the Upanigadic seers i n t h i s respect, we must 
not lose s i g h t of the f a c t t h a t Dharma, or the moral Law, 
i s placed i n the very centre of t h i n g s , f o r S r i Krishna 
says, "Know t h a t Dharma i s my beloved f i r s t - b o r n mental 
son, whose nature i s t o have compassion on a l l creatures 
.... ""'^  This leaves nc 
of the e t h i c of f a i t h . 
This leaves no room f o r antinomian i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s 
(d) The e t h i c s of the Bhagavadglta 
Our survey under t h i s head i s a co n t i n u a t i o n of our 
an a l y s i s of the e t h i c s of the Epics and Puranas, f o r as 
we s t a t e d e a r l i e r , the Glta i s pa r t of the Mahabharata, 
one of the two great epics of ancient I n d i a . But i n view 
of the e x t r a o r d i n a r y impact of the Gita on the minds of 
•""Mahabharata, Asva. Parv, 11-1?. 
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the Hindus, we have decided t o mention b r i e f l y the out-
standing f e a t u r e s of i t s e t h i c s . As i s w e l l known, the 
Vedic and Upanisadic groups of l i t e r a t u r e had, by the time 
the GTta was w r i t t e n , become immensely vast, and contained 
a host of e t h i c a l concepts and r e l i g i o u s creeds which 
were not always mutually compatible and, thereby, could 
have become sources of p e r p l e x i t y t o the p r a c t i s i n g Hindu. 
To give j u s t one exami^le, there was considerable wrangling 
as t o whether knowledge or devotion or s a c r i f i c e was the 
means t o deliverance, whether a s c e t i c r e n u n c i a t i o n 
( N i v r t t i ) or the discharge of one's moral and s o c i a l d u t i e s 
( P r a v r t t i ) was the b e t t e r approach t o the goal. The most 
outstanding c o n t r i b u t i o n of the Gita i s i t s work of syn-
t h e s i s of a l l these concepts and creeds, which has since 
become the model f o r every r e l i g i o u s t h i n k e r or leader 
i n I n d i a . The Gita i s an ingenuous e f f o r t t o b r i n g the 
best of a l l these creeds together, and i s perhaps l a r g e l y 
responsible f o r the c a t h o l i c i t y of the Hindu's f a i t h and 
morals. I n the words of Dr. Radhakrishnan, 
The Gita takes up the various creeds and codes 
t h a t were already competing w i t h each other and 
transforms them i n t o aspects of a more inward r e -
l i g i o n , f r e e , s u b t l e , and profound. I f popular 
d e i t i e s are worshipped, i t must be understood t h a t 
they are only v a r i e d manifestations of the One 
Supreme. I f s a c r i f i c e s are t o be o f f e r e d , they 
must be of the s p i r i t and not of m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s . 
A l i f e of s e l f - c o n t r o l or d i s i n t e r e s t e d a c t i o n i s 
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a s a c r i f i c e . j ^ . .The Glta teaches the doctrine of 
the Brahman-Atman which the followers of the 
Upanisads seek and proclaim. The Yoga of concen-
t r a t i o n i s useful but the Supreme i s the Lord of 
Yoga. The dualism of the Samkhya i s taken over 
i n t o non-dualism, f o r purusja'and p r a k r t i are the 
two natures of the Supreme*Lord, Purusottam. He 
alone dispenses grace. He i s the true object of 
devotion. For Him must a l l work be done. Saving 
wisdom i s of Him. The t r a d i t i o n a l rules of 
Dharma are to be followed because He established 
them and He upholds the moral order. The rules 
are not ends i n themselves, f o r union with the 
Supreme i s the f i n a l goal. The teacher of the 
Glta reconciles the d i f f e r e n t systems i n vogue 
and gives us a comprehensive eirenicon which i s 
not l o c a l and temporary but i s f o r a l l time and 
a l l men.l. 
We should be excused f o r t h i s lengthy quotation, f o r , as 
we believe, i t would help to bring out c l e a r l y the various 
elements i n the synthesis of the Glta. 
The other d i s t i n c t i v e feature of the Gita i s i t s 
emphasis on what may be called a Kantian ethic i n a 
r e l i g i o u s s e t t i n g . This new ethic might have helped to 
turn the t i d e against asceticism and renunciation ( M i v r t t i 
Marga) by i t s a u t h o r i t a t i v e and f o r c e f u l exposition of the 
view th a t Mokga could be attained by discharging one's 
duties i n l i f e , , and need not necessarily e n t a i l ascetic 
s e l f - d e n i a l . Since the moral law or Dharma was established 
by the Lord, man has an obligation to do v/hat i s enjoined 
by t h i s law. But he must act from the sole consideration 
"^ Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, i n his introduction to the transla-t i o n of the Glta (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1960), pp. 74f. 
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that t h i s i s his duty, not from the motive of reward. 
There i s i n f a c t a renunciation involved here too, but 
t h i s i s the renunciation of the f r u i t s of man's actions 
and not of actions as such. This ethic of "Duty f o r Duty's 
sake" i s an important element i n Hindu thought and has 
provided the rationale f o r the endeavour toward Moksa 
along with an active l i f e i n the world. 
In view of the fac t that a l l l a t e r Hindu thought 
i n ethics and r e l i g i o n has based i t s e l f on one or the other 
of the various elements found i n the l i t e r a t u r e discussed 
above, our analysis of the constituents of Hindu ethics 
could, with s u f f i c i e n t reason, end here. But considering 
the profound influence of Shamkara and Ramanuja on l a t e r 
Hindu thought and practice, i t appears that any account 
of Hindu ethics vrfiich does not include these tv/o i l l u s t r i -
ous figures i s bound to be incomplete. Hence we sh a l l 
consider b r i e f l y the emphases and orientations given to 
Hindu thought by these two. 
(e) Landmarks i n the development of l a t e r Hindu ethics: 
Shamkara and Ramanu.ja 
The importance of Shamkara i n Hindu thought can 
easily be appreciated i f we realise that quite often 
Hinduism i t s e l f i s i d e n t i f i e d with the non-dualism 
(Advaita) of Shamkara. In f a c t , i t would not be wrong 
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to t h i n k that the frequent characterisation of Hindu 
ethics as such as "world-and-life denying""^ i s largely 
due to t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . His description of the world 
as i l l u s i o n (M^ya) and his f o r c e f u l exposition of the 
view that the ultimate destiny of the i n d i v i d u a l soul i s 
merger i n t o the A l l - s o u l (Brahma) has had such tremendous 
impact that at times people have been misled i n t o think-
ing that there i s nothing more i n Hinduism. Shamkara, the 
St. Thomas Aquinas of India, advocates an i n t e l l e c t u a l -
i s t i c and contemplative ethic which culminates i n the 
mystical merger of the i n d i v i d u a l soul i n the A l l - s o u l , 
Brahma. Though he does not deny the existence of the 
world nor of the perspnal God on the p r a c t i c a l plane, 
(V'yavaharika Satta), he does tend to rej e c t these on the 
ultimate plane, (Parmarthika Satta). For the f i n a l r e a l i -
sation of the i d e n t i t y or non-difference of the in d i v i d u a l 
soul w i t h the Absolute, which i s what Mokga means to Sham-
kara, . knowledge or.wisdom i s the ultimate means. But he 
does not deny the i n i t i a l value of either action or devo-
t i o n . For him "karma" (action or duty) and "bhakti" 
2 
(devotion) "are means to s p i r i t u a l freedom," stepping-
stones, as i t were, t o the attainment of saving knowledge. 
This phrase i s used by Albert Schweitzer to contrast, f o r 
instance, the "world-and-life-affirming" optimism of West-
ern thought with the "world-and-life-denying" pessimism 
-ts of Indian thought i n his books Indian Thought and i Development and C i v i l i s a t i o n and .hithics.^" 
2 
Radhakrishnan, Commentary on the GltH, op. c i t . , p. 73. 
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This emphasis on knowledge as the means of l i b e r a t i o n and 
the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of l i b e r a t i o n 02? Moksa i t s e l f as the 
f i n a l r e a l i s a t i o n by the i n d i v i d u a l soul that " I am 
Brahma (Aham Brahma-asmi)" i s only a more eloquent and 
uncompromising version of the Upanigadic ethic. 
Ramanuja, on the other hand, int e r p r e t s the "three 
great sources (Prasthanatrayl)" as implying an ethic of 
love and submission to a personal God. He regards God as 
f u l l of auspicious (Subha) q u a l i t i e s of a l l sorts, especial-
l y mercy or kindness. Man's l i b e r a t i o n , according to him, 
consists i n an eternal l i f e i n communion with God which 
can be attained p r i m a r i l y by the grace of God that dawns 
as a consequence of man's unquestioning f a i t h and genuine 
devotion to God. This ethic of love and gratitude, i t 
must be said, has had a much wider appeal i n India than the 
non-dualism of Shamkara, which has been confined to the 
cotery"^ of philosophers. The ethic of love and submission, 
through a host of poet saints l i k e ?allabha, Ohaitanya, 
Kanaka, Kabira and Dadu, has permeated the whole fabric 
of l i f e i n India, and has established i t s e l f as the ethic 
of the masses. And the credit f o r t h i s must go as much 
to Ramanuja as to any other source. 
Much as we might l i k e to include i n our analysis 
the re-interpretations of Hindu ethics by modern thinkers 
l i k e Tagore, ¥ivekananda, S r i Aurobindo, Gandhi ; 
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and Radhakrishnan, we are obliged, f o r two reasons, to 
suppress t h i s temptation and close the account here. 
F i r s t l y , the space at our disposal does not seem to allow 
any f u r t h e r extension of t h i s analysis. Moreover, a l l 
these thinkers have generally adopted one or the other of 
the main lines of e t h i c a l thinking already discussed, with 
suitable modifications i n the l i g h t of modern circumstances 
and knowledge. As a r e s u l t , though the emphases have 
changed, ancient and medieval lines of e t h i c a l thinking 
have generally been the guidelines of modern thinking i n 
Hindu ethics. 
Conclusion 
I t seems to be time to summarise what we have been 
discussing so f a r i n order to bring i n t o sharper focus the 
main burden of our argument. Our account of the constitu-
ents of Hindu and Christian ethics has been by no means 
exhaustive, but i t may be hoped that i t has not been too 
sketchy either. Our whole e f f o r t would be J u s t i f i e d only 
i f i t were reasonably obvious by now that our hypothesis 
about the nature of Christian and Hindu ethics i s borne 
out by evidence, i . e . , that both Christian and Hindu 
ethics are catholic, comprehensive and el a s t i c . Pluston 
Smith, w r i t i n g on Islam, says that "the creed of Islam 
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wastes no words. ""^  V/e maintain that i t w i l l be extremely 
d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible, to say the same either of 
C h r i s t i a n i t y or of Hinduism. The l a t t e r are not well-
defined systems of ethics, but contain systems wi t h i n 
systems, a var i e t y of e t h i c a l concepts and creeds, not 
necessarily mutually compatible. They are great reservoirs 
of e t h i c a l ideas from which t h e i r adherents can draw f o r 
consumption what they f i n d suited to t h e i r tastes. In 
other words, by c a l l i n g someone a Christian or a Hindu, 
though!, we undoubtedly derive some general information 
about his b e l i e f s , we cannot with any certainty predict 
h i s p r i n c i p l e s and practice i n the f i e l d of morals. As 
we have seen, there i s such a wide range of e t h i c a l con-
cepts and practices within either Hinduism or Ch r i s t i a n i t y 
that the sheer fac t of being an adherent of one of these 
f a i t h s does not necessarily commit anyone to any specific 
kind of e t h i c a l thinking. A Christian i s free to b u i l d 
his moral values around the nucleus of either mysticism 
or monasticisra, eudaemonisra, formalism, u t i l i t a r i a n i s m 
or even sacramentalism and r i t u a l i s m so long as he places 
the ethic of love i n the centre and accepts some basic 
dogmas of the Christian f a i t h . And l e t us remember that 
a Christian, i n giving his e t h i c a l thinking an ascetic or 
"^Huston Smith,., The Religions of Man (Harper. Colophon Books, 
1964), p. 210. 
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i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t i c or any othei" orientation, need not be 
g u i l t y of scandalous o r i g i n a l i t y , f o r he can, i n most 
cases, quote quite respectable authoi-ity f o r his own i n -
t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
This applies even more aptly to Hinduism, A Hindu 
can make his choice of- moral values from a vast range of 
these which he may f i n d i n his scriptures and t r a d i t i o n . 
In f a c t , i t must be admitted that Hinduism goes to much 
greater, almost absurd, lengths i n emphasising i t s non-
do c t r i n a i r e approach to moral practices and b e l i e f s . For 
example, Dr. Radhakrishnan claims that "the t h e i s t and 
the a t h e i s t , the sceptic and the agnostic may a l l be Hindus 
i f they accept the Hindu system of culture and l i f e . " " * " 
This amount of l a t i t u d e would clearly not be allowed to 
a Christian, f o r whom a set of dogmas demands unconditional 
acceptance. I t seems, therefore, that there may be a 
difference of degree between the two, but both C h r i s t i a n i t y 
and. Hinduism ai^e by and large catholic and comprehensive 
i n t h e i r e t h i c a l thinking. 
This d i v e r s i t y and e l a s t i c i t y of Christian and 
Hindu ethics needs explanation, the former perhaps more 
than the l a t t e r . For as we have stated e a r l i e r , recognition 
of the d i v e r s i t y i n tastes and temperaments of people i s 
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almost a credal b e l i e f i n Hinduism. C h r i s t i a n i t y , on the 
other hand, i s supposed to have started as a simple f a i t h , 
with the emphasis on uni t y rather than d i v e r s i t y . Yet the 
astounding t h i n g i s that t h i s i n i t i a l l y simple f a i t h has 
had to make room f o r a variety of e t h i c a l concepts and 
practices i n course of i t s two thousand years of existence 
and expansion. In our opinion three factors may be re-
garded as c h i e f l y responsible f o r the present d i v e r s i t y 
of Christian and Hindu ethics. 
(a) The d i v e r s i t y of sources 
As our analysis should have shown, the sources of 
both Christian and Hindu ethics are too many, re s u l t i n g i n 
an inevitable d i v e r s i t y of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and emphasis. 
But i t may be held that since C h r i s t i a n i t y i s rooted i n 
i t s founder, Jesus Christ, he i s the ultimate source, and 
his teaching the f i n a l a r b i t e r i n a l l matters of Christian 
f a i t h and morals. This, however, does not seem to help 
as much as i t promises t o , f o r i t side-tracks the main 
problem. The main problem f o r Christian scholars and 
theologians through the ages has been that of determining 
what exactly Christ's teachings were and what they meant. 
And the d i v e r s i t y of interpretations and emphases i s 
largely due to the f a c t that i t has been very d i f f i c u l t 
to do t h i s . Christ's ministry was b r i e f ; his utterances 
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were cryptic and by no means mutually consistent. J. E. 
Fison, i n his b r i l l i a n t analysis of "the c a t h o l i c i t y of 
Jesus Christ," l i s t s the various elements i n the "holiness 
of Jesus," which includes the esoteric, prophetic, ascetic, 
natural, supernatural, sacramental, mystical and many 
others.''" I n view of t h i s , i t i s not at a l l surprising 
that Christian ethics should contain a d i v e r s i t y of elements. 
'The t r u t h i s that t h i s many-sided holiness of Jesus has 
been subject t o various emphases and interpretations at 
the hands of l a t e r scholars and commentators who have 
stressed one of these elements at ihe cost of the other with 
the r e s u l t that each of these has an equal claim to be re-
garded as genuinely Christian. 
(b) The d i v e r s i t y of the human material 
I t i s a well known fact that India has assimilated , 
i n course of i t s long histo r y , people of p r a c t i c a l l y every 
race, colour and culture. This process of assimilation 
has i n e v i t a b l y led to a tolerance of the customs and be-
l i e f s of aliens by recognising these as somehow forming 
part of Hinduism. I t i s perhaps t h i s factor which eventu-
a l l y led to the Hindu's emphasis on d i v e r s i t y as a fact of 
l i f e . C h r i s t i a n i t y , s i m i l a r l y , has been forced to give 
way to a l l kinds of customs and be l i e f s i n the course of 
Fison, op. c i t . , Chapter I I I , pp. 115-128. 
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i t s expansion through various continents. To quote only 
one example of t h i s compromise, i t i s well known that the 
caste system of India has not l e f t unvarnished the Christ-
ian community i n India. T i l l recently there were separate 
churches f o r the converts coming from the class of "un-
touchables. " Moreover, what Hinduism has overtly recog-
nised as a creed has been covertly i n opei^ation within 
C h r i s t i a n i t y , namely, the d i v e r s i t y i n the tastes and 
temperaments of people. This, to an extent, accounts f o r 
the i n f i l t r a t i o n of al i e n concepts and practices. 
(c) Love and gratitude capable of various interpretations 
Almost the whole of C h r i s t i a n i t y and the main 
stream of Hinduism can be described as the r e l i g i o n of 
love and gratitude. And i t i s a notorious fa c t that love 
and gratitude can be expressed i n more than one way. I t 
can be the relationship of love between father and son, 
or between friends, or between lover and beloved. The 
f i r s t of these, which characterises the whole of Christ-
i a n i t y and o^me sects of Vaisnavism, i s perhaps the purest 
and l o f t i e s t expression of the love of the Almighty, but 
the l a s t one of these can, and has led to erotic express-
ions, sometimes r e s u l t i n g i n absurd aberrations. E r o t i -
cism, though more common i n Hinduism, i s , however, not 
confined to i t alone. Marguerite Marie Alacoque, St. 
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Gertrude and St. Theresa are illusti'-ations of the erotic 
blend of love within Christian history. William James 
quotes the following passage as an i l l u s t r a t i o n of what 
he c a l l s the theopathic condition of the mind. This 
passage describes the transports of Margaret, a Catholic 
nun: 
...But to be loved by God! and loved by him to 
d i s t r a c t i o n (aime jusqu'a l a f o l i e ) ! Margaret 
melted away at the thought of such a thing.... 
She said to God, 'Hold back, 0 my God, these 
torrents which overwhelm me, or else enlarge 
my capacity f o r t h e i r reception.'^ 
I t would be seen then that the description of Christian 
ethics as the ethic of love has only the deceptive appear-
ance of s i m p l i c i t y . In r e a l i t y , however, the ethic of 
love lends i t s e l f t o various shades of meaning and thus 
becomes a source of d i v e r s i t y and e l a s t i c i t y v/ithin a 
certain f a i t h . This i s as true of Hinduism as of Christ-
i a n i t y . 
•''William James, op. c i t . , p. 343. 
Chapter I I I . 
THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN 
Reinhold Niebuhr, i n An Interpretation of Christ-
ian Ethics, says. 
The d i s t i n c t i v e contribution of r e l i g i o n to 
morality l i e s i n i t s comprehension of the dimen-
sion of depth i n l i f e . . . . A r e l i g i o u s morality 
i s constrained by i t s sense of a dimension of 
depth to trace every force with which i t deals 
to some ultimate o r i g i n and to relate every pur-
pose to some ultimate end.l 
In other words, the e t h i c a l a c t i v i t y that the adherent of 
a r e l i g i o n undertakes has v a l i d i t y or u t i l i t y only insofar 
as i t promotes the ultimate end as conceived by the r e l i -
gion i n question. This ultimate end or f i n a l destiny i s 
what imparts meaning and significance t o the e t h i c a l 
endeavour of man. I t follows, then, that the r e l i g i o n 
which f a i l s to establish a meaningful relationship between 
the e t h i c a l ideal i t preaches and the ultimate end i t 
prescribes f a i l s not only as a sa t i s f y i n g r e l i g i o n but 
also as a system of ethics. I t i s of the utmost impor-
tance, therefore, that we consider the Christian and Hindu 
"'•Reinhold Niebuhr, An Inte r p r e t a t i o n of Christian Ethics 
(SCM Press, 1936), pp. 15f. ~" " ™~ 
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views of the ultimate end or f i n a l destiny of man i n 
order that we may estimate t h e i r value as systems of 
re l i g i o u s morality. I t needs no arguing, however, that 
the destiny of man depends on his essential nature and 
capacities. 
We s h a l l , therefore, open our discussion i n t h i s 
chapter with the consideration of the Christian and Hindu 
views of the nature and status of man. This, however, 
en t a i l s a consideration of the how and why of creation 
i t s e l f , f o r man only occupies a place i n the created uni-
verse, and his nature and capacities can be explained only 
i n the context of creation. 
The Creation Myths 
In every r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n we f i n d stories about 
how and why the world came i n t o existence. To some ad-
herents of any of these r e l i g i o n s these stories may appear 
to be l i t e r a l accounts of the act of creation, but to most 
others they seem to be only symbolic or metaphorical re-
presentations of the basic facts about creation. In view 
of t h i s , i t would be more appropriate to c a l l these 
stories "myths," f o r myths are "tales which are not 
l i t e r a l l y true. ""^  How any discussion of these creation 
A^. Flew end D. Mackinnon, Mew Essays i n Philosophical Theolog:y (SCM Press, 1963) ,T^r~T7T7^~ ~ 
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myths i n e v i t a b l y raises many knotty problems. The answers 
to some of these problems or detailed discussion of any of 
t h e i r aspects i s c l e a r l y beyond the scope of t h i s essay. 
We intend to touch on only those aspects of t h i s issue 
which, i n our opinion, have some s i g n i f i c a n t bearing on 
the main theme of our present enquiry, that i s , the nature 
and destiny of man. Let us s t a r t w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l 
Christian story. 
(a) The creation myth i n the Christian t r a d i t i o n 
The Genesis narrative opens with the words, 
In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. 
And the earth was without form, and void; 
and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And 
the S p i r i t of God moved upon the face of the 
waters. 
And God said. Let there be l i g h t : and there was l i g h t . 1 
We do not have to go i n t o f u r t h e r d e t a i l s of t h i s narra-
t i v e to realise that before t h i s act of creation there was 
nothing else apart from God. What i s asserted unequivocal-
l y i n t h i s account, then, i s that God created out of 
nothing. In other words, God did not j u s t shape a pre-
e x i s t i n g matter, as Plato, f o r example, believed; He 
produced the world out of sheer nothingness, as i t were. 
•^Genesis 1:1-3. 
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He i s the sole and s u f f i c i e n t cause of the world. This 
raises the issue of v/hether the world can be said to have 
a beginning or t o be eternal. How i t must be said that 
creation ex n i h i l o implies not only "the popular idea of 
creation (involving on the one hand a beginning of the 
world)," but also "the creation of the theologians on the 
other (a recognition of man's absolute dependence on God).""'' 
Before deciding which of these implications i s relevant f o r 
our purposes, i t would perhaps be d_esirable to mention St. 
Thomas' views as to whether the world had a beginning. In 
the words of Etienne Gilson, 
St. Thomas maintains (therefore) the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of proving the creation 9c:nihilo of the universe, 
wherein he i s . . . r e s o l u t e l y opposed to Averroes 
and his followers; but, i n conceding, l i k e Mai-
monides, the l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y of a universe 
created from a l l e t e r n i t y , he refuses to confuse 
the t r u t h s of f a i t h with those which can be the 
objects of proof. In t h i s way he achieves i n 
his teaching the harmony which he sets out to 
establish between the authentic doctrine of 
C h r i s t i a n i t y and whatever undoubted t r u t h i s con-
tained i n the philosophy of Ar i s t o t l e . 2 
Thus i t would seem that the "authentic doctrine of 
C h r i s t i a n i t y " asserts the beginning of the world i n time. 
This question of the beginning of the world i n time, how-
ever, may be of significance to the students of the 
•^Flew and Mackinnon, op. c i t . , p. 185. 
2 Gilson, op. c i t . , p. I 5 I . 
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his t o r y of science or of metaphysics. i''or our purposes, 
the more s i g n i f i c a n t aspect of the doctrine of creation 
ex n i h i l o l i e s i n i t s "insistence on absolute dependence 
(on God) and t h i s r e j e c t i o n of any sort of d u a l i s t i c 
account of the universe.""'" This i s what we called the 
theologians' idea of creation. The significance of t h i s 
idea l i e s i n the moral suggestions and overtones i t has. 
As evidence of the moral suggestions entailed by t h i s 
idea, Anthony Elew quotes Emil Brunner's statement that 
i n recognising God as "MY creator and the creator of a l l 
things I become aware that I am...his servant, his pro-
perty, because a l l that I am and have I have from him, 
because not only I but a l l that i s has been created by 
2 
him." In the words of J. S. Whale, 
The Christian doctrine of creation i s a sym-
bolic assertion, not that the world was made by 
the Great A r t i f i c e r as a carpenter makes a box, 
but that man i n a l l his f e l t f i n i t u d e comes from 
God and goes to God; he i s not surrounded by a 
sheer abyss of nothingness. God, the God and 
Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, i s the ground and 
goal of a l l that i s . A l l i s of God—rour creation, 
preservation and a l l the blessings ofMthis l i f e ; 
the redemption of the world, the means of grace and 
the hope of glory. y-Ee i s the f i r s t and the l a s t 
and the l i v i n g One. 
"'"Flew and Mackinnon, op. c i t . , p. 173. 
^ I b i d . , p. 173. 
^J. S. Whale, Christian Doctrine (Fontana Books, F i f t h 
Impression, 19630, PP. 13f. 
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I t should be obvious t h a t such a view of c r e a t i o n 
w i l l i n e v i t a b l y imply c e r t a i n moral a t t i t u d e s — a t t i t u d e s 
such as, i n the words of S'lew again, "This i s God's woi'-ld 
... iandu we should behave, as i t were, as guests and 
borrowers:, not as owners who have a r i g h t t o do v/hat they 
l i k e w i t h t h e i r o w n . I t f o l l o w s from the above d i s -
cussion t h a t there are three p o i n t s of c a r d i n a l impor-
tance i n the t r a d i t i o n a l C h r i s t i a n account of c r e a t i o n 
which may deserve s p e c i a l n o t i c e by students of C h r i s t i a n 
e t h i c s . These are ( l ) the i n s i s t e n c e on absolute depend-
ence, (2) the r e j e c t i o n of any r e a l fundamental dualism, 
and (3) the suggestion of c e r t a i n conduct and a t t i t u d e s 
as a p p r o p r i a t e . 
Though once again t h i s i s a metaphysical problem 
which does not p r i m a r i l y concern us, we s h a l l s t i l l make 
a passing reference t o the question of why, a f t e r a l l , 
God created the universe. This i s important because the 
purpose t h a t God had i n c r e a t i n g the world i s bound t o 
have a bearing on the d e s t i n y and the e t h i c a l i d e a l of 
man. St. Thomas' answer t o t h i s question, i n the words 
of Etienne Gilson, i s 
t h a t good tends n a t u r a l l y t o d i f f u s e i t s e l f beyond 
i t s e l f ; i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e i s t o seek t o 
communicate i t s e l f t o other beings t o the extent 
•'"Flew and Mackinnon, op. c i t , , p. 173. 
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t o which they are capable of r e c e i v i n g i t . What 
i s t r u e of every good being i n p r o p o r t i o n as i t 
i s good, i s eminently t r u e of the Supreme Good 
which we c a l l God.l 
Thus the reason f o r c r e a t i o n i s the superabundance of 
goodness i n God "whose p e r f e c t i o n overflov^s and spreads 
over a h i e r a r c h y of p a r t i c i p a t i n g beings." I f we sub-
s t i t u t e love f o r goodness, we may rephrase t h i s explana-
t i o n , but the e s s e n t i a l argument w i l l be h a r d l y changed. 
God i s l o v e , and love, l i k e good or perhaps even moreso, 
seeks t o communicate i t s e l f t o other beings t o the extent 
t o which they are capable of r e c e i v i n g i t . Thus love and 
goodness form the very f a b r i c of the world, and so must 
determine the e t h i c a l i d e a l and f i n a l d e s t i n y of man. 
(b) Creation myths i n the Hindu t r a d i t i o n 
Our use of the p l u r a l , myths, i s d e l i b e r a t e here, 
f o r i n the Hindu t r a d i t i o n t here i s more than one myth 
r e g a r d i n g the act of c r e a t i o n , though q u i t e a few of these 
myths d i f f e r from each other i n only minor d e t a i l s and 
not on the main theme or i t s e s s e n t i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . I n 
the words of S i r Charles E l i o t , 
Hindu cosmogonies are various and discordant i n 
d e t a i l s , but u s u a l l y s t a r t w i t h the e v o l u t i o n o r 
emanation of l i v i n g beings from the D i v i n i t y and 
•^Gilson, op, c i t . , p. 141, 
^ I b i d . , p, 141. 
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o f t e n a reproductive act forms p a r t of the pro-
cess, such as the hatching of an egg or the 
d i v i s i o n of a D i v i n i t y i n t o male and female 
halves. I n many accounts the Deity brings i n t o 
being personages who continue the work of world-
making and such e n t i t i e s as mind, time and des i r e 
are prod.uced before the m a t e r i a l world. But 
ev e r y t h i n g i n these c r e a t i o n st03?ies i s f i g u r a -
t i v e . 1 
I t may be d e s i r a b l e t o mention b r i e f l y i n t h i s 
context what i s pei'haps the oldest and ihe most celebrated one 
of these " s t o r i e s . " This i s contained i n the famous 
I'urusa Snkta of the Rga Veda (X, 129). According t o t h i s 
account, the world and a l l t h a t i s i n i t has emanated from 
the One I r i m e v a l Man (Furusa). This l u r u s a i s both imma-
nent and transcendent, f o r "the f i n i t e world only accounts 
f o r one-quarter of h i s being, the remaining three-quarters 
c o n s t i t u t e i m m o r t a l i t y . . . . " The act of c r e a t i o n was 
s t a r t e d by Purusa o f f e r i n g himself as an o b l a t i o n at the 
great primeval S a c r i f i c e , and thus the world may be said 
t o be a r e s u l t of t h i s act of self-immolation by Purusa. 
The whole universe then i s only a p a r t of God, and, 
n a t u r a l l y , cannot e x i s t independently of God. 
Fas c i n a t i n g as they might be, i t w i l l be n e i t h e r 
p o s s i b l e nor p r o f i t a b l e f o r us t o dw e l l at length on these 
"various and discordant" d e t a i l s of the c r e a t i o n s t o r i e s . 
•'"Sir Charles E l i o t , Hinduism and Buddhism. I,Book I I , p. 43. 
Professor R. C. Zaehner, Hinduism (Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 
1962), p. 57. ~~ ' 
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I t i s p o s s i b l e , however, t o make some observations which 
may be g e n e r a l l y acceptable t o a l l or most schools of 
Hindu ti o u g h t . I t must be s a i d f i r s t of a l l t h a t the idea 
of c r e a t i o n ex n i h i l o i s more the exception than the r u l e 
w i t h Hinduism. The more common concept seems t o be t h a t 
God creates i n the sense of arranging, ordering or manipu-
l a t i n g elements t h a t are themselves e t e r n a l . The Nyaya-
Vaisesika theory of c r e a t i o n , f o r example, holds t h a t there 
are e t e r n a l c o n s t i t u e n t s of the u n i v e r s e — t h e f o u r kinds 
of atoms ( o f e a r t h , a i r , f i r e and water) and the f i v e sub-
stances (Ikasa, space, time, mind and s o u l ) — v / h i c h can 
n e i t h e r be created nor destroyed. God only arranges these 
various e t e r n a l c o n s t i t u e n t s i n t o composite substances i n 
accordance w i t h the requirements of Karma. The Mimamsa, 
which does not b e l i e v e i n a God, holds t h a t t h i s arrange-
ment of atoms can be brought about by the law of Karma i t -
s e l f . The Samkhya, which again i s a t h e i s t i c , believes i n 
the e v o l u t i o n of e v e r y t h i n g but souls from the unconscious 
p r i m o r d i a l s t u f f , c a l l e d P r a k r t i . I t i s important t o note, 
hoivever, t h a t i n the a l l i e d system Yoga, God, oi" I s vara, 
i s brought i n t o co-ordinate and give d i r e c t i o n t o the 
process of e v o l u t i o n . I n the Glta, on the other hand, the 
dualism of the type advocated bgf Samkhya i s transformed 
i n t o a monism, and the two u l t i m a t e e n t i t i e s — P u r u s a and 
P r a k r t i — a r e conceived as being only d i f f e r e n t aspects of 
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the Supreme Person, Purusottam. Thus matter, though d i s -
t i n c t from s p i r i t , i s co-eval w i t h i t as p a r t of the Supreme. 
This i s the explanation adopted by Ramanuja also, the most 
i n f l u e n t i a l of the Hindu t h e i s t s . 9i^S. ( s p i r i t ) and A p i t a 
( m a t t e r ) are both c o n s t i t u e n t s of the Lord, Isvara or 
Brahma. I t would thus be c l e a r t h a t according t o most 
i n f l u e n t i a l schools of Hinduism, matter and s p i r i t are 
both e q u a l l y p r i m o r d i a l and hence the question of c r e a t i o n 
out of nothing does not a r i s e . 
The second p o i n t on which there i s complete unanim-
i t y among a l l schools of Hinduism i s t h a t there can be no 
question of the world having a beginning i n time. With 
i t s b e l i e f i n c y c l i c c r e a t i o n i t tends t o subscribe t o 
what f o r St. Thomas was a mere l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y , t h a t 
i s , t h a t the universe i s created from a l l e t e r n i t y (Anadi). 
We are, however, s t i l l t o emphasise what f o r our 
purposes i s the most important i m p l i c a t i o n of the Hindu 
cosmology. This i s t h a t despite the d i f f e r e n c e s i n other 
d e a t i l s , every school of Hinduism (except of course the 
a t h e i s t i c Samkhya and Pllmamsa) u n h e s i t a t i n g l y declares 
the u t t e r dependence of the world and e s p e c i a l l y man on 
God. Even those systems which advocate some k i n d of 
p l u r a l i s m on the u l t i m a t e plane (Madhva and Nyaya, f o r 
example) i n s i s t t h a t P'aramatman, or the Supreme S e l f , i s 
the sovereign, and t h e r e f o r e everything i s u l t i m a t e l y 
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dependent on Him. A l l these systems conceive the human 
soul t o be separate from but dependent on God. Only 
Shamkara believes i n the u l t i m a t e i d e n t i t y of the Atman 
w i t h Brahma.; but even he has t o concede t h a t the Stman, 
being merely a p a r t of Brahma, cannot be independent of 
the l a t t e r . Thus even though God creates v/ith p r e - e x i s t i n g 
m a t e r i a l and though the souls are e t e r n a l and unborn, 
n o t h i n g can conceivably e x i s t independent of God, This 
f a c t of dependence on God i s brought out even more f o r c e -
f u l l y by the popular Hindu b e l i e f t h a t the t r i n i t y of 
Brahma, Visnu and Mahesa, as d i f f e r e n t aspects of the same 
Supreme Lord, i s responsible f o r not only the cx'eation but 
also the pr e s e r v a t i o n and d e s t r u c t i o n of the universe. 
This conception almost s t r i k e s the same note as the 
"nothing but by God" of the Nicene Greed. 
Regarding t h i s absolute dependence, which the 
C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e of c r e a t i o n i s i n t e r p r e t e d t o imply, 
the utterances of the Glta leave us i n no doubt whatsoever 
t h a t i t i s the same i n Hinduism. S r i Krishna declares, 
( I am) the goal, the upholder, the l o r d , the w i t -
ness, the abode, the refuge and the f r i e n d . ( I 
am) the o r i g i n and the d i s s o l u t i o n , the ground, 
the r e s t i n g place and the imperishable seed.l 
•^Gita, IX, 18. 
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I f God i s the ground of everything t h a t i s and happens, 
then u t t e r and absolute dependence could be the only res-
ponse t o Him. This i s brought out also by the sentiments 
expressed by the many poe t - s a i n t s of I n d i a who have played 
an i n s t r u m e n t a l p a r t i n g i v i n g d i r e c t i o n t o r e l i g i o u s 
p i e t y amongst the m u l t i t u d e s i n I n d i a . The moral over-
tones of t h i s sense of absolute dependence, once again, 
are the same i n Hinduism as they were found t o be i n the 
case of C h r i s t i a n i t y , t h a t i s , t h a t since t h i s i s God's 
world, we ought t o behave as guests, borrowers, or even 
servants, r a t h e r than as owners who have a r i g h t t o do 
what they l i k e w i t h t h e i r own. The very opening verse of 
the I s a Upanisad s t r i k e s t h i s note when i t says, 
(Know t h a t ) a l l t h i s , whatever moves i n t h i s 
moving world, i s enveloped by God. Therefore, 
f i n d your enjoyment i n re n u n c i a t i o n s ; do not 
covet what belongs t o others.•'• 
The same a t t i t u d e characterises the e t h i c of the Gita 
which declares. 
Whatever thou doest, whatever thou eatest, 
whatever thou o f f o r e s t , whatever thou g i v e s t 
away, whatever a u s t e r i t i e s thou dost p r a c t i s e , 
do t h a t (0 Son of K u n t i — A r j u n a ) , as an o f f e r -
i n g t o Me.2 
4 s a Upanisad, 1. 
^G l t a , IX, 27. 
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Thus t h e a t t i t u d e of absolute dependence and the suggestion 
of c e r t a i n conduct and a t t i t u d e s as appropriate are common 
t o both Hinduism and C h r i s t i a n i t y , as f o l l o w i n g from t h e i r 
d o c t r i n e s of c r e a t i o n . 
About the why of c r e a t i o n , once again many anwers 
are o f f e r e d . Tv/o terras are most f r e q u e n t l y mentioned i n 
connection w i t h t h i s explanation of the u l t i m a t e mystery. 
These are Maya and L i l a . I^ya i s g e n e r a l l y understood t o 
mean the "power which enables Him t o produce mutable 
nature. ""'' Though there may be d i f f e r e n c e s of opinion about 
t h i s meaning, i t may reasonably be he l d t o be the view of 
most of the t h e i s t i c schools and c e r t a i n l y of the GIta. 
I n the PurSpic l i t e r a t u r e , however, and i n much of the 
Bhakti sects there i s an equa l l y frequent mention of the 
second of these terms, t h a t i s . I l i a . L i l a means sport, 
and thus c r e a t i o n i s a t t r i b u t e d t o Divine sport. This may 
seem t o be a very u n - C h r i s t i a n way of speaking about the 
c r e a t i v e act of God, i f i t i s supposed t o mean, as i s some-
times done by f o r e i g n scholars, a c a l l o u s , purposeless and 
i n d i f f e r e n t act on the p a r t of God. But t h i s i s d e f i n i t e l y 
not the r e a l meaning of the term. Sport, i n the context 
of c r e a t i o n , only s i g n i f i e s a c e r t a i n exuberance which 
overflows i n t o an act of c r e a t i o n . And t h i s i s because 
^Radhakrishnan, I n t r o d u c t i o n t o the Gita, p. 42. 
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God i s supposed t o be l o v i n g , and so the exuberance i s 
the exuberance of love and a f f e c t i o n . I n the words of 
Dr. Radhakrishnan, 
The one Godhead...is also the Supreme L i v i n g 
God, l o v i n g the world and redeeming i t by His 
grace. Why i s the world what i t i s w i t h i t s 
graduated hierarchy? We can only say, i t i s 
the nature of the Supreme t o express I t s e l f i n 
t h i s way.-*-
The Nyaya-Vaisesika explanation of c r e a t i o n , however, 
a t t r i b u t e s c r e a t i o n t o the desire (Ichha) of Isvara or 
God, under c e r t a i n accessory co n d i t i o n s (Sahakarl). But 
God i s not supposed t o have created the world f o r any 
2 
s e l f i s h purpose, "but f o r the good of a l l beings." 
That the L I l a of God i s no mere whim would be r e a l i s e d i f 
we remember the Nyaya-Vaisesika b e l i e f , shared by most 
Hindus, t h a t God creates i n accordance w i t h the r e q u i r e -
ments of the Law of Karma i n order t h a t the souls might 
have the chance t o enjoy or s u f f e r the consequences of 
t h e i r a c t i o n s . The world thus becomes a moral stage on 
which n o t h i n g happens by sheer chance. 
I t seems then t h a t whether i n Hinduism or i n 
C h r i s t i a n i t y , the explanation of the why of c r e a t i o n i s 
•••rbid., pp. 39f. 
2 
S. K. Das Gupta, A H i s t o r y of Indian Philosophy 
(Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y T r e s s , 1^2277~rr724. 
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e i t h e r i n terms of good or of love, though i t i s o f t e n 
confessed t h a t these are mere humble human e f f o r t s t o 
understand or pierce the d i v i n e mystery. This tendency 
t o regard the how and why of c r e a t i o n as an u l t i m a t e 
mystery, though more common i n Hinduism, i s not, however, 
absent from C h r i s t i a n i t y . Bernard Iddings B e l l ' s remarks 
on C h r i s t i a n i t y are worth quoting i n t h i s connection. He 
says, "Almost the f i r s t t h i n g t o be noted about C h r i s t i a n -
i t y i s t h a t i t i s a r e l i g i o n based on agnosticism.... I t 
makes no attempt t o e x p l a i n the unexplainable or, as the 
negro pastor said, 'to unscrew the inscrutable.'""^ This 
remark on C h r i s t i a n i t y , i t may be c o n f i d e n t l y s a i d , applies 
e q u a l l y w e l l t o Hinduism. 
Man—His Nature and Status 
The above accounts of c r e a t i o n provide the back-
ground i n which we now must consider i n some d e t a i l the 
nature and status of man. This would i n v o l v e the i n v e s t i -
ga^tion of such questions as: what i s the c o n s t i t u t i o n and 
the e s s e n t i a l nature of man? v/hat i s he capable of? and 
what i s h i s status i n the hierarchy of beings i n t h i s 
created univei-se? 
"'"Bernard Iddings B e l l , R e l i g i o n f o r L i v i n g (John G i f f o r d 
L t d . , London, 1939), p.T^. ™""" 
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(a) The C h r i s t i a n view 
I n the words of A. C. Bouquet, 
C h r i s t i a n s are committed o f f i c i a l l y t o a 
very high b e l i e f i n the p o t e n t i a l greatness of 
man. He i s a l i t t l e lower than God (Ps. v i i i ) . 
He i s made i n the image of God (Gen. i ) . The 
spi x - i t of man i:© the candle of the Lord (Prov. 
27). Yet C h r i s t i a n s are equally committed t o 
the b e l i e f i n man's u t t e r need of God. Man 
needs God. Man can not be a l l t h a t he ought 
t o be, or f u l f i l h i s grand p o s s i b i l i t i e s , i f 
he t r i e s , as he so o f t e n does, t o be the a r t i s t 
of h i s own s o c i a l and i n d i v i d u a l l i f e — ' o n his-, 
own', so t o speak—apart from the l i f e of God. 
This passage p r a c t i c a l l y sums up the main p o i n t s i n the 
C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e of man. But l e t us examine i n greater 
d e t a i l some of the key phrases used and t h e i r i m p l i c a -
t i o n s . To s t a r t w i t h , what i s the exact s i g n i f i c a n c e of 
the phrase " i n the image of God"? L i n g u i s t i c a l l y , perhaps, 
i t can o n l y mean t h a t man bears a c e r t a i n amount of r e -
semblance or likeness to God. This may mean t h a t man, 
though not q u i t e God, does, t o some extent, possess the 
a t t r i b u t e s and powers t h a t are supposed t o belong t o God. 
In other words, i t i s only a f i g u r a t i v e vray of speaking 
about what Bouquet c a l l s the " p o t e n t i a l greatness of man." 
Among oth e r t h i n g s , t h i s p o t e n t i a l greatness i m p l i e s t h a t 
j u s t as God r u l e s or has dominion over a l l His creatures, 
•^ A. G. Bouquet, Comparative R e l i g i o n (A Pelican Book, s i x t h 
e d i t i o n , 19&2), p. 257. 
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so man was made t o have "...dominion over the f i s h of the 
sea, and over the f o w l of the a i r , and over the c a t t l e , 
and over a l l the e a r t h , and over every creeping t h i n g t h a t 
creepeth upon the e a r t h . ""'" The d i f f e r e n c e between man and 
God, however, must not be l o s t s i g h t o f. God's dominion 
over the universe i s f i n a l and absolute, t h a t i s , He 
e x e r i i s e s t h i s i n His own r i g h t as the creator of the u n i -
verse, whereas i n the case of man, t h i s p r i v i l e g e or power 
i s there simply because i t has been delegated t o him by 
God. I t f o l l o w s , then, t h a t man can enjoy h i s powers only 
so long as he enjoys the confidence and love of God, some-
t h i n g l i k e the s i t u a t i o n of the ambassador of a country, 
who can represent the i n t e r e s t s of h i s country only so 
long as he enjoys the confidence of h i s country's govern-
ment. This, as we s h a l l see l a t e r , has important e t h i c a l 
i m p l i c a t i o n s . 
Meanwhile, l e t us ask what else i s e n t a i l e d by man's 
being created i n the image of God. Since God i s a creator, 
man's lik e n e s s t o God may also imply the power of c r e a t i v i t y 
on a l i m i t e d scale. But, perhaps, the most s i g n i f i c a n t 
i m p l i c a t i o n of the phrase " i n the image of God," at le a s t 
e t h i c a l l y , i s man's awareness of i t . As J. S. Whale puts i t , 
"'"Genesis 1:26. 
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He i s l i f t e d above a l l e a r t h l y creatures i n being 
made i n the image of God, and i n being aware of 
the f a c t . He i s aware t h a t the Creator i s the 
E t e r n a l Love who c a l l s men i n t o existence t h a t 
t h e i r w i l l i n g response t o h i s love may f u l f i l h i s 
c r e a t i v e purpose. This responsible awareness 
which God created i n man (Ansprechbarkeit, address-
a b i l i t y , or a n s w e r a b i l i t y , as Brunner has c a l l e d 
i t ) i s man's greatness and h i s f a t a l temptation. 
As Brunner observes, t h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y or 
a d d r e s s a b i l i t y was not a task, but a g i f t ; not 
law, but grace.1 
To summarise, then, the C h r i s t i a n view i s t h a t man 
i s God's creature, but a p r i v i l e g e d one i n s o f a r as he has 
been created i n the li k e n e s s of God. This means t h a t he 
has been endowed w i t h i n t e l l i g e n c e , w i t h the power of 
c r e a t i v i t y on a l i m i t e d scale, and w i t h the power t o r e -
ci p r o c a t e God's love, but above a l l , w i t h a sense of res-
p o n s i b i l i t y , an awareness t h a t a l l h i s powers and p r i v i -
leges are g i f t s of God r a t h e r than h i s absolute r i g h t s . 
I n s t a t u s , t h e r e f o r e , he seems t o occupy an intermediate 
p o s i t i o n — d e f i n i t e l y above the other creatures of the 
e a r t h but below t h a t of the c e l e s t i a l creatures, l i k e the 
angels, f o r example. The f a c t i s t h a t man can achieve 
almost anything and i s p o t e n t i a l l y capable of everything, 
provided he does not f o r g e t t h a t he i s , a f t e r a l l , only 
a creature and i s embodied l i k e the r e s t . 
•'"Whale, op. c i t . , pp. 41f. 
122. 
This question of man's being embodied and merely 
a creature r a i s e s the question of i m m o r t a l i t y , and, perhaps, 
of pre-existence. I f man i s only a creature and i s embodied 
l i k e the r e s t of the creatures, as s u r e l y he i s , and i f he 
i s also immortal, as C h r i s t i a n theology i n s i s t s , then i t 
f o l l o w s t h a t i m m o r t a l i t y can belong only t o h i s soul, f o r 
i t s u r e l y cannot be h i s body's. The popular n o t i o n i s t h a t 
i n p h y s i c a l death only the body dies, and the soul survives 
i n some form, f o r a f t e r the Day of Judgment i t i s t h e soul 
which e i t h e r reaps the reward of e t e r n a l communion w i t h 
God or s u f f e r s e t e r n a l damnation i n h e l l . Now, what ex a c t l y 
i s meant by "soul," and i n what sense i s i t immortal? 
Once again, we seem t o be faced w i t h a very d i f f i c u l t 
metaphysical problem whose s o l u t i o n i s beyond the scope of 
our enquiry. Leaving aside a l l metaphysical s u b t l e t y , how-
ever, i t can be s a f e l y asserted t h a t the b e l i e f i n a soul 
i s a concrete r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of man's c o n v i c t i o n , or, we 
might say, fond wish, t h a t there i s more i n the c o n s t i t u -
t i o n of man than meets the eye. That one p a r t of man, h i s 
body, i s perishable cannot p o s s i b l y be questioned, f o r 
a f t e r a l l , t h i s p a r t of man i s only made of "dust." "...For 
dust thou a r t , and unto dust s h a l t thou return"''" i s the 
v e r d i c t of God. But whatever t h i s phrase might have meant 
•'"Genesis 5:19. 
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i n e a r l y Judaism, l a t e r Judaism and C h r i s t i a n i t y regarded 
t h i s as r e f e r r i n g merely t o the "body" of man. l e s , the 
body of man i s made of dust and so i t must r e t u r n t o dust. 
But what about the S p i r i t or S o u l — t h e Divine i n man? 
This s u r e l y survives p h y s i c a l death, or i n other words i s 
immortal. How and when the concept of i m m o r t a l i t y entered 
i n t o C h r i s t i a n i t y i s extremely d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d out, nor 
i s i t our task, but i t i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t i n St. Paul's 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Resurrection there i s c l e a r evidence of 
b e l i e f i n i m m o r t a l i t y of the soul. We are not suggesting 
t h a t St. Paul was the f i r s t i n the C h r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n t o 
have t a l k e d of soul and the i m m o r t a l i t y of the soul, but, 
i n the words of S. D. P. Salraond, " I t i s i n Paul's E p i s t l e s 
above a l l others t h a t i t i s set f o r t h as the s p e c i f i c a l l y 
C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e . "*'• Without going i n t o f u r t h e r d e t a i l , 
we may conclude, then, t h a t St. Paul's d o c t r i n e of Resur-
r e c t i o n , and a l l l a t e r C h r i s t i a n theology, i m p l i e s t h a t 
man i s an "embodied s o u l " and t h a t though the body i s per-
i s h a b l e , the soul i s immortal. This immortal soul can 
c e r t a i n l y not be i d e n t i c a l w i t h the mind, as we understand 
the l a t t e r today, though there are many instances i n the 
h i s t o r y of Western philosophy and theology where no r e a l 
"''S. D. P. Salmond. The C h r i s t i a n Doctrine of I m m o r t a l i t y 
(T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh, 191377 vT~Wr» 
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d i s t i n c t i o n has been maintained between the mind and the 
s o u l . But t h i s statement, perhaps, i s not q u i t e r e l e v a n t 
here. V/hat i s r e l e v a n t i s t h a t the authentic C h r i s t i a n 
d o c t r i n e on t h i s issue happens t o be t h a t the soul, though 
created, i s immortal at the same time. We s h a l l have 
occasion t o r e f e r t o the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the b e l i e f i n 
created but immortal souls. E'oi' the time being, l e t us 
pass on t o another a l l i e d problem. 
We have seen t h a t the C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e of xResur-
r e c t i o n i m p l i e s a theory of i m m o r t a l i t y . Does i t also 
imply a theory of pre-existence? Almost a l l C h r i s t i a n s 
today w i l l c e r t a i n l y exclaim a vigorous "no" i n answer t o 
t h i s question. But l e t us remember t h a t b e l i e f i n pre-
existence i s not q u i t e as f o r e i g n t o C h r i s t i a n t h i n k i n g as 
i s g e n e r a l l y imagined. Origen, f o r example, one of "the 
leaders of e a r l y C h r i s t i a n thought" "...took the idea of 
pre-existence d e f i n i t e l y and s e r i o u s l y " and b e l i e v e d t h a t 
"every i n d i v i d u a l i s born w i t h an i n h e r i t e d burden of 
f a i l u r e s and s i n s , not i n h e r i t e d from Adam but from h i s 
own previous l i f e . " " * " I t i s t r u e t h a t Origen's teaching 
on t h i s p o i n t has been g r a d u a l l y and d e f i n i t e l y l o s t on 
the C h r i s t i a n world, and i t cannot, t h e r e f o r e , be accepted 
•'"S. H. Mellone, Leaders of :Early C h r i s t i a n Thought 
(The Lindsey Press, LondonT" 1954)7~P^7. 
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as genuine Christian b e l i e f , i^ut i t may be urged that 
his explanation i n terms of pre-existence and a f t e r - l i f e 
may appear to many a better explanation of the continuity 
of the soul's existence a f t e r bodily death than the b e l i e f 
that the bodies of the dead are l i t e r a l l y to be "raised" 
before the f i n a l Judgment. Origen, understandably, "re-
pudiates with indignation the notion that the bodies of 
the dead are to be 'raised' and to exist f o r ever.""*" Re-
surrection of the dead does not seem to explain what hap-
pens t o the immortal soul a f t e r the death of the body. 
In what form i s the soul preserved, as i t must be, t i l l 
the Day of Judgment? I f i t i s assumed that i t takes another 
perhaps subtle form, then r e b i r t h i n some form i s cl e a r l y 
implied. And t h i s seems to be an unavoidable alterna t i v e 
i f the "rai s i n g of the dead" i s not to mean a fresh 
creation by God. 
I'o sum up, then, C h r i s t i a n i t y believes that man i s 
p o t e n t i a l l y great. He i s a complex of body and s p i r i t , of 
which the former i s perishable but the l a t t e r immortal. 
Thus i t believes that the soul can be created, yet immor-
t a l . I t s concept of the immortality of the soul and i t s 
b e l i e f i n the resurrection of the dead contain i m p l i c i t l y 
the idea of pre-existence and i^ebirth, as i t was worked 
•^Ibid., p. 95. 
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out "by Origen, but o f f i c i a l C h r i s t i a n i t y somehow shies 
away from t h i s b e l i e f . 
(b) The Hindu view 
Let us state at the outset that the Hindu view 
about the nature, composition and status of man i s s t r i k -
i n g l y d i f f e r e n t from that of C h r i s t i a n i t y i n many d e t a i l s ; 
but t h i s i s not to say that the Hindu view of man's status 
or his capacities i s contrary t o , or even essentially 
d i f f e r e n t from, the Christian. The fact i s that the meta-
physical and ontological constituents of the story are 
d i f f e r e n t , but, as we s h a l l see l a t e r , the e t h i c a l sub-
stance i s by and large the same. 
Hindu metaphysics has worked out i n much more ela-
bor.'ate d e t a i l the nature and composition of man than per-
haps Christian theology has. According to most authorita-
t i v e Hindu accounts, man i s a compound of (1) a human form 
or body (l)eha or Sarira) v;hich includes the ten external 
organs (Bahyakaranas)—five sensory and f i v e motor; (2) 
l i f e ("f rana); (5) mind (Manas), which i s a kind of co-
ordinator between knowledge and action; (4) i n t e l l e c t 
(Buddhi), which i s the organ of ascertainment and decision; 
(5) ego (Ahamkara), which i s responsible f o r the fe e l i n g 
of " I and mine" (Abhimana); and, of course, (6) a soul 
(Atman). I t should be clear from t h i s enumeration that 
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i n the Hindu t r a d i t i o n the mind, the i n t e l l e c t and the 
ego are d e f i n i t e l y recognised to be d i f f e r e n t from the 
soul or self and hence there can never be any question of 
confusing the soul or Atman v/ith the mind at a l l . I t would 
fol l o w , then, that v;ith the decomposition of the body only 
the adjuncts of the body can die; i t does not affect the 
soul i n any way. 
What, then, i s the nature of the soul or Atman? 
The Glta returns an unequivocal answer to t h i s : 
He (the true s e l f or Atman) i s never born, 
nor does he die at any time, nor having (once) 
come to be w i l l he again cease to be. He i s 
unborn, eternal, permanent and primeval. He 
i s not slain when the body i s s l a i n . 1 
That t h i s soul or se l f i s immortal i s obvious from the 
above passage, and does not therefore have to be estab-
lished. But there i s another phrase i n t h i s passage which 
ought to be taken careful note of. I t says that "He (Atman) 
i s never born" either. This undoubtedly implies that 
there can be no question of the Atrnan having been created 
at. a l l . I t i s an eternal e n t i t y and has co-existed along 
with God from e t e r n i t y . But t h i s does not mean that i t 
i s an independent e n t i t y . In the words of Dr. Kadharishnan, 
•^Glta, I I , 20. 
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" I t i s everlasting as a ^ i v i n e form and derives i t s 
existence from God. ""*• I t i s no doubt separate from God, 
but from only part of God. Thus the Atman i n man i s 
l i t e r a l l y and r e a l l y the JJivine spark i n man, what St. 
Paul perhaps means by the Christ that " l i v e t h i n me." 
I t w i l l be seen that whatever the other advantages 
or disadvantages of t h i s theory, i t c e r t a i n l y avoids the 
inconsistency of created but immortal souls. But i n keep-
ing w i t h our i n t e n t i o n to avoid controversies of a meta-
physical nature, we s h a l l not discuss i n d e t a i l the d i f f -
i c u l t i e s of the doctrine of created but immortal souls. 
We s h a l l simply point out that to quite a few great minds, 
including that of Bradley, t h i s doctrine seems to involve 
a p l a i n contradiction,-^ 
Viihat i s relevant f o r our purposes here i s the fact 
that Hinduism believes i n eternal and immortal souls. 
Those eternal souls, once they have entered Samsara, or 
the world-process, assume various bodies, including those 
of animals and plants. I t i s clear that Hinduism regards 
animals as well as plants as being possessed of souls. 
This, once again, i s i n sharp contrast to the t r a d i t i o n a l 
"^Radhakrishnan, Introduction to the Gtta, p. 10? (emphasis mine). 
^Galatians 2:20, 
5 
For a detailed analysis, see K l i o t , op. c i t . , p p . l i i i to I v i . 
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Christian b e l i e f wherein only human beings are supposed 
to have souls. This b e l i e f , i n c i d e n t a l l y , though help-
f u l i n boosting the status of man, has obvious l i m i t a t i o n s . 
For instance, " i t seems to be assumed that such a complex 
mind as a dog's can be explained as a function of matter, 
whereas there i s something i n a c h i l d which can not be so 
explained.""^ I t w i l l be seen that, howsoever f l a t t e r i n g 
t h i s b e l i e f might be to man's ego, i t does not seem to 
f a l l i n l i n e with modern s c i e n t i f i c and evolutionary ideas. 
Hinduism, on the other hand, treats the souls of a l l l i v i n g -
beings as p o t e n t i a l l y equal, though i t asserts that a l l 
the souls are not equally evolved and capable of promoting 
the soul's ultimate good. In f a c t , only the human soul 
i s capable of l i b e r a t i o n (Moksa). 
Anyway, to proceed with our main story, each i n d i -
vidual soul, once i t has entered Samsara, passes through 
a series of progressively more complex bodies u n t i l i t 
reaches the human l e v e l on i t s evolutionary march. U n t i l 
the human stage has been reached, the soul's passage from 
one body to another i s determined by some kind of auto-
matically operating natural law. But once the soul has 
taken a human form, i t comes under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of a 
moral law—the law of Karma. Henceforward i t i s man's 
•^Ibid., p. l i i i . 
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own actions that govern the course of his existence and 
status i n a future l i f e . Our actions i n t h i s l i f e generate 
certain potencies which, f o r better or f o r worse, determine 
what kind of existence our souls w i l l have a f t e r the de-
composition of the present body. I f we have led a good 
l i f e and have attained moral worth, we s h a l l most certai n l y 
be born i n circumstances more congenial to the attainment 
of s p i r i t u a l freedom, and we shall be a step nearer our 
ultimate goal. And i f we continue to l i v e morally, the 
day would i n e v i t a b l y come when we should have realised our 
divine worth, and thus be liberated from the f l u x of l i f e , 
called Samsara. 
To summarise, then, Hinduism teaches that the soul 
i s eternal and immortal. Once involved i n the world-
process, a body of some sort becomes a necessary adjunct 
f o r the soul, but the same body i s neither necessary nor 
convenient f o r an i n d e f i n i t e period of time. Accordingly, 
when one body becomes old, or when the s p i r i t u a l and moral 
progress of the soul necessitates a more complex body, the 
soul passes i n t o a new body a f t e r discarding the old one. 
Just as a person casts o f f worn-out garments and 
puts on others that are new, even so does the 
embodied soul cast o f f worn out bodies- and take 
on others that are new. 
-^GM, I I , 22. 
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Pre-existence and transmigration are, therefore, necessary 
postulates of the Hindu view of l i f e . What i s , thus, an 
exceptional point of view i n C h r i s t i a n i t y i s the general 
rule i n Hindu thought. 
I t i s remarkable, however, that these rather impor-
tant differences on the metaphysical and ontological plane 
do not lead t o as much difference i n the moral implications 
of these doctrines as one would imagine. In other words, 
the Hindu doctrine about the nature, status and capacities 
of man i s not, as some might expect, fundamentally d i f f e r -
ent from the Christian. This would, perhaps, need to be 
demonstrated. To s t a r t with, l i k e the Christian, the 
Hindu view accepts man's complete dependence on God, even 
though i t does not regard the soul as a creature. The 
consensus i n the Hindu t r a d i t i o n i s f o r t r e a t i n g the soul 
as a separate, eternal but dependent e n t i t y . To repeat 
the words of Dr. Hadhakrishnan, the soul i s "everlasting 
as Divine form and derives i t s existence from God." I t 
i s obvious, then, that the uncreated existence of the soul 
does not absolve i t of i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y or accountability 
to God. The soul i s a part of God, as i t were, and, l i k e 
any other part, can have no r e a l i t y i n i s o l a t i o n from the 
whole, that i s , God. 
Coming once again to the status of man, vie f i n d the 
Hindu view much the same as the Christian. Though the 
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souls of a l l creatures are alike i n the sense that they 
are a l l eternal and primordial, t h i s does not mean that 
a man i s the same as a monkey or a moth. We have already 
seen that the embodied soul reaches the human stage at the 
very highest phase i n i t s evolutionary course. Assumption 
of a human body, therefore, i s the crown of achievement 
f o r the soul so long as i t i s embodied and unliberated. 
But undoubtedly there are gods and goddesses and angels 
who are i n a way higher up than men i n the hierarchy of 
beings, though i t i s remarkable that even gods have to be 
reborn as men i f they desire libeberation, "for i t i s only 
through a human incarnation that Fioksa or f i n a l l i b e r a t i o n 
can be achieved.""^ In t h i s respect, then, men are more 
pr i v i l e g e d than even the gods. But on the whole man's 
status i n Hinduism, as i n C h r i s t i a n i t y , i s intermediate, 
i . e . , above a l l other beings of the eai'th but below that 
of the gods and angels. 
Man's p o t e n t i a l greatness, s i m i l a r l y , i s undisputed. 
By v i r t u e of his possession of a divine soul, man becomes 
divine. But i t may be objected that t h i s i s true of every 
other being, and, therefore does not impart any unique-
ness t o human existence. This i s true to an extent, and 
morally s i g n i f i c a n t , because t h i s implies that every 
"^Zaehner, op. c i t . , p. 82. 
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l i v i n g being should be treated with sympathy and respect. 
But i f we remember that i n the scale of evolution the 
human stage i s the l a s t and the highest, we w i l l see that 
man, rather than any beast, i s more l i k e l y to regain his 
l o s t d i v i n i t y . The l i b e r a t i o n of a beast, though possible, 
i s a miracle, whereas that of a human being i s j u s t what 
i t . ought to be. Indian mythology i s f u l l of accounts of 
indiv i d u a l s who, by t h e i r sheer moral and s p i r i t u a l pro-
gress or by the power of t h e i r devotion, have actually 
become gods. This i s why we hear so many of the poet-saints 
of India singing of the u t t e r f u t i l i t y and wretchedness of 
t h e i r l i v e s , because they are tortured by the awareness 
that they have f a i l e d to make the best of the g i f t of a 
human existence (Manava Jama). 
But the greatness of man i s not unqualified. This 
very greatness constitutes a pote n t i a l threat or tempta-
t i o n . In the Christian t r a d i t i o n man's temptation l i e s i n 
his f o r g e t t i n g the fact of creaturehood and his tendency 
to place himself i n the position of God. In the Hindu 
t r a d i t i o n the same story i s t o l d i n d i f f e r e n t words. Among 
a l l the beings man i s the only one who has int e l l i g e n c e and 
® S 0 (Buddhi and Ahamkara). I f the ego, t h i s f a c u l t y which 
creates the axi^areness of " I and mine" (Abhimana or pride), 
i s suppressed, or, even better, given up, s p i r i t u a l freedom 
i s the reward, but i f the ego i s l e t loose, i t can create 
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desires and hankerings i n man which w i l l bind him more 
and more f i r m l y t o SamsBra. I n other words, both Hindu 
and Christian t r a d i t i o n s emphasise the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of 
men, as moral creatures, to s t r i v e to avoid f a l l i n g prey 
to the temptations of false pride and to work f o r t h e i r 
salvation i n fear and trembling. 
Man—His Final Destiny: Redemption or Biberation 
We have seen that both C h r i s t i a n i t y and Hinduism 
speak of salvation as the ultimate destiny of man, and, 
to t h a t extent, can be described as r e l i g i o n s of redemp-
t i o n . But what exactly does t h i s concept of redemption 
mean? What i s redemption sought from, and why? These 
are the questions that w i l l engage our attention i n the 
next few pages. A t e n t a t i v e answer to the question "why 
redemption?" seems to be suggested by our analysis of the 
nature and status of man i n the previous section. We 
have seen that both C h r i s t i a n i t y and Hinduism emphasise 
the p o t e n t i a l greatness of man. And the very emphasis on 
the use of the term " p o t e n t i a l " seems to imply that i n 
a c t u a l i t y man has, f o r one reason or the other, l o s t some 
of his greatness, at least temporarily. Howtiis happened 
and what can be done to recover what has been l o s t are 
some of the most fundamental issues that C h r i s t i a n i t y and 
135. 
Hinduism have had to wrestle with. We sha l l now be review-
ing, b r i e f l y , the common ground of Christian and Hindu 
thinking on these issues. 
(a) The Christian view 
We have mentioned e a r l i e r that Christians are 
committed " o f f i c i a l l y to a very high b e l i e f i n the po t e n t i a l 
greatness of man," but we noted at the same time that they 
are equally "committed to the b e l i e f i n man's u t t e r need 
of God." We also mentioned that, i n f a c t , man's pot e n t i a l 
greatness, his having been created i n the image of God, i s 
also "his f a t a l temptation." I t i s a temptation because 
man might overrate his greatness and thereby forget the 
fact of his "utter need of God." His po t e n t i a l greatness 
might tempt him to do away with God, or, i n other words, 
he might t r y to become God Himself. In his self-pride he 
might lead a l i f e of defiance and re b e l l i o n against the 
Creator. And t h i s i s precisely what has happened, accord-
ing to the B i b l i c a l narrative. Adam ate of the forbidden 
tree , the tree of the knov/ledge of good and e v i l , i n d e f i -
ance of the e x p l i c i t command of God. By so doing, he t r i e d 
to become God. In the words of Genesis 3:23, 
And the Lord God said. Behold, the man i s be-
come as one of us, to know good and e v i l : and now, 
le s t he put f o r t h his hand, and take also of the 
tiree of l i f e , and eat, and l i v e f o r ever: there-
fore the Lord God sent him f o r t h from the garden of 
Eden, to t i l l the ground from whence he was taken. 
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This has been t r a d i t i o n a l l y called the story of the F a l l . 
About the exact consequences of the F a l l there are d i f f e r -
ences of opinion among theologians. But t h i s much i s 
agreed—that man's F a l l , symbolised by t h i s act of d e f i -
ance, vjas a great s p i r i t u a l catastrophe which erected a 
ba r r i e r between God and man and which has ever since stood 
i n the way of man's communion with God. "Therefore the 
Lord God sent him f o r t h from the garden of Eden" leaves no 
doubt about the displeasure of God and the consequent act 
of punishment. This act of defiance i s man's greatest sin, 
and i t i s as a res u l t of t h i s sin that he i s being forced 
to l i v e i n i s o l a t i o n from God. 
Thus the root of the trouble l i e s i n the w i l l of 
man, who, not being content with his finiteness, misuses 
his freedom and t r i e s to take the place of God and thereby 
f a l l s a prey to temptation and sin. As Reinhold Niebuhr 
puts i t , 
...The basic source of temptation...resides i n 
the i n c l i n a t i o n of man either to deny the con-
tingent character of his existence ( i n pride and 
self-love) or to escape from his freedom ( i n 
sensuality). Sensuality represents an e f f o r t to 
escape from the freedom and the i n f i n i t e p o s s i b i l -
i t i e s of s p i r i t . . . a n e f f o r t which results i n e v i t -
ably i n unlimited devotion to l i m i t e d values.^ 
1 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man (Nisbet and Co., Ltd., London7~T9Zn:77~r7~ig77 ' 
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But whatever the source of sin, a s i n f u l state of exis t -
ence i s f a r from desirable. We sha l l have f u r t h e r 
occasions to work out i n d e t a i l the connotation and im- • 
p l i c a t i o n s of sin. For the time being, we sh a l l be con-
tent t o state that the story of the F a l l , and the conse-
quent sin has been interpreted generally i n one of tv;o 
ways. To some i t has meant a l i t e r a l account of the 
F a l l of Adam, the f i r s t ancestor of man, from his state of 
o r i g i n a l perfection, and has generally s i g n i f i e d a burden 
of i n h e r i t e d g u i l t and sin which every man has in e v i t a b l y 
to carry insofar as he i s a descendant of the F i r s t man. 
But there are others, especially among modern interpreters 
of C h r i s t i a n i t y , to whom the F a l l of Adam merely sym-
bolises the character of man's v / i l l and his proneness to 
defy God, the assertion of his s e l f - w i l l . In the words 
of J. S. Whale, f o r example, 
The idea of a F a l l from an o r i g i n a l state of 
perfection i s r e a l l y a l i m i t i n g conception, a 
theological Grenzbegriff. I t i s not a scien-
t i f i c statement about the dawn of history. 
The F a l l i s symbolism, necessary to the i n t e l l -
ect, but inconceivable by the imagination... 
i t describes the q u a l i t y rather than the 
hi s t o r y of 'man's f i r s t disobedience.'l 
I t would seem, then, that sin r e a l l y consists i n 
1 Whale, op. c i t . , p. 49, 
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man's placing his own w i l l i n opposition to God's w i l l . 
I t i s t h i s tendency i n man which i s generally referred to 
as man's depravity or sin. But, as Bouquet says. 
This w i l l i n i t s e l f i s no more e v i l than the 
'cool self-love' of which Bishop Butler speaks 
i n one of his sermons. But i t s over-emphasis 
leads to a nearer and narrower good being pre-
ferred to a higher, remoter and more ultimate 
good, and t h i s exaggerated self-love i s what 
i s called carnal freedom or more shortly 'sin' 
(German, 'Stinde'), i . e . that which sunders or 
separates from fellov/ship with God.l 
I t should be obvious by now that the tr a g i c con-
sequence of sin consists mainly i n i t s sundering or separat-
ing man from the fellowship with God. And the agent of 
t h i s tragedy i s the exaggerated self-love or ego of man, 
the exaggerated f e e l i n g of " I and mine," what the Hindu 
c a l l s Ahamkara or Aham. In other words, man's bondage 
l i e s i n his ego, which prevents him from v i s u a l i s i n g the 
higher goal of communion or fellowship v/ith God by narrow-
ing his perspective. I f t h i s i s so, i t follows that his 
deliverance consists i n re-establishing- communion with 
God by shunning t h i s l i f e of sin and by making God's w i l l 
supi-eme. 
The foregoing discussion has atteuipted to answer 
one of the questions that we undertook to i n v e s t i g a t e — 
•''Bouquet, op. c i t . , p. 257. 
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the Christian conception of the why of redemption; i n other 
words, why man i s i n need of redemption at a l l . Man was 
created i n the image of God, "recreated i n the image of the 
Son," and was meant to l i v e i n communion with God. As a 
r e s u l t of his sin, t h i s communion was made i n e f f e c t i v e ; and 
so the need f o r redeeming man from sin so that he could 
l i v e i n fellowship with God. I t i s clear that redemption, 
then, p r i m a r i l y means redemption from sin. Man must repent 
f o r his s i n , submit his own w i l l to the w i l l of God, l i v e 
a l i f e of righteousness and love so that the merciful God 
could, once again, accept the los t sheep back i n t o His f o l d . 
"V/hat i s aimed at," then, " i s freedom from sin, and the 
ac q u i s i t i o n of holiness.""^ 
Thus the unequivocal answer that a Christian would 
return to the question "What i s redemption sought from?" 
would be that i t i s "from s i n . " Hederaption from sin, be-
cause "the world of s i n " " . . . i s alienation from the l i f e 
of God through wicked works, the consequent darkening of 
2 
the conscience and understanding...." Once redeemed from 
sin, the way would be open f o r a l i f e i n communion with 
God; organically viewed, the Kingdom of God. I t may, 
•^Donald Mackenzie, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, 
edited by James Hastings rT7~and T, Clark, Edinburgh, 1912), 
^ I b i d . , p. 471. 
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however, be doubted whether redemption from sin i s the 
entire connotation of the Christian doctrine of redemption, 
We s h a l l , therefore, t r y to examine below whether there i s 
anything more implied by t h i s doctrine. In other words, 
we s h a l l see whether the Christian doctrine of redemption 
also e n t a i l s redemption from t h i s world. 
I t i s a well known fac t that the early Christian 
f a i t h was largely apocalyptic. There was d e f i n i t e a n t i -
cipation on the part of Jesus himself and some of his 
followers that the end of the present world was near, and 
that t h i s would be followed by the Kingdom of God. 
And the stars of heaven s h a l l f a l l , and the 
powers that are i n heaven s h a l l be shaken. 
And then s h a l l they see the Son of man coming 
i n the clouds vjith great power and glory. 1 
Appeals to people to be righteous were made i n t h i s con-
t e x t , f o r i t was presumed that the end might come any 
time, and th a t , therefore,,those who wanted eternal happi-
ness were expected to keep themselves i n readiness. After 
Jesus' c r u c i f i x i o n , some of his disciples were genuinely 
d i s i l l u s i o n e d that the prophecy had not come true. This 
i s what the Kingdom of God meant to the contemporaries of 
Christ. I t would be reasonable to conclude then that 
•^ Mark 13:25,26. 
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G h r i s t i a n i t y , at least i n i t s beginnings, preached not 
only redemption from sin but also redemption from t h i s 
world i t s e l f . I t i s true that " t h i s primary meaning of 
redemption has come to he missed i n Protestant do c t r i n a l 
construction, ""^  but there are many modern scholars who 
regard t h i s to be genuine New Testament teaching. In the 
words of A. G. Hogg, 
Too commonly redemption means f o r us only redemp-
t i o n from sin, or even only redemption from pun-
ishment, whereas by those who f i r s t experienced 
redemption through Christ i t was (conceived of as 
redemption from the many-sided tyranny of an e v i l 
world-order, of which g u i l t and moral impotence 
were only factors, although doubtless the,most 
outstanding and momentous factors.2 
Or as Sydney Gave puts i t , 
The consummation of the Kingdom would not come by 
the gradual education of the race, nor even by 
the progressive influence of the Ohurch. I t would 
come by the power of God. The Kingdom was the 
heavenly realm i n which men might share already the 
l i f e which i s eternal and triumphant. To be a 
member of the Kingdom i s thus already to be re-
deemed from the w o r l d f ^ ~ 
Whatever, therefore, the Protestant and post-
modernist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of redemption, i t i s not a l t o -
""•A. G, Hogg, Redemption from t h i s V/orld (Cunningham Lec-
tures, T. and T."~Glark, Edinburgh, 1^22), p. 13. 
^ I b i d . , p. 13. 
3 
Sydney Cave, Redemption Hindu and Christian (Oxford Uni-. 
v e r s i t y Press,"T9a9T, p. 23TTemphasesliiIne7. 
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gether f a n c i f u l t o suggest that the Christian conception 
of redemption also e n t a i l s redemption from the world. In 
f a c t , t h i s presumption w i l l help to explain better the 
other-worldliness and the derogatory references to the 
world that are to be found i n many of the leaders of early 
Christian thought. 
(b) 'I'he Hindu view 
We s t a r t our analysis of the Hindu view of man's 
destiny with the examination of a passage i n the Gita. 
I t says, 
A fragment (or f r a c t i o n ) of My own s e l f , having 
become a l i v i n g soul, eternal, i n the world of l i f e , 
draws t o i t s e l f the senses of which the mind i s the 
s i x t h , that rest i n nature.1 
I n t h i s passage, "a fragment of My own s e l f " refers to the 
i n d i v i d u a l soul, the Atman,, which, as we mentioned e a r l i e r , 
i s divine. The next phrase, however, "having become a 
l i v i n g soul, eternal, i n the world of l i f e , " seems to de-
mand some explanation. The problem i s that i f the Atman 
i s divine, how does i t come to be involved " i n the world 
of l i f e , " the world of becoming (Samsara)? 
This problem has been one of the most vexing to 
r e l i g i o u s thinkers and philosophers i n India, and conse-
•'•Glta, xy,7. 
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quently there are many answers given to t h i s problem. 
Leaving aside the views of the philosophical schools f o r 
the time being, we sha l l t r y to concentrate on the common 
elements i n the explanations given by the main r e l i g i o u s 
schools. The commonest tendency among these schools, of 
course, i s to t r e a t t h i s as part of the divine mystery 
which i s beyond man's comprehension. But i f something 
must be said i n explanation of t h i s phenomenon, a l l the 
schools, including the orthodox systems of philosophy, seem 
to agree on one t h i n g — t h a t the embodiment of the soul and 
i t s consequent involvement i n Samsara i s due to ignorance, 
°^ Avidya. Avidya i s a cosmic p r i n c i p l e , as much a part 
of the co n s t i t u t i o n of the universe as anything else i s . 
When the soul i s affected by Avidya, i t forgets i t s r e a l 
divine essence and descends, as i t were, i n t o the fray of 
Samsara, the world of l i f e and becoming. 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note here that there seems to 
be an obvious contrast between C h r i s t i a n i t y and Hinduism 
i n t h i s respect. We have noted that Adam's F a l l l i e s i n 
his eating of "the tree of the knowledge of good and e v i l , " 
whereas i n Hinduism the soul's bondage comes about by i t s 
association with the p r i n c i p l e of ig^norance. Whereas 
C h r i s t i a n i t y considers man's attempt to be God as the main 
cause of his f a l l , i n Hinduism i t i s man's forgetfulness 
of his d i v i n i t y that i s regarded as his bondage. But l e t 
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us not be misled by these apparent differences of the two 
explanations, f o r the r e s u l t i n each case i s the same. The 
F a l l makes man subject to bodily death, decay and disease; 
so does bondage, brought about by ignorance. The F a l l 
creates a chasm between man and God, and bondage makes man 
oblivious to his divine essence through a false i d e n t i f i -
cation with his bodily adjunct, or, i n other words, i t 
makes him forget his r e a l nature. Nor i s i t much use ask-
ing why there i s «6'gnorance, f o r i t would be l i k e asking why 
God planted the tree of knowledge i n the garden of Eden. 
God, being the omnipotent creator of the universe, could 
have refrained from creating a s i t u a t i o n i n which man could 
disobey Him, as much as He could have created a universe 
without the cosmic p r i n c i p l e of ignorance. Why He chose 
to do otherwise, only He knows. The usual Christian an-
swer that God deliberately allowed the p o s s i b i l i t y of dis-
obedience on the part of man because He wanted man to 
surrender to His w i l l , of his own free choice, smacks of 
a naivete, f o r i t pretends to know everything, including 
the mind of God. In f a c t , t h i s pretence may be said to 
spring from the saine pride and conceit of man which 
C h r i s t i a n i t y regards as the cause of the F a l l . Hinduism 
i s generally content with ascribing at least some part of 
the work of God to the sphere of mystery. 
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Excusing ourselves from t h i s digression, however, 
we must return to the point which i s relevant f o r us. And 
t h i s i s that the bondage of the soul i s due to ignorance. 
We have noticed that despite the technically d i f f e r e n t 
explanations given of the Christian doctrine of the F a l l 
and the Hindu doctrine of bondage, the consequences of the 
two are more or less the same. This becomes more obvious 
when we work out the moral implications of the F a l l on the 
one hand and of bondage on the other. According t o the 
Hindu b e l i e f , once the delusion of the Atman has started, 
i t must undergo the whole cycle of b i r t h s and deaths u n t i l 
i t reaches the human l e v e l , where, as we said e a r l i e r , i t 
becomes d i s t i n c t l y possible f o r man to r i s e above the do-
main of Karma by a supreme moral and s p i r i t u a l e f f o r t . But 
not every man succeeds i n so doing. What stands i n his 
way, then? Nothing but his exaggerated " I and mine" con-
sciousness, his ego (Ahamkara) that refuses to face the 
f a c t that he i s only a "fragment" of God and that wrongly 
"looks upon himself as the .sole agent. "''' "Such a perverse 
mind," (Burmatih), l i v e s i n a world of make-believe, and 
by i t s l i m i t e d vision and s e l f i s h hankerings f a l l s a prey 
to desires v;hich prove i t s undoing through the irtibrumen-
t a l i t y of the unsparing Law of Karma. At the human l e v e l , 
•""Glta, X V I I I , 15. 
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therefore, the Christian and Hindu stories about the 
f a i l i n g of man are the same. Both the systems declare 
that man's enemy i s his false pride, his ego (Abhimana), 
what we, i n the phrase of Niebuhr, called "unlimited 
devotion to l i m i t e d values." 
I t goes without saying, then, that i f man's bondage 
i s due to his f a l s e l y regarding himself as the sole agent 
of a l l h i s a c t i v i t y and a l l his achievement, his redemption 
w i l l l i e i n the widening of his perspective. He must come 
to r e a l i s e that i t i s not he but the Almighty, the Supreme 
Person (Furusottam), who i s the doer, the agent of every-
t h i n g that happens, a l b e i t only i n His lower aspect as 
P r a k r t i or nature. Whosoever realises that the Supreme 
i s "the taste i n the waters," "the l i g h t i n the moon and 
the sun" and "the sound i n ether and the manhood i n men, "''• 
ceases to be s e l f i s h , a slave to desires. A l l his work, 
a l l h is devotion and a l l his attention are then directed 
t o the Supreme which paves the way to his rediscovery of 
the l o s t glory of the Atman. 
He who does work f o r Me, he v/ho looks upon 
Me as his goal, he who worships Me, free from 
attachment, he who i s free from enmity to a l l 




This i s Lord Krishna's advice to Arjuna. 
We ought to take careful note of the phrase "he 
goes to He" i n the passage quoted above. This emphasises 
the f a c t that on i t s positive side Mokga or l i b e r a t i o n 
means, according to most t h e i s t i c schools, the Atman's 
going to God, l i v i n g i n eternal communion with God. I t 
i s true that Shamkara int e r p r e t s ftoksa as merger with 
Brahma, but, as we noted e a r l i e r , though Shamkara's i n t e r -
pretation i s very vigorous and commands the attention of 
most thoughtful Hindus, he cannot be regarded as the re-
presentative of the large majority of Hindus on t h i s issue. 
This p r i v i l e g e must indeed belong to Raraanuga. According 
to Ramanuja, Brahma i s not a qualityless Absolute, but 
the personal Lord possessed of a l l auspicious q u a l i t i e s . 
And Moksa i s not i d e n t i t y with t h i s Absolute but eternal 
b l i s s i n communion with God. Moksa i s attained by sub-
mission or by a kind of gradual self-surrender to the 
loving Lord. In f a c t , according to Rg^ manuga the a t t i t u d e 
of love to God i s fundamental to the very being of the 
Atman. 
But i t cannot be denied that the negative side of 
Moksa means release or redemption from the world, Samsara. 
This world, with a l l i t s e v i l s and suffering, i s not the 
ideal abode f o r the eternal soul. Hence b l i s s cannot be 
obtained except by transcending the world. This a t t i t u d e . 
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however, as we have seen, i s not an exclusively Hindu 
a t t i t u d e . I f the ultimate end i s communion with God, or 
a Kingdom of God i n Heaven, then attachment to t h i s world 
i s a sheer perversion. And t h i s i s as much true of Hindu-
ism as of C h r i s t i a n i t y . I t i s well known that Chi'istian-
i t y , both early and medieval, has treated t h i s world as 
an i n f e r i o r sphere of existence which must be transcended. 
Liberal C h r i s t i a n i t y , of course, w i l l protest against t h i s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of C h r i s t i a n i t y , but we do not have s u f f i -
cient ground to t r e a t Liberal C h r i s t i a n i t y as the most 
representative form of C h r i s t i a n i t y . Niebuhr i s perhaps 
r i g h t i n saying that Liberal C h r i s t i a n i t y invests "the 
r e l a t i v e moral standards of a commercial age with u l t i -
mate sanctity by f a l s e l y casting the aura of the absolute 
and transcendent ethic of Jesus upon them. ""^  Yes, i t i s 
true that redemption from the world i s not i n tune with 
the aspirations of a commercial age, but that i s no reason 
why the evidence of the scriptures and of t r a d i t i o n should 
be disregarded. 
The evidence of h i s t o r y supports the view that 
redemption i n C h r i s t i a n i t y can legiti m a t e l y be taken to 
imply redemption from the world. Commenting on the 
pessimistic character of Hinduism and Buddhism, Sir 
Charles E l i o t says. 
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I t i s generally assumed that these (pessimism etc.) 
are bad epithets, but are they not applicable to 
Christian teaching? Modern and medieval Christ-
i a n i t y — a s witness many popular hymns—regards 
t h i s world as vain and t r a n s i t o r y , a vale of tears 
and t r i b u l a t i o n s , a troubled sea through whose 
waves we must pass before we reach our rest. And 
choirs sing, though without much conviction, that 
i t i s weary waiting here. This language seems 
j u s t i f i e d by the Gospels and Epistles. •'^  
I f the world i s vain and t r a n s i t o r y , there n a t u r a l l y would, 
and should, be a desire f o r redemption from the world. 
I f V7e were now to summarise b r i e f l y our discussion 
so f a r , these essential facts would seem to emerge. F i r s t , 
though creation i s u l t i m a t e l y a mystery, both Hinduism and 
C h r i s t i a n i t y tend to a t t r i b u t e i t to the nature of God, 
either as loving or as good or both. Man i s above a l l 
other creatures, and i s r e a l l y divine, but yet dependent 
on God. V/hen, i n excess of s e l f - p r i d e , man forgets t h i s 
f a c t of dependence, he becomes subject to su f f e r i n g and 
e v i l . This can be stopped by a fresh r e a l i s a t i o n of the 
f a c t of man's dependent status. This r e a l i s a t i o n i t s e l f i s 
a slow and d i f f i c u l t process, involving not only the r i g h t 
kind of knowledge but also an a t t i t u d e of complete, w i l l i n g 
submission of one's own w i l l to that of God, • This a t t i t u d e 
•'".Eliot, op. c i t . , p. l i x . 
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of submission i t s e l f e n t a i l s the highest possible regard 
f o r the w i l l of God, as understood by man through his own 
int e l l i g e n c e and through revelation. And i f man thus 
keeps on doing the w i l l of God, and ceases to be a slave 
to selfishness and false pride, he ultimately regains his 
l o s t greatness and attains eternal communion w i t h God. He 
i s redeemed. I t seems to us that the above summary of 
man's nature, status and f i n a l destiny represents the 
essence of Christian as well as Hindu views on t h i s sub-
j e c t . Differences of terminology and narrative d e t a i l s 
between the Christian and Hindu stories are many, but i t 
i s f a i r to conclude that once we have crossed the bar r i e r 
of terminological and technical d e t a i l s , the essential 
core of Christian and Hindu thinking does not appear to be 
so very d i f f e r e n t . 
The Relevance of Moral E f f o r t to the Religious End 
Afte r examining the Christian and Hindu views on 
the nature and destiny of man, i t v/ould perhaps be desirable 
to conclude t h i s chapter with a b r i e f examination of how, 
i f at a l l , these two r e l i g i o n s make room f o r e t h i c a l en-
deavour i n the context of the transcendent r e l i g i o u s ends 
they prescribe. For as Niebuhr r i g h t l y points out, "the 
et h i c a l f r u i t f u l n e s s of a r e l i g i o n i s determined by the 
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q u a l i t y of tension between the h i s t o r i c a l and the trans-
cendent" He suggests two considerations i n judging t h i s 
" e t h i c a l f r u i t f u l n e s s " of a r e l i g i o n : ( l ) f i r s t , whether 
i t i s " t r u l y transcendent" and (2) second, v/hether i t can 
impart significance to the historical."'" Applying the f i r s t 
of these questions to the r e l i g i o u s end prescribed and sub-
s t i t u t i n g " h i s t o r i c a l " by " e t h i c a l , " we can reframe these 
questions and ask: ( l ) Are the r e l i g i o u s ends prescribed 
by C h r i s t i a n i t y and Hinduism " t r u l y transcendent"? and 
(2) Can these r e l i g i o u s ends impart significance to the 
"ethical"? 
I t does not need much arguing to prove that both 
C h r i s t i a n i t y and Hinduism prescribe r e l i g i o u s ends which 
are t r u l y transcendent. V/e have seen that both these 
r e l i g i o n s are r e l i g i o n s of redemption, and, as we argued 
e a r l i e r , redemption does ult i m a t e l y imply redemption from 
the world. Moreover, the positive content of redemption 
i s conceived as communion with God. C h r i s t i a n i t y speaks 
of a Kingdom of God i n Heaven, and Hinduism, though 
generally speaking of Moksa, does occasionally speak of 
eternal b l i s s i n heaven, Swarga or Vaikuntha. Though 
there may be numerous people who would l i k e to argue with 
Tolstoy, f o r example, that the Kingdom of God i s within 
"'"Niebuhr, An In t e r p r e t a t i o n of Christian Ethics, p. 15, 
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every man's own soul, and t h a t , therefore,, t h i s term does 
not have any other-worldly reference, i t i s unquestion-
ably true that Christian t r a d i t i o n has by and large re-
garded the Kingdom of God as a realm transcending t h i s 
vjorld. Even the Kingdom of God on Earth refers to an 
i d e a l , a future p o s s i b i l i t y which i s certa i n l y not to be 
found i n the world as i t i s , with a l l i t s sin and suffer-
ing, and i s to that extent transcendent. Similarly, though 
there are schools of thought i n India which advocate the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of Jlvanmukti, or l i b e r a t i o n here on t h i s 
earth, there can be no doubt that Moksa has i n general 
been conceived to be a state which ce r t a i n l y i s not of t h i s 
world, and i s , therefore, a transcendent goal. Thus i t 
i s possible f o r us to answer the f i r s t question i n the 
a f f i r m a t i v e , that i s to say, that the f i n a l destiny of man 
as conceived by C h r i s t i a n i t y and Hinduism i s t r u l y trans-
cendent. 
Now, precisely because we have answered the f i r s t 
question i n the a f f i r m a t i v e , the second question becomes 
extremely important. The e t h i c a l i d e a l advocated by 
C h r i s t i a n i t y i s righteousness or holiness, and Hinduism 
appeals to i t s adhei'ents to be virtuous or righteous, 
Dharmatma. Now the question i s that i f the ultimate end 
of man i s something that involves transcending the world, 
or i s other-worldly, as i s the case with both C h r i s t i a n i t y 
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and Hinduism, why should there be a demand f o r any kind 
of e t h i c a l endeavour, which i s necessarily confined to 
t h i s world? This simply amounts to asking: What i s the 
relevance of moral e f f o r t i n t h i s world to the transcendent 
and other-worldly r e l i g i o u s end? 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how else any transcendent 
r e l i g i o u s goal can be related t o an e t h i c a l l i f e i n t h i s 
world except by t r e a t i n g the l a t t e r as a necessary pre-
paration or stepping-stone to the former. And t h i s i s 
exactly what i s done by both C h r i s t i a n i t y and Hinduism. 
Holiness or righteousness, necessarily involving good 
conduct and the pursuit of certain values, i s regarded by 
C h r i s t i a n i t y as the precondition of fellowship with God. 
In Luther, perhaps, the emphasis on holiness i s not so 
pronounced as i n Catholicism, f o r Bishop Nygren states 
t h i s difference: " . . . i n Catholicism, fellowship with God 
on God's own l e v e l , on the basis of holiness; i n Luther, 
fellowship with God on our l e v e l , on the basis of s i n . " ^ 
But despite t h i s change of emphasis, i t cannot be denied 
that Luther demands holiness or righteousness, as involv-
ing good conduct. S i m i l a r l y , Hinduism regards the per-
formance of Dharma as a necessary condition to the a t t a i n -
"'^ Quoted by Lehman, op. c i t . , p. 40. 
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ment of Moksa. And i n t h i s respect even Shamkara, who 
denies the ontological r e a l i t y of the world, would have 
nothing d i f f e r e n t to say. Antinomianism apart, there seems 
to be no doubt that both C h r i s t i a n i t y and Hinduism regard 
a moral l i f e as an absolute pre-condition of eternal happi-
ness i n the world hereafter. 
Chapter IV. 
THE MORAL L/LW, ITS AUTHORITY AND SOURCES 
Toward the end of the l a s t chapter we t r i e d to 
answer the question how C h r i s t i a n i t y and Hinduism, with 
t h e i r conceptions of the transcendent and other-woi*ldly 
human destiny, can s t i l l i n s i s t on the necessity of lead-
ing a moral l i f e i n t h i s world. And our answer to t h i s 
question was that both these systems made room f o r ethics 
by s t i p u l a t i n g that an e t h i c a l l i f e was a pre-condition or 
an essential preparation f o r the attainment of the highest 
s p i r i t u a l end, i . e . , redemption or Mok^a. This was, how-
ever, only part of the answer. This question v / i l l be 
more ad.equately answered i n the course of t h i s chapter. 
To ant i c i p a t e , we w i l l see that not only leading a moral 
l i f e i s important but also that we i n fact do not r e a l l y 
have an option once we adopt either the Christian or the 
Hindu view of the nature of the creative act and of man's 
place i n the created world. We have seen that the accept-
ance of the view that t h i s i s God's world leads to the 
acceptance of the implication that i n matters of conduct 
i n t h i s world i t i s God's w i l l , and not ours, which must 
be regarded as the f i n a l words. And morality, they would 
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argue, i s nothing but doing what God expects us to do. We 
have, therefore, an absolute obligation to do what God 
commands, and we can f l o u t these only at our own r i s k . 
In other words, i f the creatorship of God i s con-
ceded, i t would follow that the world cannot be viewed as 
a mere f o r t u i t o u s combination of elements; i t must indeed 
be regarded as a kingdom of ends. And we, as "guests and 
borrowers" i n God's world and as beings who cannot l i v e 
independently of God, have a duty to do only what promotes 
these ends insofar as we know what they are. 
I t would seem to follow, then, that Christians as 
well as Hindus would generally consider the very nature of 
the relationship between man and God as one which makes 
demands on man i n the form of a consciousness of duty. 
This would be vindicated as we proceed further with our 
enquii'y. Meanwhile, we sh a l l presuppose that i t i s the 
concept of -Duty which perhaps forms the nucleus of Christ-
ian and Hindu ethics, and accordingly we s h a l l s t a r t our 
discussion with an analysis of the concept of duty. IMow, 
the word "duty" may be used i n one of two senses: ( i ) a 
subjective sense and ( i i ) an objective one. 
( i ) In the words of H, i). Lewis, "The subjective 
duty i s that duty that appears so to some p a r t i c u l a r per-
son, and a man can be said t o have done his duty i n the 
sense that r e a l l y matters so f a r as his moral worth i s 
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concerned i f he i s l o y a l to his own moral end or id e a l . " 
This sense of duty seems to presuppose a well-formulated 
end or ideal on the part of the in d i v i d u a l which may or 
may not he shared by others. Loyalty to t h i s i d eal i s the 
individual's duty, and the only s i g n i f i c a n t problem i t 
presents i s that of in t e r p r e t a t i o n i n p a r t i c u l a r circum-
stances. 
( i i ) The other sense of duty, however, implies 
duties of a kind that would be considered as duty by any-
one, irrespective of his private ideals, i f only the i n -
d i v i d u a l understood or were made to understand the broad 
connotation of duty. To quote Lewis again, "The objective 
duty i s the course of action which he would consider his 
duty i f he understood a r i g h t , the duty that we have i n 
mind when we say that some honest or well-meaning person 
2 
has done what i s wrong." 
Duty in t h i s objective sense presupposes a certain 
objective "realm" or "order of values" which i s regarded 
as making demands on us. The unique feature of t h i s de-
mand i s that the awareness of t h i s demand i s , i n the words 
of Professor Maclagan, "not simply a consciousness of being 
"''H. D. Lewis, Morals and the New Theology (Victor Gollancz 
Ltd., London, 194?;, V ' ~ W . " 
2 
I b i d . , p. 36. 
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'under obligation' i n a quite general and empty way,""*" but 
one t l i a t i s always specific and commands our absolute 
allegiance. The moral demand or duty has an authorita-
tiveness that makes i t an imperative. The moral law i s , 
i n the inimitable phrase of Kant, a Categorical Imperative. 
Consideration of duty i n t h i s sense, therefore, involves 
a discussion of t h i s Imperative or the Moral Law and i t s 
implications. In the pages t o follow we s h a l l , according-
l y , devote our at t e n t i o n to such questions as arise i n 
connection with the Moral Law. 
There are three main questions that deserve con-
sideration i n t h i s context: ( l ) What i s the nature and 
source of t h i s Moral Law i n C h r i s t i a n i t y and i n Hinduism? 
(2) From what does t h i s Law derive i t s authority? In 
other words, what makes t h i s Law obligatory or binding on 
us? I t w i l l be seen that t h i s question entails the dis-
cussion of the theory or theories of "obligation" either 
specificaLly formulated or implied i n the et h i c a l thinking 
of Christians and Hindus. (3) What are the sources of 
the knowledge of t h i s Law? In other words, dow does an 
i n d i v i d u a l come to know the contents and implications of 
t h i s Law? Let us now proceed to the consideration of the 
f i r s t of these. 
•^W. G. Mavlagan, The Theological f r o n t i e r of Ethics (George Allen and Unwin Ltd.TT^ndon, 196l77~pT"5Tr ^ 
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The Nature and Source of the Moral Law 
(a) C h r i s t i a n i t y 
We have seen i n a previous chapter that Christian-
i t y i n h e r i t e d from Judaism the concept of a M^ral Law which 
expresses the w i l l of a Righteous God and which has been 
l a i d down i n the Decalogue f o r the guidance of a l l men. 
This b e l i e f was l a t e r reinforced by the Stoic concept of 
a World-Reason or logos which governs and determines the 
working of a l l natural, phenomena. In fact the Stoics, i n 
t h e i r emphasis on t h i s World-Reason, were merely giving a 
more systematic expression to a general b e l i e f i n a l l pre-
vious Greek thought i n the conception of an eternal law of 
which the moral law was l a t e r regarded as only an aspect. 
This conception of "a fundamental lav;, a divine common 
logos, a universal reason" that "holds sway" can be traced 
back i n Greek thought to Heraclitus, the "Obscure Lh i l o -
sopher" (535-4-70 E.G.),-"" Thus s t a r t i n g from Heraclitus, 
t h i s idea of an eternal or fundamental law was adopted i n 
one foi'm or another, and with various degrees of emphasis, 
by almost a l l the leading ancient ©reek thinkers u n t i l i t 
f i n a l l y c r y s t a l l i s e d i n the philosophy of the Stoics, 
A. Roraraen, The Natural Law, Thomas R. Han ley, trans. 
(B. Herder -Book Co., St. Louis and London, 1949), pp. 5f« 
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through whom i t eventually gave ris e to the Christian con-
cept of Natural and Moral Law. 
One passage i n Rommen's book The Natural Law more 
or less suras up the development of the Christian Natural 
Law from i t s general Greek and, p a r t i c u l a r l y Stoic, origins 
The metaphysical natural law of Llato as w e l l as 
the more r e a l i s t i c one of A r i s t o t l e formed the 
high-water mark of moral and natural-law philosophy 
i n Greek c i v i l i z a t i o n . Stoicism, on the other 
hand, i n a remarkable eclectic synthesis of single 
p r i n c i p l e s drawn from many philosophers, furnished 
i n i t s system of natural law the terminology or 
word vessels i n t o which the Church Fathers were 
able to pour the f i r s t conceptions of the Christian 
natural law and t o impart them to the world of 
t h e i r t i m e . l 
The Stoics, p a r t i c u l a r l y Cicero, had already popularised 
the idea of the lex nata or the law within us, so that the 
natural-law philosophy of the Early Fathers had no d i f f i -
c u l t y i n blending t h i s lex nata with the Jewish Tora, and 
then making t h i s an important element of t h e i r teaching. 
This i s the background i n which we must understand the 
words of St. Laul whex-ein he declares that the natural 
law i s inscribed i n the hearts of men: 
For when the Gentiles, which have not the 
law (of Sinai), do by nature the things contained 
i n the law, these, having not the law, are a law 
unto themselves: 
•'•Ibid., pp. l l f . 
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Which shew the work of the law written i n 
t h e i r hearts....! 
This conception of the natural and moral law has 
been an important element i n Christian thinking ever since 
the days of St. Paul and the Fathers of the Early Church. 
In the words of Hommen, 
The Fathers of the Early Church made use of the 
Stoic natural law, f i n d i n g i n i t s principles "seeds 
of the V/ord," to proclaim the Christian doctrine of 
the personal Creator-God as the Author of the 
eternal law as well as of the natural moral law 
which i s promulgated i n the voice of conscience and 
i n reason.2 
St. Augustine replaced the eternal, impersonal world-reason 
of the Stoics by the personal all-wise and all-powerful 
God, and declared that eternal law had i t s source i n the 
w i l l of God. Natural moral law, according to St. Augustine, 
i s precisely t h i s divine law with reference to man, so f a r 
as the l a t t e r p a rticipates i n the divine law. He was of 
the opinion that 
The eternal law dwells as b l i n d necessity i n i r -
r a t i o n a l nature. As oughtness, as norm of free 
moral a c t i v i t y , i t i s inscribed i n the heart of 
man, a r a t i o n a l and free being. I t appears i n 
the moral, r a t i o n a l nature of man; i t i s w r i t t e n 
i n t o the r a t i o n a l soul.3 
"'"Romans 2:14,15. 
R^ommen, op. c i t . , p. 35. 
^ I b i d . , p. 38. 
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In St. Augustine, then, there i s an effoi^t to 
base the natural moral law i n the natural reason of man, 
so that the i n t r i n s i c imraor a ' l i t y of determinate actions 
consists not so much i n the v i o l a t i o n of the law as i n 
the variance with natural reason. St. Thomas t r i e s to 
continue the basic approach of Augustine i n t h i s respect, 
but he also relates the eternal law to the wisdom of God. 
In so doing, he succeeds i n showing that the eternal law 
or the natural moral law i s not merely the pure w i l l of 
God, but only a consequence follov/ing from the nature of 
% d , and, therefore, amenable to the nature of man insofar 
as man i s a r a t i o n a l being, made i n the image of God. St. 
Thomas' concern i s to base morality on something i n t e r n a l 
or i n t r i n s i c to man rather than on the command of an ex-
t e r n a l authority; and he does so by bringing i n r a t i o n a l i t y 
as the common ground between the natures of the law-giver, 
God, and man f o r whom the law i s intended. He, i n fact, 
takes recourse t o his theory of the ultimate i d e n t i t y of 
being, good and ti'uth. Being, t r u t h and goodness, accord-
ing to him, are convertible, so that "Good i s to be done" 
means the same thing as "Realise your essential nature." 
I t i s clear that the eternal law, on the whole, and the 
natural moral law, as a special application of the former, 
has i t s source, according to St. Thomas, i n the w i l l of God. 
But since there i s no opposition between the w i l l and 
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i n t e l l i g e n c e of God, the Perfect Being, the law may as 
we l l be said to have i t s source in the i n t e l l i g e n c e or 
wisdom of God. "The eternal law, then, i s the governance 
of the world through God's w i l l i n accordance with His 
wisdom."''" St. Thomas, however, i t should be remarked, 
does not rest content with laying down the general rule 
f o r moral actions. VJith his characteristic s p i r i t of syn-
thesis, he also goes on to demonstrate that the deriva-
t i v e s or p a r t i c u l a r norms of morality, deducible from the 
natural moral law, are i d e n t i c a l with the DecalogTie or 
Ten Commandments. The d e t a i l s of t h i s demonstration, how-
ever, may be l e f t out at the moment. What i s worth noting 
i s that Aquinas believes that there i s an eternal divine 
law which, i n the domain of free, r a t i o n a l beings, becomes 
the natural moral law. This law i s derived from the wis-
dom or reason of God, and, since men are r a t i o n a l , corres-
ponds t o the nature of man. 
But t h i s e f f o r t of Aquinas t o emphasise the p r i -
macy of i n t e l l e c t and to base morality on something i n -
t r i n s i c to the nature of man, i. e . , his reason, though 
perhaps the most i n f l u e r i t i a l l i n e of thinking i n Christian 
ethics, i s by no means the only one. With Duns Scotus, 
f o r example, the p r i n c i p l e of the primacy of the i n t e l l e c t 
•'-rbid., p. 45. 
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gives way to that of the w i l l , and thereby s t a r t s a new 
t r a i n of th i n k i n g i n Christian moral philosophy. For 
Scotus morality depends on the w i l l of God. A t h i n g i s 
good not because i t corresponds to the nature of God, or, 
analogically, to the nature of man, but because God so 
w i l l s . This trend of thought leads almost to a kind of 
positivism i n William of Occam, f o r whom "law i s w i l l , 
pure w i l l without any foundation i n r e a l i t y , without 
foundation i n the essential nature of things.""^ 
Without going i n t o f u r t h e r d e t a i l s — w h i c h the con-
siderations of space do not permit—we may conclude that 
a l l l a t e r Christian ethics accepts natural moral law as 
an aspect of the divine eternal law which has, obviously, 
i t s source i n God. This eternal law i s implanted i n the 
very c o n s t i t u t i o n of things and represents t h e i r law of 
being. The natural moral law i s the same law as applied 
to the conduct of human beings. There i s no difference of 
opinion whatsoever as to the source of t h i s law. I t i s 
God; but, as we have seen, there are differences as to 
whether the source l i e s i n the pure w i l l of God or i n 
His nature as the All-wise being. This difference, hovj-
ever, i s relevant not here but fu r t h e r on i n our analysis 
when we s h a l l be considering the theories of obligation. 
•^Ibid., p. 59. 
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So leaving i t aside f o r the time'being, we s h a l l now pass 
on to the consideration of the Hindu concept of the Moral 
Law and i t s source. 
( b ) H j j i dAjl sm 
The concept corresponding t o the eternal law as 
we l l as the natural moral law i n Hinduism i s that of 
Dharma. While discussing the nature of Christian and Hindu 
ethics i n an e a r l i e r chapter, we noted that Dharma was an 
all-embracing, universal p r i n c i p l e which manifests i t s e l f 
i n various forms i n various spheres. We have also seen 
'^^^Q-'^ Dharma, with i t s v/ide variety of meanings, i s to be 
regarded as "indeterminate" rather than vague, and we ar-
gued that t h i s indeterminateness might possibly have been 
purposely allov/ed to enter i n t o the connotation of Dharma 
by the ancient Hindus, f o r Dharma i s regarded as the very 
foundation of the universe. The universe, v/ith i t s many 
spheres and aspects, n a t u r a l l y requires i t s foundation 
to manifest i t s e l f i n various forms. The Mahanarayana 
Upanisad states that " i t i s by Dharraa that the whole world 
i s held together (parigrhitam)"''" and again that pharma " i s 
the world's foundation.""^ Thus there i s no doubt that 
•'•Mahanarayana Upanisad, 78,6. 
2 
Mahanarayana Upanisad, 79,7. 
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Dharma i s nothing but the eternal law v;hioh governs the 
whole world and holds i t together. 
Dharma, then, i s that a l l - i n c l u s i v e eternal p r i n -
c i p l e which i n i t s broadest sense constitutes the very 
f i b r e of the world and i s reflected as the moral law i n 
the f i e l d of human conduct. I t i s wri t t e n i n the minds of 
men and i s revealed through the scriptures. Max Miiller's 
d-efinition of Rta, from which, we know, the concept of 
Dharma has been derived, refers to both aspects of Rta— 
Rta as eternal law and Rta as the raoral law. He defines 
• ..• nil..- , — * ™ 
Rta as the 
.. . s t r a i g h t l i n e which, in' spite of many momentary 
deviations, was discovered to run through the 
whole realm of nature. We c a l l that Rta, that 
s t r a i g h t , d i r e c t or r i g h t l i n e , when we apply i t 
i n a more general sense, the Law of Nature; and 
when we apply i t t o the moral world, we t r y to 
express the same idea again by speaking of the 
Moral Law, the lav/ on which our l i f e i s founded, 
the eternal Law of Right and Reason, or, i t may 
be, "that which makes f o r righteousness" both 
w i t h i n us arid without.1 
I f t h i s i s true of Rta, i t needs no arguing that the same 
must be true of Dharma. 
G. H. Mees l i s t s at least sixteen d i f f e r e n t ways 
i n which the term Dharma has been used i n the scriptures, 
•''Max Miiller, quoted by Mees, op. c i t . , p. 9. 
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but i t should be remembered that a l l these meanings are 
a l l i e d and i n t e r r e l a t e d . Some of these manLngs are: 
Dharma as impersonal p r i n c i p l e or order or law; Dharma as 
the moral and social duty of man; Dharma as merit; Dharma 
as Divine Justice; as common law; as convention, etc."'" 
The f a c t i s not that there are so many separate meanings 
of Dharma but that there are various applications of the 
same p r i n c i p l e . I t should, however, be noted that a l l of 
these meanings of Dharma have a moral overtone, f o r Dharma, 
above a l l , i s the Moral Law. 
Innumerable passages can be quoted from the scrip-
tures t o show that Dharma has been universally regarded as 
the cosmic p r i n c i p l e which holds the equilibrium of the 
universe, and which, therefore, must not be disturbed. The 
underlying b e l i e f i s that moral conduct on the part of man 
or righteousness strengthens Dharma, the foundation of the 
world, whereas immorality undermines i t and gradually 
leads t o the destruction of not only the sinner but also 
the world, i f sin and unrighteousness begin to p r e v a i l . 
For instance, Manu says, "Dharma being violated, destroys; 
Dharma being preserved, preserves: therefore, Dharma must 
not be v i o l a t e d , l e s t v i o l a t e d Dharnia destroys us. " 3-n 
"''See Mees, op. c i t . , pp. 4ff. 
%anu, V I I I , 15. 
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the famous passages of the Gita which explain the why of 
Incarnation there i s l e f t no doubt that divine Incarnation 
takes place p r i m a r i l y to restore the balance of Dharma over 
Adharma. 
'Whenever there i s decline of righteousness and 
r i s e of unrighteousness, 0 Bharata (Arjuna), then 
I send f o r t h (create, incarnate) Myself. 
lor the protection of the good, f o r the des-
t r u c t i o n of the wicked and fo r the establishment 
of righteousness (dharma samsthapang'rthi!ya)"~I 
come i n t o being from age to*age.^ 
Quite often, hov/ever, foreign scholars are misled 
i n t o i d e n t i f y i n g Dharma with the several duties of the 
classes and stages of man (Varna-Asrama). That Varna-Asrama 
Dharma i s a part, perhaps even the most important part^ of 
Dharma cannot be denied. But we ought not to forget that 
Dharma i s p r i m a r i l y eternal and moral law, and to i d e n t i f y 
i t with any one aspect of Dharma, Varna-Asrama Dharma f o r 
example, i s l i k e i d e n t i f y i n g the whole with one of i t s 
parts. Varna-Asrama Dharma, l i k e Yuga pharma (the Dharma 
of a certain age) and Apad Dharma (the Dharma of unusual or 
c r i t i c a l circumstances), i s only one part of SanStana Dharma 
(Eternal Law). 
The conclusion, then, i s that Dharma i s both eter-
nal law and natural moral law which manifests i t s e l f i n 
•""Glta, IV,7,8, (Emphasis mine). 
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various forms i n various contexts, and appears d i f f e r e n t 
from d i f f e r e n t angles of vi s i o n . G. H. Mees' summing up 
of t h i s a l l - i n c l u s i v e p r i n c i p l e i s so b r i l l i a n t that i t 
may be worthwhile quoting a rather long passage from his 
book: 
Dharma i s seen by-men according t o the d i f f e r e n t 
stages of t h e i r development, or to the colour of 
t h e i r character, which i s related to the special 
f i e l d they are working i n , and the special psycho-
l o g i c a l angle from which they are wont to look at 
i t . The r e l i g i o u s man w i l l see Dharma as the 
divine law of God, the et h i c a l person w i l l see i t 
as the inner p r i n c i p l e that affords standards of 
good and e v i l , the lawyer w i l l see i t as law, as 
a plan of protection of r i g h t and security, the 
psychologist w i l l stress t r a d i t i o n , common law 
and the social mind, the philosopher w i l l see i n 
i t the consciousness of kind or the consciousness 
of u n i t y , by i t s nature impelling man i n the long 
run to manifest 'kindness' or unity, the i d e a l i s t 
w i l l see i t as the i d e a l , the r e a l i s t as the law 
behind the existent show of l i f e , the p r a c t i c a l 
mystic w i l l see i n i t the force impelling to 
brotherhood, building the community and bringing 
about harmony i n uni t y . 
But i n t r u t h i t i s the p r i n c i p l e at the bottom 
of and contained i n a l l these manifestations, and 
underlying a l l these conceptions.^ 
As to the source of t h i s eternal law, Dharma, the 
consensus of opinion i n Hindu thought i s (with the ex-
ception of the a t h e i s t i c schools such as Samkhya and 
MImamsa) that t h i s law i s God-given, and that Dharma i s 
nothing but, to use a phrase we employed e a r l i e r , "God's 
•'"Mees, op. c i t . , p. 22. 
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governance of the world through God's w i l l i n accordance 
with His wisdom." But as against those who conceive a 
personal source of the law, called the I-auruseyav5dins, 
the Mimamsa school regards i t as Impersonal Law v/ithout 
any personal source. The followers of t h i s school, there-
fore, are called Apaurugeyavadins. This school refuses to 
be dragged beyond the Scr i p t u r a l Imperative f o r a more 
ultimate ground. They accept Dharma as revealed i n the 
scriptures as the f i n a l word and leave i t there. But, as 
we have maintained elsewhere, the dominant note i n Hindu-
ism i s one of b e l i e f i n a Personal God who i s the creator 
and Lord of the universe; i t would be reasonable to believe 
that most Hindus would consider pharma to be God's law f o r 
the governance of the world. 
The Authority of the Moral Law 
We have so f a r been examining the Christian and 
Hindu concepts of the Moral Lav/. A f t e r having discussed, 
however, that both C h r i s t i a n i t y and Hinduism believe i n 
a Moral Laiv and that both, with certain exceptions on the 
Hindu side, regard the Moral Law to be God-given, i t i s 
now important to f i n d out why, i n the opinions of Christ-
ians and Hindus, i t i s necessary to respect t h i s Lav/. In 
other words, what J u s t i f i c a t i o n do Christians and Hindus 
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give i n support of a moral l i f e ? As we said e a r l i e r , t h i s 
i s the same as asking what theories of obligation are put 
forward by theN-fcwo r e l i g i o n s . 
(a) C h r i s t i a n i t y 
While discussing the Christian conception of 
natural moral law, we had occasion to point to a difference 
i n the approaches of Aquinas and Duns Scotus as,to whether 
a thing v/as good because i t corresponded to the nature of 
God or simply because i t was God's w i l l . This controversy 
i t s e l f throws a hi n t toward the answer to the question. 
What i s the r e a l seat of authority of the Moral Law? Is 
i t the pure w i l l of God or the w i l l of God as informed and 
determined by His r a t i o n a l nature? Here we already have 
the seeds of two of the most important theories of o b l i -
gation formulated by Christian theologians. In fa c t , we 
sh a l l see l a t e r that these may not be two theories so much 
as two d i f f e r e n t emphases on the same theory. For both 
these theories base the Moral Law ulti m a t e l y on the w i l l 
of God. And th i s i s p e r f e c t l y understandable. For i n 
the Christian t r a d i t i o n the highest good i s the godhead. 
In the words of Rommen, "The highest good i s the Godhead, 
purest Being. God's honour and glory, to which the whole 
of creation bears witness, are also i t s highest end.""'' 
•'•Rommen, op. c i t . , p. 202. 
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I f Godhead i s the highest end, i t n a t u r a l l y follows that 
God's w i l l should be the f i n a l word and i t s own J u s t i f i c a -
t i o n . There i s no doubt that i n the Christian t r a d i t i o n 
duty or raoral obligation i s explained p r i m a r i l y and u l t i -
mately by an appeal to God's w i l l or command f o r us. And 
we s h a l l be examining the implications of t h i s theory. 
But though this.' i s the main theory, attempts are 
sometimes made to provide "extraneous support" f o r the moral 
demand from "contextual considerations.""'' For example, i t 
may be argued or implied that though the authority of the 
moral demand follows from the very f a c t of i t s being God's 
command, t h i s authority may be further reinforced by ob-
serving that there i s something i n the nature of the world 
i t s e l f which makes morality meaningful and worthwhile. The 
argument, i n other words, i s "that the universe must be 
f r i e n d l y to the doing of our duty i f there i s to be any 
sense i n doing i t . " Theories which t r y to explain the 
moral demand on t h i s or other similar postulates may be 
called "contextual," i n the phrase of Professor Maclagan. 
I t would be i n t e r e s t i n g t o examine one or two specimens of 
such contextual theories. 
Professor Maclagan, i n his admirable analysis, re-
•''Maclagan, op. c i t . , p. 64. 
^ I b i d . , p. 57. 
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marks t h a t the basic p o s t u l a t e of contextual e x p l a n a t i o n s — 
namely, t h a t the universe must be f r i e n d l y t o our sense of 
duty—may be presented i n e i t h e r a crude or a r e f i n e d form. 
He takes up f i r s t " i t s very f a m i l i a r crude form" which 
amounts t o saying t h a t the universe i s so c o n s t i t u t e d t h a t 
"the good man w i l l be rewarded and the e v i l punished. 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t support f o r t h e moral demand i s here de-
r i v e d from the c o n v i c t i o n or hope t h a t i t u l t i m a t e l y pays 
t o be moral because "the universe" "looks a f t e r the i n t e r -
ests of the d u t i f u l . " Professor Maclagan r i g h t l y d i s -
misses t h i s as too crude a the o r y and pours on i t the con-
tempt i t deserves. This t h e o r y i s extremely p r u d e n t i a l 
and i s a p t l y derided as " t r a i n i n g ourselves i n commerce 
and not i n godliness." 
I t must, however, be added, i n a l l f a i r n e s s t o 
C h r i s t i a n e t h i c a l t h i n k i n g t h a t no C h r i s t i a n t h i n k e r t o -
day v;ould s e r i o u s l y consider e x p l a i n i n g duty on these 
l i n e s . I t i s t r u e t h a t most C h r i s t i a n theologians do make 
some reference t o rewards and punishments. I n f a c t Jesus 
himself promised a l l kinds of rewards f o r the v i r t u o u s . 
But the rev;ards are promised, i f one may say so, as some-
t h i n g t h a t w i l l f o l l o w a u t o m a t i c a l l y our doing the w i l l of 
•^Ib i d . , p. 57. ' 
^ I b i d . , p. 57. 
^ I b i d . , p. 58. 
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God. The primary appeal i s the l a t t e r , not the former. 
God's w i l l i s t o be done not because of considerations of 
personal advantage but because i t i s God's w i l l . 
The " r e f i n e d " v e r s i o n of the contextual explanation 
i m p l i e s t h a t we c e r t a i n l y cannot claim p u r e l y moral motives 
f o r doing our duty i f v/e act from considerations of reward 
and punishment. But as a matter of f a c t , some k i n d of be-
l i e f i n the f r i e n d l i n e s s of the universe i s e s s e n t i a l , at 
l e a s t as an i n c e n t i v e towards the r e a l i s a t i o n of our moral 
i d e a l s . Maclagan concedes t h a t t h i s i s more r e f i n e d but 
adds pungently t h a t t h e r e f o r e i t i s "only a more r e f i n e d 
e r r o r , He counts i n t h i s very category "the c l o s e l y 
r e l a t e d suggestion t h a t we can even define m o r a l i t y i n 
terms of what the universe i s f r i e n d l y towards." The ex-
ample he gives of such t h i n k i n g i s a passage from Stephen 
Weill's C h r i s t i a n ffaith To-day (Penguin BOOKS, 1955, p. ^ 2 ) , 
i n which the l a t t e r says: 
Some a t t i t u d e s and actions run along the g r a i n of 
the universe, and others run cont r a r y t o i t ; t h i s 
i s r e a l l y v/hat i s meant by d e s c r i b i n g some a t t i - -y 
• tudes and actions as moral and others as immoral. 
I t i s not d i f f i c u l t t o see t h a t the above passage de-
•''Ibid., p. 60. 
2 
I b i d . , p. 60. 
I b i d . , f o o t n o t e , p. 60. 
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f i n e s as "moral" those a c t i o n s which "run along the g r a i n 
of the universe." This i s c e r t a i n l y not a good d e f i n i t i o n , 
f o r i n t o the already considerably d i f f i c u l t problem of 
what i s moral and why we should be moral i t introduces an-
other very d i f f i c u l t e l e m e n t — t h a t of d i s c o v e r i n g what 
runs along the g r a i n of the universe. But even l e a v i n g 
aside the q u a l i t y of t h i s as a d e f i n i t i o n , one would f e e l 
c onstrained t o agree w i t h Professor Maclagan t h a t these 
c o n t e x t u a l t h e o r i e s , however r e f i n e d , tend to be p r u d e n t i a l . 
He does not seem t o be a supporter of Kantian r i g o r i s m , 
i'or he himself concedes t h a t "moral devotion... r e q u i r e s be-
l i e f i n a universe f r i e n d l y t o the extent t h a t i n some 
measure our i d e a l s can be r e a l i s e d i n i t . " " * " But he f e e l s 
t h a t "what i s intended by those who look f o r f r i e n d l i n e s s 
i n t he universe as a c o n d i t i o n of the reasonableness of 
the moral demand i s c l e a r l y more than t h i s . " 
Thus since a l l c o n t e x t u a l considerations seem t o 
impart t o m o r a l i t y a p r u d e n t i a l t i n g e , i t i s c l e a r t h a t 
they do not succeed i n p r o v i d i n g the extraneous support 
they i n t e n d t o provide t o the claims of duty. Moreover, 
even i f such extraneous support could be had i n a l e g i t i -
mate sense, i t would s t i l l be of a secondary order. 
•'•Ibid., p. 60. 
^ I b i d . , p. 60. 
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An appeal p r i m a r i l y t o the w i l l of God would f o r a C h r i s t -
i a n be the only l e g i t i m a t e explanation of duty. Hence, 
l e t us now t u r n t o t h i s main theory. 
This main theory of the moral law and i t s o b l i g a -
t o r i n e s s i s the one t h a t i n s i s t s t h a t the law i s a u t h o r i -
t a t i v e simply because i t i s God's w i l l . Most C h r i s t i a n s 
w i l l be q u i t e content w i t h g i v i n g the explanation t h a t 
the moral law i s God's command f o r us which, as His crea-
t u r e s , i t i s our duty t o f o l l o w . C l e a r l y , then, our p r i -
mary and, perhaps, only duty i s t o obey God's command. 
This theory may s a f e l y be regarded as the most representa-
t i v e of C h r i s t i a n t h e o r i e s of o b l i g a t i o n . As Cardinal 
Mercier says. 
I n the opinion of most C h r i s t i a n m o r a l i s t s since 
the time of Kant, moral duty admits of only one 
po s s i b l e explanation, namely the a u t h o r i t y of 
God, the supreme L e g i s l a t o r ^ o f the moral order 
as He i s of the p h y s i c a l . I f there i s a d i f f e r -
ence of opinion i t i s only on the question 
whether i t i s His essence. His i n t e l l e c t . His 
w i l l , or His i n t e l l e c t and w i l l coaibined, which 
gives the o b l i g a t o r y character t o the moral law. 
VJe must not f o r g e t , however, t h a t the shades of d i f f e r e n c e 
r e f e r r e d t o i n the l a s t sentence do not r e l a t e t o the 
e s s e n t i a l p o s i t i o n t h a t i t i s God's w i l l or command t o 
Cardinal Mercier ( e t a l , ) , A Manual of Modern Scholastic 
Philosophy, authorised t r a n s l a t i o n by T. L. Parker and S. 
A. Parker (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. Ltd, London, 
T h i r d E n g l i s h e d i t i o n , P i f t h impression, 1950), Vol. I I , p. 
2^8. 
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which we owe our oblig;ation. The moral law i s God's w i l l 
w i t h o u t doubt; the d i f f e r e n c e s of opinion occur as t o 
whether i t i s God's w i l l , pure and simple, or God's w i l l 
as determined by His essence, i n t e l l i g e n c e , etc. 
I t must be sa i d i n defence of t h i s t heory t h a t i t 
i s f r e e from the confusion of values from which some of the 
p r e v i o u s l y considered ones s u f f e r , f o r i t r e s t r i c t s i t s e l f 
t o God's w i l l as the source of o b l i g a t i o n . But, neverthe-
l e s s , i t r a i s e s important questions. I n what sense i s 
our duty commanded by God? I s i t i n an " o b j e c t i v e " sense 
or i n a " s u b j e c t i v e " sense, or both? What might sometimes 
happen, and i n f a c t does happen f r e q u e n t l y , i s t h a t a mis-
guided conscience may t h i n k of something as duty which 
might a c t u a l l y be d i f f e r e n t from, i f not also p o s i t i v e l y 
c o n t r a r y t o , the o b j e c t i v e sense of duty. And i n such 
circumstances, i t w i l l be d i f f i c u l t t o decide whether man 
w i t h h i s conscience has or has not disobeyed God and the r e -
by i n c u r r e d s i n . This i s the serious 'problem posed by t h i s 
theory. I f our o b l i g a t i o n t o moral e f f o r t f o l l o w s from the 
mere f a c t t h a t i t i s God's w i l l , then i t makes "the o b l i g a -
t i o n t o obey God," the "one s o l i t a r y underived moral o b l i -
gation."'^ And i t i s always pos s i b l e t o misread God's w i l l . 
We have seen how Duns Scotus' emphasis on the pure w i l l of 
•'•Maclagan, op. c i t . , p. 67. 
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God leads t o a k i n d of moral p o s i t i v i s m or even n i h i l i s m . 
For the i m p l i c a t i o n of the basic view of William of 
Occam, which we .quoted e a r l i e r , seems t o be t h a t s i n does 
not contain "any i n t r i n s i c element of immorality o r what 
i s u n j u s t , any inner element of i n j u s t i c e ; i t i s an ex-
t e r n a l offence against the v d l l of God."''" 
I t i s here t h a t the s u p e r i o r i t y of St. Thomas' 
explanation begins t o show i t s e l f . By basing the moral 
law i n the very essence of God, he succeeds i n guarding 
a ^ n s t these p o s i t i v i s t i c m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the moral 
law. He does not deny t h a t i t i s God's command t h a t 
matters, but he i n s i s t s t h a t God's command i t s e l f must 
have a r a t i o n a l basis, f o r He i s an a l l - i n t e l l i g e n t being 
whose commands cannot but be r a t i o n a l l y comprehensible. 
This reference t o d i v i n e i n t e l l i g e n c e or essence, apart 
from ensuring the i n t r i n s i c m o r a l i t y of God's command, 
also makes m o r a l i t y subject t o r a t i o n a l c r i t i c i s m and 
ev a l u a t i o n . 
The j u s t i f i c a t i o n sometimes put forward f o r the 
C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s of love or Agapism i s t h a t we are made 
i n the image of God, and since God i s the l o v i n g and 
m e r c i f u l Father, i t f o l l o w s t h a t we ought t o be l o v i n g 
as w e l l . This simple philosophy of i m i t a t i n g our Creator 
"^ Rommen, op. c i t . , p. 59. 
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i n matters of conduct i s , i n s p i t e of i t s i n d e f i n i t e n e s s , 
a l l r i g h t so f a r as i t goes. But v;hen people begin t o 
argue, and some do, t h a t we ought t o love because i n l o v -
i n g we are "so l i v i n g as t o be w e l l - p l e a s i n g t o God, 
then the J u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a moral l i f e i s no more the 
i m i t a t i o n of God but the anxi e t y t o please God. The im-
p l i c a t i o n of t h i s theory i s t h a t we ought t o love because 
t h i s TMDuld be p l e a s i n g t o God. Now, q u i t e c l e a r l y t h i s 
theory makes "god's pleasure, considering simply as His 
pleasure, the o v e r r i d i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n , " ^ and thereby w i t h 
a s i n g l e stroke robs m o r a l i t y of i t s r e t i o n a l element 
which St. Thomas t r i e s so hard t o preserve. 
Another theory o f t e n presented seems t o be based 
on what may be c a l l e d an imperfect understanding of the 
s p i r i t of Kant's philosophy. The Kantian p r e s c r i p t i o n of 
"reverence f o r the moral law" i s accepted by some people 
as a prr©ftise. But they go on t o add t h a t the f e e l i n g of 
reverence or respect, i n the proper sense of the term, can 
only be e x c i t e d by a personal r e a l i t y . As Professor Mac-
lagan s t a t e s the argument of the supporters of t h i s 
theory: 
"'•See Maclagan, op. c i t . , p. 78. 
^ I b i d . , p. 78, 
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Our experience v;hen we are conscious of 'the 
moral law' i s , at l e a s t i m p l i c i t l y , the ex-
perience of c o n f r o n t a t i o n by a personal H o l i -
ness; t h a t i s t o say, by God. The s a n c t i t y of 
'the moral law' i s i t s ' i r r a d i a t i o n ' by the 
s a n c t i t y of a God who i s i t s Author. 
The essence of t h i s argument i s t h a t love and reverence 
f o r God, who i s the author of "the moral I a n " not only 
i n v o l v e s but i s the necessary c o n d i t i o n of respect f o r 
the moral law. But the exponents of t h i s argument, 
though quoting a Kantian phrase, ignore something much 
more fundamental wnich u n f o r t u n a t e l y takes the l i f e out 
of t h e i r argument, Kant himself makes i t abundantly 
c l e a r t h a t the reverence must be f o r the law i t s e l f . I t 
i s t r u e t h a t i f we b e l i e v e i n a personal r e a l i t y as the 
law-giver, we would normally have a reverence f o r t h i s 
person, but as Professor Maclagan says, "there i s a 
d i s t i n c t i v e reverence f o r the moral law t h a t i s not r e -
duc i b l e t o revei'^ence f o r a person." The moral l i f e , we 
may conclude, gains n o t h i n g from r e l a t i n g the moral law 
t o a personal God who i s i t s author, except perhaps im-
p a r t i n g a f e e l i n g tone t o m o r a l i t y which i s so sadly lasSk-
i n g i n Kant. Our o b j e c t i o n t o the above argument s t i l l 
- ^ I b i d . , p. 79. 
"^ I b i d . , p. 80. 
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remains t h a t i t i s a Kantian argument on an un-Kantian 
fo u n d a t i o n . 
With t h i s summary of C h r i s t i a n t h e o r i e s of o b l i -
g a t i o n , we now r e t u r n t o Hindu t h e o r i e s of the j u s t i f i c a -
t i o n of moral l i f e . 
( b ) Hinduism 
Examining Hindu t h e o r i e s of moral o b l i g a t i o n , we 
come across the same, or n e a r l y the same, kinds of argu-
ments as we encountered w h i l e t a k i n g account of C h r i s t i a n 
t h e o r i e s . We have, f o r example, one p a r t i c u l a r theory of 
o b l i g a t i o n given by the NaiySyikas which can p o s s i b l y be 
described as p r u d e n t i a l . For the Naiyayika V i d h i or 
S c r i p t u r a l Imperative "derives i t s f o r c e from a sanction, 
v i z , istasadhanatva or conduciveness t o good. The Obliga-
t o r i n e s s o f the Imperative i s . . . t h u s the moral worth or 
excellence of i t s end appealing t o the consciousness of 
the agent. ""^  I n a complicated explanation, d i s t i n g u i s h -
i n g between the oblip^atoriness and the o b j e c t i v e a u t h o r i t y 
of the Imperative, the Waiyayikas make the p o i n t t h a t "The 
o b j e c t i v e a u t h o r i t y a r i s e s from the i n t r i n s i c worth or 
value of the end or good, w h i l e o b l i g a t o r i n e s s i s due 
t o t h i s o b j e c t i v e value being s u b j e c t i v e l y appropriated 
2 
through a p a r t i c u l a r Kamana or d e s i r e . " 
-'•S.K. Ma i t r a , The Et h i c s of the Hindus ( C a l c u t t a Uni-
v e r s i t y Press, T : ^ 5 T 7 " p r T 3 T j r — " 
2lbid., p. 131. 
182. 
But i t i s not d i f f i c u l t t o see t h a t whatever the value 
of d e s i r e or Kamana as a psy c h o l o g i c a l f a c t o r i n leading 
t o a c t i o n of some s o r t , making the Moral Imperative i t s e l f 
s ubject t o a desire or u l t e r i o r end makes no c o n t r i b u t i o n 
t o the p u r i t y and autonomy of the moral law i t s e l f . I t • 
i s d i f f i c u l t t o help the f e e l i n g t h a t according t o t h i s 
theory the Imperative can be o b l i g a t o r y only when i t i s 
considered as leading t o the end t h a t the agent has i n 
mind. This theory thus brings i n the consideration of 
the agent's d e s i r e . For example, i t i s suggested t h a t 
some of the Vedic i n j u n c t i o n s about the performance of 
c e r t a i n s a c r i f i c e can be b i n d i n g on those who des i r e 
happiness i n heaven. I t i s c l e a r , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h i s 
t h eory tends t o make the moral law, as l a i d down i n the 
s c r i p t u r e s , a means t o an end which i t s e l f may vary, and 
i s t o t h a t extent p r u d e n t i a l r a t h e r than p r o p e r l y moral. 
I t i s because of t n i s t h a t the Mimamsa school i s 
very c r i t i c a l of t n i s Wyaya theory. Kumarila, f o r example, 
i s of the opinion t h a t "the end, consequence or phala 
determines only the motive and choice, but not the o b l i -
g a toriness of the Imperative. He f e e l s t h a t the end, 
at l e a s t i n some cases, comes i n t o operation only a f t e r 
•'•Ibid., p. 132. 
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the choice and hence cannot be the cause of the o b l i g a -
t o r i n e s s of the Imperative. But i t i s t o be remembered, 
however, t h a t Kumarila himself does concede t h a t the end 
i s t o be reckoned as an e s s e n t i a l p a r t of the whole pro-
cess t h a t leads t o v o l i t i o n . According t o him, whatever 
the class of a c t i o n s , whether they are Kamya ( o p t i o n a l ) 
or N i t y a - N a i m i t t i k a (compulsory d a i l y and occasional), 
the end i s s u r e l y i n v o l v e d . For example, the end involved 
i n the Kitya-IMaimittika a c t i o n s would be the avoidance of 
the s i n (Pratyavaya) t h a t would f o l l o w on non-performance. 
"But," he i n s i s t s , " i t i s not because of the phala or 
consequence, but because he i s Miyuktapuruga or morally 
appointed by the Imperative t h a t the l a t t e r binds him. "''' 
I n other words, the agent must perform these compulsory 
d u t i e s simply because they are h i s d u t i e s , though un-
doubtedly the performance of these w i l l also b r i n g c e r t a i n 
consequences which may, i n the f i r s t place, determine our 
v o l i t i o n . I n t h i s t h e o r y , then, we f i n d the seeds of a 
gradual t r a n s i t i o n from the p r u d e n t i a l t o the p u r e l y 
moral theory of o b l i g a t i o n . 
The tendency t o develop a p u r e l y moral theory t h a t 
we n o t i c e d i n Kum'arila seems t o be more or less c r y s t a l l -
• ^ I b i d . , p. 133. 
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i s e d i n another t h i n k e r of the Mimamsa school, Prabhakara, 
who, i n c i d e n t a l l y , i s regarded as th e exponent of a separ-
ate school w i t h i n the Mimamsa system. The Prabhakara 
school of Mimamsa i s of the view t h a t Niyoga or S c r i p t u r a l 
Imperative must be i t s own end. The moral Imperative as 
l a i d down i n the s c r i p t u r e s i t s e l f " c o n s t i t u t e s the 
sanction, the motive as w e l l as the moral a u t h o r i t y of the 
V i d h i . "•'" There i s no t h i n g e x t e r n a l t o which an appeal need 
be made or from which the Imperative can derive i t s author-
i t y . On the contrary, they say, where the agent i s im-
p e l l e d by des i r e f o r the consequence, as i n o p t i o n a l 
d u t i e s , the Imperative becomes Udasina, i . e . , m o r a l l y neut-
r a l . According t o them, i n the case of those u n c o n d i t i o n a l 
d u t i e s which may p r o p e r l y be regarded as duty the Impera-
t i v e i s s e l f - a u t h o r i t a t i v e or s e l f - r e a l i s i n g , w h i l e i n the 
case of the Klmya, or o p t i o n a l actions, i t i s v/ithout any 
imperative character, " i t s f u n c t i o n being merely t o estab-
l i s h a r e l a t i o n of means and end between the act and the 
consequence t o be a t t a i n e d thereby." 
I t cannot be denied t h a t t h i s i s a great improve-
ment on the t h e o r i e s of o b l i g a t i o n put forward by the Nai-
yayikas as v/ell as by Kumarila. But we must confess t h a t 
• ^ I b i d . , p. 134. 
^ I b i d , , p. 137. 
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even Prabhakara's theory s u f f e r s from a c e r t a i n p r u d e n t i a l 
t i n g e . And there are two reasons f o r t h i s . F i r s t l y , be-
cause, i n s p i t e of h i s uncompromising a t t i t u d e on the 
d e f i n i t i o n of duty, Prabhakara i s s t i l l l i m i t e d by the 
general Mimamsa conception of Dharma. Dharma i s regarded 
by t h i s school as Alaukika Sreya Sadhana, or the means t o 
the attainment of a c e r t a i n supernatural essence. rva. 
I t f o l l o w s then t h a t i f Dharma i s a means t o some super-
sensuous end, i t cannot any more enjoy the f u l l autonomy 
t h a t c h a racterises or should characterise the moral law. 
Moreover, Prabhakara introduces i n t o h i s theory one other 
element which seems t o give i t a s l i g h t l y p r u d e n t i a l bear-
i n g . He says t h a t not every s c r i p t u r a l i n j u n c t i o n c o n s t i -
t u t e s Dharma. I t i s only those of them which lead t o 
Artha (and not t o Anartha) t h a t r e s u l t i n Jharma through 
t h e i r supersensuous e f f e c t s o r A£urva. The Prabhakaras 
define Artha as t h a t which does not produce pain i n excess 
of pleasure. Dharma, according t o them, i s only a s p e c i f i c 
foxmi of t h i s generic good, namely, t h a t which does not 
produce an excess of pain over pleasure. I t w i l l be e a s i l y 
seen t h a t t h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n of the consideration of p l e a -
sure and pain i n the determination of Dharma imparts t o 
the Prabhakara theory of o b l i g a t i o n a d e f i n i t e l y u t i l i -
t a r i a n and p r u d e n t i a l character. 
One i n t e r e s t i n g theory of o b l i g a t i o n seems t o be 
i m p l i e d i n Ramanuja's attempt t o deduce the moral v i r t u e s 
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from the supposed character of God, since God i s here r e -
garded as the moral ideal.''" I n other words, Ramanuja ad-
vocates the view t h a t i n any circumstance we ought t o be-
have as we expect God t o behave i n a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n . 
I'or example, we ought t o be k i n d to the d i s t r e s s e d , f o r -
g i v i n g t o the offender, of help t o the weak and so on be-
cause i n s i m i l a r circumstances God would be doing the same. 
This i s reminiscent of the C h r i s t i a n theory of i m i t a t i o 
G h r i s t i , considered e a r l i e r , t h a t we ought t o love because 
we are creatures of the l o v i n g Father. And t h e r e f o r e , we 
may only repeat the comment we made on t h a t occasion, t h a t 
we ought t o i m i t a t e God. But, as we remarked then, i f the 
motive i s simply t o please God, then t h i s theory i s not 
f r e e from the r i s k s of m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or of complete 
misunderstanding as t o what would be pleasing t o God. 
But t h i s , however, i s only an i n d i r e c t i m p l i c a t i o n 
of some of Ramanuja's utterances. The main p o s i t i o n of 
Ramanuja i s t h a t we ought t o f o l l o w the moral law which i s 
p r e s c r i b e d by God and which represents His i n t e l l i g e n c e . 
We have seen t h a t Raraanuja and the Naiyayikas,- along w i t h 
various Bhakti sects, are c a l l e d Paureseyavadins because 
they b e l i e v e t h a t the moral law i s prescribed by an e t e r -
mally p e r f e c t being who lays down the duty f o r man i n a 
•'•Ibid., p. 22. 
187. 
code of i n j u n c t i o n s and p r o h i b i t i o n s . Unquestionably 
t h e r e f o r e , the moral law derives i t s a u t h o r i t y from the 
w i l l of God who knows what i s good f o r us. But as i n 
C h r i s t i a n i t y , so i n Hinduism there are d i f f e r e n c e s of 
opinion as t o whether i t i s the pure w i l l or the w i l l as 
enlightened by His i n t e l l i g e n c e which gives the moral law 
i t s a u t h o r i t y . I n t h i s respect, while the Waiyayikas 
tend t o take the p o s i t i o n of Duns Scotus and others, Rama-
nuja would appear t o go w i t h St. Thomas. According t o the 
Ramanujists, 
The commands represent the I n t e l l i g e n c e of the 
Lord, i . e . , h i s knowledge of what i s t r u l y r i g h t 
and^what i s wrong; according t o the Hyaya-
Vaisegikas they represent only the w i l l of the 
Lord, i . e . , h i s mere pleasure or f i a t . 1 
This p o s i t i o n then i s s i m i l a r t o the main current i n 
C h r i s t i a n t h i n k i n g on t h i s issue. And there would seem 
t o be no need f o r r e p e a t i n g what we already s a i d i n eval-
u a t i n g t h i s theory. 
A l l these explanations of the moral l i f e discussed 
so f a r have g e n e r a l l y been i n s t r u m e n t a l i n shaping the 
moral a t t i t u d e s of the Hindus i n v a r y i n g degrees. But the 
p r i d e of place as the most i n f l u e n t i a l and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
Hindu explanation of duty belongs t o the theory of Niskama 
•^ I b i d . , p. 161 (emphasis mine). 
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Karma or Duty f o r Duty's sake, advocated by the Bhagavad-
g i t a . There would h a r d l y be any Hindu, of any denomina-
t i o n whatsoever, who would challenge the moral and l o g i c a l 
excellence of t h i s theory, even though there may be many 
who would s t r e s s how d i f f i c u l t i t i s t o f o l l o w t h i s theory 
i n p r a c t i c e . The s y n t h e t i c i n g e n u i t y of the Glta seems t o 
be v i v i d l y e x e m p l i f i e d here i n as much as i t succeeds, or 
n e a r l y succeeds, i n pres e r v i n g the l o f t y p u r i t y and auto-
nomy of the moral law, spoken of by Kant, without succumb-
i n g t o the r i g o r i s m or formalism of the Kantian theory of 
Duty f o r Duty's sake. 
According t o the Gita, Dharma consists i n the d i s -
i n t e r e s t e d discharge of one's d u t i e s without being moti-
vated by considerations of reward and punishment. Duty 
or the moral Imperative must not be taken t o der i v e i t s 
a u t h o r i t y from any extraneous source whatsoever. Duty has 
t o be done because i t i s duty. The performance of du t i e s 
w i l l c e r t a i n l y b r i n g i t s reward i n due course, f o r t h i s 
w o r l d i s not a chaos but a well-ordered cosmos under the 
c o n t r o l and guidance of a p e r f e c t and a l l - p o w e r f u l God. 
But t h i s must not form p a r t of our c a l c u l a t i o n or motiva-
t i o n , because t h i s i s not man's sphere but God's. Our Job 
i s t o do our duty; t o ensure t h a t appropriate consequences 
f o l l o w our deeds i s God's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . So l e t us do 
what i s our concern and leave the r e s t t o God. "To a c t i o n 
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alone hast thou a r i g h t and never at a l l t o i t s f r u i t s ; 
l e t not the f r u i t s of a c t i o n be thy motive; n e i t h e r l e t 
there he i n thee any attachment t o i n a c t i o n , ""^  says the 
Git a. 
This passage at once not only establishes the s e l f -
v a l i d a t i n g nature of the moral demand but also rebuts the 
charge o f t e n l e v e l l e d against Hinduism t h a t i t s philosophy 
leads t o i n a c t i o n . One i s advised t o do u n h e s i t a t i n g l y 
and w i t h a l l h i s capacity the duties t h a t are h i s — t h e 
d u t i e s of h i s class and stage, the d u t i e s of h i s profession, 
the d u t i e s t o the gods and t o the " f a t h e r s . " This i s , i n 
f a c t , the only proper course, f o r man, as man, cannot l i v e 
a l i f e of impulses and i n s t i n c t s , l i k e brutes do; nor can 
he give up a c t i o n completely while he i s embodied. The 
c o n s t i t u e n t s of h i s body w i l l never l e t him r e s t , f o r the 
dynamic t r a k r t i , w i t h i t s three strands, which composes 
man's body, i s ever a c t i v e . So act he must, and obviously 
the b e t t e r man i s the one who l e t s h i s duty determine h i s 
course of a c t i o n r a t h e r than l e t t i n g h i s s e l f i s h hankerings 
determine h i s course. Thus there i s no need t o renounce 
the world, nor can one renounce a c t i o n a l t o g e t h e r ; what one 
can renounce i s the desire f o r reward. This i s the meaning 
oi" i ^ i v y t t i or r e n u n c i a t i o n according t o the Glta. "Sarva 
^ G i t i , 11,47. 
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Karma Phala Ty;aga"—the r e n u n c i a t i o n of a l l f r u i t s of ac-
t i o n i s the motto. 
The enlightened one v/ho has acquired d i s c r i m i n a -
t i v e knowledge, or the p r i v i l e g e d one, l i k e Arjuna, to. 
whom the Lord has revealed the whole t r u t h , may come t o 
know t h a t Pharma i s God's law and may t h e r e f o r e be impelled 
t o c o n t r i b u t e t o the p r e s e r v a t i o n of Dharma i n the world. 
But f o r the average person, duty i s the l a s t word. I f he 
cannot p i e r c e the mystery of the world, he does not have 
t o worry. So long as he i s prepared t o do h i s duty without 
any attachment t o the consequences, he i s already c o n t r i -
b u t i n g t o God's higher purpose and t o h i s own s a l v a t i o n . 
For the o r d i n a r y man i t i s enough t o know t h a t t h i s i s God's 
world, and accordingly, l e t him dedicate t o God everything 
t h a t he does. There need be no other consideration except 
t h a t of duty, but the b e l i e v e r may r e s t assured t h a t the 
Lord who i s the c r e a t o r , sustainer and destroyer of the 
world i s also the moral governor; and, t h e r e f o r e , i f he 
only does what i s demanded of him, the appropriate conse-
quences w i l l a u t o m a t i c a l l y f o l l o w . I n t h i s way the Gita 
seems t o expound the Kantian maxim of Duty f o r Duty's sake, 
and succeeds i n making i t m o r a l l y more s a t i s f y i n g by r e l a t -
i n g duty t o a personal God. Kant also postulates b e l i e f 
i n a God on moral grounds, but h i s God i s an empty l o g i c a l 
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or p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n , and not the l i v i n g God of 
the Glta'. 
I t should be worthv/hile t o examine i n t h i s connec-
t i o n the comments of John Mackenzie on the e t h i c s of the 
Gita. I n h i s book Hindu E t h i c s , he admits t h a t t h i s theory 
of the d i s i n t e r e s t e d discharge of d u t i e s "marks a great ad-
vance i n e t h i c a l d o c t r i n e . " But he complains t h a t 
no p r i n c i p l e i s provided by which the content of 
' r i g h t ' may be discovered. For the content of 
m o r a l i t y we are po i n t e d t o dharma. I f we ask 
why we should f o l l o w t h i s strange amalgam of 
e t h i c a l , s o c i a l and r i t u a l p r i n c i p l e s , no answer 
seems t o be given. Why may not a man without 
attachment p r a c t i s e other forms of conduct? No 
reason i s given . , . . ! 
There seem t o be two p o i n t s i n v o l v e d i n Mackenzie's 
c r i t i c i s m which r e q u i r e examination: t h a t t h i s theory 
f a i l s t o provide, f i r s t , a p r i n c i p l e by which the content 
of r i g h t may be discovered and, second, an explanation of 
why we should f o l l o w Dharma. 
As regards the f i r s t c r i t i c i s m , i t can be said t h a t 
the Gita i s only t r y i n g t o formulate the concept of duty, 
and i s not g i v i n g a d e t a i l e d c a s u i s t r y of what our d u t i e s 
c o n s i s t o f. I t presupposes the t i m e - o l d conception of 
Dharma as duty, %nd t h e r e f o r e merely r e f e r s t o Dharma i n 
•""Mackenzie, Hindu E t h i c s , p. 126. 
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answer t o what we ought t o do. A d e f i n i t i o n of duty and 
the working out of the d e t a i l e d content of duty are two 
d i f f e r e n t tasks and i t i s p o i n t l e s s t o blame f o r not doing 
the l a t t e r any system which i s undertaking t o do only the 
former. As the f o r m u l a t o r of an iridependent comprehensive" 
system Kant i s j u s t l y blamed f o r l e a v i n g out the content 
of duty while f i x i n g the connotation and i m p l i c a t i o n s of 
duty. As Lewis suggests, Kant i s "apt t o give the im-
pression of supposing t h a t the content of duty can be de-
r i v e d from the idea of duty i t s e l f . ""^  But t h i s c r i t i c i s m 
cannot apply t o the G l t ^ , f o r the Glta i s not an indepen-
dent system, but a l i n k i n a chain, so t h a t i t i s p e r f e c t l y 
j u s t i f i e d i n l e a v i n g the content of duty t o the e a r l i e r 
Vedic t r a d i t i o n w h i l e d e f i n i n g our a t t i t u d e t o duty. This 
i s why the GltS r e f e r s t o IJharma f o r f i n d i n g out the con-
t e n t of duty. 
To the question of why we should f o l l o w pharma and 
not other forms of conduct, we may only say t h a t i f Mac-
kenzie had kept i n mind the wider connotation of Dharma as 
the moral order, t h i s question should h a r d l y have arisen. 
Pharma i s the moral law as w e l l as the e t e r n a l law, i t 
needs no e x p l a i n i n g why we should f o l l o w Dharma. I t would 
seem, then, t h a t Mackenzie's c r i t i c i s m i s centered round 
•'"Lewis, op, c i t , , pp. 56f, 
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what he considers the a r b i t r a r y way i n which the d e t a i l e d 
content of Dharma i s f i x e d . I n other words, he seems t o 
ask f o r an explanation as t o why the content of Dharma 
should be what i t i s and not something else. The only an-
swer t o t h i s i s t h a t the i n s i g h t of the wiser men i n the 
Vedic t r a d i t i o n happened t o i n t e r p r e t i t t h i s way. En-
l i g h t e n e d men may be f r e e t o depart from some d e t a i l s l a i d 
down by t r a d i t i o n , but f o r t h e average man, \^ho lacks the 
i n t u i t i v e power t o discover the content of Dharma f o r him-
s e l f , t h e r e i s no a l t e r n a t i v e except t o f o l l o w t r a d i t i o n . 
That Dharma need not always be i n t e r p r e t e d i n the t r a d i -
t i o n a l way, and t h a t , t h e r e f o r e , i t i s not always necessary 
t o f o l l o w what Mackenzie c a l l s " t h i s strange amalgam of 
e t h i c a l , s o c i a l and r i t u a l p r i n c i p l e s , " would be d r i v e n 
home i f we c a r e f u l l y understand the Hindu's approach t o 
Dharma. G. H. Mees very s u c c i n c t l y suras up t h i s approach 
i n these words: 
The Hindu d o c t r i n e i s t h a t a l l the time man has t o 
open up a l l h i s i n n e r f a c u l t i e s i n order t o be i n -
strumental t o Dharma. To the extent he i s not' 
able t o r e a l i s e Dharma i n t u i t i v e l y , he has t o per-
form the Dharma of h i s class, h i s f a m i l y and pro-
f e s s i o n , as. ordained by Karman. I f he has not yet 
any s u b j e c t i v e r e a l i s a t i o n , he must f o l l o w duty 
and v/ork i n s o c i e t y , as l a i d down i n the scale by 
people wiser than h i m s e l f , as a c h i l d follov/s a 
p a r t i c u l a r school and not any other, because h i s 
parents thus deem the most advisable. I f l a t e r 
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he gets the s u b j e c t i v e r e a l i s a t i o n , he ( ' i t ' i n 
the t e x t ) may o v e r r u l e the decisions and opinions 
of others, and change the course of h i s l i f e . l 
We may add only t h a t t h i s seems t o be an eminently sensible 
course, f o r the con t r a r y would lead only t o chaos. 
With t h i s c onsideration of the f i r s t two questions 
we r a i s e d a t the beginning of t h i s chapter, we must now 
consider very b r i e f l y the t h i r d . I n f a c t t h i s seems t o 
have been demanded by our ana l y s i s of Mackenzie's objec-
t i o n s t o the e t h i c s of the Gita. For these o b j e c t i o n s , as 
we have seen, centre not so much round the conception of 
duty or the moral law as round the determination of the 
content of duty, ahd why one i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the content', 
of duty i s t o be p r e f e r r e d t o another. We are, t h e r e f o r e , 
l e d t o t h e examination o f the sources of knowledge of the 
moral law. The determination of the content of the moral 
law i s important and we must know which sources are t o be 
r e l i e d on. 
Sources of Knowledge of the_Law 
I n the f i r s t s e c t i o n of t h i s chapter we discussed 
•t^e source of the moral law. What we meant t o ask there 
""•Mees, op. c i t . , p. 23, 
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v/as: Who prescribes the moral law, who i s the law-giver? 
We are nov; t r y i n g t o answer the question: Who gives us 
the knowledge of t h i s law? Our answer then was t h a t God 
i s the source of the moral law i n O h 3 ? i s t i a n i t y as w e l l as 
i n Hinduism ge n e r a l l y . We s h a l l now t r y t o f i n d out the 
various sources of the knowledge of t h i s law according t o 
O h r i s t i a n i t y and Hinduism r e s p e c t i v e l y . Let us s t a t e at 
the outset t h a t we do not i n t e n d here t o deal w i t h the 
numerous questions t h a t w i l l i n e v i t a b l y a r i s e regarding 
the r e l a t i v e importance of the various sources. We s h a l l 
merely i n d i c a t e b r i e f l y what the sources, g e n e r a l l y , are. 
(a) C h r i s t i a n i t y 
I t can be s a i d vdthout f e a r of c o n t r a d i c t i o n t h a t 
C h r i s t i a n i t y recognises at l e a s t f o u r sources which i n t e r -
pi'et and reve a l t o us what the moral law means or what i t s 
content are. These are (1) the Sc r i p t u r e s , (2) the Church, 
(3) the redeemed souls or s a i n t s , and (4) the conscience. 
There may be, and t h e r e a c t u a l l y have been, d i f f e r e n c e s 
of opinion as t o the r e l a t i v e primacy of these sources, but 
i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o t h i n k of any section of C h r i s t i a n i t y 
virhich would r e j e c t o u t r i g h t the claim of any of these t o 
be i n t e r p r e t e r s of God's law. 
I n s p i t e of the r i s k of s t a t i n g mere g e n e r a l i t i e s , 
we may say t h a t the S c r i p t u r e s come f i r s t as being the 
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d i r e c t testimony of God's w i l l . But i t may be objected 
t h a t Catholicism on the whole gives the p r i d e of place t o 
the Church. This perhaps would be t r u e up t o an extent. 
But even the Catholic church sti'ives t o Judge moral issues 
o n l y i n conformity w i t h the s p i r i t of the s c r i p t u r e s . The 
Church does profess t o be the sole and f i n a l a u t h o r i t y i n 
matters of B i b l i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , but i t can never claim 
t o supersede the s c r i p t u r e s . To t h a t extent the s c r i p t u r e s 
should be g e n e r a l l y regarded as the f i r s t source. The 
Church a u t o m a t i c a l l y comes next, f o r the Church i s the 
Body of C h r i s t through which the Holy S p i r i t works, and 
a c c o r d i n g l y , the voice of the church i s claimed t o be the 
voice of the S p i r i t . The s a i n t s who have undoubtedly l i v e d 
a l i f e of holiness and whose s p i r i t , t h e r e f o r e , was i n 
communion w i t h God, could be r e l i e d upon t o give guidance 
i n matters of conduct. 
These are a l l , however, e x t e r n a l sources. The 
i n t e r n a l source, of coux'se, i s the conscience. I f one's 
conscience i s pui-e and c u l t i v a t e d , i t i s taken f o r granted 
t h a t he w i l l a u t o m a t i c a l l y know what h i s duty i s i n any 
s i t u a t i o n . V/e have seen t h a t C h r i s t i a n i t y b e l i eves t h a t 
the n a t u r a l moral law i s also w r i t t e n i n the hearts of 
men. St. Ambrose of Milan says (and most C h r i s t i a n t h i n k e r s 
w i l l agree w i t h him) t h a t 
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I f men had been able t o f o l l o w the Natural Law 
which God our Creator had p l a n t e d i n the heart 
of each one, there would have been no need f o r 
the Law t h a t v;as i n s c r i b e d on t a b l e s of stone. 
That d i v i n e Law i s not w r i t t e n ; i t i s inborn; 
i t i s not l e a r n t by reading anything; i t f i n d s 
expression through a capacity n a t i v e t o our 
minds, r i s i n g as i t were l i k e a stream whose 
source i s i n the nature of every one of u s . l 
A c t u a l l y t h e r e are many controversies on the question of 
conscience, f o r example, whether i t knows through the 
mind or through the h e a r t , which, though very i n t e r e s t i n g 
as w e l l as important, cannot be discussed by us i n the 
space a t our d i s p o s a l . We s h a l l , t h e r e f o r e , content our-
selves w i t h the observation t h a t C h r i s t i a n i t y believes i n 
an i n n e r f a c u l t y which has an inborn capacity t o judge 
what i s m o r a l l y good. I t i s possible t o argue t h a t con-
science i s perhaps the most important source, f o r no 
C h r i s t i a n would be expected t o advise a course of a c t i o n 
which i s c o n t r a r y t o h i s conscience. But, as v/e s a i d 
e a r l i e r , i t i s not p o s s i b l e f o r us t o enter i n t o the con-
t r o v e r s y on t h i s issue i n the space at our d i s p o s a l , 
(b) Hinduism 
Though Hinduism does not have a recognised Church 
which could be a source of knowledge of t h i s law, i t a l l 
"'•Quoted by Mellone, op. c i t . , p. 22. 
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the same recognises f o u r sources. The Dharma Shastras 
l a y down t h a t the sources of our knowledge of Dharma are 
(1) S r u t i or the Vedas and Upanigads, (2) the Smrtis, 
(5) the example of the v i r t u o u s , and (4) the approval of 
an enlightened c o n s c i e n c e . T h e place of the church, thus, 
i s taken by another group of l i t e r a t u r e , the Smrtis, and 
the Vedas are taken as an independent source i n themselves. 
I t must be admitted, however, t h a t though the 
approval of the conscience (Atmanah or Antahkarana or 
Hrdaya) i s l a i d down as a c o n d i t i o n of a c t i o n , on the whole 
the approach of Hinduism i n matters of morals seems t o be 
comparatively more a u t h o r i t a r i a n and u n c r i t i c a l . To take 
j u s t one example, the w r i t e r s of the Dharma Shastras gen-
e r a l l y presupposed t h a t "the S r u t i i s the u l t i m a t e source 
of a l l our knowledge of Dharma." Consequently, when they 
discovered i n the case of a p a r t i c u l a r Smrti r u l e "that 
no t e x t of the S r u t i i n support of the Smrti r u l e can be 
found," they took "recourse t o the f i c t i o n t h a t a S r u t i 
t e x t must be i n f e r r e d or assumed i n support of the Smrti." 
v'/hatever the motives i n t a k i n g t h i s a t t i t u d e , there i s no 
doubt t h a t t h i s has l e d t o very u n s a t i s f a c t o r y conclusions. 
"^ Manu, 11,6; 11,12. 
"""Aiyer, op. c i t . , p. 19. 
^ I b i d . , p. 20. 
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F o r t u n a t e l y , however, t h i s a t t i t u d e i s not common i n l a t e r 
Hinduism, nor even i n every section of the same group of 
l i t e r a t u r e . Manu, the most celebrated of the w r i t e r s of 
Dharma Shastras, lays equal s t r e s s on conscience. He de-
c l a r e s , "Perform only such actions as would s a t i s f y your 
conscience. Avoid others.""'' S i m i l a r l y , "Manah putam 
Samacaret"—act i n conformity w i t h your c o n s c i e n c e — i s the 
advice o f f e r e d by Chanakya, and the Bhakti school g e n e r a l l y 
stresses conscience (Hrdaya) more than anything else. 
••-Manu, IV, 161, 
Chapter V. 
THE CONTENT OF THE MORAL LAW: VIRTUES AND DUTIES 
While examining a p a r t i c u l a r c r i t i c i s m of the 
e t h i c s of the Glta i n the l a s t chapter, we had occasion 
t o note t h a t the concept of duty, howsoever e l a b o r a t e l y 
and c a r e f u l l y formulated, need not n e c e s s a r i l y give any 
i n d i c a t i o n of the content of duty. A p r a c t i c a l system 
of e t h i c s w i l l , t h e r e f o r e , be expected t o pay as much a t -
t e n t i o n t o the content of duty as t o the concept of duty. 
As p r a c t i c a l systems of e t h i c s which have helped t o shape 
the l i v e s of m i l l i o n s of human beings f o r hundreds of 
years, C h r i s t i a n i t y and Hinduism, more than most others, 
are expected t o l a y down a systematic and coherent pat-
t e r n of d u t i e s f o r the guidance of t h e i r f o l l o w e r s . And 
we may c o n f i d e n t l y s t a t e t h a t they have done so i n ample 
measure, though we cannot yet make any d e f i n i t e pronounce-
ments on how s u c c e s s f u l l y or how c o n s i s t e n t l y t h i s task 
has been c a r r i e d out. As a matter of f a c t , t h i s i s one 
of the p o i n t s we s h a l l be examining i n t h i s chapter. 
The discussions t h a t we had i n the l a s t chapter 
on the C h r i s t i a n and Hindu concepts of the Moral Law could 
only u n d e r l i n e our a t t i t u d e t o the Law, namely, t h a t of 
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absolute and u n c o n d i t i o n a l a l l e g i a n c e . We s h a l l now t r y 
t o f i l l i n the concrete d e t a i l s of what e x a c t l y t h i s 
a l l e g i a n c e i n v o l v e s . I n other words, having l e a r n t about 
the concept of duty we s h a l l now work out the d e t a i l e d 
content of duty. C h r i s t i a n and Hindu teachers down the 
ages have made great e f f o r t s t o lay down what e x a c t l y be-
i n g a C h r i s t i a n or a Hindu means i n the context of behav-
i o u r . I n the f i r s t place, they have emphasised the ac-
quirement or c u l t i v a t i o n of c e r t a i n a t t r i b u t e s of character, 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y c a l l e d v i r t u e s . Besides, there have been 
innumerable exh o r t a t i o n s e i t h e r to do c e r t a i n t h i n g s or t o 
r e f r a i n from c e r t a i n others. These do's and don't's may 
be termed d u t i e s . These d u t i e s , however, are so numerous 
and r e l a t i v e t h a t i t w i l l be palpably absurd t o have a 
d e t a i l e d discussion of them i n a b r i e f a nalysis l i k e ours. 
We s h a l l , t h e r e f o r e , be ob l i g e d t o confine our discussion 
t o v i r t u e s g e n e r a l l y . We s h a l l see, however, t h a t i n many 
cases the d i s t i n c t i o n between v i r t u e s and d u t i e s breaks 
down, f o r they begin t o in v o l v e each other. This v / i l l be 
c l e a r i f we t r y t o d e f i n e v i r t u e s and t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s . 
As Thomas McLherson p o i n t s out, i n moral p h i l o -
sophy these days there i s h a r d l y any discussion of virtues.''" 
The reason f o r t h i s , i n h i s own words, i s t h a t 
"'"See Mcpherson's a r t i c l e on C h r i s t i a n V i r t u e s i n A r i s t o -
Mlia^...Society I'roceedings, Supplementary Vol.XXXVII, 1963, 
202. 
There i s , indeed, always something a r t i f i c i a l — 
i f useful"—about the i s o l a t i o n of s p e c i f i c 
' v i r t u e s ' . A man's character i s a whole; and 
too much concentration on separate v i r t u e s , or 
on separate ends or motives, however apparently 
necessary i n the i n t e r e s t s of order and c l a r i t y , , 
obscures t h i s . There i s , f o r instance, such a 
t h i n g as a Chi-istian man, but the t r a d i t i o n a l 
i n s i s t e n c e of many moral theologians on e x p l a i n -
i n g him i n terms of separate v i r t u e s does not 
alv/ays make i t easier t o understand t h i s n o t i o n . 
This i s by and large t r u e , but, as he himself p o i n t s out, 
i n moral theology v i r t u e s are more l i k e l y than not t o be 
a subject of discussion. Whatever, t h e r e f o r e , the a r t i -
f i c i a l i t y i n v o l v e d i n disc u s s i n g separate v i r t u e s , i t 
seems t h a t f o r a proper understanding of the i n g r e d i e n t s 
of C h r i s t i a n or Hindu character, as conceived by moral 
th e o l o g i a n s , a discussion of v i r t u e s i s hardly avoidable. 
To proceed w i t h our d e f i n i t i o h . of v i r t u e s , then, 
we may quote the words of F. J. H a l l and F, H. Hallock. 
According t o them, v i r t u e s are the " r e g u l a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s 
or h a b i t s of conduct which when f u l l y observed produce 
p e r f e c t righteousness of l i f e and character." I n the 
words of Gilson, v i r t u e s are "forms of h a b i t disposing us 
more permanently t o good a c t i o n s . " I t appears, then, 
t h a t v i r t u e s are those values or a t t r i b u t e s of character 
•""Ibid., pp. 511. 
2 
F. J. H a l l and F. H. Hallock, Moral Theology (Longmans, 
Green and Co., 19241, p. 89-
•^Gilson, op. c i t . , p. 248. 
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which should be c u l t i v a t e d i f we care t o l i v e a moral 
l i f e . And c u l t i v a t i o n of these almost a u t o m a t i c a l l y i n -
volves an u n f a i l i n g p r a c t i c e of these v i r t u e s on every 
s i n g l e occasion so t h a t i n due course i t becomes a habit 
or a permanent d i s p o s i t i o n i n the person concerned. The-
o r e t i c a l l y i t may appear t h a t the agent has the option 
not t o p r a c t i s e a p a r t i c u l a r one of these v i r t u e s a t a 
p a r t i c u l a r time. But t h i s r e a l l y does not square up w i t h 
the n o t i o n held by C h r i s t i a n i t y as w e l l as by Plinduism 
t h a t the Moral Law must receive u n c o n d i t i o n a l a l l e g i a n c e . 
I f the moral law, then, consists of exhortations t o cer-
t a i n v i r t u e s , among other i n j u n c t i o n s , then the p r a c t i c e 
of these v i r t u e s can h a r d l y admit of exceptions. I n other 
words, the p r a c t i c e of each of the v i r t u e s p rescribed on 
every s i n g l e occasion becomes the sacred duty of every 
adherent of e i t h e r of these r e l i g i o n s . I f , f o r example, 
C h i - i s t i a n i t y p rescribes j u s t i c e as a v i r t u e , then the ex-
ercis e of j u s t i c e under any circumstances and at any cost 
becomes the duty of every C h r i s t i a n . I n f a c t the same 
moral advice can be presented, i n many cases, e i t h e r by 
l i s t i n g i t as a v i r t u e or else by g i v i n g i t the form of 
a command or duty. To say t h a t j u s t i c e i s a v i r t u e i s 
noth i n g d i f f e r e n t from saying t h a t i t i s our duty t o be 
' j u s t . This i s why sa i d t h a t i t i s extremely d i f f i c u l t 
204. 
i n the context of r e l i g i o u s e t h i c s t o maintain a sharp 
d i s t i n c t i o n between duty and v i r t u e . I t i s perhaps be-
cause of t h i s mutual involvement t h a t Hinduism uses the 
same term, Dharma, f o r v i r t u e as w e l l as duty. This, as 
a matter of f a c t , i s our excuse f o r discussing v i r t u e s 
and d u t i e s i n the same chapter. But as we said e a r l i e r , 
our emphasis w i l l be on v i r t u e s , and we s h a l l take i n t o 
account only those d u t i e s t h a t tend t o e n t a i l some k i n d of 
v i r t u e or v i r t u e s . 
Now our discussion of v i r t u e s and d u t i e s , i n 
C h r i s t i a n i t y and i n Hinduism, w i l l have three sections. 
F i r s t l y , we s h a l l t r y t o enumerate i n some d e t a i l the v i r -
tues and t h e i r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s i n C h r i s t i a n i t y and i n Hin-
duism. Next, we s h a l l tr-y t o compare the so-called Christ-
i a n w i t h the so - c a l l e d Hindu v i r t u e s , n o t i c e the d i s t i n c -
t i v e f e a t u r e s , i f any, of these sets of v i r t u e s , and t r y 
t o i n d i c a t e what k i n d of person the r e a l i s a t i o n of these 
v i r t u e s i s l i k e l y t o produce. F i n a l l y , we s h a l l discuss 
on the basis of our f i n d i n g s i n the previous two sections 
i n what sense, i f any, can C h r i s t i a n v i r t u e s be c a l l e d ex-
c l u s i v e l y C h r i s t i a n and Hindu v i r t u e s Hindu. 
V i r t u e s and Their C l a s s j j ^ i c a t i o n 
(a) C h r i s t i a n i t y 
Mclherson i s r i g h t i n saying t h a t "there i s no 
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s i n g l e B i b l i c a l source f o r a l i s t of the C h r i s t i a n v i r -
tues. ""^  But he adds t h a t moral theologians seem t o be 
agreed " t h a t the C h r i s t i a n v i r t u e s are seven i n number— 
three t h e o l o g i c a l v i r t u e s , f a i t h , hope and love, together 
w i t h the f o u r c a r d i n a l v i r t u e s , prudence, f o r t i t u d e , 
2 
temperance and j u s t i c e . " Bet us add, however, t h a t 
these seven are not the only v i r t u e s mentioned by C h r i s t -
i a n theologians. The b e l i e f i s t h a t though there a?e a 
host o f v i r t u e s which C h r i s t i a n s ought t o c u l t i v a t e , a l l 
these are re d u c i b l e i n the long run t o these seven. The 
e n t i r e range of v i r t u e s t h a t C h r i s t i a n l i t e r a t u r e mentions 
may s a f e l y be asserted t o be derived from three sources 
p r i m a r i l y — t h e Decalogue or the Ten Commandments of the 
Old Testament, the teachings and i d e a l s of Jesus feis de-
p i c t e d i n the Gospels, and the Greek canon of v i r t u e s . We 
s h a l l s t a r t our a n a l y s i s w i t h a discussion of the Deca-
logue and i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s . 
The Ten Commandments may be summarised as fo l l o v ; s : 
(1) Thou s h a l t have none other gods but Me. 
(2) Thou s h a l t not make t o t h y s e l f any graven image. 
(3) Thou s h a l t not take the Name of the Lord thy, God 
i n v a i n , 
(4) Remember the Sabbath Day t o keep i t holy, 
(5) Honour t h y f a t h e r and t h y mother. 
Mcf'herson, op. c i t . , p, 53. 
2 I b i d . , p. 53« 
See summary b;^  , ___ , . 
(Church Book Room Press L t d . , London,'1955T7^« 79. 
5 
^See summary by W. H. G r i f f i t h Thomas, The Catholic i''aith 
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(6) 'Iliou s h a l t do no murder. 
(7) 'ihou Shalt not commit a d u l t e r y . 
(8) Thou s h a l t not s t e a l . 
(9) ,Thou s h a l t not bear f a l s e witness. 
(10) Thou s h a l t not covet. 
These Commandments, i t i s easy t o see, are r a t h e r 
elementary d u t i e s , simple and d i r e c t i n t h e i r presenta-
t i o n , o r i g i n a l l y given t o the Jewish community at a very 
e a r l y stage of c i v i l i s a t i o n . Since t h e i r adoption by 
C h r i s t i a n i t y , they have g r a d u a l l y been " C h r i s t i a n i s e d " t o 
take account of the l a t e r r e v e l a t i o n , and have been f r e -
quently i n t e r p r e t e d t o include a more extensive and p o s i -
t i v e range of p r i n c i p l e s . I n the words of H a l l and Hallock, 
The p r o v i s i o n s of the older (Old Testament) are 
r i g h t l y c r i t i c i z e d as l a r g e l y negative and ex-
t e r n a l , r e g u l a t i n g outward conduct; but C h r i s t -
i a n i z e d they stand f o r p o s i t i v e p r i n c i p l e s r e -
g u l a t i n g thought as w e l l as word and a c t . l 
To give oust one i l l u s t r a t i o n of the extension of the 
scope of these Commandments as a r e s u l t of t h e i r " C h r i s t -
i a n i s a t i o n , " the f i f t h Commandment i s i n t e r p r e t e d t o i n -
clude not only honour and obedience t o one's parents but 
also "obedience t o a l l d i v i n e l y sanctioned a u t h o r i t y , 
whether i n v o l v e d i n p r o v i d e n t i a l circumstances at large or 
based upon s p e c i f i c d i v i n e appointments. Speaking broadly. 
"^Hall and Hallock, op. c i t . , pp. lOJf. 
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i t s sphere i s t h r e e f o l d : the f a m i l y , the Church and the 
State. Whether or not, and t o what extent, the State 
can be regarded as a " d i v i n e l y sanctioned a u t h o r i t y " i s 
arguable i n modern circumstances. -But t h a t i s beside the 
p o i n t . The above opinion does serve as an instance of the 
r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and the consequent broadening of the 33ope 
of the Decalogue. 
The Decalogue i s gene r a l l y d i v i d e d i n t o two t a b l e s , 
concerned r e s p e c t i v e l y w i t h d u t i e s t o God and du t i e s t o 
man. Usually the f i r s t f o u r Commandments are regarded as 
forming the f i r s t table. But i n some d i v i s i o n s even the 
2 
f i f t h i s included i n the f i r s t t a b l e , whereas i n some 
other d i v i s i o n s only the f i r s t three are included i n the 
f i r s t t a b l e . This i s , however, a question of d e t a i l which 
may not be rele v a n t f o r our purposes. What i s unques-
t i o n a b l e i s t h a t every account regards the Decalogue as 
forming e i t h e r the whole or p a r t of the content of the 
moral law. V/e have seen i n the previous chapter t h a t St. 
Thomas, a f t e r l a y i n g down the general r u l e f o r moral ac-
t i o n s , goes on t o assert t h a t the d e r i v a t i v e s or p a r t i c u -
l a r norms of m o r a l i t y are " i d e n t i c a l w i t h the Decalogue, 
or Ten Commandments." I n c i d e n t a l l y , St. Thomas i s one 
•^ I b i d . , pp. 112f. 
^ I b i d . , p. 104. 
Rommen, op. c i t . , p. 51. 
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of those who draws the l i n e between the f i r s t and second 
t a b l e s a f t e r the t h i r d Commandment. 
I t can be e a s i l y seen t h a t the f i r s t f o u r of these 
Commandments r e l a t e s p e c i f i c a l l y t o forms of b e l i e f and 
worship, and t o t h a t extent do not have any d i r e c t bear-
i n g on e t h i c s , though, as we s a i d i n the I n t r o d u c t i o n , i t 
i s p o s s i b l e t o argue t h a t i n a system of r e l i g i o u s e t h i c s 
proper worship i s as much p a r t of good conduct as anything 
else. The f i f t h Commandment, i n t e r p r e t e d as obedience t o 
d i v i n e l y sanctioned a u t h o r i t y , i s only a s p e c i a l a p p l i c a t i o n 
of obedience t o God as the primary oblip^ation. The l a s t 
f i v e are p r o h i b i t i o n s which enj o i n r e f r a i n i n g from murder, 
a d u l t e r y , s t e a l i n g , f a l s e witness and covetousness. These 
negative i n j u n c t i p n s , when formulated i n p o s i t i v e terms, 
lead t o the v i r t u e s of r e s p e c t . f o r l i f e , honour and pro-
pei-ty, v e r a c i t y and contentment. Obviously, these are 
u n i v e r s a l l y recognised v i r t u e s p r a c t i s e d i n every c i v i l i s e d 
s o c i e t y or community. 
The Ten Commandmients, amongst much else, formed 
the background against which the l i f e and character of 
Jesus h i m s e l f took shape. This v/as, however, only the 
o u t l i n e t o which Jesus added a richness of content drawn 
p a r t l y from the Jewish prophetic t r a d i t i o n but l a r g e l y from 
h i s own i n s i g h t and genius. The s p e c i a l v i r t u e s which r e -
ceive p o i n t e d emphasis i n the teachings of Jesus appear 
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t o be s i m p l i c i t y , meekness or h u m i l i t y , patience, f o r -
giveness and s u f f e r i n g . The Sermon on the Mount, f r e -
q uently h a i l e d as the cream of Jesus' teaching, bears 
testimony t o the new emphasis on these q u a l i t i e s . I t i s 
here t h a t the "meek" and the " m e r c i f u l , " and the "pure i n 
h e a r t " are declared t o be "blessed," thus g i v i n g these 
q u a l i t i e s a new s a n c t i t y . The emphasis on love, even i n 
r e t u r n f o r hate, and the advice to t u r n the other cheek 
receive approbation f o r the f i r s t time i n the Judaeo-
G h r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n . St. Paul i s only repeating w i t h a 
renewed s t r e s s t h i s genuine teaching of Jesus when he t a l k s 
of the " f r u i t of the S p i r i t . " Enumerating these " f r u i t s 
of the S p i r i t , " as opposed t o the "works of the f l e s h , " St. 
Paul says t h a t these are "love, ^oj, peace, l o n g s u f f e r i n g , 
gentleness, goodness, f a i t h , meekness, temperance,""^ and 
adds s i g n i f i c a n t l y t h a t "they t h a t are C h r i s t ' s have 
2 
c r u c i f i e d the f l e s h w i t h the a f f e c t i o n s and l u s t s . " This 
c r u c i f i x i o n of the f l e s h , i n c i d e n t a l l y , gives an i n d i c a -
t i o n of the ascetic character of e a r l y C h r i s t i a n teaching 
and the sharp.opposition between the " f l e s h " and the 





Stephen N e i l l mentions these q u a l i t i e s as love, 
j o y , peace, patience, kindness, goodness, f a i t h f u l n e s s , 
gentleness and s e l f - c o n t r o l ; he remarks t h a t "This i s 
not meant t o be a complete l i s t of a l l the possible 
C h r i s t i a n v i r t u e s ; i t t e l l s us the k i n d of people t h a t 
we ought t o be. I n f a c t t h i s may be taken as a b r i e f 
sketch of what Jesus C h r i s t was l i k e , T h e l a s t sent-
ence makes i t abundantly c l e a r t h a t the primary norm, of 
course, i s i m i t a t i o Christi« The model i s Jesus C h r i s t , 
and a C h r i s t i a n would be expected t o c u l t i v a t e a l l the 
v i r t u e s t h a t C h r i s t demonstrated i n h i s own l i f e . I t may 
be remarked t h a t t h i s f a c t o r t h a t the C h r i s t i a n can a l -
ways look t o the personal l i f e of the one Ch r i s t as a mod-
e l and thereby derive h i s p a r t i c u l a r v i r t u e s gives a great 
t h e o r e t i c a l advantage t o the C h r i s t i a n over, f o r example, 
a Hindu who cannot claim a h i s t o r i c a l person as the found-
er of h i s f a i t h . But a t h e o r e t i c a l advantage need not a l -
ways lead t o a p r a c t i c a l advantage, e s p e c i a l l y i f there 
are c o u n t e r a c t i n g f a c t o r s present. 
We must r e t u r n from t h i s d i g r e s s i o n , however, and 
continue our account of the nine q u a l i t i e s l i s t e d by St. 
Paul, According t o W e i l l , 
•^Stephen N e i l l , The C h r i s t i a n Character (World C h r i s t i a n 
Books, No. 6, 195677^^"!^^^™"' 
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These nine q u a l i t i e s f a l l roughly i n t o three groups, 
corresponding, but i n the opposite order, t o the 
three words, 'soberly and r i g h t e o u s l y and godly' 
i n T i t u s 2:12: 
i n r e l a t i o n t o God: love, j o y , peace; 
i n r e l a t i o n t o other men: patience, k i n d -
ness, goodness; 
i n r e l a t i o n t o ourselves: f a i t h f u l n e s s , 
gentleness, s e l f - c o n t r o l . ^ 
He goes on t o add. 
I t i s important t o note t h a t St. Paul speaks of 
these nine v i r t u e s as 'the f r u i t of the S p i r i t . ' 
The S p i r i t i s . one, and I am one. I am c a l l e d t o 
be obedient t o God i n a l l t h i n g s . I f by His help 
I am obedient t o Him i n one respect, I s h a l l be-
come i n a l l t h i n g s more l i k e C h r i s t , and i n a l l 
respects my character w i l l begin t o show t h a t 
likeness.2 
The l a s t sentence demonstrates unequivocally the o v e r a l l 
emphasis on the primary v i r t u e of obedience t o God, which 
being t h e r e , the r e s t are expected t o f o l l o w as necessary 
consequences. Though we have d e a l t w i t h t h i s aspect i n , 
a previous chapter, we may once more repeat t h a t t h i s ex-
cessive s t r e s s on obedience only tends t o d e t r a c t from the 
value o f the p a r t i c u l a r v i r t u e s r e f e r r e d t o e a r l i e r . I f 
a l l other v i r t u e s a u t o m a t i c a l l y issue out of obedience, 
there i s always the r i s k of m i s i n t e r p r e t i n g i t as an ex-
"''Ibid., p. 16. 
p 
" I b i d . , p. 16. 
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h o r t a t i o n t o suspend p r a c t i c e of those v i r t u e s , and r e l y 
s o l e l y on the v i r t u e of obedience. But we have seen 
t h a t sheer obedience, even i f i t were a v i r t u e , can lead 
t o consequences of very d o u b t f u l moral q u a l i t y . 
A few words about the p r i n c i p l e of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
adopted above may not be out of place. The v i r t u e s have 
been c l a s s i f i e d as those " i n r e l a t i o n t o God," those 
" i n r e l a t i o n t o other men," and those " i n r e l a t i o n t o 
ourselves." One may not be q u i t e sure of what " i n r e l a -
t i o n t o " e x a c t l y means, but i t appears t h a t i t may s i g n i f y 
only the d i r e c t i o n of the v i r t u e s , t h a t i s , whether the 
v i r t u e s are d i r e c t e d p r i m a r i l y towards God or towards 
other men or towards one's own s e l f . I f ; t h i s i s what i s 
meant, then love, j o y and peace, f o r example, v;ould be 
the v i r t u e s t h a t we are t o p r a c t i s e or demonstrate i n 
r e l a t i o n t o God, On t h i s assumption i t may be said t h a t 
the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n does not seem t o be very s c i e n t i f i c , 
nor perhaps v/as i t meant t o be. What we mean i s t h a t some 
of the q u a l i t i e s l i s t e d under one head could w i t h equal 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n , i f not more, be placed under another head. 
To take j u s t one example, the v i r t u e of f a i t h f u l n e s s , i f 
seems, could be more a p t l y placed under e i t h e r of the 
f i r s t two heads i n s t e a d of i n the t h i r d . .i:''or t h i s i s a 
v i r t u e which can be demonstrated only i n r e l a t i o n t o 
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e i t h e r God or our neighbour r a t h e r than t o ourselves, 
unless f a i t h f u l n e s s connotes having f a i t h i n ourselves 
i n the sense of self-confidence.' There i s a sense i n 
which we can be said t o be f a i t h f u l or f a i t h l e s s t o our-
selves: f o r example, we can be said t o be f a i t h f u l t o 
our conscience or c o n v i c t i o n s . This i s undoubtedly an 
important aspect of the meaning of t h i s term, but v/e may 
s t i l l i n s i s t t h a t the primary meaning of f a i t h covers the 
f i e l d of our r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h someone else. 
We s h a l l , however, leave the matter there, f o r 
volumes have been w r i t t e n on the exact connotation of 
the p a r t i c u l a r v i r t u e s and on why any of them should be-
lo n g t o one class of v i r t u e s r a t h e r than another. We do 
not i n t e n d t o , nor can we a f f o r d t o , l e t ourselves be i n -
volved i n the discussion of a l l these d e t a i l s . To r e t u r n 
t o the subject of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n f o r a w h i l e , we f i n d y e t 
another p r i n c i p l e sometimes adopted, namely, on the basis 
of the various f a c u l t i e s which are p r i m a r i l y i n v o l v e d i n 
th e exercise of these v i r t u e s or d u t i e s . According t o 
t h i s p r i n c i p l e , the Ten Cormnandments, f o r example, are 
d i v i d e d on the basis of whether any one of tnem i s t o be 
observed i n thoug;ht or i n speech or i n deed or i n a com-
b i n a t i o n of two or more of these. G r i f f i t h Thomas, f o r 
example, adopts t h i s p r i n c i p l e i n The C a t h o l i c _ g a i i A 
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A f t e r broadly d i v i d i n g the Ten Commandments i n t o two 
equal p a r t s , v i z . , Duty t o God and Duty t o our Neighbor, 
he goes on t o suggest t h a t the f i r s t two Commandments are 
t o be observed i n thought, the t h i r d i n word and speech, 
the f o u r t h and f i f t h i n deeds, as also the s i x t h , seventh 
and e i g h t h , while the n i n t h and t e n t h are t o be observed 
i n both words and thoughts,"^ Even a casual examination 
reveals the many overlappings i n t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , but 
we s h a l l not d i l a t e on t h a t . What we want t o take note of 
i s t h a t so f a r we have come across two p r i n c i p l e s of 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of v i r t u e s and d u t i e s : (1) according t o 
the o b j e c t t o which response i s t o be made, and (2) accord-
i n g t o the f a c u l t i e s t o which these d u t i e s and v i r t u e s 
belong gene:r:ally. 
We must now pass on t o the consideration of the 
seven fundamental C h r i s t i a n v i r t u e s — t h r e e " t h e o l o g i c a l " 
and the f o u r " c a r d i n a l , " We have already seen t h a t i n 
terms of v i r t u e s i t i s these seven which are regarded as 
absolute C h r i s t i a n v i r t u e s , f o r a l l the r e s t of the v i r -
tues are considered r e d u c i b l e t o these seven. To remind 
ourselves of p a r t of our anal y s i s i n the second chapter, 
we have n o t i c e d t h a t t o the ge n e r a l l y f a m i l i a r and recog-
nised v i r t u e s of love, f a i t h and hope i n the O'udaeo-
•' ' G r i f f i t h Thomas, op. c i t . , p. 79, 
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C h r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n were l a t e r added the Greek v i r t u e s 
of wisdom, temperance, f o r t i t u d e and j u s t i c e . C a l l i n g 
them Greek v i r t u e s i s only a vaj of saying t h a t i t was 
the Greeks who f i r s t formulated them and l a i d s t r e s s on 
them. I n f a c t , however, these could be regarded as u n i -
v e r s a l v i r t u e s . But we have seen t h a t the e t h i c of s e l f -
achievement u n d e r l y i n g these v i r t u e s l a t e r came i n t o con-
f l i c t v/ith the e t h i c of s e l f - s u r r e n d e r preached by 
C h r i s t i a n i t y . But since the r a t i o n a l appeal of these v i r -
tues was tremendous, there developed a tendency t o syn-
t h e s i s e the two canons of v i r t u e s . 
The best known expedient devised t o b r i n g about 
the synthesis of the two canons of v i r t u e s was t o t r e a t 
a l l these seven v i r t u e s as C h r i s t i a n v i r t u e s . The seven 
were d i v i d e d i n t o two c l a s s e s - — ( l ) c a r d i n a l or e a r t h l y 
v i r t u e s p e r t a i n i n g t o the n a t u r a l order and e a r t h l y r e -
l a t i o n s , and (2) t h e o l o g i c a l or heavenly v i r t u e s per-
t a i n i n g t o "the supernatural order" and d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d 
t o "the attainment of the summum bo num. ""^  The c a r d i n a l 
v i r t u e s , as v/e know, are wisdom or prudence, temperance, 
f o r t i t u d e or courage and j u s t i c e , and the t h e o l o g i c a l ones 
f a i t h , hope and love. Of the four c a r d i n a l v i r t u e s , wis-
dom i s supposed t o be seated i n the i n t e l l e c t , temperance 
•^Hall and Hallock, op. c i t . , p. 90. 
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and f o r t i t u d e i n the emotions, and j u s t i c e i n the w i l l . 
The remarkable f e a t u r e , however, i s t h a t the t h e o l o g i c a l 
v i r t u e s are suppiosed t o 
supplement and t r a n s f i g u r e the c a r d i n a l vix'tues, 
g i v i n g them a p e r t i n e n t r e l a t i o n t o the a t t a i n -
ment of the summum bonum which i s otherwise 
l a c k i n g ; t h a t i s , the c a r d i n a l v i r t u e s are made 
t o serve supernatural purposes. F a i t h elevates 
wisdom, hope elevates j u s t i c e , and c h a r i t y e l e -
vates temperance and f o r t i t u d e ; but i n a complex 
i n t e r a c t i o n and mutual dependence.! 
What e x a c t l y i s meant by t h i s " t r a n s f i g u r a t i o n " or 
" e l e v a t i o n " i s d i f f i c u l t t o understand, and t h e r e f o r e , we 
s h a l l reserve our comments. We may, however, remark i n 
passing t h a t t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between c a r d i n a l and the-
o l o g i c a l v i r t u e s was i t s e l f perhaps derived from the 
Greek d i s t i n c t i o n between e t h i c a l and dianoetic v i r t u e s . 
St, Thomas d i s t i n g u i s h e s between moral v i r t u e s 
and i n t e l l e c t u a l v i r t u e s . The former are the vii'tues 
l e a d i n g t o the r a t i o n a l i s i n g of desire or a p p e t i t e i t s e l f , 
whereas the l a t t e r lead t o the knov/ledge of proper means 
and ends. The two c l e a r l y must supplement each other. To 
make the d i s t i n c t i o n between moral and i n t e l l e c t u a l v i r -
tues a b i t c l e a r e r , the v i r t u e s which help t o ^ udge 
p r o p e r l y the worth of acti o n s and t h e i r ends as i v e l l as 
• ^ i b i d . , p, 91. 
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the r i g h t means w i l l be c a l l e d i n t e l l e c t u a l v i r t u e s . 
These, i t may be no t i c e d , are reminiscent of Socratic 
v i r t u e s . Moral v i r t u e s , on the other hand, r e l a t e t o our 
v o l i t i o n , the possession of which makes i t n a t u r a l f o r 
man t o w i l l what i s considered good by the reason. 
The c h i e f i n t e l l e c t u a l v i r t u e s are i n t e l l i g e n c e , 
knowledge, wisdom and prudence. Of these the f i r s t three 
are p u r e l y i n t e l l e c t u a l and are u l t i m a t e l y subsumed under 
wisdom. I n t e l l i g e n c e i s the v i r t u e which " f i t s the i n -
t e l l e c t f o r the knowledge of d i r e c t l y evident t r u t h s or 
principles""''.; knowledge i s a v i r t u e "enabling reason t o 
judge sanely of a c e r t a i n order of knowables"'^, and admits 
of various degrees and kin d s ; wisdom, however, being the 
highest conclusions concerning the "ultimate causes," must 
be only one. But these v i r t u e s only help t o know the end. 
I t i s not, however, "enough f o r man merely t o t h i n k , he 
must also l i v e and l i v e r i g h t l y . " Hence the need t o f i n d 
out the proper means as w e l l . So we need an i n t e l l e c t u a l 
v i r t u e "which enables reason t o a r r i v e a t a s u i t a b l e de-
t e r m i n a t i o n of means le a d i n g t o the end i n view: t h i s 
v i r t u e i s prudence, r e c t a r a t i o a g i b i l i u m ; and t h i s i s a 
•^Gilson, op. c i t . , p. 252. 
^ I b i d . , p. 252. 
^ I b i d . , p. 255. 
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v i r t u e necessary f o r l i v i n g r i g h t l y . ""^  The p u r e l y moral 
v i r t u e s , of course, are j u s t i c e , temperance and f o r t i -
tude: "These three moral v i r t i i e s together w i t h the one 
i n t e l l e c t u a l v i r t u e of prudence, are u s u a l l y described 
as ' p r i n c i p a l ' or ' c a r d i n a l ' v i r t u e s , f o r they alone imply 
both the f a c u l t y of a c t i n g r i g h t l y and the performance of 
the good act i t s e l f , and consequently they r e a l i s e by 
themselves p e r f e c t l y the d e f i n i t i o n of v i r t u e , " 
Before passing on t o the consideration of Hindu 
v i r t u e s , we ought t o draw p o i n t e d a t t e n t i o n t o the f a c t 
t h a t i n the realm of v i r t u e s C h r i s t i a n theologians main-
t a i n a d e f i n i t e g r a d a t i o n , some v i r t u e s being regarded as 
e a r t h l y (the c a r d i n a l ones) whereas others (the t h e o l o g i c a l 
ones) are regarded as supernatural or s p i r i t u a l , the l a t t e r 
obviously being considered primary. For, as we have seen, 
i t i s the l a t t e r which impart t r u e s i g n i f i d a n c e t o the 
former. Given f a i t h , hope and love, the other v i r t u e s 
are supposed t o f o l l o w a u t o m a t i c a l l y , f o r they are f r u i t s 
of the s p i r i t , St, Augustine's attempt t o demonstrate 
t h a t a l l v i r t u e s are forms of love i n f a c t makes love the 
primary v i r t u e , i f not the only one. The excessive stress 
on the duty of obedience t o God, s i m i l a r l y , tends t o imply 
• ^ I b i d , , pp. 253f, 
^ I b i d . , p. 254. 
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t h a t a l l the d e s i r a b l e v i r t u e s can issue f o r t h from the 
mere w i l l t o obey. The e a r t h l y v i r t u e s , anyway, would 
appear t o be worth c u l t i v a t i o n only i n s o f a r as "ftiey are 
supposed t o pave the way f o i * the attainment of the summum 
bonum, t h a t i s , l i b e r a t i o n or redemption. I t would not 
be u n f a i r t o say t h a t on t h i s reading the e a r t h l y v i r t u e s 
do not appear t o have any i n t r i n s i c worth or excellence, 
or at l e a s t not the same as belongs t o the t h e o l o g i c a l 
ones. This only stresses the f a c t t h a t i n any system of 
r e l i g i o u s e t h i c s r e l i g i o u s p i e t y u l t i m a t e l y tends t o take 
precedence over e t h i c a l values, and C h r i s t i a n i t y i s no 
exception t o t h i s r u l e . 
(b) Hinduism 
I f we remember the remark t h a t we j u s t made about 
the r e l a t i o n between r e l i g i o u s p i e t y and e t h i c a l values, 
i t w i l l be i n f i n i t e l y easier f o r us t o understand the 
f a l l a c y u n d e r l y i n g some i l l - f o u n d e d but popular miscon-
ceptions about Hindu e t h i c s . The most widely prevalent 
and p e r s i s t e n t of these i s t h a t the Hindu i s so much ob-
sessed v/ith the desire f o r release or Mokga t h a t he seldom, 
i f a t a l l , appreciates the need f o r e t h i c a l values or con-
duct. This c r i t i c i s m assumes a greater poignancy and 
relevance w i t h respect t o the philosophy of the Vedanta. 
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I t i s argued t h a t these schools of thought regard merger 
w i t h the Absolute as the u l t i m a t e goal f o r human beings, 
hence nothing else matters t o them. The s t a t e of Moksa 
not only transcends the t r u l y e t h i c a l l i f e but i t i n f a c t 
also denies i t . But t h i s on c o r r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s as 
much t r u e of C h r i s t i a n i t y as of Hinduism. There i s no 
denying the f a c t t h a t t he u l t i m a t e r e l i g i o u s goal does 
transcend e a r t h l y e t h i c a l values. We have already seen 
i n an e a r l i e r chapter t h a t where the u l t i m a t e r e l i g i o u s 
d e s t i n y i s redemption, e t h i c a l l i f e can at best be regarded 
as a pr e p a r a t i o n f o r i t . I f t i i s means t h a t the r e l i g i o n 
i n question does not have an e t h i c s , then C h r i s t i a n i t y 
must be equa l l y subject t o t h i s charge, Vi/e have seen 
t h a t i n C h r i s t i a n i t y t h e r e i s the conception of c a r d i n a l 
v i r t u e s being "made t o serve supernatural purposes," I n 
the same way, i n Hinduism Dharma i s made t o serve s p i r i t -
u a l purposes, i . e . , the attainment of Moksa. 
The other misunderstanding of a s i m i l a r import, 
but from a d i f f e r e n t angle, issues from the m i s i n t e r p r e -
t a t i o n of c e r t a i n s c r i p t u r a l passages which lend them-
selves t o antinomian d i s t o r t i o n s . This again, i s no 
monopoly of Hinduism, f o r C h r i s t i a n i t y has s u f f e r e d im-
measurably from such d i s t o r t i o n s . I n the words of Hop-
k i n s , a " r e s u l t of misunderstanding r a t h e r than of i n t e l l i -
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gent i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " i s the reading of antinornian sug-
gestions i n some Hindu s c r i p t u r a l utterances such as: 
"Sin does not c l i n g t o a v/ise man more than water c l i n g s 
t o a l o t u s - l e a f . " This " i s not to declare," he says, 
" t h a t the sage may s i n and be f r e e , but t h a t one f r e e from 
w o r l d l y attachments sheds s i n , i s not attached t o i t . . . . " " * " 
A perusal of some r e p r e s e n t a t i v e passages from the e a r l i -
est of the s c r i p t u r e s w i l l d r i v e home how, i n s p i t e of 
accepting Moksa as the highest d.estiny f o r man, e t h i c a l 
values and conduct were emphasised as the a b s o l u t e l y 
e s s e n t i a l p r e p a r a t i o n f o r the former. 
The Rga Veda declares, "Whether i n heaven or on 
e a r t h , l e t t r u t h be my guide" ; "Mighty LordI Prompt even 
a miser t o p r a c t i s e c h a r i t y , l e t him be k i n d i n d i s p o s i -
t i o n . " - ^ The Atharva Veda s t r i k e s a t y p i c a l l y e t h i c a l 
note: "We have conquered e v i l and gained v i r t u e . VJe are 
then t o be f r e e from s i n . " The same s p i r i t i s found i n 
some of the hymns of the Yagurveda: "Direct our energies 
i n the path of righteousness (Agnenaya Supatharaye 
Asrnsin)"^; "Good a c t i o n s alone l i v e f o r a hundred year's. 
There can be no b e t t e r path than t h i s . Let your actions, 
"^E. W. Hopkins, op. c i t . , p. 66. 
2'5Rga Veda, X,$7,2; VI,55,5. 
5-. 
^'"Atharva Veda, XVI,6,1. 
laourveda, 5,56. 
however, not t a i n t your soul ( o r produce attachment t o 
the consequences).""'' Or consider these Upanisadic hymns: 
The good and the pleasant approach a man, and the 
v/ise man d i s c r i m i n a t e s between them, choosing the 
b e t t e r , not the more pleasant; the f o o l through 
greed and avarice chooses the more pleasant, but 
w e l l f o r him who chooses the b e t t e r ; whoso f o r -
sakes the b e t t e r and chooses the more pleasant 
f a i l s of h i s aim.2 
Whosoever views a l l beings as h i s own soul ( A t -
maiva) f o r him there can be no delusion or misery; 
t h e r e f o r e , see a l l as one.5 
I t i s perhaps not necessary t o add t o these passages, f o r 
hundreds of these can be found scattered a l l through these 
s c r i p t u r e s . We s h a l l , t h e r e f o r e , close t h i s p r e l i m i n a r y 
explanation and proceed w i t h our analysis of the Hindu 
v i r t u e s and d u t i e s proper. 
Not perhaps an exhaustive or systematic l i s t of v i r -
tues or d u t i e s , but the t r u e s p i r i t of conduct expected 
of a good Hindu i s r e f l e c t e d i n the teacher's e x h o r t a t i o n 
t o the d e p a r t i n g students contained i n the T a i t t i r i y a 
Upanisad: 
Having taught the Veda, the teacher i n s t r u c t s 
the p u p i l . Speak the t r u t h . P r a c t i s e v i r t u e . 
"^lajurveda, V,40,2. 
2 
Kat^ha Upanisad, 1,2,2. 
•^Isa Upanigad, ?. 
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Let there be no neglect of your ( d a i l y ) reading. 
Having brought t o the teacher the wealth t h a t i s 
ple a s i n g ( t o him), do not cut o f f the thread of 
the o f f s p r i n g . Let there be no neglect of t r u t h . 
Let there be no neglect of v i r t u e . Let there be 
no neglect of welfare. Let there be no neglect 
of p r o s p e r i t y . Let there be no neglect of study 
and teaching. Let there be no neglect of the 
du t i e s t o the gods and the f a t h e r s . Be one t o 
whom the mother i s a god. Be,one t o whom the 
f a t h e r i s a god. Be one t o whom the teacher i s 
a god. Be one t o whom the guest i s a god. What-
ever deeds are blameless, they are t o be prac-
t i s e d , not others. Whatever good p r a c t i c e s there 
are among us, they are t o be adopted by you, not 
others. Whatever Brahmanas there are (who a r e | 
superior t o us, they should be comforted by yoii;: 
w i t h a seat. (What i s t o be given) i s t o be given 
'wi'bh f a i t h , should not be given without f a i t h , 
should be given i n p l e n t y , should be given w i t h 
modesty, should be given w i t h f e a r , should be 
given w i t h sympathy.... 1 This e x h o r t a t i o n t o p r a c t i s e t r u t h , v i r t u e , respect f o r 
and obedience t o el d e r s , welfare of others, f a i t h , modes-
t y or h u m i l i t y , f e a r and sympathy provides, we may say, 
the background against v/hich we can nov; undertake a more 
systematic account of Hindu v i r t u e s and du t i e s . 
Perhaps foremost amongst the l i s t s of v i r t u e s and 
du t i e s f o r Hindus comes what has been f r e q u e n t l y c a l l e d 
the Ten Commandments of Manu. Manu, l i k e almost a l l other 
w r i t e r s of Dharma ShSstras, d i v i d e s the duties of men 
under two heads: (1) d u t i e s r e l a t i v e t o one's s t a t i o n i n 
l i f e ( t he Varna-Asrama Dharma), and (2) general or common 
•'"Ojaittiriya Upanisad, 1,11,1-3 (eraphasis mine). 
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d u t i e s (Sadharana Dharma) which men, as men, are t o d i s -
chax^ 'ge i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r p o s i t i o n , s t a t i o n or stage i n 
l i f e . N a t u r a l l y the former k i n d of du t i e s w i l l vary accord-
i n g t o the Varna ( c l a s s ) and Asrama (stage) of i n d i v i d u a l s , 
the former themselves depending on the natures (Svajbhava) 
of the i n d i v i d u a l s , 'and t h e r e f o r e cannot be regarded as 
u n i v e r s a l d u t i e s . Since such duties are numerous and r e l a -
t i v e , we s h a l l be obl i g e d t o confine ourselves t o the con-
s i d e r a t i o n of only the common du t i e s . But i t may perhaps 
be i n t e r e s t i n g t o r e f e r b r i e f l y t o the du t i e s and q u a l i t i e s 
of the d i f f e r e n t Varnas l a i d down i n the Glta (Chapter 
X V I l l ) . The three consecutive verses which l i s t these run 
as f o l l o w s : 
S e c u r i t y , s e l f - c o n t r o l , a u s t e r i t y , p u r i t y , 
forbearance, and uprightness, wisdom, knowledge 
and f a i t h i n r e l i g i o n , these are the dut i e s of 
the Brahmin, born of h i s nature (Svabhavajam). 
~ X V I 1 I , 4 2 . 
H^eroism, vigour, steadiness, resourcefulness, 
not f l e e i n g even i n a b a t t l e , generosity and 
leadership, these are the du t i e s of a K s a t r i y a 
born of h i s nature.—•XVI11,45. 
A g r i c u l t u r e , t ending c a t t l e and trade are 
the d u t i e s of a Vaisya born of h i s nature; work 
pf the character of service i s the duty of a 
Sudra born of h i s n a t u r e . — X V I I I , 4 4 . 
To r e t u r n t o the common d u t i e s , however, these are ten i n 
number according t o Manu: 
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(1) Dhairya or D h r t i (patience or stead-
f a s t n e s s ) " 
*^ 2) Ksama ( f o r g i v e n e s s ) 
(3) Pama ( a p p l i c a t i o n ) 
As;.b_eya (non-appropriation or non-
s t e a l i n g ) 
(5) Sauca ( c l e a n l i n e s s or p u r i t y ) 
(6) I n d r i y a Nigraha ( r e s t r a i n t of the organs 
of sense) 
(7) Dhi (wisdom) 
^^ -^  ( l e a r n i n g or knowledge of the 
sacred t e x t s ) 
^9) Satya ( v e r a c i t y ) 
^^^^ Akrodha (freedom from anger) 
I t w i l l be seen t h a t a l l these d u t i e s i n f a c t are v i r t u e s , 
and t h i s lends support t o our e a r l i e r t h e s i s about the 
d i f f i c u l t y of separating d u t i e s from v i r t u e s i n the con-
t e x t of a r e l i g i o u s e t h i c s . These ten, are, however, 
u l t i m a t e l y reduced t o f i v e i n t h e i r short form (Samasikam. 
Dharmam): non-ingury (Ahimsa), v e r a c i t y (Sat2.a), honesty 
or n o n - s t e a l i n g (Asteg;a), c l e a n l i n e s s (Sauca) and r e s t r a i n t 
of senses ( I n d r i y a Nigraha). Yajnavalkya s u b s t i t u t e s 
celebacy (Brahmacarya) and non-attachment (Aparigraha) f o r 
Sauca and I n d r i y a Nigraha. These f i v e are regarded as 
"'•Manu X,63. 
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u n i v e r s a l i n j u n c t i o n s w i t h the a d d i t i o n "generosity, s e l f -
c o n t r o l , sympathy and patience.""^ These f i v e apparently 
negative v i r t u e s , namely, AhimsB, Satya, Aste^^, Brahma-
carya and Aparigraha are perhaps the best known and most 
widely preached i n the Indian t r a d i t i o n . The f i v e lamas 
(forms of s e l f - r e s t r a i n t ) of L a t a n j a l i , the l^nca Maha-
yr a t a (the f i v e great vows) of the Jainas and the Lanea 
S I l a of the Buddhists a l l emphasise the same q u a l i t i e s , 
though the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the content of these i n j u n c -
t i o n s are q u i t e o f t e n of a very p o s i t i v e nature. Vi/e s h a l l , 
however, come t o t h i s p o i n t l a t e r . 
Prashastapada's l i s t of these u n i v e r s a l or common 
d u t i e s , though mainly incorpoi'ating a l l the d u t i e s l i s t e d 
by Manu and Yajnavalkya, contains some new a d d i t i o n s , so 
t h a t , on the whole, h i s seems t o be perhaps a more s o c i a l l y 
o r i e n t e d account of v i r t u e s than t h a t of Manu where the 
emphasis c l e a r l y seems t o be on self-autonomy. The generic 
Samanya d u t i e s , according t o Prashastapada, are these: 
•^^ ^ Sradha or Manahprasada (moral earnestness 
or regard f o r PharmaJ 
(2) Ahifflsl ( n o n - i n j u r y ) 
(5) B h utahitatva (seeking the good of crea-
turesT™ 
1 Hopkins, op. c i t . , p. 116. 
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Satjavacana ( v e r a c i t y ) 
^^ 5) Asteya (honesty or non-stealing) 
Brahmacarya (celebacy or freedom from 
passion") * 
^7) Anupadha ( s i n c e r i t y or p u r i t y of motive) 
(8) Krodhavar.jana ( r e s t r a i n t of anger) 
^9) Abhisecana etc. (personal c l e a n l i n e s s ) 
(10) Sucidravyaseyana (non-eating of impure 
foodT"' 
(11) Visista-Devata-Bhakti (devotion t o the 
recognised d e i t y ) 
^12) Upavasa ( f a s t i n g on s p e c i f i e d occasions) 
-^'-5) Apramada (moral watchfulness)"'' 
I t w i l l be seen t h a t Prashastapada adds t o Manu's 
l i s t of d u t i e s moral earnestness, n o n - i n j u r y , p^oodwill t o 
creatures and moral watchfulness, while he drops from 
Manu's l i s t forgiveness, a p p l i c a t i o n , wisdom and l e a r n i n g . 
Of the q u a l i t i e s t h a t Prashastapada adds t o the l i s t of 
Manu the most s i g n i f i c a n t i s perhaps the one of Bhutahi-
t a t v a , or seeking the good of creatures, which, as we 
sa i d , gives h i s l i s t a more s o c i a l o r i e n t a t i o n . Non-injury 
may not be regarded as q u i t e an a d d i t i o n since, as we saw, 
t h i s occurs i n the "compressed" l i s t of Manu. Moral 
watchfulness and moral earnestness i n place of wisdom and 
"'"Listing based on Maitra, op. c i t . , p. 10 (some t r a n s -
l a t i o n s mine). 
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l e a r n i n g are, as Maitra says, " s i g n i f i c a n t as emphasising 
the e t h i c a l i n place of the di a n o e t i c v i r t u e s and thus 
teaching a n o n - i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t i c view of m o r a l i t y as d i s -
t i n g u i s h e d from the i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m of Samkhya and Sham-
kara-Vedanta." I t should also be noticed t h a t some of 
the d u t i e s l i s t e d above are pure d u t i e s only, and can hard-
l y be regarded as v i r t u e s i n a proper sense, f o r example, 
the d u t i e s of f a s t i n g , c l e a n l i n e s s and non-eating of im-
pure foods. 
Keeping St. Thomas/' d i s t i n c t i o n between i n t e l l e c t -
u a l and moral v i r t u e s , i t may be said t h a t the only 
p r o p e r l y i n t e l l e c t u a l v i r t u e s preached by Manu are wisdom 
and knowledge (Vidya), whereas there are hardly any 
s t r i c t l y i n t e l l e c t u a l v i r t u e s l i s t e d by Prashastapada. 
The whole range of v i r t u e s o c c u r r i n g i n the l i s t s of a l l 
the t h r e e sources discussed so f a r are, t h e r e f o r e , a mix-
t u r e of i n t e l l e c t u a l and e t h i c a l v i r t u e s (though no such 
d i s t i n c t i o n has been maintained by the authors of the l i s t s 
themselves), w i t h the emphasis s h i f t i n g from the former t o 
the l a t t e r as we pass from Manu to Prashastapada. Patan-
j a l i ' s l i s t of Yamas and I'^iyamas, which has q u i t e o f t e n 
been accepted as another l i s t of Hindu v i r t u e s , not only 
adds the l a t t e r f i v e but also i n s i s t s on a s c r i b i n g a much 
"'"Maitra, op, c i t . , p. 16. 
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more p o s i t i v e content t o the i n j u n c t i o n s which we noticed 
while r e f e r r i n g t o Yajnavalkya. Thus the complete l i s t 
of d u t i e s l a i d down by P a t a n j a l i would be these: non-
i n j u r y , v e r a c i t y , non-stealing, freedom from passion and 
non-attachment—the f i v e Yamas; and c l e a n l i n e s s (Sauga), 
contentment (Santosa), arduous a p p l i c a t i o n and devotion 
(Tapas), r e c i t a t i o n of the S c r i p t u r e s (Svadhyaya) and 
m e d i t a t i o n on the g l o r i e s and p e r f e c t i o n s of the Lord 
( I s v a r a - p r a n i d h a n ) — t h e f i v e Niyamas. The Yamas may be 
c a l l e d the forms of s e l f - r e s t r a i n t and the Niyamas r u l e s 
of s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n . But the "forms of s e l f - r e s t r a i n t " 
a c t u a l l y become p o s i t i v e v i r t u e s when t h e i r connotation i s 
enlarged, as i s done by P a t a n j a l i . Por example, Ahimsa 
not only means r e f r a i n i n g from violence i n a merely nega-
t i v e way but also includes the p o s i t i v e s p i r i t of tender-
ness and g o o d w i l l t o a l l creatures i r r e s p e c t i v e of place 
and time. On t h i s reading Ahimsa i m p l i e s not only the 
resolve not t o k i l l or harm but also the a l t r u i s t i c en-
deavour t o seek the good of a l l creatures and may p o s s i b l y 
be the Hindu counterpart of the v i r t u e of love and k i n d -
ness on a much extended scale i n s o f a r as i t includes not 
only the neighbour but also a l l creatures as the objects 
of love. Thus we may say, i n the words of Maitra, t h a t 
P a t a n j a l i ' s conception may be regarded as "an attempt t o 
r e c o n c i l e the i d e a l of a r i g o r i s t i c autonomy of the s e l f 
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and freedom from d e s i r e v;ith t h a t of the a l t r u i s t i c seek-
i n g of the good of creatures through g o o d - w i l l and love. ""'' 
I t would seem from our analysis of Hindu v i r t u e s 
and d u t i e s so f a r t h a t d u t i e s t o others and t o God have 
not been sharply d i s t i n g u i s h e d from d u t i e s t o oneself, nor 
have they been d i v i d e d on the basis of f a c u l t i e s , though 
we s h a l l have occasion t o examine s h o r t l y one p a r t i c u l a r 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of v i r t u e s on the basis of the f a c u l t i e s 
t h a t are i n s t r u m e n t a l i n e x e r c i s i n g them. The reason f o r 
mentioning Bhutahitatva or the good of a l l creatures, f o r 
example, or the devotion t o God along w i t h other v i r t u e s 
which have the i n d i v i d u a l himself as t h e i r object primar-
i l y , might p o s s i b l y have been t h a t between duty t o God and 
others and duty t o oneself a d i s t i n c t i o n was perhaps con-
sidered unnecessary or a r t i f i c i a l . But the more important 
reason might be t h a t the aim of a l l these v i r t u e s , at l e a s t 
according t o the sources t h a t we have so f a r considered, 
was p r i m a r i l y self-autonomy, and t h e r e f o r e a l l the e f f o r t 
was mainly d i r e c t e d tov/ards developing a c e r t a i n k i n d of 
temperament f o r oneself which would a u t o m a t i c a l l y ensure 
the proper performance of d u t i e s t o other agencies such 
as one's neighbour or God. 
•'•Ibid., p. 225. 
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Vatsyayana, hov^ever, c l a s s i f i e s v i r t u e s accord-
i n g t o the f a c u l t i e s p r i m a r i l y i n v o lved i n the exercise 
of the v i r t u e concerned. According t o him, v i r t u e s may 
be e i t h e r r e l a t i n g t o the body ( v o l i t i o n a l ) or t o speech 
or t o thought. There are thus three kinds of v i r t u e s : ( l ) 
Kg[yika, i . e . , b o d i l y or v o l i t i o n a l , (2) Vajika, or those 
r e l a t i n g t o speech, and (3) Manasika., or those r e l a t i n g t o 
the mind or thought.. These three kinds of v i r t u e issue 
from good i n c l i n a t i o n s (pubha P r a v r t t i ) as against e v i l 
i n c l i n a t i o n s (Papatmika P r a v r t t i ) which lead t o Adharma 
or v i c e . Every v i r t u e , t h e r e f o r e , has a corresponding 
v i c e which i s l i s t e d alongside i t . These v i r t u e s and 
t h e i r corresponding vices are the following:''• 
V o l i t i o n a l 
or r e l a t i n g 
t o the body 
Dharma 
P a r i t r a n a (Suc-
couring the d i s -
tressed) 
2. Dana ( C h a r i t y 
or munificence) 
5• Parigaran 
( S o c i a l s e r v i c e ) 
Adharma 
!• Himsa ( C r u e l t y ) 
2- Ste2:a (Theft or 
a p p r o p r i a t i o n ) 
50 P r a t i s i d d h a Maithuna 
(Sexual i n d u l g e n c e j " " 
R e l a t i n g t o 
speech 
Satya ( V e r a c i t y ) 1. Mithya (Mendacity) 
2' Priyavacana 2. Parusa (Harshness) 
(Agreeableness of 
speech) 





5« Hitavagana (Bene- 3. Sueana (Scandal) 
f i c i a l speech) 
^' SvSdhyaya (Read- 4. Asambaddha (Gossip) 
i n g of Sc3?iptures) 
R e l a t i n g t o 
mind or 
thought 
1. Daya (Kindness, 
benevolence) 
1* Paradroha ( H o s t i l i t y ) 
2« AsEyha ( i n d i f f e r - 2. Paradravyabhipsa 
ence t o m a t e r i a l (CovetousnessT 
gains) 
5* Sraddha (Rever-
ence or p i e t y ) 
5* Nastikya ( I r r e v e r -
ence or i m p i e t y ) 
I n t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of v i r t u e s and the corres-
ponding vices there i s only one p a r t i c u l a r v i r t u e which 
does not seem t o have an exact correspondence w i t h i t s 
counterpart. I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see how sexual indulgence 
can be the opposite of the v i r t u e of s o c i a l service. But 
perhaps Maitra may be r i g h t i n commenting, " I t may be said, 
hoviever, t h a t Just as p a r i car an consists i n doing good t o 
s o c i e t y so pratisiddha-maithuna rends the s o c i a l f a b r i c 
by loosening the s o c i a l bonds and weakening the stock. ""'' 
I n any case, t h i s correspondence i s not our c h i e f concern. 
Looking at the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of v i r t u e s i t s e l f , we cannot 
f a i l t o n o t i c e t h a t Just l i k e i t s counterpart i n C h r i s t -
•'rbid., p. 218. 
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i a n i t y , t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s u f f e r s from overlapping, t h a t 
i s t o say, one or the other of v i r t u e s under one p a r t i c u l a r 
head may be e a s i l y t r a n s f e r r e d under another head without 
serious d i f f i c u l t y . One f e a t u r e of t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s 
remarkable, however; t h a t i s t h a t the eraphasis here seems 
t o have s h i f t e d almost e n t i r e l y t o other-regarding duties. 
Self-autonomy i s no longer the primary concern, f o r almost 
a l l the v i r t u e s l i s t e d here seem t o have a s o c i a l motiva-
t i o n . V i r t u e seems t o be regarded here as q u a l i t i e s which 
must be exercised i n respect of o t h e r s — e i t h e r the neigh-
bour or God. The v i r t u e which defines man's r e l a t i o n s h i p 
w i t h God i s Sraddha or p i e t y , which may be regarded as the 
counterpart of the t h e o l o g i c a l v i r t u e of f a i t h . 
But i t must be s a i d t h a t though p i e t y i s mentioned 
as a v i r t u e , as are Isyara-Prani(3-hana and Bhakti i n • the 
l i s t s of P a t a n j a l i and Prashastapada r e s p e c t i v e l y , none of 
the l i s t s mentioned so f a r could be said t o have a p r i m a r i l y 
t h e o l o g i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n . The v i r t u e s seem t o have been 
de r i v e d e i t h e r from the concept of self-autonomy or from 
the humanitarian concern f o r the well-being of soc i e t y . 
Hamanuja on the other hand, as we mentioned i n an e a r l i e r 
chapter, derives the v i r t u e s from h i s conception of God as 
the moral i d e a l . And since Ramanuja and the various devo-
t i o n a l schools i n f l u e n c e d by him undoubtedly represent the 
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popular form of Hinduism, we can never consider our ac-
count of Hindu v i r t u e s complete without mentioning h i s 
views on t h i s issue. As we said, Ramanuja conceives God 
as the moral i d e a l which e n t a i l s a s c r i p t i o n of c e r t a i n 
auspicious q u a l i t i e s t o Him. 
God as Bhagvana or Lord i s conceived as akhila-heya-
p r a t y a n i k a , i . e . , as a c t i v e l y c a n c e l l i n g or remov-
i n g a l l e v i l and i m p e r f e c t i o n of f i n i t e beings even 
as l i g h t cancels darkness. In t h i s consists the 
l i f e of God which i s a personal l i f e i n incessant 
and inseparable r e l a t i o n t o other persons.! 
This means t h a t a l l the auspicious q u a l i t i e s of God must 
a l l the time be d i r e c t e d towards removing the obstacles 
from the path of His creatures: as examples, His i n f i n i t e 
knovi?ledge i s a c t i v e i n d i s p e l l i n g the ignorance of His 
creatures, His might c o n s i s t s i n enabling creatures t o 
overcome t h e i r f r a i l t y and t o have the power t o eschew 
e v i l and a t t a i n the good. Wov;, meii as f i n i t e centres of 
d i v i n i t y can only help i n the r e a l i s a t i o n of the d i v i n e 
purpose by doing what God would do i n a given context. God 
and man are inseparable and so are t h e i r successes and 
f a i l u r e s ^ hence the c l e a r and unavoidable duty of man i s t o 
i m i t a t e , as f a r as l i e s w i t h i n h i s power, a l l these d i v i n e 
a t t r i b u t e s . This, we remarked e a r l i e r , i s very s i m i l a r t o 
the C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e of i m i t a t i o G h r i s t i . On t h i s i d e a l 
-'•Ibid., p. 22. 
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the v i r t u e s t h a t we must p r a c t i s e and the q u a l i t i e s t h a t 
we must manifest i n a given context become q u i t e c l e a r . 
We must give knowledge t o the ignorant so t h a t they can 
d i s c r i m i n a t e between good and e v i l (Gyanam Agyanam); we 
must f o r g i v e the g u i l t y (Ksama Saparadhanam); the weak 
deserve help t o overcome t h e i r moral f a i l u r e ( & a k t i Asak-
tanam);. we must show kindness t o the d i s t r e s s e d (Krpa 
Dukhinam); tenderness t o the imperfect and d e f i c i e n t 
(Vatsalyam sadqganam); h u m i l i t y t o the arrogant or u n c i v i l 
(Silam Mandanam); straightforwardness t o the crooked 
(Arjavam Kutilanam);' sympathy t o the wicked i n heart 
(Sauhardyam Dustahrdayanam) and gentleness f o r the shy and 
t i m i d (Mardavam Vislegabhirunam)."'" 
Thus i n t h i s l i s t ( i f we can c a l l i t a l i s t ) almost 
a l l the best q u a l i t i e s of the heart are l a i d down, and are 
derived from the character of the Supreme model, God, 
These v i r t u e s do not only lead t o the well-being of man 
but also transform human character by b r i n g i n g i t more i n t o 
tune w i t h the u l t i m a t e purpose of God. I t i s needless t o 
add t h a t i n t h i s scheme the i n c e n t i v e t o c u l t i v a t e the 
p e r f e c t i o n s , enumerated above, comes from the sentiment of 
love f o r the Lord which i s r e f l e c t e d i n the tendency t o 
i m i t a t e Him, f a i t h i n the i n t r i n s i c goodness of God's 
"'•Ibid., pp. 22f. 
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purpose, and hope i n the u l t i m a t e p o s s i b i l i t y of achiev-
i n g the good l i f e through God's mercy. Thus the t h e o l o g i -
c a l v i r t u e s of love, f a i t h and hope are c e r t a i n l y i m p l i e d , 
though not s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned. 
Comparison of C h r i s t i a n and Hindu Vi r t u e s 
A f t e r the for e g o i n g account of C h r i s t i a n and Hindu 
v i r t u e s , i t may now not sound as a mere p l a t i t u d e t o say 
t h a t the range of v i r t u e s and duties o u t l i n e d i n both sys-
tems i s s t r i k i n g l y s i m i l a r , or at l e a s t not so d i s s i m i l a r 
as i s o f t e n supposed. The langxiage and terminology, as 
also q u i t e o f t e n the emphases, are obviously and n a t u r a l l y 
d i f f e r e n t . But on the whole they compare q u i t e favourably. 
I n the course of our an a l y s i s i n the previous section we 
have i n places suggested how they compare i n some s p e c i f i c 
d e t a i l s . We s h a l l now b r i e f l y o u t l i n e the o v e r a l l p o s i -
t i o n . 
To begin w i t h the most s t r i k i n g s i m i l a r i t y , we may 
r e f e r t o the l a s t f i v e of the Commandments i n the Deca-
logue, which are almost e x a c t l y i d e n t i c a l w i t h the f i v e 
Hindu i n j u n c t i o n s t h a t recur not only i n orthodox Hindu 
systems but also i n the heterodox Indian systems such as 
the Jaina and the Bauddha. These are, of course, the f i v e 
237. 
p r i n c i p l e s of Ahimsgl, §at;)[a, Asteya, Brahmacarya and A^aia-
graha. The correspondence of these f i v e with the la s t f i v e 
of the Ten Goramand.ments may be shown by the following table: 
Christian Hindu 
(5) Thou S h a l t do no rnur- Ahimsa or non-injur-y 
der. *" 
(7) Thou Shalt not commit Brahmacarya or celebacy 
adultery 
(8) Thou S h a l t not s t e a l Asteya or non-stealing 
(9) Thou S h a l t not bear Satya or veracity 
false witness 
(10) Thou shalt not covet Apari^raha or non-attachment 
These f i v e , as we said e a r l i e r , come foremost 
amongst the pr i n c i p l e s regulating the conduct of Hindus. 
The Christian v i r t u e s of kindness, goodness, gentleness 
and f a i t h f u l n e s s are a l l comprehended by the two Hindu v i r -
tues of Daya and Sraddha; patience and s e l f - c o n t r o l are 
e x p l i c i t l y stressed i n both systems; and the Greek virtues 
also have t h e i r counterparts. Temperance as s i g n i f y i n g 
avoidance of extremes i s amply covered by the injunction of 
s e l f - c o n t r o l . The f i v e Yamas, as v/e have seen, are l i t e r -
a l l y "forms of s e l f - r e s t r a i n t . " f o r t i t u d e has i t s counter-
part i n Dama or even i n the Yogic prescription of Tapas. 
Wisdom (Dhi), as d i s t i n c t from mere learning (Vid^a), i s 
included i n the Ten Commandments of Manu, and i s highly 
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prized by every Hindu. In f a c t , the saving knowledge 
which gives one the ins i g h t i n t o the real nature of things 
and helps to achieve l i b e r a t i o n , called Jnana, i s not i n -
t e l l e c t u a l knowledge so much as wisdom i n the form of 
r e a l i s a t i o n . The v i r t u e of ju s t i c e i s more than replaced 
by the i d e a l of BhTltahitatva, or good of a l l creatures,) f o r 
i f one respects the Hindu teaching of regarding a l l crea-
tures with a sense of non-discrimination i n treatment, 
j u s t i c e i s c e r t a i n l y guaranteed. The Christian ideal of 
love or charity and universal brotherhood i s covered by the 
three v i r t u e s of Vatsyayana, namely, l a r i t r a n a , Pariparana 
and "Dana. Faith, hope and love, as we said e a r l i e r , form 
the very basis of Ramanuja's derivation of the vir t u e s from 
God's character and are the main theme of the devotional 
schools i n Hinduism which, as we said e a r l i e r , must be con-
sidered the most representative forms of Hinduism, The 
Glta sets the tone f o r the r e l i g i o n of f a i t h i n these words: 
He who has f a i t h , who i s absorbed i n i t ( i . e . , 
wisdom) and who has subdued his senses gains wis-
dom and having gained v;isdom he attains quickly 
the supreme peace.^ 
We may approach t h i s i d e n t i t y of content between 
Christian and Hindu v i r t u e s from a d i f f e r e n t angle. We 
•^GltS, IV,39. 
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have noticed Stephen N e i l l ' s comment that the nine qual-
i t i e s , l i s t e d by St. Paul as "the f r u i t s of the S p i r i t " do 
not give a complete l i s t of a l l the possible Christian 
v i r t u e s . They merely t e l l us "the kind of persons we 
ought t o be." And he also adds that t h i s may be taken to 
be "a b r i e f sketch of v/hat Jesus Christ was l i k e . " Jesus 
Christ, then, i s the kind of person Christians ought to 
be. This would hardly be challenged even by a Hindu, Dog-
ma apart, the Hindu would readily agree that Jesus ap-
proaches the Hindu picture of the id e a l man i n almost a l l 
respects. For Jesus would be viewed as the wise man who 
knows things i n t h e i r correct perspective, i s i n the r i g h t 
kind of relationship with God, i s neither elated by success 
nor worried by c r u c i f i x i o n , does always what he considers 
to be the good of a l l and has a l l the composure of a true 
Yogin as described i n the GltS, Extracts from a few re l e -
vant passages i n the Glta w i l l constx'uct the picture of a 
man who may even be i d e n t i f i e d as Christ: 
He whose mind i s untroubled i n the midst of 
sorrows and i s free from eager desire and plea-
sures, he from whom passion, fear and rage have 
passed away, he i s called a sage of settled 
i n t e l l i g e n c e . - - I I , 5 6 . 
The holy men whose sins are destroyed, v/hose 
doubts ( d u a l i t i e s ) are cut asunder, whose minds 
are d i s c i p l i n e d and who rejoice i n (doing) good 
to a l l creatures, a t t a i n to the beatitude of God. 
— V,25. 
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Christ, i n f a c t , would be accepted by the Hindu as the 
very f a m i l i a r f igure of the wise seer or sage. 
The Uniqueness of Christian or Hindu Virtues 
The near-identity of content between the Christian 
and Hindu vir t u e s that we have noticed i n the previous 
section obliges us to consider i n what sense, i f any, either 
Christian or Hindu vir t u e s can be regarded as unique or ex-
clusive. Since Hindus are not generally heard to claim any 
such uniqueness f o r t h e i r v i r t u e s , our problem, i n ef f e c t , 
i s to examine whether t h i s Christian claim i s j u s t i f i e d . 
Hindus do often claim, and perhaps r i g h t l y , that t h e i r 
social system, by which they mean Varna-Asrama Dharma, i s 
unique; some of t h e i r ideas about Godhead, creation and 
se l f or Atman are declared to be exclusive possessions, as 
also are some of t h e i r customs and practices. But when i t 
comes to the q u a l i t i e s that make a good man, i n other words, 
v i r t u e s , there seems to be no such claim. But i n Christ-
i a n i t y there i s a d e f i n i t e tendency to regard Christian 
vir t u e s as exclusively Christian and unique. Even ordinary 
Christians—by "ordinary" we mean non-theologians—seem 
quite often to be convinced that the fact of t h e i r being 
"Chidstian" somehow adds to the merit and the q u a l i t y of 
the v i r t u e s . This needs examination. 
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Thomas Mclherson, i n his a r t i c l e referred to above, 
analyses at some length the grounds of uniqueness claimed 
fo r Christian v i r t u e s and comes to the conclusion that t h i s 
claim i s rather gratuitous. Starting with the question, 
"What are 'Christian virtues'?", he suggests that there 
can be two possible views:'^ ( l ) Either that "Christian v i r -
tues" i s the name of a p a r t i c u l a r l i s t of virtues d i f f e r e n t 
i n content from other l i s t s ( d i f f e r e n t i n respect of a l l 
items or i n respect of at least some items). This would 
mean that i t contains items that one would not f i n d i n a 
l i s t of, say, Greek v i r t u e s . Or, (2) that "Christian v i r -
tues" does not s i g n i f y a special l i s t of virtues d i f f e r e n t 
i n content from the r e s t , but that the virtues i n question, 
even though common i n other l i s t s , yet possess a special 
q u a l i t y or property not possessed by non-Christian virtues. 
In course of his examination of the f i r s t view, he 
takes note not only of the t r a d i t i o n a l seven Christian v i r -
tues but also of some others which are classed by Aquinas 
as v i r t u e s , or parts of v i r t u e , or acts of v i r t u e , f o r ex-
ample, r e l i g i o n , vengeance, martyrdom, fa s t i n g , v i r g i n i t y , 
h u m i l i t y , etc. A f t e r examining the exact connotation of 
some of these v i r t u e s and comxjaring them t o Greek virt u e s , 
he comes to the follov/ing conclusion: 
•^Mctherson, op. c i t . , pp. 52ff. 
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. . . I am suggesting that Christian v i r t u e s , con-
sidered as c o n s t i t u t i n g a special class of v i r -
tues, need not be looked on as quite unique; I 
do not want to suggest that there i s no d i f f e r -
ence at a l l between Christian v i r t u e s and Greek 
vir t u e s . 1 
v/e may only add that our examination of the content of 
Christian and Hindu v i r t u e s , and the near-identity that 
we have noticed , strengthens Mctherson's argument and 
casts serious doubt on the claim to uniqueness of Christ-
ian v i r t u e s i n the f i r s t sense. 
Coming to the second view of Christian v i r t u e s , 
McPherson feels that the supposed "distinguishing mark" 
of Christian v i r t u e s , as claimed by theologians quite of-
ten, i s the q u a l i t y of being "infused" or implanted by God 
as His g i f t s . He, therefore, feels impelled to examine 
t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between "infused" and "acquired" vi r t u e s ; 
but a f t e r examining a l l the supposed differences between 
them, he finds that there i s no convincing ground f o r main-
t a i n i n g a d i s t i n c t i o n between them. He feels that at 
least t o non-theologians there appears to be no convincing 
proof that there are any infused virtues as d i s t i n c t from 
merely acquired ones. Hence he comes to the inevitable 
conclusion that there i s no good evidence to show that 
-"-Ibid., p. 58. 
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"Christian v i r t u e s " have any unique q u a l i t y or property 
which non-Christian vir t u e s lack. 
And we, as non-theologians, are obliged to accept 
the inescapable logic of Mclherson's arguments. Thus i t 
would seem that there i s no ground to believe that being 
Christian could i n any sense add to the merit or qua l i t y 
of the vi r t u e s which are l i s t e d as such. We may perhaps 
concede that the sense of security r e s u l t i n g from one's 
b e l i e f or f a i t h i n a God may i n some cases render the ex-
ercise of v i r t u e s comparatively easy. But t h i s i s some-
thin g which, even i f true, could apply equally well to 
non-Christians. 
We, therefore, take the view that "Christian v i r -
tues" i s j u s t a convenient and t r a d i t i o n a l way of describ-
ing the virtues that should be practised by Christians, 
without i n any way suggesting that they are exclusive or 
unique. S i m i l a r l y Hindu virt u e s may be only a convenient 
way of describing the kind of values that have been cher-
ished by a certain community, without implying that they 
have been absent elsewhere. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note i n 
t h i s connection that the term "Hindu" i t s e l f i s of foreign 
o r i g i n . What i s now known as Hinduism has actually been 
called by Hindus Sanatana Dharma or eternal r e l i g i o n . 
This ancient name, when substituted f o r Hindu v i r t u e s . 
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w i l l make i t mean eternal virtues or universal virtues 
to which no claim to exclusiveness can attach i t s e l f . 
Chapter VI. 
MORAL EFFORT AND HUMAN FKiiiEDOM 
We have so f a r examined the Christian and Hindu 
concepts of the Moral Law and the demand that i t makes on 
man. 'We have also discussed what sort of values he must 
c u l t i v a t e or what sort of character he must develop i f he 
i s to be i n harmony with the divine law. I t would, there-
fore, now seem appropriate to enquire whether man has the 
capacity or freedom to achieve what i s demanded of him. 
On the face of i t , t h i s would hardly seem to be a problem, 
f o r we have already agreed that neither C h r i s t i a n i t y nor 
Hinduism have any doubts about the p o t e n t i a l greatness of 
man and his i n f i n i t e capacities. But v/hat i s p o t e n t i a l 
need not be actual. In f a c t , both C h r i s t i a n i t y and Hindu-
ism believe, f o r one reason or another, that man i n his 
present state i s f a r removed from his p o t e n t i a l greatness. 
Thei'-e l i e s the d i f f i c u l t y . Whatever his ultimate destiny, 
man as man i s heavily encumbered by factors which clearly 
seem to l i m i t seriously, i f not altogether annul, his 
freedom of choice and action. The question that aidses, 
then, i s : Is man free to achieve v/hat he ought to achieve? 
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And i f so, to what extent? 'This i s the context, i n which 
v^ e i n t e n t to make human freedom the subject of our en-
quiry. 
Now, i n view of man's consciousness of freedom of 
choice and action, within certain l i m i t s , t h i s may seem a 
singu l a r l y i d l e and t h e o r e t i c a l question. Perhaps i t i s ; 
but no more so than most other problems that philosophers 
have racked t h e i r brains about, and are s t i l l doing. 
There i s , however, the need to specify with precision the 
sense i n v/hich we intend to t r e a t human freedom as a pro-
blem. For there i s one very legitimate sense i n which t h i s 
can be called a "pseudo-problem." This sense i s the one 
i n which freedom i s equated v/ith indeterminism or lack of 
causation of any sort and i s then set against determinism 
which i s interpreted to imply lack of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and 
freedom of conduct. The classic argument of t h i s kind i s 
very succinctly stated by Meritz Schlick i n his Problems 
of .idJthics: 
I f determinism i s true, i f , that i s , a l l events 
obey immutable lav/s, then my w i l l too i s always 
determined, by my innate character and my i)io~ 
t i v e s . Hence my decisions are necessary, not 
free. But i f so, then I am not responsible f o r 
my acts, f o r I would be accountable f o r them only 
i f I could do something about the way my deci-
sions went; but I can do nothing about i t , since 
they proceed with necessity from my character and 
the iiiotives. And I have made neither, and have 
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no power over them: the motives come from with-
out, and my character i s the necessary product 
of the innate tendencies and the external i n f l u -
ences which have been e f f e c t i v e during my l i f e -
time. Thus determinism and mo2?al r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
are incompatible. Moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y presup- -j^  
poses freedom, that i s , exemption from causality. 
There i s no denying the fact that much of the 
t r a d i t i o n a l discussion about the freedom of the w i l l has 
been, unfortunately, on the above l i n e . And i t i s easy to 
see why the problem involved i n t h i s kind of reasoning has 
been declared by Schlick and many others to be a pseudo-
problem. Freedom as meaning complete exemption from 
causality undermines the very foundation of morality, which 
i t i s supposed, v/rongly i n f a c t , to safeguard; and i t 
thereby defeats i t s purpose. I f there were no causal re-
l a t i o n between a man's motives and his actions, and i f 
whatever a man did v^ere no more than a matter of chance, 
then indeed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and, by implication, morality 
would become meaningless concepts. Causality, therefore, 
or determinism i n the sense of a necessary and uniform 
.connection between the motives and actions, and between ac-
tions and consequences i s indeed as necessary a postulate 
of morality as freedom of choice and conduct. Hence the 
genuine sense of freedom i s not u t t e r indeterminism as 
"''Moritz Schlick, Problems of Ethics, authorised transla-
t i o n by David Rynin~lLrentice^^TRaTl, Inc., 1939), p. 146. 
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opposed to any kind and degree of determinism or causal-
i t y but a certain amount of freedom of choice and conduct, 
as opposed to t o t a l and absolute compulsion and external 
pressure or interference. And i t i s i n t h i s sense of 
freedom that we are interested. 
I t i s true that freedom in t h i s — i t s genuine— 
sense can be a topic of discussion only because of i t s 
implications f o r another issue which i s a philosopher's 
concern—the issue of moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . For no one 
can be a responsible agent i f he i s not a free agent. In 
viev/ of t h i s , our discussions i n the present chapter are 
only a kind of preliminary groundwork f o r the next chapter 
wherein we intend to discuss r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . This d i v i -
sion i n t o two chapters i s only f o r the sake of convenience, 
and the two are r e a l l y complementary. For the present, 
hovjever, we s h a l l be confining ourselves to the considera-
t i o n of human freedom i n C h r i s t i a n i t y and i n Hinduism. In 
other words, we s h a l l be asking ourselves whether the 
human freedom postulated by moral e f f o r t and re s p o n s i b i l i t y 
i s consistent with the r e l i g i o u s or* theological doctrines 
of C h r i s t i a n i t y and Hinduism. 
In a very general way the crux of the problem f o r 
the r e l i g i o u s man i s touched i n the following l i n e s , quoted 
by Maclagan: "Our r e l i g i o u s convictions demand dependence 
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on God; our eth i c a l convictions demand freedom,..."''" This 
i s the central problem f o r any r e l i g i o u s ethics--^that of 
reconciling dependence on God, which every r e l i g i o n de-
mands i n varying degrees, with the freedom demanded by 
moral e f f o r t . Quite often t h i s c o n f l i c t i s gust declared 
t o be i r r e c o n c i l a b l e . This i s , f o r example, the at t i t u d e 
of the author of the lines quoted above when to those lines' 
i s added: "The mistake that has been made has been that 
theologians have aimed at philosophical consistency." I t 
i s extraordinary that he regards the attempt at philosoph-
i c a l consistency as a "mistake." Even agreeing that r e l i -
gion i s p r i m a r i l y a matter of f a i t h , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see 
how v;e can altogether r e f r a i n from examining the p h i l o -
sophical consistency or otherwise of reli g i o u s doctrines 
and t h e i r r e l a t i o n to non-religious facts. But t h i s i s 
i n any case i r r e l e v a n t to our present purposes. We are not 
interested i n examining any inherent c o n f l i c t s between 
ethics and r e l i g i o n i n a general way, and so we must pass 
on to the consideration of freedom s p e c i f i c a l l y i n Christ-
i a n i t y and Hinduism. 
Wow, human freedom, may be reflected at two levels 
i n the whole range of moral a c t i v i t y : at the l e v e l of 
•^ The Doctrine of Grace, ed. Whitley, p. 20, quoted by Maclagan, op. c i t . , p. 113. 
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choice and then at the l e v e l of execution of t h i s choice. 
A p a r t i c u l a r r e l i g i o u s doctrine may deny altogether the 
p o s s i b i l i t y that human beings can make the r i g h t choice 
without some supernatural aid. I t may be implied that 
human beings by t h e i r very nature are either wholly or 
p a r t i a l l y incapable of distinguishing between good and 
e v i l , and that even i f they do t h e o r e t i c a l l y understand 
v;hat i s good, i t i s not i n t h e i r power to opt f o r the good 
because they are essentially corrupt and perverted. This 
would be lack of freedom at the f i r s t stage. But i t may 
also be held that though human beings are free t o choose, 
they do not have the power to achieve what they have cho-
sen without divine or supernatural assistance of some sort. 
A t y p i c a l example of t h i s kind of incapacity i s provided 
by Rousseau's Savoyard, p r i e s t when he says: " I have always 
the power t o w i l l but not always the strength to do v/hat 
I v j i l l . " " ' ' I t villi be seen that freedom i n the sense of 
capacity to undertake and achieve what i s considered the 
r i g h t course of action i s as important as i n the f i r s t 
sense of capacity to judge what i s r i g h t . For, as we sha l l 
shov; i n the following chapter, r e s p o n s i b i l i t y involves not 
only that the agent should be a self-conscious i n d i v i d u a l 
who knows what he i s doing and v/hat he ought to do but 
"^Rousseau i n limile (Evei^ymnn edition, p. 243), quoted by Maclagan, op. c i t . , p.-, IO3C 
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also that he should not be t o t a l l y incapacitated or ser-
iously l i m i t e d i n His e f f o r t s by factors beyond his con-
t r o l . We sh a l l accordingly consider freedom i n both sen-
ses, and to that end single out doctrines, i n Ch r i s t i a n i t y 
and i n Hindusim, which either d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y 
threaten to impair human freedom and examine to what ex-
ten t , i f any, they do so. 
C h r i s t i a n i t y 
Taking C h r i s t i a n i t y f i r s t , v;e suggest that there 
are at least two t r a d i t i o n a l doctrines which a'ppear to 
c u r t a i l seriously, i f not deny completely, human freedom: 
f i r s t , the Christian doctrine of Sin, especially the doc-
t r i n e s of Original Sin and Inherited G u i l t ; and second, 
the doctrine of Grace. I t should be borne i n mind, how-
ever, that these two doctrines are i n t e r r e l a t e d and comple-
mentary. They are i n f a c t related as diagnosis and cure, 
and to that extent they may actually be d i f f e r e n t parts 'Of 
a single more comprehensive aocurine. But f o r the pur-
pose of greater c l a r i t y i t may be desirable to examine 
them separately. 
(a) The Doctrine of Sin and Human Freedom 
The doctrine of Sin i s ine x t r i c a b l y connected v/ith 
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the doctrine of the F a l l to which we have had occasion to 
refe r i n a previous chapter. In i t s essence i t relates 
that because of the ingratitude and disobedience of the 
Fix-st Man, Adam, the entire human race has become s i n f u l 
and perverted. Some people consider Adam's F a l l to be the 
cause of i t ; others merely regard i t as symbolic of what 
i n f a c t man has done and i s doing. Man's s i n f u l nature, 
i n any case, has a twofold implication. The f i r s t and 
primary meaning of Sin i s the leaving out of God and re-
garding the world as an e n t i r e l y human enterprise—the 
a t t i t u d e of defiance and disobedience which i s chronic and 
universal. We are a l l creatures of God; but i n our pride 
and self - l o v e we tend to ignore t h i s fact and regard our-
selves as masters of our own destiny. This i s , as i t 
were, the beginning of the catastrophe. What follov/s as 
a consequence of t h i s d i s t o r t e d perspective i s a loss of 
the sense of values—a b l u r r i n g or colouring of the vision, 
as i t v/ere. The primary and i n i t i a l Sin, thus, issues 
forth, i n t o Sin i n i t s secondary meaning—that of moral 
depravity or a general tendency towards e v i l . The net 
r e s u l t , i n other words, i s not simply a certain amount of 
d u l l i n g or blunting of the moral i n s i g h t , but also (vjhat 
i s worse) a positive and inherent impulse towards e v i l , 
even where the good i s somehow appre.hended. As a res u l t 
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of Sin, then, men ai'e n a t u r a l l y (that i s , without the 
Grace of God) corrupt and prone to temptations of a l l 
sorts v/hich deflect them from the path of righteousness. 
I t i s a kind of f a i l u r e to place f i r s t things f i r s t . 
Even i f t h i s mild version were accepted as a • 
generally reasonable account of the Christian doctrine of 
Sin, i t would s t i l l be d i f f i c u l t to miss the general pess-
i m i s t i c note about man's character and p o s s i b i l i t i e s . I t 
i s clearl3i' implied that man, without God's grace, neither 
has the adequate capacity to apprehend moral values nor 
does he have the natural willingness to achieve them, even 
i f his darkened conscience somehow succeeded i n apprehend-
ing them. This i s a gloomy view of human nature by any 
account, and not p a r t i c u l a r l y conducive to moral freedom 
and e f f o r t . But t h i s generally gloomy picture i s made i n -
f i n i t e l y v^orse by two t r a d i t i o n a l Christian doctrines 
about Sin, namely, the doctrine of Inherited Guilt and 
that of Total Corruption, which are both c o r o l l a r i e s of 
the doctrine of Original Sin. 
The doctrine of Original or Inherited Guilt implies 
that as descendants of Adam we are natura l l y g u i l t y of his 
sin and that the whole human race has to suffer the con-
sequences of t h i s f a t a l and s h a B i e f u l ingratitude on the 
part of Adam. The consequences do not only include bodily 
death and disease but also the depravity and sinfulness 
that v;e talked of e a r l i e r . This notion of an Inherited 
G u i l t , however, has been seriously challenged not only i n 
modern times but even i n the ancient past by thinkers l i k e 
Origen, f o r example. M.odern Chicistians understandably con-
sider t h i s an outrage. J. .8. V-Jhale i l l u s t i ' a t e s t h i s modern 
re j e c t i o n of the doctidne when he says. 
I t can not be stated too emphatically that 'Ori-
g i n a l Sin' neither implies nor means 'Original 
G u i l t ' . The l a t t e r expression carries with i t 
forensic and penal implications v;hich outi^age the 
moral sense. No man may be judged g u i l t y because 
of the misdeeds of his ancestor. Such a judgment 
v/ould destroy the very meaning of morality. There-
fo r e , such terminology which i s only a stumbling-
block today i s better abandoned. 
I t should be possible to quote from a number of modej:n 
sources to show hov^  much abhorred t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l doctrine 
i s today. And i n any case t h i s i s a doctrine which has 
more d i r e c t implications f o r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , which we i n -
tend to consider i n the next chapter. V/e s h a l l , therefore, 
drop t h i s out of our account f o r the time being. 
There i s , hov;ever, s t i l l the need to explain and 
examine the f u l l implications of the other s t r a i n i n the 
doctrine of Original Sin, no less objectionable and no less 
damaging to morality than that of Original Guilt. This i s 
"''ViJhale, op. c i t . , p. 46. 
255. 
the doctrine of Total Corruption worked out so uncompro-
misingly by Augustine and allov/ed to be an important theme 
i n the thoughts of most of the Reformers, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
Luther. Calvin, i t must be admitted, refused t o c o n t r i -
bute t o any doctrine of t h i s kind. Total Corruption may 
have an advantage i n the explanation of the fact of e v i l , 
but i t c l e a r l y threatens to undermine the very foundations 
of morality, f o r i f man's reason were t o t a l l y corrupt, 
moral i n s i g h t and judgment become meaningless expressions. 
And yet t h i s has been a generally accepted doctrine i n 
t r a d i t i o n a l orthodox C h r i s t i a n i t y . VJe f e e l l i k e asking, 
with J. S. Whale, 
Vfliat are we to make of the grim and t e r r i b l e doc-
t r i n e of Total Corruption—found i n the Holy 
Scripture c e r t a i n l y , but worked out with an un-
s c r i p t u r a l and p i t i l e s s logic bj' St. Augustine 
and the Reformers? Man i s ' u t t e r l y leprous and 
unclean'. I f t h i s i s not blasphemous pessimism, 
what is? Vi/hat did i t mean?! 
Answering the question himself, Whale goes on to 
t e l l us i n v/hat sense the doctrine of Total Corruption 
could be acceptable. He writes: 
I f t o t a l Corruption meant that every man i s as 
bad as he can be, i t would be t o t a l l y absurd, 
simply because the conception i s self-destroying, 
•'•Ibid., p. 39. 
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as Professor John B a i l l i e has reminded us. 'A 
t o t a l l y corrupt being would be as incapable of 
sin as would a t o t a l l y i l l o g i c a l being of f a l l a -
cious argument'. But i n spite of the deplorable 
extravagance of the language of some Reformers 
here, notably, Luther, t h i s doctrine of Total 
Corruption v/as r e a l l y insisting- that the deprav-
i t y which sin'has produced i n human nature ex-
tends to the whole of i t , permeates human l i f e 
and experience i n a l l i t s ranp;es; that there i s 
no part of man's nature, not^eyen his v i r t u e , 
which i s unaffected by i t T ^ 
I t i s not d i f f i c u l t to see that even on t h i s i nterpreta-
t i o n the doctrine of Total Corruption connotes only mar-
g i n a l l y less than t o t a l corruption and, therefore, f a i l s 
to a l t e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y the essential view of human na-
ture, i t s freedom and capacity. 
Reinhold Niebuhr, giving his reasons f o r why the 
doctrine of " t o t a l depravity" must be given up, says that 
"the orthodox doctrine of a ' t o t a l depravity', r e s u l t i n g 
from a complete corruption of the 'image of God' i n man, 
i s equally destructive of the very insight which i t seeks 
p 
to perfect." The word "equally" refers to the other 
destructive doctrine, namely, that of inherited corrup-
t i o n . IMiebuhr i s undoubtedly r i g h t i n t h i s opinion. But 
the question i s : I s i t possible to give up t h i s theory or 
to decry i t as completely un-Christian? Perhaps Augustine 
•^Ibid., pp. 39f. 
^Niebuhr, An _ Int e r p r e t at i^^^^ of Ghris Ethi c s, p. 101. 
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and Luther and others were v/rong in deducing a doctrine of 
Total Corruption from the doctrine of Sin. But from a l l 
evidence, i t does not appear that C h r i s t i a n i t y , i n i t s i n -
sistence on the doctrine of Sin, has actually been saying 
nothing more than the truism that man i s l i a b l e sometimes 
to sin. And c l a s s i c a l C h r i s t i a n i t y c e r t a i n l y does not 
seem to encourage the view that man i s s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t and 
free and capable of achieving his moral end. A passage 
from Wiebuhr himself w i l l prove the point. Commenting on 
the "moral realism" and pessimism implied i n the Christian 
doctrine of Sin, he says: 
In l i b e r a l C h r i s t i a n i t y there i s an i m p l i c i t as-
sumption that human nature has the resources to 
f u l f i l what the gospel demands. The Kantian 
axiom, ' I ought, therefore, I can,' i s accepted 
as basic t o a l l analyses of the moral s i t u a t i o n . 
In c l a s s i c a l C h r i s t i a n i t y the perfectionism of 
the gospel stands i n a much more d i f f i c u l t re-
l a t i o n to the estimate of human resources. The 
love Commandment stands i n juxtaposition to the 
fact of s i n . l 
I t becomes clear on t h i s evidence, then, that i f the deduc-
t i o n of t o t a l corruption from the cla s s i c a l Christian doc-
t r i n e of Sin i s rather extremist, the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
complete freedom and unlimited capacity which the l i b e r a l 
Christians put on t h i s doctrine i s no less so. Even on the 
•"•Ibid., p. 75. 
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mildest and most modest account, therefore, s i n , because 
of the perversion of values that i t engenders and the 
natural temptation to e v i l that i t fosters, does to some 
extent c u r t a i l human freedom and capacity, and i t i s to 
that extent detrimental to the pursuit of a moral end. 
(b) The Doctrine of Grace and IiLiman l^ 'reedom 
The deterministic and pessimistic implications of 
the doctrine of Sin become clearer when we re l a t e i t to 
the doctrine of Grace. For i t i s not d i f f i c u l t to see 
that i f Chi'istianity believed i n the s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y of 
man, there would hardly be any need f o r God's grace. I t 
i s precisely because man i s n a t u r a l l y perverted and l i m i t -
ed by his sin that there arises the need f o r God's forgive-
ness and active help i n order to redeem mankind from the 
shackles of sin. As we have seen e a r l i e r , i t i s pr i m a r i l y 
t h i s lack of r e a l i s a t i o n of man's u t t e r incapacity and 
complete dependence on God which constitutes sin. This 
f a c t of man's "utter need of God" and his complete depend-
ence on God i n everything he does, however, i s i t s e l f f e l t 
to give r i s e to problems. I f man i s so u t t e r l y dependent, 
how can he be free at the same time? This i s why we must 
examine the meaning of Grace and f i n d out v/hether i t 
leaves man the minimum of freedom demanded by morality. 
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We ought to make i t clear at t h i s point that what 
v/e are examining here i s not the f a m i l i a r , age-old problem 
of God's omnipotence and man's freedom. For we are assum-
ing that i n any system of r e l i g i o u s ethics l i k e Christian-
i t y , or Hinduism f o r that matter, man can be expected to 
enjoy only a l i m i t e d amount of freedom delegated to him 
by the omnipotent God. Ultimately, of course, a l l the 
power must belong to God. This must be accepted i f the 
theory of Grace i s t o make any sense. But i t i s possible 
to i n t e r p r e t grace i n such a way that i t may not leave to 
man any s i g n i f i c a n t degree of even t h i s delegated freedom. 
I t i s from t h i s angle that we propose to consider the 
Christian theory of Grace. 
Let us formulate precisely the question that we 
sh a l l t r y to answer i n t h i s section. V/e have seen that 
sin p r i m a r i l y r e s u l t s i n a darkening of conscience and per-
version of w i l l which prevents man from knowing x-ihat i s 
good as well as from opting f o r the good naturally. We 
are now asking: Assuming that somehow, either as a res u l t 
of sudden insight or ef f e c t i v e i n s t r u c t i o n , man, i n spite 
of his sinfulness, i s able to know what i s x'ight and i s 
also prepared to follow the r i g h t course, how f a r can his 
ov/n moral e f f o r t s (that i s , v/ithout the mercy or grace of 
God) secure the end he aspires after? The docti-ine of 
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Grace seems to imply that i t i s within man's power to 
make the necessary e f f o r t toward righteousness, but 
whether he w i l l a t t a i n the desired state i s something 
that depends on the w i l l of God. This i s a b i t disturb-
ing, f o r i t leaves at least one loose end. There seems 
to be no guarantee that the r i g h t kind of e f f o r t i n ade-
quate measure i s sure to take one to the desired goal. 
I t becomes clear that unaided man or "natural man," that 
i s , man without the grace of God, i s incapable of reach-
ing the goal of holiness by himself. This kind of b e l i e f , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n some of i t s more dogmatic and l i t e r a l i n -
te r p r e t a t i o n s , deprives moral e f f o r t of i t s entire pur-
pose and meaning. But whatever we have said so f a r i s 
only by way of a n t i c i p a t i o n . Let us f i r s t have some of 
the t r a d i t i o n a l views regarding the doctrine of Grace. 
The Report of the Commission on Christian Doctrine 
(1922) gives the primary and essential meaning of grace i n 
Christian theology as "the w i l l of God (which i s also His 
love) regarded as active on behalf of and i n man,"''" An-
other committee—the Theological Committee of the Faith 
and Order Movement—recommends the drawing of a d i s t i n c -
t i o n between "Grace" and the "work of the S p i r i t , " "Grace 
"''Maclagan, op. c i t . , p. 108. 
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being r e s t r i c t e d 'to i t s o r i g i n a l meaning as an a t t r i -
bute of God' and 'the work of the S p i r i t ' s i g n i f y i n g 
'His a c t i v i t y i n man'.""*" I t i s easy to see that the mean-
ing of grace as l a i d down i n the f i r s t of our d e f i n i t i o n s 
i s equivalent t o that of "the work of the S p i r i t " i n the 
second d e f i n i t i o n . But the conclusion i n any case i s 
that the " S p i r i t " i s always active "on behalf of and i n 
man" so that on any p a r t i c u l a r occasion when we think that 
we have been able to do our duty, i t i s not quite us so 
much as the S p i r i t i n us which has i n fact achieved t h i s , 
a l b e i t , through the instrumentality of our own w i l l . Now 
since the S p i r i t i s supposed to be working through our 
v ; i l l , the Doctrine i n the Church of England, f o r example, 
claims that "the operation of grace i s not opposed t o the 
freedom of the human w i l l , since grace acts through the 
w i l l and not externally to i t . " But r e f l e c t i o n does not 
appear to support the claim. 
Professor Maclagan's c r i t i c i s m of t h i s claim de-
serves respectful consideration. According to him, to sup-
pose that apart from our own v / i l l there i s another unob-
served and unobservable factor (grace) working when we set 
ourselves to face a "moral challenge," i s not only an un-
•^Ibid., p. 108. 
^ I b i d . , p. I l l , 
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v e r i f i a b l e i^henomenon, but even " i n contradiction v/ith 
the idea of a free v / i l l i n g . ""'' I t may be possible to drop 
the f i r s t of Professor Haclagan's c r i t i c i s m s i n the lines 
quoted on the ground that we cannot always take recourse 
to empirical v e r i f i c a t i o n i n matters of f a i t h . But a l l 
the same, his second charge—that the involvement of God's 
grace i n a l l our w i l l i n g i s contradictory to our idea of 
free w i l l i n g — i s serious and sensible enough not to be i g -
nored. Grace as con s t i t u t i v e of human w i l l does r e a l l y 
seem to make human freedom a mere appearance. V/e seem to 
come to the unsatisfactory conclusion that man, as man, i s 
ce r t a i n l y not free ; only man aided by the S p i r i t , or more 
precisely, only the S p i r i t i n man (which i s c e r t a i n l y not 
man) i s free. Instead of human freedom, then, we are as-
sert i n g the freedom of the S p i r i t which, however, has never 
been i n question. Thus even i f we ignore the Augustinian 
or Pelagian theories of grace "that set 'God's grace and 
man's resolution' i n opposition, assigning 'so much to God 
and so much to man'," we do not yet seem to have a v/ay 
out of the d i f f i c u l t y created by grace. We are obliged to 
agree v/ith Professor Maclagan that grace as a kind of "en-
vironmental" help does not seriously i n t e r f e r e v/ith the 
•''Ibid., p. 111. 
p I b i d . , p. 116. 
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idea of w i l l i n g , but i f i t i s intej:-preted as i n any v/ay 
" c o n s t i t u t i v e " of human w i l l , i t , takes the essence out of 
our moral response, and makes the idea of free v / i l l i n g a 
farce."'' 
I t i s needless to point out that i f t h i s compara-
t i v e l y moderate and l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of grace cannot 
f i n d room f o r human freedom i n the f u l l e s t sense of the 
term, more extremist, and perhaps even more popular, con-
t i n e n t a l theories of grace can only reduce human freedom 
to an i l l u s i o n . An example of the theologians' conviction 
that moral achievement i s impossible without the grace of 
God i s provided by the following passage quoted by M. D. 
Lewis from Brunner's T h e v i n e Imperatiye : 
Duty and genuine goodness are mutually exclusive. 
Obedience due to a sense of unwilling constraint 
i s bondage, and indeed the bondage of Sin. I f I 
f e e l I ought to do r i g h t , i t i s a sign that I can 
not do i t . I f I could r e a l l y do i t , there would 
be no question of 'ought' about i t at a l l . The 
sense of 'ought' shows me the good at an i n f i n i t e 
impassable distance from my w i l l . W i l l i n g obedi-
ence i s nevei^ the f r u i t of a sense of 'ought' but 
only of love. This i s the paradox: that the sense 
of 'ought,' through which alone I learn at a l l what 
freedom i s i n t h i s sense of 'ought,' unveils to me 
my formal f.reedom—-announces to me that I am i n 
bondage to sin.2 
""•Ibid., pp. 113ff. 
2 imil Brunner, The Divine ^mp,e.ratlve^ p. 74, quoted by 
H. D. Lewis, op. c i t . , p. 30. 
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I t i s easy to see that the above passage, apart 
from coming to a most extraordinary conclusion from the 
analysis of ought, c l e a r l y denies man's capacities f o r 
moral achievement v/ithout the grace of God. The argu-
ment i s based ^primarily on the sup"position that since the 
moral demand i s rooted I n t h e , w i l l of God, our capacity 
t o respond to t h i s demand must also come from the:- same 
source. In the words of H. IJ. Lewis, 
For the ascription of the alien categorical 
character of e t h i c a l demands d i r e c t l y to t h e i r 
o r i g i n i n the w i l l of God carries with i t also, 
as a r u l e , the curious but very persistent be-
l i e f that these demands are so foreign to our 
nature that v/e' can not i n any measure y i e l d 
them of our own v o l i t i o n , but only i n so f a r 
as the pov/er to obey i s also given us by God. 
Indeed i t i s frankly asserted that obligation 
i s not obligation proper unless i t i s alien i n 
both these senses.-^ 
The passage quoted from Brunner, "who i s considered a 
good example of the more moderate of the Continental the-
p 
ologians," i s not implying anything very d i f f e r e n t from 
what Lewis seems to be saying. I t w i l l be agreed that 
when the power to respond to the moral demand i s made 
subject to the grace of God, we are no more expecting 
from God the meve delegated freedom, which i s understand-
"''Lewis, op. c i t , , p. 29. 
^ I b i d . , p, 50. 
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able, but are malting m.orality i t s e l f depend on the w i l l of 
God, and thus deprive morality of the human significance 
and context. 
Grace as such, then, i t would appear, i s not par-
t i c u l a r l y conducive to human freedom and hence moral ef-
f o r t . V/hsb makes i t outrageous, hovjever, i s the a r b i t r a r i -
ness implied i n another doctrine, quite frequently associ-
ated with the t r a d i t i o n a l doctrine of Grace, namely, the 
doctrine of divine Election. This doctrine amounts to. 
saying that no matter what men do to be saved or redeemed, 
whether they w i l l r e a l l y be redeemed depends not on t h e i r 
e f f o r t but on the discretion of God. "Wot a l l v^ ho are 
called are chosen" r e f l e c t s the a r b i t r a r y mode i n which 
divine Election v;orks, and which at one stroke makes hu-
man e f f o r t and the moral freedom to achieve one's end a 
misnomer. I t was t h i s completely i r i ' a t i o n a l doctrine 
v/hich e l i c i t e d the following expression of b i t t e r abhor-
rence from J. S. M i l l : 
But there i s one moral contradiction inseparable 
from every form of C h r i s t i a n i t y , which no ingen-
u i t y can resolve, and no sophistry explain away. 
I t i s , that so precious a g i f t (grace), bestov/ed 
on a few, should have been v/ithheld from the 
many; that countless m i l l i o n s of human beings 
should have been allov/ed to l i v e and die, to sin 
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and suffer, without the one thing needful, the 
divine remedy f o r sin and suffering, which i t 
would have cost the Divine Giver as l i t t l e to 
have vouchsafed to a l l , as to have bestowed by 
special grace upon a favoured minority. 
This passage i s as much an indictment of divine i n j u s t i c e 
as of the i r r a t i o n a l i t y of the theory of grace and divine 
election, wnich reduces man's freedom and capacity to a 
chimera. 
Hinduism 
V/e nov/ return to the consideration of human free-
dom i n the context of Hinduism. Let us state at the out-
set that much of the d i f f i c u l t y caused by the concepts of 
sin and grace are not exclusive to Ch r i s t i a n i t y . Insofar 
as Hinduism, or sections of Hinduism, contribute to these 
b e l i e f s , they expose themselves to the same charges, 
though not necessarily to the same extent. For sin and 
grace, though forming s i g n i f i c a n t elements i n the devo-
t i o n a l c ults of Hinduism, v/hich, as w^e have seen, may be 
regarded as the more i n f l u e n t i a l and popular form of 'this 
f a i t h , do not have quite the same connotation i n Hinduism 
nor the same implications. 
•'•J. S. M i l l , Thr e e Essay s o n Religion (Longmans, Green, 
Reader and Dyer, London, 187477 P« 115• 
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Sin, f o r example, i s as much an obsession with 
some of the modern poet-saints of Hinduism as i t i s with 
Christian theologians. A perusal of some lines from 
poet-saints l i k e Dadu, Suradas or Tukaram w i l l convince 
us of t h i s . Dadu, i n one of his many moments of agonis-
ing self-appraisal, exclaims: 
I have neglected God's service: a s i n f u l servant am I ; 
There i s no other so f o u l as I am. 
I offend i n every act, I f a i l i n every duty, 
I sin against Thee every moment. Pardon my 
transgressions.1 
Tukarara, the Maharashtrian saint and poet, s i m i l a r l y de-
clares : 
Fallen of f a l l e n , t h r i c e f a l l e n am I ; 
But do Thou raise me by Thy pov/er, 
I have neither p u r i t y of heart, nor a f a i t h 
f i r m l y set at Thy fee t ; 
I am created out of si n , how o f t shall I 
repeat i t ? says Tuka.2 
Innumerable passages can be quoted from Suradas or Tul-
sidas or any of the other Bhakti-poets which dwell on the 
theme of sin and g u i l t i n r e l a t i o n to God. 
But l e t t h i s not b l i n d us to the fact that i n the 
t r a d i t i o n of the Hindus there i s no b e l i e f corresponding 
•'^ Quoted by John Mackenzie, Two Religions (Sutterworth 
Press, London, 1950), pp. 107f. 
p 
I b i d . , p. 
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to either Original Sin or Total Corruption, On the meta-
physical plane, i n f a c t , sin i s conceived as moral e v i l 
which i s a force to be reckoned with. This e v i l i s op-
posed to good, but the v i c t o r y of good i n the long run i s 
assured. Indi v i d u a l men can either promote or f r u s t r a t e 
t h i s ultimate v i c t o r y of good by opting f o r good or f o r 
e v i l . The stories of the battles between the gods and 
the demons (Devas and Asuras) are only symbolic represen-
t a t i o n s of the c o n f l i c t between good and e v i l . Hinduism, 
then, does admit the tremendous fact of sin and moral e v i l , 
but does not suggest that every man i s necessarily over-
powered by sin , except insofar as his previous l i f e and 
actions have created i n him a natural temptation f o r e v i l . 
But t h i s need not be universal. Sin i n the form of v/ick-
edness, selfishness and pride, the tendency to do e v i l , i s 
c e r t a i n l y recognised to be ingrained i n the human consti-
t u t i o n , but no more so than the tendency to do good. 'The 
Gitta, the f a c u l t y of v o l i t i o n , i s a store-house of good 
as well as bad impulses, and whether a man v / i l l d i r ect his 
Git_ta t o one or the other of these i s e n t i r e l y his ov;n 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Hence the t r a d i t i o n a l logic emphasis on 
the control of these impulses ( C l t t a - V r t t i ^ ), 
which leads to p u r i f i c a t i o n of the s e l f (Atmasuddhi), and 
thus, i n spite of the presence of e v i l as a force i n the 
269. 
very c o n s t i t u t i o n of man, whether a man w i l l actually 
"become a sinner or a saint i s a r e s u l t of his owi dis-
cretion. This explains the anguish i n the utterances of 
the poet-saints. They f e e l g u i l t y i n t h e i r own eyes and 
g u i l t y i n the presence of God because of t h e i r r e a l i s a -
t i o n that they could have directed a l l t h e i r energies to 
the love of God and to moral betterment, but have unfor-
tunately allowed t h e i r Gitta to be sv/ayed by s e l f i s h 
hankering. 
Sim i l a r l y , the Hindu doctrine of Grace, though a 
very dominant and almost universal feature, stands i n 
Juxtaposition to another equally i n f l u e n t i a l b e l i e f which 
has been held since the e a r l i e s t days and which runs con-
ti'ary t o the determinism implied i n the theory of Grace 
(Prasada or Anug;raha). This other b e l i e f i s the one that 
either by extreme penance or devotion the deity can be 
made to bestow lo v i n g l y his grace on the devotee or seek-
er. iVe have had occasions to refer to the b e l i e f i n 
grace i n the e a r l i e s t l i t e r a t u r e of the Hindus v/hich has 
continued to be an important feature of Hinduism. The 
passages quoted above from two of the Bhakti-poets w e l l 
i l l u s t r a t e the general Hindu a t t i t u d e . In f a c t , Ramanuja's 
follov;ers are divided i n t o tv;o schools holding two d i f f e r -
ent views of the operation of grace. These two views are 
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regarding 'i'ra'patti, that i s , hov; communion vjith God comes 
about. One school holds the view thac God, i n His mercy, 
picks the sinner as the cat picks i t s k i t t e n (iJar^jSra Nyaya); 
the other believes that God carries the sinner to be sure, 
but only v/hen the sinner or devotee has done what i s ex-
pected of hira, or i n other words, a c t i v e l y cooperates 
v;ith God, Just as the monkey carries i t s young baby only 
while the baby i s holding fast to i t s mother (Markata 
Myaya) • i ' h i s i s s t r i k i n g l y similar to the differences i n 
the Christian Church between Synergists and Monergists. 
I t must be said, however, that Hainanuja himself does not 
approve of Marjara Myaya, f o r i n his view t h i s gives r i s e 
to the dangerous doctrine of Dosabhogya, that God enjoys 
sin, since i t gives a larger scope f o r the display of His 
.grace.^ 
I t should be clear that grace has been as much a 
part of the dominant section of Hinduism as i t has been 
of C h r i s t i a n i t y , and therefore, the former should normally 
be subject to the same charges as the latten?. But i t must 
be added, however, that the insistence on preparation to 
receive grace, as i n Ramanuja and the school of Marjara 
Nyaya generally, restores to moral eff03?t the significance 
which i s b e l i t t l e d by the school of Harkata Hyaya. Grace, 
"^Eliot, op. c i t . , 11,256. 
2 l b i d . , p. 236. 
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on ;Ramanuja's account, then, i s not as damag;ing to moral 
e f f o r t and freedom as i t could have been. On t h i s viev/, 
grace i s no more the g i f t of a capricious God but the re-
vjard of devotion and moral e f f o r t . God does aid the de-
votee a f t e r a certain stage, but does not i n t e r f e r e vjith 
his normal a c t i v i t y or v/ith his freedom to decide f o r 
himself what course he i s going to take. 
Moreover, as we mentioned e a r l i e r , the doctrine 
of grace and i t s deterministic note i s tempea^jOd by the 
other b e l i e f that the dei t y can be pursuaded or even com-
pelled by one means or another. This rather unusual doc-
t r i n e , v;hich forms the basic theme of Hatha Yoga, has i t s 
roots i n the Vedic idea of Tap as v/hich s i g n i f i e d that by 
s p i r i t u a l penance, self-abnegation and s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e i t 
vjas possible to compel the gods to bow down to the villi of 
the aspirant. I t i s as a consequence of t h i s b e l i e f , 
again, that Hindu devotees i n t h e i r exuberance sometimes 
take recourse to the alt e r n a t i v e of compelling the deity 
by genuine devotion and self-denial i n i t s extreme form. 
I t i s true that such techniques have often degenerated into 
queer aberrations and indiscretions, but that i s another 
matter. As f a r as human freedom i s concerned, one can on-
l y complain of excess of i t rather than lack of i t . God's 
grace i s neither denied nor underrated; but i t i s pr i m a r i l y 
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the human power to invoke t h i s grace that i s underlined 
by "chese b e l i e f s . I t appears, then, that the Hindu con-
cept of gjrace sheds o f f much of i t s unsavoury colour as 
a r e s u l t of the impact of the concepts of Tapes and l o -
gic s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e . 
But the above account need not be taken to imply 
that there i s nothing i n Hindu doctrine to undermine hu-
man freedom. There are tv;o concepts universally accepted 
i n Hinduism (also Buddhism and Jainiam) which threaten to 
jeoi^ardize the Hindu' s b e l i e f i n self-autonomy and human 
freedom. These tv/o are the doctrines of Avidya or AjnSna 
(ignorance) and the Law of Karma. These two are i n t e r r e -
l a t e d t o such an extent that a discussion of one would 
alv;ays involve that of the other. But i n spite of t h i s 
d i f f i c u l t y , we intent to consider the implications of the 
doctrine of Avidya, or ignorance, f i r s t . 
Ignorance, i n the broadest sense, means the lack 
of knowledge or r e a l i s a t i o n of the true nature of things, 
more s p e c i f i c a l l y of the s e l f , which i s especially re-
f l e c t e d i n man's i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of his Itman with the 
body-mind organism and the consequent perversion of values. 
Freedom from such ignorance, negatively, and the acquire-
ment of genuine discriminatory knov^/ledge or wisdom (Yiveka 
Jnana), p o s i t i v e l y , i s the most important condition of 
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freedom from bondage, or of l i b e r a t i o n . Though there are 
many d i f f e r e n c e s of opinion amongst various schools of 
Hindu thought as t o the exact nature, status and the ex-
t e n t of i t s consequences, i t may be unanimously accepted 
t h a t AvidyH i s a k i n d of p r i m o r d i a l elerhent i n the very 
c o n s t i t u t i o n of the universe which may, and i n f a c t does, 
lead a man t o a confusion between the essence and the ap-
IJearance of t h i n g s , and thereby creates a d i s t o r t i o n of 
the g oal o f human l i f e . I n a sense i t i s possible t o com-
pare Avidya w i t h O r i g i n a l Sin, as t r o f e s s o r Smart appeal's 
t o do,"*" i n s o f a r as both ( " O r i g i n a l " ) Ayldya .and O r i g i n a l 
Sin r e f e r t o a transcendent s t a t e t o which i t i s man's duty 
t o r e t u r n . But t h i s comparison cannot go very f a r . Avidya, 
as we s a i d e a r l i e r , i s a cosmic p r i n c i p l e which does not 
come i n t o being as a r e s u l t of human i n d i s c r e t i o n as does 
s i n i n the B i b l i c a l account. Avidya i s p r i o r t o man. More-
over, i t n e i t h e r i m p l i e s t o t a l and inescapable c o r r u p t i o n 
nor i n h e r i t e d c o r r u p t i o n , f o r we can pi e r c e through the 
v e i l of Avidya and a t t a i n l i b e r a t i o n . Besides, whereas i n 
the case of Avidya knowledge i s the anti d o t e (although 
t h i s i s not £rj.£iarlly the knowledge of good and e v i l ) , i n 
the case of O r i g i n a l Sin i t i s the very cause of the a i l -
• ^ i n i a n Smart, A Dialogue o f j ^ e l i g i o n s (SCM Press L t d . , London, 1960), p. 527 
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ment. i%n's knowledge of good and e v i l or his atte^upt to 
have i t i s , as we have seen, the cause of the F a l l . I t 
seems, then, that the comparison betvjeen Avidya and Ori-
g i n a l Sin cannot go beyond a certain l i m i t . 
In any case, t h i s conception of A v i d ^ or Ajnana 
as an ultimate cosmic p r i n c i p l e i s more philosophical than 
popular. There i s yet another, more popular, sense of 
Ajnana i n which i t i s treated as an empirical phenomenon, 
that i s , as r e s u l t i n g from man's own carelessness and sloth. 
As we have seen, Hinduism regards the soul or Atman to be 
an essentially s p i r i t u a l p r i n c i p l e d i s t i n c t from the body, 
the mind and the sense organs. The body i s merely a ve-
h i c l e of the soul. Though t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between the 
se l f and the not-self i s blurred by Avidya i n i t s primary 
sense, AvidyS i n i t s secondary sense makes the d i s t i n c t i o n 
even hazier and i n f i n i t e l y more d i f f i c u l t to grasp. Since 
the soul i s always perceived to l i v e and act through the 
body, the unsuspecting, i n a l e r t man fux-ther confuses the 
two. Not only i s the d i s t i n c t i o n i t s e l f but even the w i l l 
to acquire knov/ledge of the d i s t i n c t i o n l o s t . Once t h i s 
happens, we become subject to the passions and desires of 
the body to an extent which makes us completely oblivious 
of the r e a l natu.re of the Atman, and we are deluded by 
false values. We then go on l i v i n g a l i f e of egotism. 
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s e l f i s h n e s s and p r i d e , and worst of a l l , have an unhealthy 
c r a v i n g f o r the pleasures of the world. Through such 
s e l f i s h and l u s t f u l l i v i n g we become subject t o the inex-
orable Law of Karma, which, without our being aware of i t , 
g r a d u a l l y determines and moulds our f u t u r e existence i n 
tune w i t h our present d i s p o s i t i o n s . 
But l e t us not f o r g e t t h a t Avidya, though begin-
n i n g l e s s (anSdi), has an end (sa n t a ) . I t i s t r u e t h a t once 
we have f a l l e n a v i c t i m of ignorance, i t w i l l d e f i n i t e l y 
have a momentum of i t s own whereby we may continue t o be 
under delusion f o r a time. But i t i s always, a t l e a s t 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y , w i t h i n our power t o put an end t o t h i s pro-
cess. Indeed even while the process i s i n operation, we 
are never a l t o g e t h e r incapable of seeing through t h i s per-
n i c i o u s s e l f - d e c e p t i o n , because the soul, however concealed, 
never a c t u a l l y deserts us. At any p o i n t of time we can r e -
assert our w i l l and acquire knowledge or wisdom which w i l l 
r e s t o r e the proper perspective. Thus the soul i s f r e e i n 
a l l o ther respects and at a l l times except i n i t s descent 
i n t o the world-process (Sa.msara). 
But i t may be asked w i t h ample j u s t i f i c a t i o n : What 
about the wrong or e v i l we d i d while we were under the 
s p e l l of ignorance? Can we undo the e v i l t h a t was gener-
ated by our wrong judgment and actions? This question 
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b r i n g s us t o the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the Law of Karma. This 
Law, we have seen, i s the counterpart i n the moral f i e l d 
of the Law of Conservation of Energy. This i m p l i e s t h a t 
whatever a c t i o n s we perform—good or bad—generate cer-
t a i n potencies, p r i m a r i l y i n the foi-m of d i s p o s i t i o n s , so 
t h a t i t i s impossible f o r us t o escape the consequences of 
our a c t i o n s . The a c t i o n s , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t a man performed 
while under the s p e l l of ignorance w i l l d e f i n i t e l y lead 
him t o reap the consequences e i t h e r i n the present l i f e or 
i n the l i f e hei'-eafter. I t i s these t h a t w i l l determine 
what the circumstances of h i s next l i f e are going t o be. 
The f a c t t h a t he has now been able t o r e a l i s e the t r u e na-
t u r e of the Atman w i l l prevent him from f u r t h e r s e l f i s h 
and i n t e r e s t e d conduct, but i t cannot annul the consequen-
ces of what he has already done. By t h i s transformed per-
spective, he may prevent the accumulation of f r e s h Karmas 
(Sanciyamana Karmas), and he may also stop the operation 
of the Karmas which have been accumulated already but have 
not y e t s t a r t e d o p e r a t i n g (Sancita Karmas), but the Karmas 
t h a t are already i n operation (Prarabdha Kariiia.s) w i l l com-
p e l hira t o undergo a c e r t a i n k i n d of l i f e — f o r b e t t e r or 
f o r worse—depending on what h i s past actions have been 
l i k e . 
Now t h i s has sometimes been i n t e r p r e t e d as imply-
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i n g determinism. The argument advanced i s very s i m i l a r 
t o the one summarised by us e a r l i e r i n the words of Mor~ 
i t z S c hlick. Since our present nature and d i s p o s i t i o n s , 
i t i s argued, as w e l l as the co n d i t i o n s of our existence, 
have already been determined by our previous b i r t h , do 
we r e a l l y have any choice between good and e v i l ? Are we 
not being d r i v e n by our nature t o do whatever we do? We 
are, the argument runs, slaves t o our d i s p o s i t i o n s and 
circumstances, which are completely beyond our c o n t r o l . 
This apparently does sound d e t e r m i n i s t i c , but c a r e f u l r e -
f l e c t i o n does not s u s t a i n t h i s n o t i o n . There are two con-
s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t go against a d e t e r m i n i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of the Law of Karma. I n the f i r s t place, we have t o r e -
cognise t h a t p r e c i s e l y because of t h i s law i s introduced 
i n t o the moral f i e l d the element of causation which, we 
have agreed, i s a must f o r assigning r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
a c t i o n s . I n the words of Dr. Radhakrishnan, 
I t ( t he Law of Karma) i s the p r i n c i p l e of science 
vjhich displaces b e l i e f i n magic or the theory t h a t 
we can manipulate the forces of the world at our 
pleasure. The course of nature i s determined not 
by the passions and pr e j u d i c e s of personal s p i r i t s 
l i a r k i n g behind i t but by the operation of im-
mutable laws. 
The Law of Karma, i n f a c t , guarantees t h a t we s h a l l get 
•^Radhakrishnan, hindu^Vi^ew p. 52. 
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what we have deserved, and thus r u l e s out the element of 
chance. I t i s not the freedom of conduct t h a t t h i s law 
denies but the freedom from causation. 
I t seems, then, t h a t determinism i n the sense of 
compulsion can be read i n t o t h i s law only on a very d i s -
t o r t e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the working of t h i s law. I f we 
have l e d a g e n e r a l l y bad l i f e i n the past, i t i s c e r t a i n 
t h a t we s h a l l have a g e n e r a l l y e v i l d i s p o s i t i o n as also 
other impending circumstances appropriate t o such a d i s -
p o s i t i o n . But unless one has been the d e v i l himself, h i s 
character w i l l never be q u i t e so depraved and perverse as 
t o make i t impossible f o r him t o see a t any stage whatever 
what the good l i f e was. This leaves the p o s s i b i l i t y of a 
change of heart a l t o g e t h e r open. I f at any time e i t h e r 
due t o a sudden f l a s h of i n s i g h t or due t o r e v e l a t i o n or 
i n s t r u c t i o n one came t o r e a l i s e the e v i l character of h i s 
l i f e , i t would always be w i t h i n h i s power t o s t r i v e f o r 
the b e t t e r . I n short, i t i s always possible f o r the bad 
man t o transform h i s conduct and thereby t o create b e t t e r 
c o n d i t i o n s f o r himself i n any f u t u r e existence. I f t h i s 
transformed man takes up the good l i f e i n r i g h t earnest, 
i t w i l l be only a matter of time before he w i l l be ready 
f o r f i n a l l i b e r a t i o n . For the Law of Karma, i n the u l t i -
mate a n a l y s i s , i s not q u i t e so unsparing as b l i n d law. 
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For t h i s i s not a b l i n d law. I t i s governed and adminis-
tered by a l i v i n g and personal God. To quote Dr. Radha-
krishnan again, "Karma i s not a mechanical p r i n c i p l e but 
a s p i r i t u a l necessity. I t i s the embodiment of the mind 
and w i l l of God. God i s i t s supervisor (Karmadhyaksah). 
Sometimes the objection against the Law of Karma 
i s presented i n a s l i g h t l y modified language. I t i s ar-
gued that since (due to the opei'-ation of Karma) every ac-
t i o n performed—even good ones—must generate potencies 
which involve us i n the cycle of b i r t h s and deaths (Sam-
sara) and thereby at least delay our l i b e r a t i o n ; a per-
son who i s anxious f o r l i b e r a t i o n w i l l i n effect f i n d 
t h i s law rather obstructing and to that extent l i m i t i n g 
his freedom. The best thing, therefore, that a seeker of 
l i b e r a t i o n would be advised to do would be to give up ac-
t i o n altogether. Unfortunately, such an int e r p r e t a t i o n of 
t h i s law seems to be implied i n the school of Shamkax'a 
Vedanta, which prescribes a l i f e a i n a c t i v i t y or M v r t t i 
f o r the seeker of l i b e r a t i o n . But we have seen that Kiv-
r t t i need not mean i n a c t i v i t y , but only disinterested dis-
charge of duties as prescribed by the Gita. For i t i s not 
action that binds but only attachment to results. "He who 
v/orks, having given up attachment, resigning his actions 
"^Ibid., p. 53. 
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to God, i s not touched by sin, even as lotus leaf ( i s 
untouched) by water. 
•^GltS, Y,10. 
Chapter V I I . 
MORAL miLURE AND RESPONSIBILITY 
In the la s t chapter we stated that our discussion 
of freedom was only a preliminary to our consideration of 
the various problems raised by the concept of responsibil-
i t y . For only a responsible ap^ent can be regarded as a 
properly moral agent, and freedom i s a v i t a l , i f not the 
sole, condition of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . In the present chapter, 
then, we s h a l l merely be carrying forward the discussion 
we undertook i n the previous one vdth, of course, specific 
reference to r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . This would involve an anal-
ysis of the concept of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n order t o f i n d out 
precisely the conditions of moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , and then 
the examination of whether, hov; and to what extent the con-
cept of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s consistent with the theological 
presupx>ositions of C h r i s t i a n i t y and Hinduism. 
That both C h r i s t i a n i t y and Iiind.uism generally sub-
scribe to human r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r moral f a i l u r e can hai-d-
l y be questioned. We have already seen that i n either of 
these systems there i s the b e l i e f i n an order of values and 
i n a Moral Law which demands unconditional allegiance. 
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Any deflection from the path of duty gives r i s e to what 
i n r e l i g i o u s terminology i s called sin. There may be, 
and i n fact there are, some minor differences i n the 
Christian and Hindu conceptions of sin. But despite these 
differences, sin i s generally regarded as'identical with 
moral f a i l u r e ("moral" being used i n the widest sense, i n -
cluding r e l i g i o u s and sacramental duties) and i s supposed 
to be the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of man. I f t h i s were not so, the 
system of rewards and punishments—of which the best known 
are heaven and h e l l respectively—which both C h r i s t i a n i t y 
and Hinduism lay down w i l l hardly make sense. The ques-
t i o n , then, i s not whether i n fact Christian and Hindu 
ethics hold men responsible f o r moral f a i l u r e but whether 
they can r e a l l y do so i n consistency with t h e i r r e l i g i o u s 
doctrines, and i f so, to what extent. 
This question, however, cannot be answered unless 
we know what r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the context of morality 
means. William Frankena mentions "at least three kinds 
of cases" i n which we " a t t r i b u t e moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to 
certain agents".'"'" 
(1) We sometimes say, i n recommending X, that he 
i s responsible or i s a responsible person, mean-
ing to say something morally favourable about 
his character. (2) We also say, where Y i s a 
"''Prankena, Ethics, p. 55« 
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past action or crime, that I was and i s respon-
sible f o r i t . (3) F i n a l l y , we say that X i s 
responsible f o r Y, where Y i s something s t i l l 
to be done, meaning that he has the responsibil-
i t y f o r doing i t . l 
Commenting on these three senses of the word "responsibil-
i t y , " he goes on to say that when we state that X i s res-
ponsible i n the f i r s t sense, we simply mean to say that X 
can be counted on to carry out his r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . Res-
p o n s i b i l i t y i n t h i s sense i s a "second-order t r a i t " which 
we ou.ght to c u l t i v a t e . Saying that X has certain respon-
s i b i l i t i e s , i n the t h i r d sense, i s simply to say that he 
has obligations, "either because of his o f f i c e or because 
of his previous commitments to do certain things, and 
hence i s a s t r a i g h t normative judgment of obligation." 
The p a r t i c u l a r meaning of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y which raises pro-
blems of an i n t e r e s t i n g and controversial kind i s the 
second one of the three senses mentioned above. For here 
the question that immediately arises i s : "Under what con-
d i t i o n s i s i t correct or r i g h t to judge or say that X was 
responsible f o r Y?" 
I t i s t h i s — t h e second of the three senses o f res-
p o n s i b i l i t y mentioned a'QOve—which i s of special interest 
to us, and accordingly we intend to confine our discussion 
•"•Ibid., p. 55. 
'^Ibid., pp. 55f-
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t o t h i s sense only. About t h i s p a r t i c u l a r sense Prankena 
r i g h t l y asserts t h a t 
To say t h a t X i s responsible f o r Y i s not merely 
t o make a causal statement of a s p e c i a l k i n d . 
Neither i s i t simply a statement t h a t X was able 
t o do Y, as the 'ible' ending suggests. S u f f i x e s 
l i k e ' i b l e ' and 'able' do not always indicate-j^ 
a b i l i t y . They may have a normative meaning. 
The r e a l meaning of a statement l i k e X was responsible f o r 
Y, he says, i s something l i k e " I t would be r i g h t t o hold 
X responsible f o r Y and t o blame or Qtherwise punish him." 
This accords v/ith the views of most contemporax'y t h i n k e r s . 
M e r i t z S c h l i c k , f o r example, i s of the opinion t h a t the 
question regarding r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s the question: "Who, 
i n a given case, i s t o be punished? Who i s t o be consid-
ered the t r u e wrongdoer?" S i m i l a r l y , H. D. Lewis asserts 
t h a t "the etymology of t h i s word suggests t h a t i t means 
' l i a b i l i t y t o answer', t h i s being, of course, l i a b i l i t y t o 
answer t-o a charge, w i t h the i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t i f the an-
sv/er i s not s a t i s f a c t o r y a penalty w i l l be i n c u r r e d . "^'" 
Thus i t i s c l e a r t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s meaningful only i n 
the context of punishment. The punishment, however, need 
"''Ibid., p. 56. 
"^ I b i d . , p. 56 (emphasis mine). 
^ S c h l i c k , op. c i t . , p. 152. 
•^*'H. D. Lewis, Morals and ..Revelation (George A l l e n and Unv/in 
L t d . , London, 19517, "p" 108. 
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not always "be i n the form of l e g a l or s o c i a l sanction, as, 
f o r example, imprisonment or ostracism; q u i t e o f t e n i t may 
be only an expression or disappi''Oval or a judgment blaming 
the agent f o r h i s f a i l u r e . 
I n other words, the determination of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
i s the same as the act of apportioning: -praise or blame t o 
whomever v;e consider t o be the r e a l agent or doer of a 
c e r t a i n act. I t should not be d i f f i c u l t t o see t h a t res-
p o n s i b i l i t y , then, has an e s s e n t i a l l y human context. I t 
would be p l a i n l y r i d i c u l o u s t o blame animals f o r any of 
t h e i r (what v7e might c a l l ) misdeeds. Similarly, there would 
be no p o i n t i n t a k i n g t o task f o r t h e i r f a i l u r e s insanes, 
i d i o t s or i n f a n t s . The f i r s t c o n d i t i o n , then, of respon-
s i b i l i t y i s self-consciousness. Only those persons can be 
held responsible who know what they are doing so t h a t even 
a normal human being can hard l y be blamed f o r what he has 
been doing i n a hypnotic trance. S i m i l a r l y , i f a person 
has been f o r c e d t o commit an offence at the p o i n t of a gun, 
we would r a t h e r sympathise w i t h t h i s unfortunate v i c t i m 
than censure him. fhus the two con d i t i o n s of being res-
ponsible would seem t o be: f i r s t l y , t h a t the agent had 
the capacity t o do i t ; and secondly, t h a t he i n f a c t d i d i t 
without any e x t e r n a l pressure or compulsion, t h a t i s , he 
d i d i t v o l u n t a r i l y , knowlingly or i n t e n t i o n a l l y . 
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A r i s t o t l e ' s observations i n t h i s respect are s t i l l 
eminently acceptable. According t o him an i n d i v i d u a l i s 
responsible for, h i s act only when 
(1) i t s cause i s i n t e r n a l t o him, i . e . , he i s not 
compelled t o act by someone or something e x t e r n a l 
t o hiffl, and (2) h i s doing i t i s not a r e s u l t of 
any ignorance ivhich he has not brought about by 
h i s own previous choices.^ 
I t seems, then, t h a t the two conditions of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
are ( l ) a conscious motive t o perform a c e r t a i n a ct, and 
(2) the freedom of choice and capacity t o perform i t . 
This question of freedom, we pointed out i n the previous 
chapter, has given r i s e t o the problems of determinism or 
indeterminism versus r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I'here have been 
those who b e l i e v e t h a t determinism i s opposed t o the very 
concept of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , whereas there have been others 
who have asserted e q u a l l y emphatically t h a t i t i s i n d e t e r -
minism v/hich i s d e s t r u c t i v e of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I n the 
h i s t o r y of philosophy so much has been w r i t t e n f o r and 
against e i t h e r of the p a r t i e s i n t h i s controversy t h a t i t 
i s c l e a r l y im'possible f o r us t o analyse the merits of the 
re s p e c t i v e cases i n any d e t a i l . Kor, fox-tunately, i s i t 
necessary f o r us t o do so. We have s t a t e d i n the chapter 
"'"Aristotle, Nicomachean E t h i c s , 111,1, summarised by 
Frankena, op. c i t . , p. 56. 
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on freedom t h a t much of t h i s problem has been grounded 
on misconceptions and confusions i n the use of terms. We 
have made our own p o s i t i o n c l e a r . Determinism as e x t e r n a l 
compulsion, we said, i s c e r t a i n l y a n t i t h e t i c a l t o freedom; 
but determinism i n the sense of causation or causal con-
n e c t i o n between motive and a c t i o n and between one's char-
a c t e r and h i s motives i s not only not opposed t o freedom 
but i s the absolute c o n d i t i o n of freedom. On t h i s — t h e 
l a t t e r meaning of d e t e r m i n i s m — i t i s not determinism but 
indeterminism which destroys r e s p o n s i b i l i t y by denying 
any necessary connection betv/een character, motive and ac-
t i o n . 
V/ith t h i s p r e l i m i n a r y examination of the meaning 
of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and i t s c o n d i t i o n s , i t should now be 
po s s i b l e f o r us t o examine the main question of t h i s chap-
t e r , i . e . , how f a r the t h e o l o g i c a l presuppositions of 
C h r i s t i a n i t y and Ilinduism allow r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o be a 
meaningful concept. Part of the answer t o t h i s question 
has already been provided by our discussion i n the pre-
vious chapter, li'reedom i n the sense of lack of compul-
s i o n , and not of indeterminism, ,being a c o n d i t i o n of res-
p o n s i b i l i t y , those d o c t r i n e s of C h r i s t i a n i t y and Hinduism 
which i n t e r f e r e w i t h human freedom i n t h i s genuine sense 
are t o t h a t extent d e t r i m e n t a l t o the concept of responsi-
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b i l i t y . Thus our task i n t h i s chapter w i l l mainly consist 
i n r e l a t i n g our observations i n the previous chapter spec-
i f i c a l l y t o the problem of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . This, however, 
v / i l l be supplemented by consideration of some other issues 
which a r i s e i n connection w i t h r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and t o 
which we had no occasion t o r e f e r i n the previous chapter. 
O r i g i n a l Sin and R e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
In the l i g h t of what we said about s i n e a r l i e r on 
there can be no question, at l e a s t on the face of t h i n g s , 
t h a t s i n i n v o l v e s human r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I f s i n means mor-
a l f a i l u r e — a l b e i t i n the wider sense which includes i n -
g r a t i t u d e t o God—then man can h a r d l y disown r e s p o n s i b i l -
i t y f o r i t . But the p o s i t i o n i s not q u i t e so simple as 
i t may at f i r s t sound. Complications begin t o a r i s e as 
soon as the connotation of s i n i s extended beyond empir-
i c a l and a c t u a l moral f a i l u r e t o include what sounds more 
l i k e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l defect and i n c a p a c i t y . And O r i g i n a l 
Sin i s c e r t a i n l y of the l a t t e r order. Let us, t h e r e f o r e , 
work out the i m p l i c a t i o n s of O r i g i n a l Sin f o r r e s p o n s i b i l -
i t y . 
(a) C h r i s t i a n i t y 
We have seen t h a t of the manifold c o r o l l a r i e s of 
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the d o c t r i n e of O r i g i n a l Sin two t r a d i t i o n a l l y important 
ones are those of T o t a l Corruption and I n h e r i t e d G u i l t or 
I n h e r i t e d Corruption. Leaving I n h e r i t e d G u i l t aside f o r 
the time being, i t does not take much e f f o r t t o r e a l i s e , 
e s p e c i a l l y i n the l i g h t of our d e t a i l e d discussion i n 
the previous chapter t h a t T o t a l Corruption, i f accepted, 
makes a mockery of human r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . For i t denies 
both c o n d i t i o n s of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I f man i s n a t u r a l l y 
t o t a l l y c o r r u p t , he does not only lack the power or f r e e -
dom t o opt f o r the good but also the basic minimum of the 
av/areness of good. I n other words, he i s no b e t t e r than 
the brute or the insane whose capacity t o apprehend the 
good i s as l i m i t e d as h i s capacity t o achieve the good. 
This t r a g i c i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s d o c t r i n e has been r e a l i s e d 
i n modei^n times s u f f i c i e n t l y w e l l t o encourage milder ver-
sions of t h i s d o c t r i n e , i f not always the absolute r e j e c -
t i o n of i t . We have seen t h a t most modern scholars and 
theologians of C h r i s t i a n i t y refuse t o read any d o c t r i n e of 
G?otal Corruption i n O r i g i n a l Sin. One very cogent argu-
ment f o r r e j e c t i n g t h i s b e l i e f i s 'put forward by Niebuhr, 
whose opinion i n t h i s context we have quoted elsewhere. 
He argues t h a t " I t i s human freedom, i n other words, cre-
ated by the transcendence of reason over impulse, which 
makes s i n possible. Therefore, i f man i s t o t a l l y corrupt 
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he i s not s i n f u l at a l l . " " ' " I'hat i s t o say t h a t there 
seems t o be a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n v o l v e d betv/een t o t a l cor-
r u p t i o n and s i n f u l n e s s . S i n f u l , as an a d j e c t i v e of moral 
dis a p p r o v a l , i m p l i e s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a c e r t a i n course 
of a c t i o n , and i t would t o t h a t extent be misapplied t o 
men i f , by nature, they were t o t a l l y corrupt. 
But the f a c t remains t h a t t h i s b e l i e f has been an 
important r e f r a i n i n much of t r a d i t i o n a l C h r i s t i a n t h i n k -
i n g . Moreover, vje have also seen t h a t even the modern i n -
t e r p r e t a t i o n s of O r i g i n a l Sin, e s p e c i a l l y undertaii'en t o 
r u l e out t o t a l c o r r u p t i o n , do not e n t i r e l y succeed i n sub-
s t a n t i a l l y improving the p o s i t i o n . We have examined i n 
the previous chapter the attem.pts of Kiebuhr and vJhale, 
f o r example, and have found t h a t howsoever anxious they 
have been t o r u l e out t o t a l c o r r u p t i o n , they have been 
somehow prevented from doing so by the immense wdght and 
emphasis t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l C h r i s t i a n i t y has attached t o the 
f a c t of s i n . O r i g i n a l Sin might not'mean t o t a l cori-up-
t i o n , but n e i t h e r can i t mean the simple f a c t of man's oc-
cas i o n a l temptation or i n c l i n a t i o n t o s i n . I n f a c t i t 
must mean much more than t h a t i f the place of Sin i n 
C h r i s t i a n t h i n k i n g i s t o be adequately accounted f o r . 
"'"Wiebuhr, •iin_J.nter£r p. 101. 
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Thus O r i g i n a l Sin, i t seems, cannot imply anything f a r 
short of t o t a l c o r r u p t i o n . And the room l e f t f o r moral 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y can only be p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o the degree 
of c o r r u p t i o n t h i s d o c t r i n e i m p l i e s . 
(b) Hinduism 
The Hindu conception of s i n , e s p e c i a l l y the Vedic, 
has been very o f t e n misunderstood. I t has been f r e q u e n t l y 
argued by some Western scholars t h a t Hinduism i n f a c t does 
not have the same awareness of s i n , and, even when there 
i s some awareness, s i n i s understood i n a "quasi-physical" 
way, i . e . , i t i s regarded as a k i n d of substance i b a t i n g 
i n the atmosphere, as i t were, which j u s t attaches i t s e l f 
t o i n d i v i d u a l s and t h e r e f o r e need not s i g n i f y any responsi-
b i l i t y . Moreover, i t i s sa i d , the Hindu considers s i n i n 
the m a t e r i a l context, t h a t i s , he i s averse t o s i n only be-
cause he f e e l s t h a t wrong-doing leads t o m a t e r i a l advers-
i t y . Most of t h i s c r i t i c i s m seems t o d i s p l a y such an u t t e r 
and c o l o s s a l ignorance of the f a c t s t h a t i t can hard l y de-
serve any reasoned answer. V/e have seen elsewhere t h a t 
the l e a d i n g medieval and modern poet-saints of I n d i a show 
an awareness, i n f a c t an obsession, w i t h s i n which i p hard-
l y any d i f f e r e n t from the C h r i s t i a n awareness of s i n . As 
f a r as the Vedic idea of s i n i s concerned, the acute and 
p a i n s t a k i n g a n a l y s i s of Henry Lefever, i n h i s book The 
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Vedic Idea of Sin, s y s t e m a t i c a l l y r e f u t e s almost a l l the 
misinformed c r i t i c i s m we have noted above. 
Examining Hopkins' opinion t h a t "the t r a n s l a t o r s 
have i n j e c t e d i n t o Kga Veda more consciousness of s i n than 
r e a l l y attaches t o i t , " Lefever has t h i s t o say: "I'o r e -
gard a d v e r s i t y as the i n e v i t a b l e consequence of s i n i s t o 
d i s p l a y , not a weak, but an exceedingly v i v i d , conscious-
ness of the g r a v i t y of sin.""*" And again, "Bo v i v i d l y i s 
the g r a v i t y and power of s i n r e a l i s e d , t h a t e v i l i s regarded 
as an o b j e c t i v e f o r c e i n the world, callable of leading men 
ast r a y (Rga Veda, 1,189,1; X,57,12), or of rebounding upon 
the wicked t o h i s own h u r t (Rga Veda, 1,1-^1-7,-4-; VI,51,7)."^ 
'Ihis l a s t observation about e v i l being an o b j e c t i v e f o r c e 
i n the world i s q u i t e i n consonance w i t h our remark i n the 
e a r l i e r chapter t h a t Hinduism juxtaposes e v i l as a force 
as opposed t o good i n which, of course, the u l t i m a t e v i c -
t o r y of good i s assured. Whether a man w i l l help the v i c -
t o r y of good by a c t i n g r i g h t l y or w i l l delay and obstruct 
i t by t u r n i n g v/icked i s e n t i r e l y h i s own' choice, and, the r e -
f o r e , h i s own r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I h i s should help t o put the 
Hindu view of s i n i n the c o r r e c t perspective, and r e f u t e 
the charges about the lac k of awareness of s i n and about 
"''Lefever, op. c i t . , p. 18. 
" ^ I b i d . , p. 19. 
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i t s m a t e r i a l context. 
There i s , however, one p o i n t i n which the Vedic 
idea of s i n may j u s t l y be regarded as d i f f e r e n t from the 
- B i b l i c a l .one. Commenting on a verse quoted from the Hga 
Veda (Ref. 1,25,1-3), Lefever says: 
There i s i n t h i s passage a f u l l consciousness of 
g u i l t and a r e a l i s a t i o n of i t s consequences un-
l e s s God's mercy i s obtained. But there i s no 
personal sense of shame before a God who i s him-
s e l f wronged by the s i n . I t i s the confession 
of g u i l t made by a c r i m i n a l before a k i n g or 
judge who i s the custodian of the law which has 
been i n f r i n g e d . The a t t i t u d e expressed i n the 
words, 'Against thee, thee only, have I sinned 
and done t h i s e v i l i n t h y s i g h t ' , i s l a c k i n g . ! 
Perhaps t h i s i s c o r r e c t . And the explanation why t h i s i s , 
or should be, so i s o f f e r e d by Lefever himself i n a l a t e r 
passage. The explanation foi-" t h i s i s t h a t according t o 
the Vedic conception, the Gods 
are ' chai\ioteers of r t a , ' guarding the transcend-
ent cosmic Law by means of t h e i r s t a t u t e s . These 
s t a t u t e s have thus t h e i r o r i g i n , not so much i n 
the pure w i l l of the Gods, as i n the transcendent 
r t a . Therefore, the breach of such s t a t u t e s i s 
not so much a personal offence against the Gods 
as a v i o l a t i o n o f t h e r t a , v/hich the Gods p r o t e c t . 
The sole duty of the Gods, as gLiardians of r t a , 
i s t o punish the v i o l a t i o n or t o reward the*keep-
i n g of r t a . I t i s i n r e l a t i o n t o t h i s o f f i c e t h a t 
the a t t i t u d e of the sinner towards the Gods must 
be understood.2 
I b i d . , p. 20. 
I b i d . , p. 20. 
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I h i s i n s i g h t i n t o the basic f a c t prevents Lefever from 
the mistake of j u d g i n g the Hindu conception of s i n from 
the C h r i s t i a n standpoint, v/hich g e n e r a l l y characterises 
some other w r i t e r s ' views. Every conception of s i n need 
not be modelled on the C h r i s t i a n p a t t e r n . The important 
t h i n g t o look f o r i s whether s i n has a moral context and 
whether men can be held responsible f o r i t . I t seems 
t h a t t h i s c o n d i t i o n i s e n t i r e l y s a t i s f i e d . Rta i s the mor-
a l law and infringement of t h i s lavj i s s i n f u l , and since 
man i s f r e e t o e i t h e r obey t h i s law or t o i n f r i n g e upon 
i t , he i s obviously answerable. 
Moreover, t h i s Vedic conception of s i n does t o an 
extent undergo m o d i f i c a t i o n s i n the Bhakti schools. Ihe 
passages t h a t we quoted from the poet-saints i n the l a s t 
chapter unmistakably manifest the same sense of anguish 
and g u i l t i n the presence of the Deity which generally 
characterises the C h r i s t i a n conception of s i n . But l e t us 
not f o r g e t t h a t even when the Hindu conception of s i n 
comes so close t o the C h r i s t i a n , i t i s never r e a l l y i d e n t -
i c a l w i t h i t . Ihe intimacy and the confidence t h a t the 
Hindu Blriakta experiences i n h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p v/ith the De-
i t y makes the dependence on God less than c r i p p l i n g , and 
t o t h a t extent more conducive t o human r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
I n any case, as we have seen e a r l i e r , there i s no 
conception i n Hinduism resembling O r i g i n a l Sin or l o t a l 
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Corruption. The suggested p a r a l l e l between O r i g i n a l Sin 
and Avidya (ignorance), as v;e pointed out i n the l a s t 
chapter, cannot r e a l l y go very f a r . Avidya i s c e r t a i n l y 
an o b j e c t i v e f o r c e which t e m p o r a r i l y clouds the nature of 
r e a l i t y , thereby causing the soul t o get i n v o l v e d i n Sam-
sara. But i t i s p r i m a r i l y of the nature of an intelleiE:tual 
e r r o r . I t i s only Avidya i n i t s secondary sense t h a t r e -
l a t e s t o the w i l l proper. I t would, t h e r e f o r e , be absurd 
t o deduce anything l i k e t o t a l c o r r u p t i o n from Ayidya, es-
p e c i a l l y since i t operates i n the context of knowledge 
r a t h e r than of the w i l l . I t can conceal and d i s t o r t the 
r e a l nature of t h i n g s , thereby i n d i r e c t l y and i n a second-
ary sense, engendering f a l s e values; but i t does not d i -
r e c t l y imply any i n e v i t a b l e c o r r u p t i o n of the w i l l . By 
a p p l i c a t i o n and s e l f - c o n t r o l i t i s possible t o escape the 
delusion caused by Avidya; and the acquirement of the r i g h t 
k i n d of knov/ledge destroys a l l i t s d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t con-
secjuences. The general Hindu p o s i t i o n , then, would seem 
to be t h a t s i n i s the v i o l a t i o n of the d i v i n e l y - o r d a i n e d 
Law (Dharraa) which springs from man's sel f i s h n e s s and pride 
and h i s f a i l u r e t o c o n t r o l h i s impulses ( G i t t a ) ; . and since 
i t i s p o s s i b l e , as i t has been f o r many, t o t r e a d the path 
Pi^iai7asL alone, a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s i n must be assigned 
t o man himself. The soul's "descent" i n t o the world may 
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not.be of i t s own choosing, but i t s choice between good 
and e v i l i s e n t i r e l y i t s own. 
But t h i s , however, i s the general p o s i t i o n which 
i s u n f o r t u n a t e l y complicated by the i m p l i c a t i o n s of inher-
i t e d s i n f u l n e s s i n the shape of i n h e r i t e d Karmas. And 
since C h r i s t i a n i t y a l s o — a t l e a s t orthodoii C h r i s t i a n i t y — 
c o n t r i b u t e s t o a d o c t r i n e of i n h e r i t e d c o r r u p t i o n , i t 
seems d e s i r a b l e at t h i s stage t o examine the problem of 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as against the not i o n of i n h e r i t e d g u i l t or 
s i n . 
I n h e r i t e d G u i l t and R e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
Ihe problem here i n v o l v e d i s one of r e c o n c i l i n g 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y v/ith the b e l i e f t h a t at lea s t p a r t of our 
moral f a i l u r e or s i n i s not the r e s u l t of our own con-
scious choice but i s i n h e r i t e d e i t h e r from our ovm pre-
vious l i f e , as i n Hinduism, or from the I ' i r s t Man, as i n 
much of orthodox C h r i s t i a n i t y . This i s , t h e r e f o r e , one 
of those s i t u a t i o n s i n which both C h r i s t i a n i t y and Hindu-
ism are faced w i t h the same k i n d of problem, though, of 
course, f o r e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t reasons. , 
(a) C h r i s t i a n i t y 
We have seen t h a t one of the t r a d i t i o n a l doctiunes 
298. 
of G h i - i s t i a n i t y i s t h a t of I n h e r i t e d Coi\ruption or G u i l t . 
I t w i l l not be necessary t o explain"the d e t a i l s of t h i s 
d o c t r i n e , f o r vie have done so e a r l i e r . I'he n u t - s h e l l of 
the d o c t r i n e , however, i s t h a t we, as descendants of the 
E i r s t Man, Adam, have i n h e r i t e d the burden of h i s s i n , 
v/hich i s why every huiiian being i s n a t u r a l l y corrupt and 
s i n f u l . God's grace or mercy i s the only means of redemp-
t i o n from t h i s s i n . Ihere seem t o be two undercurrents 
i n t h i s d o c t r i n e . One i s t h a t we are 'responsible f o r 
Adam's s i n and t h a t we have t o carry the burden of g u i l t 
f o r h i s s i n . I h i s i m p l i c a t i o n , hov/ever, seems t o have a 
more d i r e c t bearing on what i s c a l l e d C o l l e c t i v e Respon-
s i b i l i t y , and v/ould, accordingly, be examined under t h a t 
s e c t i o n . The other i m p l i c a t i o n — a n d t h i s i s the one we 
are concerned w i t h a t the moment—is, as v/e said, t h a t 
the c o r r u i ) t i o n of human nature, i . e . , our i n c l i n a t i o n t o -
ward e v i l as w e l l as our a c t u a l s i n s , are l a r g e l y the i n -
e v i t a b l e consequences of t h i s f i r s t act of defiance and 
i n g r a t i t u d e on the part of Adarn. I n other words, much, 
i f not a l l , the e v i l i n the world i s a k i n d of d i v i n e 
punishment, not f o r our own act u a l crimes, but t h i s crime 
committed by the E i r s t Man. I t i s not at a l l d i f f i c u l t 
t o see t h a t t h i s i s a h i g h l y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y p o s i t i o n which 
i s not only damaging t o r e s p o n s i b i l i t y but t o m o r a l i t y 
i t s e l f . 
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To quote Wiebuhr again, 
I f o r i g i n a l s i n i s an i n h e r i t e d c o r r u p t i o n , i t s 
i n h e r i t a n c e destroys the freedom and t h e r e f o r e 
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y which i s basic t o the con-
ception of s i n . The orthodox d o c t r i n e i s there-
f o r e s e l f - d e s t r u c t i v e . - ^ 
What i s p a r t i c u l a r l y o f f e n s i v e and s i n g u l a r l y i r r a t i o n a l 
about t h i s docti^ine i s t h a t the v;hole of humanity i s put 
i n the docks, as i t v/ere, f o r the i n d i s c r e t i o n of one man 
w i t h whom we may have only the remotest possible connec-
t i o n . I t i s not uncommon t o hear of a f a m i l y being blamed, 
though not punished, f o r the crime of one of i t s members. 
But t o ho l d the whole of mankind responsible f o r the s i n 
of Adam sounds i n c r e d i b l y absurd. And the modern outcry 
against t h i s orthodox d o c t r i n e i s . f u l l y understandable, 
f o r t h i s makes a mockery of human moral e f f o r t , m e r i t and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
I t would b e • i n t e r e s t i n g to analyse at t h i s stage 
Origen's e f f o r t to- introduce another version of i n h e r i t e d 
s i n . We have seen t h a t according t o Origen, every i n d i -
v i d u a l i s born w i t h an i n h e r i t e d burden of f a i l u r e s and 
s i n s , not i n h e r i t e d from Adam but from h i s own irrevlous 
l i f e . Origen's t h i n k i n g on t h i s issue, however, cannot 
be regarded as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of C h r i s t i a n i t y , f o r C h r i s t -
"'"Niebuhr, £^Inter£re1^ion_^ p. 100. 
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i a n i t y does not accept the b e l i e f i n t r a n s m i g r a t i o n or 
r e b i r t h , v/hich i s the e s s e n t i a l presupposition of h i s 
theory. But strangely enough, or perhaps not so stangely 
a f t e r a l l , t h i s exx>lanat,ion of man's character and h i s mor-
a l f a i l u r e s or sins i s s u r p r i s i n g l y close, i n f a c t i d e n t i -
c a l i n i t s main import, t o the Hindu explanation. We s h a l l , 
t h e r e f o r e , pass on now t o Hinduism. 
(b) Hinduism 
Ihe t w i n Hindu do c t r i n e s of Karma and SamsSra, we 
have s t a t e d elsewhere, s i g n i f y t h a t each of man's actions 
i n t h i s l i f e leads t o consequences which he p e r s o n a l l y 
must enjoy or s u f f e r e i t h e r i n t h i s l i f e or i n the l i f e 
h e r e a f t e r . I t i s i n f a c t one's actions i n t h i s l i f e t h a t 
determine what k i n d of l i f e i n the f u t u r e he i s going t o 
have. To borrow a couple of l i n e s from Rhys Davids, 
Our deeds f o l l o w us from a f a r , -j^  
And what we have been makes us what we are. 
I n other words, i f one has been a sinner i n h i s previous 
l i f e , he s t a r t s t h i s l i f e w i t h the n a t u r a l disadvantage of 
t h i s burden•of i n h e r i t e d Karmas. I h i s c l e a r l y i m p l i e s 
some k i n d of d o c t r i n e of i n h e r i t e d s i n , though not a t . a l l 
•'•Quoted by Sivaswamy Aiyer, op. c i t . , p. 139. 
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i n the C h r i s t i a n sense of the term. The i n h e r i t a n c e here 
does not come down from a remote ancestor but from one's 
own previous l i f e . 
l!h±8 b e l i e f , we said e a r l i e r i n another context, 
seems i n a sense t o be p a r t i c x i l a r l y conducive t o moral 
e f f o r t by encouraging confidence i n the e f f i c a c y of the 
moral law i n the sense t h a t one can be sure t h a t h i s nioral 
e f f o r t w i l l never be v/asted. But v/hatever the advantage 
of the Law of Karma i n t h i s respect, i t must be f r a n k l y 
s t a t e d t h a t i t creates an e t h i c a l paradox i n as.suraing t h a t 
p a r t , a t l e a s t , of the hardships and s u f f e r i n g s of t h i s 
l i f e are a d i s c i p l i n a r y e x p i a t i o n f o r sins committed i n a 
previous l i f e of which the i n d i v i d u a l has no r e c o l l e c t i o n . 
This la c k of r e c o l l e c t i o n does r a i s e a problem as t o man's 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I t c e r t a i n l y appears morally u n s a t i s f y i n g 
t h a t a msin should be made t o s u f f e r f o r something which he 
d i d i n h i s previous l i f e and of which he i s not even r e -
motely aware. Avrareness or self-consciousness, v/e have 
seen, i s as important a c o n d i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as 
freedom i s . I t i s t r u e t h a t V70 do not absolve a person 
of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a crime which he a c t u a l l y committed 
so long ago t h a t he might p o s s i b l y have f o r g o t t e n almost 
e n t i r e l y about h i s p a r t i n the crime. Clear evidence from 
a c r i m i n a l t h a t he r e a l l y does not remember having commited 
a c e r t a i n crime w i l l s u r e l y not lead t o h i s a c q u i t t a l i f 
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t h e r e i s conclusive evidence otherwise t h a t he d i d actu-
a l l y commit i t . I'hus l a c k of r e c o l l e c t i o n i n i t s e l f may 
not be enough t o absolve a man of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , i f i t 
i s otherwise possible t o r e l a t e the c r i m i n a l act t o the 
person under judgment. The r e a l d i f f i c u l t y w i t h the Law 
of Karma, i t seems, i s t h a t i t introduces u n v e r i f i a b l e 
phenomena i n t o the whole issue so t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
crimes of a previous l i f e can r e s t only on an unquestion-
i n g b e l i e f i n the v a l i d i t y of the d o c t r i n e t h a t a l l the 
various b i r t h s and deaths t h a t a man i s supposed t o under-
go according t o t h i s d o c t r i n e are only l i n k s i n a l a r g e r 
t 
chain or stages i n one continuous l i f e . 
The main o b j e c t i o n , then, t o the above viev/ of 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s not t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l does not as a 
matter of f a c t r e c o l l e c t h i s past c r i m e s — f o r t h i s , we 
have seen, need not absolve one of h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y — 
but t h a t i t i s ex hypothesi impossible f o r him t o do so. ^ 
This i s a serious enough o b j e c t i o n . But without d i s s o c i -
a t i n g ourselves from t h i s c r i t i c i s m , we might suggest how 
the Hindu answers i t . He may argue t h a t r e c o l l e c t i o n or 
no r e c o l l e c t i o n , our present l i f e i s a c o n t i n u a t i o n of a 
previous l i f e , and we cannot disown r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
the crimes of . the previous l i f e , j u s t as v./e cannot disown 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a proved crime which we might have com-
mited a t a time so long past t h a t we cannot reasonably be 
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expected t o remember i t . I t seems, then, t h a t the vaiole 
problem hinges on the acceptance or r e j e c t i o n of the be-
l i e f i n personal i d e n t i t y c a r r i e d through a whole series 
of l i v e s and deaths. The acceptance of t h i s Hindu dogma 
e n t a i l s acceptance of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a l l crimes of a 
previous l i f e v/hether or not we r e c o l l e c t them. But i f 
t h i s u n d e r l y i n g b e l i e f i s r e j e c t e d , and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s 
confined t o crimes or sins of the present l i f e only, then 
n a t u r a l l y the Hindu b e l i e f i n punishment f o r sins of an 
e a r l i e r l i f e f a l l s dovjn as v / e l l . And vjhether t h i s cent-
r a l b e l i e f or dogma should be accepted would i n v o l v e us 
i n a metaphysical question which we are c l e a r l y not i n a 
i p o s i t i o n t o answer now. We s h a l l , t h e r e f o r e , leave t h i s 
question here and pass on t o the consideration of another 
aspect of the problem of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
U n i n t e n t i o n a l _ G i n and R e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
Before we consider the question of c o l l e c t i v e x'es-
p o n s i b i l i t y , i t may be i n t e r e s t i n g t o compare the C h r i s t -
i a n and Hindu p o s i t i o n s on r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the case of 
s i n t h a t i s u n i n t e n t i o n a l . Whei^e there i s a c l e a r i n t e n -
t i o n t o do what i s known t o be a s i n , i t i s undoubtedly 
not only d e i r a b l e but also necessary to hold the person 
responsible and t o punish him. This i s very p l a i n . But 
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when vie come t o u n i n t e n t i o n a l sins, the p o s i t i o n seems t o 
be a b i t complicated. I t would seem t h a t since motive or 
i n t e n t i o n i s p a r t of the c o n d i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , 
wherever there i s no i n t e n t i o n t o commit a crime, the a-
gent cannot be held responsible. As Lewis remarks, "Noth-
i n g can be put i n t o the reckoning t h a t we do not intend. ""^  
But howsoever f a i r t h i s p o s i t i o n might sound and however 
simple, i t i s a c t u a l l y very d i f f i c u l t . We are not r e f e r -
r i n g t o the e m p i r i c a l d i f f i c u l t y of f i n d i n g out whether a 
person d i d r e a l l y i n t e n d t o commit a crime. What v/e are 
suggesting i s t h a t i n s p i t e of the general p o s i t i o n about 
i n t e n t i o n and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , we are q u i t e o f t e n blamed 
f o r u n i n t e n t i o n a l offences or moral f a i l u r e s as w e l l . We 
are blamed f o r carelessness, f o r example, which might have 
l e d t o the offence even though we d i d not in t e n d i t . Sim-
i l a r l y , v/e are blamed f o r not being aware t h a t a c e r t a i n 
act v/as i n f a c t a crime or s i n . I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , import-
ant t o note how C h r i s t i a n and Hindu t h i n k i n g proceed on 
t h i s issue. 
(a) C h r i s t i a n i t y 
Consideration of the C h r i s t i a n view on t h i s issue 
"^Lewis, Morals and the I^ ew Theologg;, p. 48. 
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b r i n g s us t o the examination of the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
for m a l and m a t e r i a l s i n . A formal s i n i s an act committed 
which the agent was aware he ought not t o have committed, 
whereas a m a t e r i a l s i n i s the committing of an act which 
i s . .in. ^  f a c t , wrong but which the agent d i d not be l i e v e or 
know t o be wrong. I t i s c l e a r then t h a t the committing 
of an act which i s only a m a t e r i a l s i n cannot be described 
as an i n t e n t i o n a l l y committed s i n . Now, the C h r i s t i a n 
p o s i t i o n about r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r m a t e r i a l and formal s i n 
may be s t a t e d i n the f o l l o w i n g passage from R. C. M o r t i -
mer's C h r i s t i a n E t h i c s : 
Thus a formal s i n i s always blameworthy: i t i s -
what we g e n e r a l l y mean by s i n . A m a t e r i a l s i n 
i s not blameworthy: i t i s not an a c t i o n which 
can be approved, because i t i s i n f a c t wrong, 
yet no stigma attaches t o the agent who has only 
done what he honestly believed r i g h t . 1 
To t h i s p o s i t i o n , however, i s added the f o l l o w i n g caution 
or e x p l a n a t i o n : 
This d i s t i n c t i o n between formal and m a t e r i a l s i n , 
and the attachment of blame only t o those ac t i o n s 
which are done i n v i o l a t i o n of conscience, or i n 
obedience t o a conscience which i s wrong because 
of the negligence or w i l f u l n e s s of the agent, i s 
a necessary c o r o l l a r y of the p r i n c i p l e t h a t con-
science i s the guide and norm of moral conduct. 
•"•R.G. Mortimer, C h r i s t i a n E t h i c s (Hutchinson's U n i v e r s i t y 
L i b r a r y , London, 19507, p. 36. 
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Yet i t must not be taken t o mean^^that i t does 
not matter much what ODe^does proyided t h a t one 
meant w e l l i n doing i t . I t must always be r e -
membered t h a t a c t i o n s done i n obedience t o a 
conscience which ought t o have known b e t t e r , 
are formal sins and so blameworthy. 
The statement e n t a i l e d i n th6;,.last but one sen-
tence above gives the r e a l clue to our a t t i t u d e t o un-
i n t e n t i o n a l s i n s . Having meant w e l l i s not enough; the 
acts must be good by o b j e c t i v e standards as w e l l . I n 
other words, unintended sins or offences are blameworthy 
too, though not t o the same degree as intended ones. And 
what makes such acts blameworthy i s the suggestion of 
negligence or " w i l f u l n e s s " i m p l i e d by t h e i r performance. 
And t h i s a p p l i e s also t o v;hat we may c a l l " a c c i d e n t a l " 
crimes or offences. Thus the conclusion would seem t o be 
t h a t u n i n t e n t i o n a l s i n s , though not subject t o censure i n 
the same degree as i n t e n t i o n a l ones, are not a l t o g e t h e r 
f r e e fr-om blame. 
(b). Hinduism 
On the question of i n t e n t i o n versus r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
thex'-e are two main views i n Hinduism. " One of these con-
s i d e r s the s u b j e c t i v e i n t e n t i o n or luotive t o be an impor-
• ^ I b i d . , pp. 56f. (emphasis mine). 
2 
ha i t i ^ a , op. c i t . , pp. 188f. 
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t a n t p a r t of the act. Hence where a d e f i n i t e motive t o 
achieve a c e r t a i n end i s not there, the agent v j i l l not be 
regarded as responsible f o r the act. An unintended Brah-
ma hat y a (murder of a Brahmana), f o r example, v j i l l i n c ur 
only h a l f the normal punisiiment. I t would seem t h a t here 
the emphasis i s on motive; not overt acts but motive and 
i n t e n t i o n i s the object of moral Judgment. 
But there are others who regard c e r t a i n acts as 
e v i l i n themselves. I n whatever circumstances and from 
whatever motives c e r t a i n acts are committed, they w i l l 
lead t o s i n and hence deserve punishment. Even ac c i d e n t a l 
Brahma ha t y a i s t o be punished i n the usual vjay. This, i t 
must be sa i d , i s a r a t h e r extreme p o s i t i o n . To make the 
a c t u a l overt act the sole c o n d i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
w i t h o u t t a k i n g i n t o account the motive of the agent i s 
mora l l y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . To say t h a t s i n committed i n any 
form, even u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y , i s s i n and t h e r e f o r e punish-
able i s one t h i n g ; but t o say t h a t u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y com-
m i t t e d s i n i s punishable i n the same way as i n t e n t i o n a l 
s i n i s t o deny the s i g n i f i c a n c e of i n t e n t i o n and th e r e f o r e 
of conscience. I f degrees of moral f a i l u r e are allowed, 
then c l e a r l y i n t e n t i o n a l sins must be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from 
u n i n t e n t i o n a l ones. 
What Professor Maclagan says i n the context of 
C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s i s equa l l y a p p l i c a b l e here. Sin may 
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normally mean "'.actual' s i n i n the 'formal' mode," i . e . , 
an immoral act w i l f u l l y committed. But sometimes t h i s i s 
also taken t o include "perverse" a c t i o n r e s u l t i n g from i g -
norance which cannot r e a l l y be subject t o censure i n the 
same sense as the former. And these two, again, must be 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d from what he c a l l s a mere "infancy of value-
consciousness""^ which i s , s t r i c t l y speaking, not an object 
of moral judgment a t a l l . And the d i f f e r e n c e between 
these various kinds of " s i n f u l " a c t i o n l i e s p r e c i s e l y i n 
the k i n d of conscience the agent has and the degree t o 
which h i s conscience has been i n v o l v e d i n the act. Of the 
two kinds of sins f o r v/hich, we said., the agent may i n 
some degree be held responsible, the f i r s t would be an i n -
stance of a c t i n g against conscience whei-eas the second i g 
a case of having a "darkened" or perverted conscience i t -
s e l f . I t i s the w i l l , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t i s held responsible 
r a t h e r than the overt act or p h y s i c a l movement of the 
agent. 
This i s why both C h r i s t i a n i t y and Hinduism em-
phasise the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the mind and the heart along 
i t h the body (Manasa Vaca Karmana) i n any moral r e s o l u -
t i o n . The same p o i n t seems t o u n d e r l i e Shridhara's b e l i e f 
t h a t a l l u n i n t e n t i o n a l f a i l u r e s are subject t o reproach, 
"^Maclagan, op. c i t . , p. 36. 
w 
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f o r they a l l imply carelessness (Iramada) on the p a r t of 
t h e i r agents,"^ and, consequently, e i t h e r a f a i l u r e t o 
t r a i n and inform t h e i r consciences or else a f a i l u r e t o 
c o n t r o l t h e i r impulses. The general C h r i s t i a n as w e l l as 
Hindu p o s i t i o n , then, v/ould seem t o be t h a t though unin-
t e n t i o n a l sins are not subject t o censure i n the same de-
gree t h a t i n t e n t i o n a l ones are, one i s not a l l the same 
absolved of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the former, because they 
imply carelessness, w i l f u l n e s s or ignorance, which are 
themselves e v i l a t t r i b u t e s . 
Gol.lectiv^ R e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
We have so f a r considered the various aspects of 
i n d i v i d u a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the C h r i s t i a n and Hindu 
t r a d i t i o n s . We s h a l l now t u r n our a t t e n t i o n t o what i s 
c a l l e d c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . When, f o r example, we 
speak of a whole group or s o c i e t y t o be " s i n f u l " ' — a n d 
C h r i s t i a n i t y c e r t a i n l y does so—v/e seem t o hold the ^ ^^hole 
group or s o c e i t y as such responsible f o r a c e r t a i n e v i l 
s t a t e of a f f a i r s . I n what sense, i f any, and t o what ex-
t e n t i s the concept of c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y meaning-
f u l ? 
'''Maitra, op. c i t . , p. I90. 
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(a) C h r i s t i a n i t y 
This problem of c o l l e c t i v e versus i n d i v i d u a l res-
p o n s i b i l i t y i s undoubtedly a very p e r t i n e n t one i n the 
context of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s , f o r i t i s i n C h r i s t i a n i t y , 
i f anywhere, t h a t the concept of c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l -
i t y has formed an important p a r t of the t r a d i t i o n a l creed. 
The concept of "Universal Sin," q u i t e o f t e n expressed i n 
terms l i k e "man's s o l i d a r i t y i n s i n " or "the c o l l e c t i v e 
g u i l t of man" or "each mau's share i n the s i n of h i s so-
c i e t y or h i s race," i m p l i e s t h a t we are a l l equally s i n -
ners i n the eyes of God and t h e r e f o r e we a l l share the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the s i n f u l s t a t e of a f f a i r s i n the 
v/orld. I t seems t h a t t h i s concept i s more or less a d i -
r e c t c o r o l l a r y of the C h r i s t i a n concept of i n h e r i t e d 
g u i l t . I t has been p a r t of the C h r i s t i a n dogma t h a t 
C h r i s t ' s c r u c i f i x i o n was a s a c r i f i c e t h a t he knowingly 
made as an e x p i a t i o n f o r the sins of mankind which i n i t i -
a l l y entered i n t o the human world w i t h the disobedience 
of Adam. Adam's s i n was i n need of e x p i a t i o n , and i t was 
and i s the duty of every man t o f e e l himself responsible 
f o r the s i n and t o do ever y t h i n g he could t o undo the ef-
f e c t s of t h i s shameful conduct on Adam's p a r t . This rup-
t u r e of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between God and man t h a t was 
brought about by the i n g r a t i t u d e of Adam could only be r e -
p a i r e d by the s a c r i f i c e of a Second Adam, C h r i s t . This 
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l a t t e r was a great event which l a i d the foundation of a 
f r e s h beginning of r e l a t i o n s between God and His crea-
t u r e s . This could give us hope; but a l l the same v/e must 
f o r e v e r bow our heads i n shame f o r the s i n of Adam and f o r 
the s i n s of a l l men f o r v;hich we are j o i n t l y responsible. 
Vie f e e l tempted t o quote a r a t h e r lengthy passage 
from Lewis' Morals and Revelation which not only summar-
is e s the C h r i s t i a n p o s i t i o n but also includes h i s own 
c r i t i c i s m of the concept of c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
. . . I should l i k e t o i n s i s t t h a t the b e l i e f i n 
' i n d i v i d u a l ' , as against any form of ' c o l l e c -
t i v e ', r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s qu i t e fundamental t o 
our o r d i n a r y e t h i c a l a t t i t u d e s . For i f we be-
l i e v e t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s l i t e r a l l y shared, 
i t becomes very hard t o maintain t h a t there are 
any p r o p e r l y moral d i s t i n c t i o n s t o be drawn be-
tween one course of a c t i o n and another. A l l 
w i l l be equally good, or equally e v i l , as the 
case may be. For we s h a l l be d i r e c t l y i m p l i -
cated i n one another's a c t i o n s , and the pra i s e 
or blame f o r them must f a l l upon us a l l without 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . This, i n f a c t , i s what ma?iyper-
sons do b e l i e v e , and i t i s very hard t o uphold 
any form of t r a d i t i o n a l i s t theology on any other 
basis. Of l a t e t h i s has been very openly a f -
f i r m e d by noted theologians who, i f they seem t o 
do very great v i o l e n c e t o common sense, have, at 
any r a t e , the courage and consistency t o acknow^ 
ledge the i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e i r viev/, and do not 
seek t o disguise them by h a l f - h e a r t e d and con-
fused f o r m u l a t i o n s . V«/e have thus witnessed r e -
c e n t l y some very uncompromising a f f i r m a t i o n s of 
the b e l i e f i n 'u n i v e r s a l s i n ' or 'the c o l l e c -
t i v e g u i l t of man'. This does not imply t h a t 
t here are no e t h i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n s of any k i n d 
which we may draw. Judgments may be passed upon 
the outward course of our conduct without preju-
dice t o the view t h a t p j u i l t i t s e l f i s 'univer-
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s a l ' , and t h i s i s why Reinhold Kiebuhr, whose i n -
fluenc e on r e l i g i o u s t h i n k i n g today i s very pro-
nounced, i s able t o combine w i t h h i s a s s e r t i o n of 
the d o c t r i n e of u n i v e r s a l s i n an account of the 
' r e l a t i v e moral achievements of h i s t o r y ' . One ac-
t i o n may be much more r e g r e t t a b l e than another, i t 
m^ be u g l i e r i n some ways or i t may do much more 
harm t o our f e l l o w s , and thus we have 'the less 
and more' of our .day-to-day judgments, but where 
proper moral e s t i m a t i o n i s concerned there i s not 
'a b i g sinner and a l i t t l e sinner'. We are a l l 
i n v o l v e d i n the sins of a l l . ^ 
Niebuhr, we have had occasions t o see, i s one of 
those modern theologians who does not h e s i t a t e t o r e j e c t 
v/hat he considers t o be an i r r a t i o n a l d o c t r i n e , even i f 
i t has been t r a d i t i o n a l l y accepted i n C h r i s t i a n i t y . So 
when even he seems t o uphold the above view of c o l l e c t i v e 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , i t leaves t o i^oom f o r doubt about the 
p o s i t i o n of C h r i s t i a n i t y w i t h regard t o t h i s issue. What 
has been s a i d above, then, may be accepted as represent-
i n g a t y p i c a l C h r i s t i a n opinion. Now the main o b j e c t i o n 
t o any k i n d of c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s already con-
t a i n e d i n the above passage from Lewis: t h a t i t i s con-
t r a r y t o our ordinary e t h i c a l a t t i t u d e s . The con d i t i o n s 
of knowledg-e, capacity and freedom t h a t make r e s p o n s i b i l -
i t y meaningful have c l e a r l y an i n d i v i d u a l context. I n 
other words, i t i s only an i n d i v i d u a l who can f u l f i l these 
1 Lev/is, Morals and Revelation, pp. 102f. 
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c o n d i t i o n s , and t h e r e f o r e , i t must be only an i n d i v i d u a l 
who can p r o p e r l y be c a l l e d responsible. A whole society 
or the v/hole of mankind can bear the consequences of one 
person's misdeeds, but t o say t h a t the whole s o c i e t y i s 
mora l l y responsible f o r the crime i s p l a i n l y absurd and 
meaningless. I n the words of Lewis, again, 
. . . t o i n c u r c e r t a i n consequences f o r what another 
person has done, i s one t h i n g , t o be morally ac-
countable i s another; and i n t h i s l a s t regard we 
can not answer f o r one another or share each 
other's g u i l t ( o r m e r i t ) , f o r t h a t would imply 
t h a t we could become d i r e c t l y worse ( o r b e t t e r ) 
persons morally by what others e l e c t t o do—and 
t h a t seems p l a i n l y preposterous.^ 
I t i s t r u e t h a t we often' use loose expressions i n which a 
whole s o c i e t y or group i s i m p l i c a t e d i n the crime of one 
of i t s members, f o r example, when an aggressor n a t i o n i s 
supposed t o be responsible f o r what a c t u a l l y i t s govern-
ment decided t o do. But t h i s i n f a c t i s a k i n d of meta-
p h o r i c a l way of i n d i c a t i n g the general area of responsi-
b i l i t y . Germans who a c t u a l l y p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the crimes 
of the H i t l e r regime against the Jews are j u s t l y punished 
f o r t h e i r p a r t i n the b r u t a l i t y , but reasonable persons 
v^ould not l i k e t o ho l d the German na t i o n as such g u i l t y , 
even though we may sometimes be using expressions l i k e 
• ^ I b i d . , p. 113. 
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"the g u i l t of Germany i n the murder of the Jews." One 
would e a s i l y agree w i t h Maclagan t h a t when we speak of a 
c e r t a i n s o c i e t y or group as being " s i n f u l , " i t involves 
a conscious m i s a p p l i c a t i o n of the term: "That i s t o say, 
we may be speaking of the s o c i e t y a s t h o u g h i t were an 
i n d i v i d u a l V i f h i l e r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t i n f a c t i t i s not....""'' 
I f we keep t h i s i n d i v i d \ i a l context n e c e s s a r i l y 
suggested by moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , i t i s not d i f f i c u l t t o 
see t h a t c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the sense i n which 
theologians g e n e r a l l y use i t i s not, and cannot be, a 
meaningful concept. Trofessor Maclagan r i g h t l y i n s i s t s 
t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y can be meaningful only when the a c t i o n 
i n v o l v e s conscious choice, and since the concept of c o l -
l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " d i s j o i n s " the concepts of choice 
and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , "the attempt t o saddle mankind v/ith 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e i r supposed u n i v e r s a l s i n f u l n e s s 
f a i l s a c c o r d i n g l y . " One may perhaps also f e e l i n c l i n e d 
t o agree w i t h h i s view t h a t c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y may 
be admitted i n the only sense suggested by Scheler, name-
l y , t h a t 
Every one of us has been an a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t 
i n an uncountable number of good and bad things 
of which he does not have, and indeed can not,. 
"'"Mac 1 agan, op. c i t . , p, 40. 
^ I b i d . , p. 47. 
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have, any knowledge, and f o r which he i s none 
the less co-responsible before God.l 
lk)_„]iiH^ iiism 
I n Hinduism there does not seem t o be any counter-
p a r t of the concept of "man's s o l i d a r i t y i n s i n " and hence 
no question of c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . But nonetheless 
i n Hindu t r a d i t i o n c e r t a i n acts are considered so s i n f u l — 
Mahapataka—that they p o l l u t e not only the sinner but also 
other members of h i s f a m i l y , even h i s v i l l a g e or society. 
This should not, however, be taken t o denote c o l l e c t i v e 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I t might imply c o - r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of some 
s o r t , but i n i t s proper import i t i s intended t o be more 
a sanction than anything else. Successful b u r g l a r y , f o r 
example, by one member of a f a m i l y and p r o s p e r i t y based on 
t h i s i s l i k e l y t o induce other innocent members of the 
f a m i l y t o attempt something s i m i l a r . Hence the need t o 
emphasise the p o l l u t i n g e f f e c t of s i n s . The un d e r l y i n g 
b e l i e f seems t o be t h a t , l i k e some k i n d of poisonous gas 
vjhich, once emitted from a c e r t a i n source, g r a d u a l l y i n -
f e c t s l a r g e r and l a r g e r areas, some kinds of sins have a 
p o l l u t i n g e f f e c t , c h i e f l y i n the sense t h a t they serve as 
bad examples f o r other members of the society. This i s 
•'-Ibid., p. 41. 
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what perhaps forms the basis of the charge, noted e a r l i e r 
on, t h a t the Hindu conception of s i n i s "quasi-physical." 
Lopular expressions about s i n and i t s e f f e c t s may give 
r i s e t o t h i s impression, but a c t u a l l y t h i s i s n e i t h e r 
q uasi-physical nor does i t imply c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
i n i t s usual sense. These expressions about " p o l l u t i o n " 
may be regarded simply as a r a t h e r crude, but e f f e c t i v e , 
way of discouraging people from a c t i o n s t h a t are regarded 
as dangerously e v i l and s i n f u l . 
Chapter V I I I . 
Gomwt 
We do not claim t o have examined a l l the questions 
t h a t may a r i s e i n connection w i t h Hindu and C h r i s t i a n eth-
i c s . But perhaps some of the more fundamental ones have 
been t r e a t e d . I t would be t e B i p t i n g t o go ahead w i t h our 
e n q u i r i e s and t o add some more t o the problems we have 
discussed so f a r . But considerations of time and space 
would not seem t o a l l o w any f u r t h e r p r o l o n g a t i o n of the 
dialogue. .Leaving, t h e r e f o r e , the many more problems, 
some of which might have been suggested i n course of our 
own e f f o r t i n the preceding pages, t o more competent scho-
l a r s , i t seems t o be time t o examine the upshot of our ar-
guments. Going back t o the i n t r o d u c t o r y chapter i n which 
we sp ec i f i e d the nature of our enquiry, we suggested t h a t 
our -purpose was not t o e s t a b l i s h or r e j e c t the alleged 
s u p e r i o r i t y of one of these two systems over the other. 
What v/as proposed was t o place the two, one by the side 
of the other, i n order t o f i n d out whether, and t o what ex-
t e n t , Hindu and C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s resembled each other. 
I n other words, t h i s was intended t o be an o b j e c t i v e and 
318. 
s c i e n t i f i c enquiry, and, as i s w e l l known, i n such en-
q u i r i e s c o l l e c t i o n of the data or f a c t s of the case may 
o f t e n be more important than the conclusions themselves. 
But since a l l such c o l l e c t i o n of data g e n e r a l l y presup-
poses a p r o v i s i o n a l hypothesis, we cannot deny t h a t some 
such hypothesis has given the d i r e c t i o n t o our search f o r 
f a c t s . Now our hypothesis i n t h i s case was a modest one. 
We had only a f f i r m e d t h a t though Hinduism and C h r i s t i a n -
i t y are very d i f f e r e n t i n many rosspects, e s p e c i a l l y i n 
matters of metaphysical and t h e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s , "the gap 
becomes considerably narrower" when i t comes t o the e t h i -
c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of these meta'physical b e l i e f s . I n other 
words, whatever t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s as r e l i g i o n s , as sys-
tems of e t h i c s they are remarkably s i m i l a r , or, a t l e a s t , 
not so f a r apart as i s o f t e n imagined. The question now 
i s : I s our p r o v i s i o n a l hypothesis supported by f a c t s ? 
The answer, i t seems, cannot but be i n the a f f i r m a t i v e . 
Vi/e do not wish t o r e i t e i ' a t e our arguments i n the 
pi^eceding pages, but i t may be' desirable t o make pointed 
references t o our observations i n order t o j u s t i f y our 
a f f i r m a t i v e answer t o the above question. To s t a r t w i t h , 
we n o t i c e d t h a t the two systems of e t h i c s are character-
i s e d by remarkable c a t h o l i c i t y and comprehensiveness, 
though there may be d i f f e r e n c e s of degrees. Both are 
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committed t o a high n o t i o n of the p o t e n t i a l greatness of 
man; both b e l i e v e i n a transcendental and s p i r i t u a l des-
t i n y f o r man virhich, though, not e n t i r e l y e t h i c a l ends i n 
themselves, make e t h i c s an indispensable step i n the r e a l -
i s a t i o n of t h i s f i n a l d e s tiny. M o r a l i t y i n each system 
derives i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e and a u t h o r i t y fi'-ora the b e l i e f i n 
a d i v i n e l y implanted moral law which i s revealed t o man 
by s i m i l a r sources. With some d i f f e r e n c e s of emphasis, 
the range of v i r t u e s i s by and large the same. Absolute 
freedom of choice and acti o n s i s n e i t h e r asserted nor im-
p l i e d . Freedom i s only delegated or c o n d i t i o n a l , and each 
system b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e r e i s enough freedom t o make mor-
a l i t y X->ossible, though, as we saw, there i s room f o r con-
t r o v e r s y i n t h i s respect. And, f i n a l l y , human responsi-
b i l i t y f o r moral f a i l u r e i s an important tenet of b e l i e f , 
though appearances t o the contrary sometimes occur i n 
e i t h e r system. 
These s i m i l a r i t i e s of approach and content are 
sur e l y impressive. But l e t us not f o r a moment imagine 
t h a t the two systems are i d e n t i c a l , and, t h e r e f o r e , i n t e r -
changeable. I'his n o t i o n v;ould be as r i d i c u l o u s as the one 
we have t r i e d t o r e f u t e , namely, t h a t they have nothing i n 
common. Our r e f l e c t i o n s i n these pages should, i t i s 
hoped, have also demonstrated t h a t , i n s p i t e of the s i m i -
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l a r i t i e s , the two remain d i s t i n c t and independent systems, 
and i t would be v a i n and p r e t e n t i o u s f o r e i t h e r t o claim 
t o take the other's place. Neither of these are temporary 
and evanescent phenomena. Hinduism has a h i s t o r y of near-
l y f o u r thousand, years and C h r i s t i a n i t y of about two. I n 
the course of t h e i r h i s t o r i e s they have proved t h e i r v i -
t a l i t y as systems, and have given r i s e t o d i s t i n c t c u l t u r -
a l t r a d i t i o n s which i t v;ould be impossible f o r any power 
t o wipe out of existence. I n f a c t i t i s t h i s t o t a l accum-
u l a t e d p a t t e r n of behaviour and a t t i t u d e , generated by 
c e n t u r i e s of r e p e t i t i o n and a s s i m i l a t i o n , which gives d i s -
t i n c t i v e n e s s t o the character of each system, and which 
also sometimes obscures the fundamental s i m i l a r i t y or u n i -
t y i n basic x ) r i n c i p l e s t h a t the two d i s p l a y on closer i n -
spection. 
Without sounding d i d a c t i c , t h e r e f o r e , we may say 
t h a t i f our arguments show anything at a l l , i t i s t h a t 
Hinduism and C h r i s t i a n i t y , or, more s p e c i f i c a l l y , Hindu 
and C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s , should both recognise and face the 
f a c t t h a t each has i n the other a competent and powerful 
adversary; and t h a t any tendency on the p a r t of one t o 
dismiss the other l i g h t l y i s not only naive but also ex-
tremely dangerous. I t seems t o be worth quoting the r e -
mark of Hopkins i n t h i s context. Concluding h i s observa-
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t i o n s on Indian e t h i c s , he says, 
And when we of the V/est v i s i t I n d i a hoping t o 
i n s t i l i n t o the Hindus the 'higher s p i r i t u a l -
i t y ' of which we vaunt ourselves the proud pos-
sessors, i t w i l l be v/ell t o remember t h a t , as 
a goal of l i v i n g , s t r i c t m o r a l i t y and high 
s p i r i t u a l i t y w i l l not seem t o the Hindus a sud-
den r e v e l a t i o n from abroad, but t h a t they have 
had t h a t goal before them f o r many ce n t u r i e s . 1 
These words were v / r i t t e n i n 1^24, but i t i s d o u b t f u l t h a t 
many have s t i l l l e a r n t the lesson conveyed through these 
words. Nor i s t h i s a t t i t u d e exclusive t o the C h r i s t i a n 
Vi/est. The Hind.u v/ho takes excessive p r i d e i n h i s " s p i r -
i t u a l i s m " and hopes t o "teach" h i s s p i r i t u a l i s m t o the 
" m a t e r i a l i s t i c " VJest w i l l p r o f i t no less from the lesson 
r e f e r r e d t o above. 
With the change i n the p a t t e r n of p o l i t i c a l pov/er, 
and each n a t i o n or c u l t u r e r e s t o r e d t o i t s r i g h t f u l place 
of e q u a l i t y i n the comity of nations, no v/orld view or 
e t h i c a l system can hope t o win i n the competition of 
equals except on the s t r e n g t h of i t s ideas and i d e a l s . 
And, as i n any competition, the only healthy and r e a l i s t i c 
a t t i t u d e i s one of respect and h u m i l i t y toward a l l the 
competitors. An excessive p r i d e i n one's own h e r i t a g e , 
w i t h the n a t u r a l tendency t o b e l i t t l e the other p o i n t of -
viev;, i s born of ignorance and b i g o t r y . And b i g o t r y i s 
•'"Hopkins, op. c i t . , pp. 257f. 
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alv/ays abominable, whethei' i t i s Hindu or C h r i s t i a n . Love 
of one's own r e l i g i o n and h e r i t a g e i s n a t u r a l and perhaps 
necessai'-y; but when i t degenerates i n t o u n c r i t i c a l and 
exclusive a d u l a t i o n , i t can never do anything but harm. 
I n the words of Dr. Sadhakrishnan, "Those who love t h e i r 
sects more than t r u t h end by l o v i n g themselves more than 
t h e i r sects. "''' 
Me have thus f a r dwelt on the basic s i m i l a r i t i e s 
between Hindu and C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s , and remarked on the 
proper a t t i t u d e s t h a t Hindus and C h r i s t i a n s w i l l be w e l l 
advised t o c u l t i v a t e toward each other's f a i t h and morals. 
I t would be i n t e r e s t i n g t o p i c k out, next, f o r c l o s e r ex-
amination and s p e c i a l emphasis some outstanding features 
of e i t h e r of these systems of e t h i c s and f i n d out how and 
whether they compare. 
Outstanding Features of Hindu and C h r i s t i a n Jjt h i c i S 
I t i s p o s s i b l e t o mention more than one featui^e 
i n e i t h e r C h r i s t i a n or Hindu e t h i c s which can j u s t i f i a b l y 
be claimed t o be e x c l u s i v e t o only one of these systems, 
at l e a s t i n emphasis. But i f we were t o s i n g l e out from 
each the most outstanding, there can be h a r d l y any doubt 
•^Radhakrishnan, The^ Z ...•'i^ .^ jlQ. ^  P* 57 • 
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t h a t i n C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s i t would be the philosophy of 
love 01' "agape, " and i n Hindu e t h i c s the philosophy 9f 
non-violence, "Miimsa". While examining the c a t h o l i c i t y 
of Hindu and C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s i n Chapter I I , we d i d ob-
serve t h a t each of these systems i s l i a b l e t o various i n -
t e r p r e t a t i o n s , w i t h various degrees of emphasis on one or 
the other f e a t u r e from among the whole range of ideas and 
i d e a l s t h a t permeate them. But we must add, as a correc-
t i v e against any misunderstanding, t h a t might have been 
caused by our d e l i b e r a t e emphasis on the d i f f e r e n c e s 
w i t h i n each system, t h a t , i r r e s p e c t i v e of whatever else 
also happens t o be the case, the f o l l o v ; i n g basic f a c t 
must never be l o s t s i g h t of. And t h a t i s t h a t no shade 
of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s i s p r o p e r l y C h r i s t i a n unless the p h i l -
osophy of love i s c e n t r a l t o i t . S i m i l a r l y , i n tune w i t h 
the vjhole r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n of I n d i a , i n c l u d i n g Buddhism 
and dainism, no shade of Hindu e t i i i c s can be ,palled, pro-
p e r l y Hindu unless the philosophy of non-violence,is fund-
am en t a l J:_9_ ij_. 
The above u n q u a l i f i e d statements are perhaps i n 
need of some explanation. JTor Hindus may object t h a t a f -
t e r a l l i t has been the C h r i s t i a n world which has fought • 
the l a r g e s t number of devas t a t i n g wax-s, which c e r t a i n l y 
has done nothing t o demonstrate t h a t the philosophy of 
love i s c e n t r a l t o C h r i s t i a n i t y . I t may also be t h a t the 
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C h r i s t i a n w o r l d has on the whole been as much, i f not 
more, su s c e p t i b l e t o the im'pulse of hatred. But those 
who emphasise these f a c t s i n order t o r e f u t e t h a t the 
philosophy of love i s c e n t r a l t o C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s have 
u n f o r t u n a t e l y missed the v/hole p o i n t of our argument. 
They are f a l l i n g a prey t o the same misconception against 
which we t r i e d t o viarn them, namely, t h a t occasional de-
v i a t i o n s from a c e r t a i n x ) r i n c i p l e , though unf o r t u n a t e , do 
not prove the l a c k of the p r i n c i p l e i t s e l f ; they only 
emphasise human f r a i l t y which i s always responsible f o r 
man's f a l l from high and e d i f y i n g i d e a l s . Moreover, we 
s t a t e d at the very outset t h a t we are concerned w i t h the 
p r i n c i p l e s r a t h e r than w i t h the p r a c t i c e , w i t h the funda-
mental x'ules t h a t ought t o govern conduct r a t h e r than 
w i t h t h e degree of conformity t o the r u l e s . Hence con-
duct t o the c o n t r a r y , even i f c o n c l u s i v e l y demonstrated, 
v / i l l not be taken t o imply t h a t the p r i n c i p l e i t s e l f i s 
missing. 
I f we keep these f a c t s i n mind, i t not be 
d i f f i c u l t t o see t h a t i f anything i s c e n t r a l t o a l l forms 
of C h r i s t i a n i t y , i t i s the philosophy of love. C h r i s t ' s 
e x h o r t a t i o n i n the Sermon, on the Mount— 
Te have heard t h a t i t hath been said. Thou 
shale love t h y neighbour and hate t h i n e enemy. 
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But I say unto you. Love your enemies, bless 
them t h a t curse you, do good to them t h a t hate 
you, and pray f o r them which d e s p i t e f u l l y use 
you, and persecute you....1 
— h a s , i n s p i t e of a l l the s t r a i n t h a t such l o f t y p r i n -
c i p l e s expose themselves t o , alv/ays remained i n C h r i s t i a n 
s o c i e t y the goal t o s t r i v e f o r . i'or t h i s reason the f r e -
quent c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s as 'ohe "ethics 
of l o v e " must be deemed { j u s t i f i e d , though not completely 
adequate. 
The p r i n c i p l e of non-violence must be considered 
equa l l y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a l l forms of Hinduism. Hon-r 
violence has been f r e q u e n t l y misunderstood as a merely 
negative concept which enjoins r e f r a i n i n g from k i l l i n g but 
does not imply a p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e of love t o the senti e n t 
beings. But i f we remember P a t a n j a l i ' s explanation of 
.Ahifflsa, as given i n Chapter V, i t should not be d i f f i c u l t 
t o see t h a t i t i s meant t o be much more than a mere nega-
t i v e v i r t u e of n o n - k i l l i n g or n o n - i n j u r y . P a t a n j a l i de-
f i n e s Ahimsa as "Sarvatha Sarvada Sarvabhutanam j-^abhi-
p 
droha," t h a t i s , a complete absence of i l l w i l l t o a l l 
s e n t i e n t creatures i r r e s p e c t i v e of time or place. I f 
"complete absence of i l l w i l l " does not imply a p o s i t i v e 
•^Matthew 5:^3,44. 
p 
"Maitra, op. c i t . , p. 220. 
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a t t i t u d e of good will and love, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see 
what else does. This, i t w i l l be seen, brings the essen-
t i a l p resupposition of Ahimsa, i n s p i t e of the use of a 
grammatically negative term, f u l l y on a par w i t h the 
C h r i s t i a n philosophy of love. I t may not be out of place 
t o mention here t h a t i n propounding h i s philosophy of 
love and non-violence, Gandhi might have appeared t o 
C h r i s t i a n s t o be propounding a philsophy which they would 
t h i n k v/as e x c l u s i v e l y C h r i s t i a n ; but as f a r as Gandhi was 
concerned, he was merely r e s t o r i n g t o i t s proper perspec-
t i v e the age-old Hindu philosophy of non-violence. That 
h i s teaching appeared t o Chi-istians as C h r i s t i a n ^ and t o 
Hindus as Hindu only proves the i d e n t i t y of approach t h a t 
Hinduism and C h r i s t i a n i t y have i n t h i s respect. 
The other e q u a l l y common misunderstanding about 
the Hindu i d e a l of Ahirasa i s t h a t the Hindu r e f r a i n s from 
k i l l i n g animals not because of any l o f t y p r i n c i p l e of love 
but from h i s f e a r , f o l l o w i n g from h i s b e l i e f i n the t r a n s -
m i g r a t i o n of souls, t h a t i n k i l l i n g a c e r t a i n animal he 
might u n w i t t i n g l y be k i l l i n g one of h i s ancestors whose 
weary soul has been condemned i n t o t h i s form of existence 
by soma^  of h i s past immoral conduct. This i s not only a 
complete m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the e s s e n t i a l idea of non-
v i o l e n c e and a complete t r a v e s t y of f a c t , but perhaps, and 
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above a l l , a t y p i c a l example of the c o l o n i a l s ' sense of 
humour v;hich'often i n f e c t e d and misled even the b e t t e r -
knowing scholar. S i r Charles l i l i o t puts the perspective 
r i g h t i n t h i s context when he says, 
...the b e a u t i f u l precept of AhinisS or not i n j u r -
i n g l i v i n g t h i n g s i s not, as Europeans imagine, 
founded on the f e a r of e a t i n g one's grand parents 
but r a t h e r on the humane and e n l i g h t e n i n g f e e l i n g 
t h a t a l l l i f e i s one and t h a t men v/ho devour 
beasts are not much above the l e v e l of the beasts 
v/ho devour one another. 1 
We may add t h a t the Hindu emphasis on vegetax^ianism i s 
not only based on the p r i n c i p l e of Ahimsa, but also on 
the e q u a l l y important c o n v i c t i o n t h a t animal f l e s h has 
undesirable e f f e c t s on the body and mind. I t impedes the 
development of the Sattya element and the p u r i f i c a t i o n of 
'^ •^^ O.l^'js, which i s indispensable f o r Moksa. But there 
can be no doubt t h a t the p r i n c i p l e of Ahimsa. i s involved 
too. The e s s e n t i a l philosophy u n d e r l y i n g the precept of 
Ahimsa might, i n the v;ords of A l b e r t Schweitzer (even 
though Schweitzer denies the presence of t h i s e t h i c i n 
In d i a n t h o u g h t ) , be c a l l e d "the Ethic of Reverence f o r 
p 
L i f e . " A verse from Manu unde.rlines the i"eason as v/ell 
as the reward of non-violence. I t says: 
L 
.Eliot,. Hinduism and Buddhi^^ , 1,1 v i . 
2 
This i s the t i t l e of Chapter XXI of Schweitzer's CivaJ._i-
s a t i o n and E t h i c s . 
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That knower of the S e l f who p e r c e i v e s the S e l f 
i n a l l s e n t i e n t beings ( S a r v a bhutegu cha StmSn-
am) and a l l s e n t i e n t beings as equal~to h i s own 
(Sarva bhutani cha atmani), a t t a i n s to h i s 
sphere ( L i b e r a t i o n ) . 1 
I t i s t r u e t h a t man's baser i n s t i n c t to k i l l , 
which a f f l i c t s the Hindu as much as i t does the C h r i s t -
i a n , has f r e q u e n t l y found support i n statements l i k e , 
" Y a i d i c Hiipsa Hiipsa na b h a v a t i , " i . e . , k i l l i n g of animals 
f o r s a c r i f i c e s i n accordance with ? e d i c i n j u n c t i o n s does 
not amount to v i o l e n c e , or "Yagyarthe pasavah s f g t a h , " 
i . e . , animals have been created to be o f f e r e d a t s a c r i -
f i c e . I t should be remembered, however, t h a t even these 
statements J u s t i f y only the k i l l i n g of animals f o r s a c r i -
f i c i a l purposes, not otherwise. So i n s p i t e of these, 
the f a c t remains t h a t Ahimsa i s one of the c e n t r a l p i l l a r s 
of the Hindu's moral s u p e r s t r u c t u r e . 
When we say t h a t Ahimsa i s a c e n t r a l concept i n 
Hindu e t h i c s , we do not mean to suggest t h a t i t i s so to 
the same extent or i n the same sense as i t i s i n Buddhism 
or J a i n i s m . These l a t t e r , p a r t i c u l a r l y Jainism, make a 
f e t i s h of t h i s concept and take i t to absurd extremes. 
Hinduism does not. For Hinduism has been more pragmatic 
•••Manu, X I I , 9 1 . 
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i n i t s ti'eatment of Ahimsa, as i n so many other respects. 
I t accepts Ahimsa as the i d e a l , but i t i s prepared t o 
make compromises i n exceptional circumstances or sp e c i a l 
contexts. That i s why the k i l l i n g of animals f o r Vedic 
s a c r i f i c e s i s not considered contrary t o the precept of 
Ahimsa. S i m i l a r l y , Krishna's e x h o r t a t i o n t o Arjuna t o 
f i g h t i s j u s t i f i e d on the ground t h a t the l a t t e r was a 
member of the K s a t r i y a Varna, whose duty i t was t o pro-
t e c t Hharma and the r u l e of Law. I f t h i s i n v o l v e d v i o -
lence, as i t n a t u r a l l y would, i t was unfortunate but i t 
could not be helped. The preservation of Dharma must 
come f i r s t . Or again, i n more recent days, when Gandhi 
ordered the k i l l i n g of an a i l i n g c a l f i n h i s Ssrama, i t 
was not considered an infringement of the r u l e of non-
v i o l e n c e , f o r the motive i n t h i s k i l l i n g v/as t o r e l i e v e 
the poor c a l f of i t s t e r r i b l e s u f f e r i n g caused by i t s i n -
curable ailment. But v/hatever the nature of these excep-
t i o n s , AhimsS as a r u l e of conduct and as i d e a l has been 
accepted by a l l sections of Iiinduism. 
I t i s p o s s i b l e t o prove t h a t Hindu s o c i e t y has 
not always been able t o l i v e up to the i d e a l of Ahimsa 
j u s t as C h r i s t i a n s o c i e t y has not always l i v e d up t o the 
.ideal of love and forgiveness. Just as many Hindus un-
derstand by .Aliimsa n o t h i n g more than a mechanical r e -
f r a i n i n g from k i l l i n g , w ithout much f e e l i n g of reverence 
550. 
or sym"pathy f o r the l i v i n g beings, so also t o many C h r i s t -
ians, "love" does not mean much more than dropping some 
s i l v e r i n t o the c o l l e c t i o n box at the church or donating 
some money t o Oxfam a f t e r p e r s i s t e n t v i s i t s by i t s inde-
f a t i g a b l e workers. But these f a c t s do not prove anything 
l i k e what some people i n t e n d t o read i n them. I f they 
prove anything, i t i s t h a t a scrupulous and consistent 
p r a c t i c e of Ahinisa, w i t h the reverence f o r l i f e t h a t i t 
connotes, i s as d i f f i c u l t as a consistent and u n f a i l i n g ad-
herence t o the philosophy of love and forgiveness. Both 
are i d e a l s too d i f f i c u l t t o be c o n s i s t e n t l y and e f f e c t i v e -
l y p r a c t i s e d by or d i n a r y mortals. I t needs a Gandhi or a 
Buddha t o inco r p o r a t e i n t o l i f e a l l t h a t Ahirasa stands,for, 
and i t takes a C h r i s t or a St. .Francis t o adhere t o the 
i d e a l of " o f f e r i n g the other cheek." 
Ahimsa and love, though d i s t i n c t i v e enough of Hin-
du and C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s r e s p e c t i v e l y , are not, however, 
the f e a t u r e s t h a t set them a p a r t ; they i n f a c t b r i n g them 
cl o s e r s t i l l , f o r they are d i f f e r e n t sides of the same 
coin. What does set Hinduism apart from C h r i s t i a n i t y , and 
both from every other r e l i g i o n , i s the i n s t i t u t i o n of the 
Church i n C h r i s t i a n i t y and t h a t of Varna and Asrama or 
class and stages i n Hinduism. I t i s not enough f o r a 
C h r i s t i a n t o subscribe t o i d e a l s l a i d dovjn i n the C h r i s t -
ia n s c r i p t u r e s ; and i t i s not enough f o r a Hindu t o adhere 
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t o what i s .preached by the Hindu s c r i p t u r e s . Apart from 
e v e r y t h i n g else, the C h r i s t i a n must belong t o one of the 
numerous churches, and the Hindu must be a member of one 
of the f o u r classes or of subsections of the l a t t e r , now 
known as castes. This i s v/here the d i f f e r e n c e s between 
C h r i s t i a n s and C h r i s t i a n s and those between Hindus and 
Hindus begin t o r a i s e t h e i r heads./ The p r i n c i p l e s of 
C h r i s t i a n or H.indu e t h i c s , as o u t l i n e d by us, give only 
the rough o u t l i n e of v;hat being a C h r i s t i a n or a Hindu i n -
volves i n the realm of morals. The s p e c i f i c d e t a i l s i n 
the o u t l i n e must be f i l l e d by the Church i n the case of 
the C h r i s t i a n and by h i s place i n the class and stage 
s t r u c t u r e i n the case of the Hindu. From a wider angle,' 
a C h r i s t i a n i s a C h r i s t i a n f i r s t and a member of h i s par-
t i c u l a r Church l a t e r . S i m i l a r l y , a Hindu i s a Hindu 
f i r s t and then anything else. But from the narrower an-
gl e , the whole p i c t u r e i s reversed. A C h r i s t i a n i s a 
C h r i s t i a n by v i r t u e of h i s a f f i l i a t i o n t o a Church, and, 
n a t u r a l l y t h e r e f o r e , h i s f i r s t a l l e g i a n c e i s t o h i s own 
Church; h i s s p e c i f i c d u t i e s and o b l i g a t i o n s f o l l o w from 
h i s membership of t h i s Church. Likev/ise, the s p e c i f i c 
d u t i e s and o b l i g a t i o n s of the Hindu f o l l o w from h i s mem-
bership of a p a r t i c u l a r class i n the Hindu s o c i a l s t r u c -
t u r e and from the p a r t i c u l a r stage t h a t happens t o be h i s . 
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I t i s very d i f f i c u l t t o s u b s t a n t i a t e i n t h i s b r i e f 
a n a l y s i s what s p e c i f i c d i f f e r e n c e s i n terms of d u t i e s r e -
s u l t from one's membership of one or another of the v a r i -
ous C h r i s t i a n churches. But i t i s evident t h a t i f these 
denominational d i f f e r e n c e s are not t o be 'regarded as mere-
l y superfluous and meaningless, some d i f f e r e n c e s i n b e l i e f , 
and consequently i n p r a c t i c e , must i n e v i t a b l y f o l l o w from 
the former. On the Hindu side, i t i s comparatively easy 
t o s e t t l e , w i t h i n c e r t a i n l i m i t s , what the membership of 
one r a t h e r than the other class e n t a i l s i n terras of speci-
f i c d u t i e s . The Hindu c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of Varnas or classes 
presupposes, t o s t a r t w i t h , temperamental and v o c a t i o n a l 
d i f f e r e n c e s among i n d i v i d u a l s as i t s basis. The Brahmana 
i s the i n t e l l e c t u a l , moral and spix'-itual leader of the 
community who must p e r s o n i f y scholarship, enlightenment 
and understanding. The K s a t r i y a i s the r u l e r or adminis-
t r a t o r and s o l d i e r who must be prepared t o defend, by a l l 
means, the i n t e g r i t y and i n t e r e s t s of the s o c i e t y . The 
Vais2;a must show t h a t clever grasp of p r a c t i c a l matters 
and the i n d u s t r y t h a t v/ould ensure the community's s e l f -
dependence i n respect of trade and welfare. And f i n a l l y , 
the gudra, who by temperament i s only f i t t e d t o serve un-
q u e s t i o n i n g l y the leaders of the community, must above a l l 
demonstrate obedience and readiness t o serve. I t i s easy 
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t o see t h a t a c e r t a i n q u a l i t y which i t i s good f o r the 
member of one class t o have may be a b s o l u t e l y undesirable 
i n a member of another class. For example, the subservi-
ence and readiness t o obey t h a t i s e s s e n t i a l f o r the 
Sudra may be s u i c i d a l i f found i n a Brahmana because the 
l a t t e r i s the i n t e l l e c t u a l leader of the community whose 
f u n c t i o n i s not submission t o the general w i l l of the 
community, even i f t i i i s v ; i l l were misinformed and misdi-
r e c t e d , but t o r e s i s t and reshape i t i n the l i g h t of h i s 
b e t t e r judgment. S i m i l a r l y , as a m i l i t a r y man, i t i s not 
wrong f o r the K s a t r i y a t o r e s o r t to arras f o r a j u s t cause, 
but i t i s abominable i f found i n e i t h e r a Bra^bjgana or a 
Vai^ya. This i s v/hy i n the Hindu c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of duties 
and v i r t u e s i t i s customary t o f i n d not only the l i s t of 
u n i v e r s a l or common d u t i e s and v i r t u e s but also the speci-
f i c ones prescribed f o r members of the d i f f e r e n t classes. 
Lest our discussion of the d i f f e r e n c e s i n t r a i n -
i n g and temperament u n d e r l y i n g the Hindu i n s t i t u t i o n of 
Varna may be mistaken t o be suggestive of any such d i s -
t i n c t i o n s fundamental o.r even a c c i d e n t a l t o the C h r i s t i a n 
i n s t i t u t i o n of Church, we must hasten t o add t h a t nothing 
of the k i n d i s i m p l i e d . The reason f o r t a l k i n g of the 
Church and the Varpa-Asrama i n the same context i s s o l e l y 
t h i s : t h a t these are the i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t create d i f f e r -
eiices between one C h r i s t i a n and another and between one 
Hindu and another r e s p e c t i v e l y , and also between C h r i s t -
ians and non-Christians and Hindus and non-Hindus, i'or 
a Hindu may i n most matters of e t h i c s be l i k e a C h r i s t i a n 
and a C h r i s t i a n , l i k e w i s e , may be close t o a Hindu or a 
Buddhist i n these respects. Hut the Hindu w i l l s t i l l be 
a Hindu p r i m a r i l y because of h i s membership of t h i s i n -
s t i t u t i o n of Varna-Asrama, and the C h r i s t i a n remains a 
C h r i s t i a n because of h i s membership i n the Church. I t i s , 
t h e r e f o r e , not at a l l unreasonable t o say t h a t the proper 
" d i f f e r e n t i a " of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s , as of the C h r i s t i a n 
f a i t h i t s e l f , i s i t s unique i n s t i t u t i o n of the Church; 
and t h a t of Hindu e t h i c s , and of Etinduism i n general, i t s 
i n s t i t u t i o n of Yarn a-Asrama. 
VJhile t a l k i n g of these two i n s t i t u t i o n s , i t may 
be i n t e r e s t i n g t o note another i n c i d e n t a l s i m i l a r i t y be-
tween the Hindu and the C h r i s t i a n approach i n t h i s context. 
I'his i s t h a t both these i n s t i t u t i o n s claim d i v i n e o r i g i n 
and s a n c t i t y and command u n c o n d i t i o n a l a l l e g i a n c e on t h a t 
accoujit. Just as the C h r i s t i a n Church i s "the body of 
C h r i s t , " so the Hindu i n s t i t u t i o n of Varna i s , i n a way, 
l i t e r a l l y the "body of God." The famous Hurusa Suk;ba of 
the Rga Veda s t a t e s t h a t the Divine Han, Hu_rusa, the soul 
and o r i g i n a l source of the universe, created the universe 
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by "immolating" h i s ovm embodied s p i r i t . I t then goes on 
to-say t h a t "the Brahmana was h i s rnouth, of both h i s arms 
was the Ra,1anya ( K s a t r i ^ a ) made, his t h i g h s became the 
/ \ ' 1 
Vais2;a, (and) from h i s f e e t the Sudra was produced." 
Thus the f o u r main Varnas represent the various limbs of 
the d i v i n e l u r u s a . Hence t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n symbolises the 
body of God. The l e a s t t h a t f o l l o w s from t h i s figui'-e i s 
t h a t n e i t h e r the C h r i s t i a n Church nor the Hindu system of 
Yarnas can be regarded merely as a r t i f i c i a l organisations 
t o promote c e r t a i n ends, as i s q u i t e o f t e n argued. They, 
have an a u t h o r i t y and s a n c t i t y of t h e i r own which cannot 
be s e r i o u s l y tampered w i t h v/ithout doing violence t o the 
s t r u c t u r e of the f a i t h s themselves. 
There are thtis important s i m i l a r i t i e s between the 
C h r i s t i a n and Hindu i n s t i t u t i o n s of Church and Varna-
AsraHia r e s p e c t i v e l y which should not be ignored. These 
are the i n s t i t u t i o n s which have been responsible f o r the 
p r e s e r v a t i o n and c o n t i n u a t i o n of the respective world-r. 
viev7s; these, again, have provided the background f o r the 
s o c i a l and community l i f e of the two s o c i e t i e s , and have 
thus been the instruments of harmonising i n d i v i d u a l and 
s o c i a l i n t e r e s t s ; and they have given t o the r e s p e c t i v e 
•^ Rga Veda-, X, 90 ,12. 
P 
_ I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o determine e x a c t l y when the theory of 
Asrama was f i r s t r e l a t e d t o t h a t of Varna, but they are 
now u s u a l l y conjoined. 
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e t h i c a l and r e l i g i o u s systems t h e i r unique appearance. 
And since these are what have been at l e a s t p a r t l y respon-
s i b l e , f o r c r e a t i n g d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n the systems them-
selves, there may, w i t h i n a c e r t a i n l i m i t , be eminent 
sense i n suggesting t h a t the concern of some C h r i s t i a n s 
t o r e s t o r e the u n i t y of the churches i s not b a s i c a l l y 
d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of those Hindus vjho have unceasingly 
t r i e d t o a b o l i s h the innumerable cast'e d i s t i n c t i o n s t o 
which the o r i g i n a l i n s t i t u t i o n of Varna has nov/ degene-
ra t e d . But we have q u a l i f i e d our statement of t h i s s i m i -
l a r i t y by the clause " w i t h i n a c e r t a i n l i m i t . " And i t i s 
important not t o misread too much i n t h i s s i m i l a r i t y . 
For the Church, though encouraging d i f f e r e n c e s , 
does not pe r p e t r a t e what i n Hinduism has now become hered-
i t a r y caste d i s t i n c t i o n s . Whatever the advantages of the 
o r i g i n a l theory of " n a t u r a l classes" on the basis of 
e s s e n t i a l teDiperamental and v o c a t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s , i t 
has t o be r e a l i s e d by every Hindu t h a t the modern form of 
t h i s i l a t o n i c Utopia i s monstrously perverted. The 
C h r i s t i a n church has not created d i f f e r e n t orders of c i t i -
zenship w i t h i n the same s o c i e t y ; the Hindu Varna-Asrama 
has. By making a creed of the n a t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s among 
human beings,and by continuously p l a y i n g on these d i f f e r -
ences, the custodians of Hindu e t h i c s and r e l i g i o n have 
337 . 
u n w i t t i n g l y undermined the i d e a l of the basic e q u a l i t y of 
human beings. And t h i s r e s u l t i s not at a l l s u r p r i s i n g . 
The e q u a l i t y of a l l men, as men, i s not a compelling f a c t 
of the same order as the d i f f e r e n c e s among i n d i v i d u a l men. 
The former tends t o be an i d e a l i n need of c a r e f u l and 
constant support from enlightened i n s t i t u t i o n s . The d i f -
ferences, on the cont r a r y , ax'-e so g l a r i n g and i r i - e s i s t -
i b l e t h a t they do not have t o be nurtured; they w i l l as-
s e r t themselves n a t u r a l l y . And Hindu e t h i c s and r e l i g i o n 
has t o r e s t o r e the proper perspective by t u r n i n g i t s a t -
t e n t i o n away from d i f f e r e n c e s and by s t r e s s i n g the i d e a l 
of e q u a l i t y . 
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